

THE TERRORIST'S DILEMMA

MANAGING VIOLENT COVERT ORGANIZATIONS

JACOB N. SHAPIRO

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Jacob N. Shapiro

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For Catherine, Felix, and Gus

and

In Memory of CDR Robert A. Schlegel, USN, 6/6/63–9/11/01

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away my habit of bringing excessive amounts of reading on our vacations (little of which actually got read), and kept me motivated with the happy thought of finishing a day's work to come home to her, Felix, Gus, and Gracie.

THE TERRORIST'S DILEMMA

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Discussions of terrorism often conjure acts conducted by shadowy, secret organizations employing highly motivated operatives willing to kill, and die, for their cause. The news media generally offer sensational and compelling profiles of individual terrorists, providing details about who they are and speculating as to what motivates them. Stories about terrorist organizations tend to detail angry rhetoric and the tragic consequences of their actions. Scholarly books ponder why terrorists use certain tactics or raise warnings about the threats from new methods of terrorism, such as suicide bombings or so-called lone-wolf attacks. In fact, more than twenty-five books on suicide bombings alone have been published since 2000, pointing to the fascination with terrorism but also highlighting a peculiar myopia that surrounds this field. Focusing so heavily on one tactic leaves us without a broader understanding of how and why particular groups are so lethal, just as the raft of books on individual terrorists' motivations tell us little about why terrorist organizations behave as they do.[1]

What is missing from most of the public discussion is a clear understanding of the organizational side of terrorism. This is a critical gap. No individual or small group acting alone, nor even a group of individuals acting under a common rhetorical banner but without any coordination, can achieve the scale of violence that makes terrorism a real threat to modern society. Individuals can conduct assassinations to be sure, and will occasionally kill tens or even hundreds, as Timothy McVeigh did in the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. But, it is organizations that have conducted the bombing campaigns that

[1]The focus on suicide terrorism in the literature is a bit like trying to understand the relative political success of Republicans in the United States from 1994 through 2010 by focusing on the politics of marginal tax rates. It is part of the puzzle, to be sure, but not really the key piece. A slightly different problem with this literature is that none of these books consider in depth why so many groups fail to use this apparently effective tactic, meaning they actually tell us very little about why it is used or how to combat it. For more on why, see Scott Ashworth et al., "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 2 (2008): 269–273.

tore through Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan in the last fifteen years, and it was a competently managed hierarchical organization, al-Qa'ida, that attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Although dozens of outstanding books have been written on specific terrorist groups, few have probed how these groups are organized.[2]

One reason terrorist groups are understudied as organizations may be that analyzing how they are managed, and why, requires more than studying the sensational aspects of group actions, such as how suicide bombers are recruited or how specific attacks were planned. It also requires focusing in on the mundane side of terrorism; the bookkeeping requirements, disciplinary procedures, and recruiting dilemmas. As we will see, the core managerial challenges of terrorist organizations are actually quite similar to those faced by other, more traditional human organizations. This is to be expected; terrorists themselves are not that different from individuals working in traditional institutions. The willingness to kill civilians as a legitimate means to a political end is certainly radical, but, terrorists are every bit as, if not more, venal, self-important, and short-sighted as the rest of us. This is exactly why their organizations employ many of the same managerial tools that we find in business firms and government bureaucracies.

Understanding why the managerial problems of terrorists resemble those of other conventional groups helps make sense of how terrorist groups are organized, and is crucial for efficiently dealing with them. Policy makers who are aware of the dilemmas terrorists face are better equipped to choose counterterror policies that target group-specific vulnerabilities, while taking into account how organizations are likely to adapt to these policies. For reasons we will discuss at length, some groups may continue to use e-mail, phone calls, and other highly detectable methods, despite threats of these being intercepted, simply because achieving their political goals requires regular communication. Other groups readily adapt to counterterrorism efforts by allowing operatives to exercise greater discretion in choosing targets rather than micromanaging their activities and thereby opening up the group to security risks. Group vulnerabilities depend, in predictable ways, on their political goals and the nature of their operatives. Counterterror policies that take this fact into account can be more targeted, more efficient, and therefore more effective.

Terrorist groups are, for the most part, small organizations operating somewhat secretly without the power to take and hold territory. The need

[2]The most important exception is Eli Berman's fantastic examination of the organizational advantages that allow some religiously motivated terrorist groups to be unusually effective. Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).

for secrecy—which arises because such groups typically cannot exclude government forces from the areas where they operate, nor effectively fight back against security force efforts to capture or imprison their members—imposes a host of organizational challenges and constraints. The groups that eventually win political power, or even major concessions, do so not on the strength of their violence, but on the back of large-scale political mobilization and participation in normal politics.[3]

The more we can see terrorist groups for what they are—ordinary organizations operating at a tremendous disadvantage—the easier it is to consign them to their proper place in the range of threats to society.[4] Seeking to understand the terrorists' dilemmas, in other words, does not imply sympathy for their goals or an acceptance of their means. Rather, understanding the very banality of terrorist organizations can serve as an important corrective to the natural tendency to view these political organizations as something unique and exceptionally threatening. Ultimately, they are neither. They are mundane and, while dangerous, rank quite low in the set of deadly threats against which society must prepare. What's more, they suffer from deep and intractable organizational dilemmas, ones that if understood can be exploited to make counterterrorism efforts more effective.

1.1 THE CHALLENGE OF ORGANIZING TERROR

The starting point for our analysis is the recognition that terrorist organizations face a difficult task in a hostile operational setting. The difficult task is achieving the controlled use of violence as a means of achieving a specified political end. Using too much violence, or hitting the wrong targets, can be just as damaging to a cause as employing too little. The Real IRA (RIRA) bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, in August 1998 is a perfect example of counterproductive violence. The attack, which killed twenty-nine people, was a massive strategic blunder by a faction dissatisfied with the Northern Ireland peace process. It aroused intense public outrage at the RIRA, discredited Republican opposition to the

[3]We will discuss this in the cases of Fatah, the Provisional IRA, and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

[4]For a slightly different take on why loosely networked terrorist groups are less threatening than they appear because of management problems that the networked model creates, see Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (2008): 7–44.

Good Friday Agreement, and has been credited with spurring on the peace process. Following the attack, support for the RIRA withered, and from 2003 through 2008, the group conducted only three attacks.[5]

The operational setting for terrorists is unusually hostile in that these organizations, unlike rebel groups that fight primarily by holding territory, rely on stealth and secrecy to complete their missions. They must, in other words, maintain that calibrated use of force in an environment where becoming known to government leads to operational failure and can cause further security compromises as government forces arrest the known associates of captured individuals.

The organizational challenge in precisely calibrating violence stems from the fact that political and ideological leaders, or the principals, must delegate certain duties—such as planning attacks, soliciting funds, and recruiting—to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. Such delegation is problematic as agents in terrorist organizations often see the world differently than their leaders and tend to disagree with them on both how best to serve the cause and how to carry out specific missions. Strategies to control the resulting agency problems all entail security costs. Ultimately, groups cannot remain highly secure and simultaneously well-controlled. This is what makes terrorist groups unique; the tools that would bring more control, management, and insight are the very tools that put these groups at risk. Of course, all organizations pay a cost for managing their people, but the tradeoffs are unusually stark for terrorist groups. The weekly report is no longer merely a nuisance that takes away time from more productive activities; it also becomes a potential ticket to arrest, detention, death, or an entire operation being foiled.

1.2 THE TERRORIST'S DILEMMA: CONTROLLING VIOLENCE AND FINANCES WHILE REMAINING COVERT

The terrorist's dilemma is simple: leaders need to control how violence is executed and how finances are managed, but the tools to do so create some measure of operational vulnerabilities and therefore increase the likelihood of operatives being caught and a group compromised. The intensity of this dilemma is captured by the fact that certain themes surface repeatedly in terrorists' own organizational writings. There is a consistent focus on how to achieve the appropriate use of violence when

[5]Global Terrorism Database, accessed January 12, 2011.

the rank and file often clamor for more violence than is useful from the leader's perspective or seek to make a profit for themselves in the course of their duties. Groups routinely struggle with the problem of staying covert while also maintaining situational awareness about political developments so that members understand which actions will advance the broader cause and which will exceed the public's tolerance for violence and therefore be politically counterproductive. Finally, there is consistent concern with balancing the need to control operational elements with the need to evade government attention and limit the consequences of any compromise.

White supremacist intellectual Louis Beam, for example, advocates minimizing the risk of compromises by making no efforts whatsoever to coordinate actions. His "leaderless resistance" concept entails a few ideologues providing guidance on the need for a struggle to defend the white race in America and on what types of actions should be taken, while making no efforts to conduct operations themselves. The actual operations are left to the initiative of individual "patriots." While this approach proved useful in keeping Beam out of prison—he has been able to lead a de facto terrorist movement for many years without being successfully prosecuted—it has been a near total failure as a method of fomenting widespread armed resistance against the U.S. government.[6]

The difficulties of controlling violence feature prominently in the organizational writings of early Russian Marxists. Groups such as the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) had regular problems with local cells conducting revenge attacks that could not be justified by Marxist theory.[7] More recently, a 1977 "Staff Report" for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) General Headquarters (GHQ) detailed reorganization plans intended to minimize security vulnerabilities while maintaining sufficient operational control.[8] One PIRA member reflecting on the use of car

[6]This failure is, perhaps, the reason this organizational approach has not been used much. Of the 52 groups conducting attacks on U.S. soil from 1970 to 2008, only four followed the "leaderless resistance" model. Analysis based on PPT-US data, version 3. See Erin Miller and Kathleen Smarick, 2012, "Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US)," http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17702 UNF:5:rMan9QGKaQXo4bRl8luCzQ==National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [Distributor] V3 [Version].

[7]Anna Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 2 (1992): 23–46.

[8]Sean Twomey, "Staff Report," Irish Republican Army, September 1977. For a discussion that puts the report in the larger context of the PIRA's organizational evolution, see John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 21.

bombs argued against their use because "it was too difficult to control and therefore you ended up with civilian casualties which no one wanted, which was (a) a tragedy for the people who were killed and (b) it was a political disaster for the aims of the struggle."[9]

Islamist groups are not immune to these concerns either, and maintaining situational awareness seems particularly problematic for them. Rich evidence of this fact is found in internal documents captured from al-Qa'ida and other groups that were originally contained in the U.S. Department of Defense's Harmony Database. The database contains more than one million documents picked up during operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Roughly a quarter of the documents have been translated and a large number have been released. We will use the documents throughout the book to provide a rich view inside modern Islamist terrorist groups. Documents from the Harmony database are referenced by their document number.[10] The problem of becoming detached from the masses because of the exigencies of maintaining security features prominently in Abu Musab al-Suri's "lessons-learned" document describing the failed jihad waged against the Assad regime in Syria from 1976 to 1982.[11] Abu Musab discusses emulating the Italian Red Brigades to better compartmentalize information while maintaining operational effectiveness. As well, captured letters between al-Qa'ida members discuss how planning and conducting too many attacks can become counterproductive, leading to unwanted government attention. For example, in a June 2002 letter, Saif al-Adel, a member of al-Qa'ida, criticized Osama bin Laden's leadership. He argued that the group needed to take an operational pause to regroup following setbacks in East Asia, Europe, America, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, the Gulf, and Morocco. Continuing to engage in "foreign actions" is described as bringing excessive pressure to bear on the organization.[12] Such views are not unique, and similar concerns have been voiced in the Arabic press by those concerned with the broader Islamist agenda.[13] For many terrorist groups, conducting too many attacks can be as damaging as conducting too few.

[9]Quoted in Rogelio Alonso, *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (New York: Routledge, 2007) 157.
[10]See appendix B for more details.
[11]Harmony, AFGP-2002-600080.
[12]Harmony, Al-Adl Letter.
[13]See, for example, Abul-Walid, "The Story of the Afghan Arabs from the Time of the Arrival in Afghanistan until their Departure with the Taliban," part 1,*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, December 8, 2004. For the best summary of schisms within al-Qa'ida, see Vahid Brown, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989–2006* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007).

A particularly telling example of a terrorist group having problems controlling violence comes from al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) in 2007. On May 28 of that year the local branch of the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), an indigenous Sunni militant organization, posted a notice at a mosque in Baghdad's Amiriyah district criticizing AQI for killing Sunnis without sufficient evidence that they had done anything wrong.[14] The next day, a group of AQI fighters trying to erase anti-AQI graffiti were attacked, leading to several days of fighting between AQI and IAI.[15] Early in the violence, on May 31, 2007, the local AQI leader Abu al-Hasan Safir wrote to his leadership trying to justify the violence by claiming that only he and his fighters "... are aware of the true nature of the Islamic Army and its leadership ..."[16] A few days later though, when it became clear that the fighting was a public relations disaster for AQI (and perhaps a military one as they seemed to get the worst of the fighting with the IAI), AQI's overall leader issued a pamphlet ordering his fighters to stay home and avoid further conflict while he rectified the situation with the IAI leadership.[17] Two facts about this incident are informative. First, the communication from AQI's leadership to the local cell was made via a public pamphlet, suggesting direct communications within the group were not especially reliable at that time.[18] Second, it was not until June 2, four days into the fighting, that the Abu al-Hasan wrote to his superiors to ask what "the big picture [general policy] of dealing with the Islamic Army" should be, suggesting the AQI leadership had failed to effectively communicate how specific actions would contribute to the cause.[19]

This conflict between AQI and the IAI was not an isolated incident. AQI repeatedly had problems with local units taking actions that led to conflicts with other insurgent organizations and alienated non-combatants, or at least captured documents suggesting that they did. In January 2007, for example, AQI leader Abu Hamza received a series of letters from Abu Abdullah al Shafi'i, the leader of Ansar al-Sunnah (an indigenous Sunni insurgent group), about a range of conflicts between

[14] John Ward Anderson, "Sunni Insurgents Battle in Baghdad," *Washington Post*, June 1, 2007.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Harmony, NMEC-2007-637011. The internal correspondence about the "Battle of Amariyah" was first documented in Brian Fishman, *"Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al Qa'-ida in Iraq*, Report (Combating Terrorism Center, 2009), 10–20. This account draws heavily on Fishman's, who also discusses a long series of similar failures of operational control for AQI in 2007–8.
[17] Harmony, NMEC-2007-639155.
[18] Airing internal grievances in public, the way this note did, was rarely done and suggests the group had no alternative.
[19] Harmony, NMEC-2007-637011.

their organizations' fighters.[20] Abu Hamza responded to these critiques by suggesting that the fault lies with his operatives, hinting that they were not acting under orders, and stating that he is "willing to hand over any person [who has] committed a crime of blood or took your money."[21] While Abu Hamza may have been disavowing his operatives' activities for political reasons in this particular instance, and not because they were actually acting contrary to his direction, there is plenty of evidence that AQI frequently had problems managing its fighters. AQI internal memos also criticize operational cells for taking actions that alienated local populations.[22] And, in a 2008 interview with *Al-Arab*, the leader of the ISI in Samaraa discussed his concerns with excess violence "driven by young men who were not controlled... [because of] the difficulty in communications between the cells and factions."[23]

The terrorist's organizational dilemma, maintaining control while staying covert, creates two fundamental tradeoffs that will frame much of this discussion. The first is between operational security and financial efficiency. Here problems of trust and control—agency problems—lead to wasteful, inefficient resource allocation from a leader's perspective. Auditing and other strategies to mitigate these problems all entail their own security costs. The second tradeoff is between operational security and tactical control. Here agency problems and other group dynamics lead to counterproductive violence. Strategies to mitigate these problems through greater control entail security costs for groups as a whole.[24]

We can understand how terrorists will deal with these tradeoffs, and therefore how groups are organized and how much control leaders will exercise, by taking a page from James Q. Wilson's *Bureaucracy*.[25] Wilson sought to explain the behavior and structure of government agencies by looking closely at the things each agency needed to produce—such as

[20]Harmony, NMEC-2007-636885, NMEC-2007-636880, NMEC-2007-636888, NMEC-2007-636892.

[21]Harmony, NMEC-2007-636898.

[22]See, e.g., Harmony, IZ-060316-02.

[23]The process by which using bureaucratic tools to manage operatives' activities can mitigate certain security risks for terrorist groups while making others worse is discussed in Blake Mobley, *Terrorism and Counterintelligence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

[24]In "Al-Qa'ida: Back to the Future," in Part I of *Harmony and Disharmony,* Jarret Brachman and Jeff Bramlett further dissect jihadi theoretician Abu Musab al-Suri's "lessons learned" from the Syrian jihad. The experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood and the *al-Tali'a al-Muqatila* (The Fighting Vanguard) in Syria from 1976 to 1982 provide a clear case of an organization that could not both exercise control over its operatives and achieve an acceptable level of security.

[25]James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

regular payments to beneficiaries according to a well-specified payment schedule in the case of the Social Security Administration—and the political environment in which they did so—one with no readily agreed upon performance metric in the case of prisons. Wilson's core insight is that the nature of an agency's production and the environment in which it operates creates pressures that jointly determine how it will organize.

To apply this same approach to understanding terrorist groups, we need to carefully analyze the tasks that these organizations must achieve, assess the unusual personnel issues they face (e.g., recruiting operatives who are willing to do horrible things to other humans yet have the self-control and obedience required for carefully calibrated violence), and examine the environments in which they operate. Doing so with theoretical insights developed from the study of firms, political parties, and social movements is extremely illuminating, both for theory and practice.[26] Once we understand these elements—and can demystify these terrorist groups—we will have a sounder footing for counterterrorism efforts and a better ability to determine what level of effort is required to make major terrorist attacks unlikely.

Between September 2001 and the present, American counterterror policy has involved a massive, worldwide effort to capture internationally minded Islamist militants when possible, and kill them with drone strikes when not. That may have been the right strategy for groups such as al-Qa'ida when they were powerful, but the world faces a range of other terrorist threats (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Lord's Resistance Army), some of which may be more effectively dealt with in other ways or successfully restrained with a smaller military commitment. Without a realistic view of the organizational challenges and constraints terrorists face, it is difficult to have properly informed debates on these matters and thus hard to choose the best strategies.

Applying careful organizational analysis to terrorist groups shows that the coinciding problems of balancing security against efficiency and operational control should be inescapable for the vast majority of terrorist groups. Using captured al-Qa'ida documents, a wide variety of historical evidence, and terrorists' own public writings, we will see that these tradeoffs have plagued terrorist groups since the 1870s. Along the way there have been a host of often amusing examples of strife and discord within these organizations. At the end of the day, these examples will highlight that terrorists are, for the most part, not nearly as capable or committed as the most successful of their kind might make one think.

[26]The best example of how theoretically informed analysis can enhance our understanding of seemingly unusual organizations is Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

As a result, their organizations are nothing close to the threat that many in the policy community once claimed them to be.

1.3 WHY UNDERSTANDING HIERARCHY AND CONTROL MATTERS

From a scholarly perspective, understanding how terrorist groups are organized is obviously valuable in its own right, but it can also provide insight into policy debates by providing a stronger foundation for thinking through what we should expect groups to be able to do under different scenarios. All other things being equal, groups with a political doctrine that provides little guidance to operatives regarding which targets should be attacked will place a higher value on hierarchical structures that help manage attacks than groups with more specific political doctrines. This means they will be less likely to respond to government crackdowns by shifting into less centralized organizational forms. Similarly, groups that have an effective safe haven for their operatives may be much less sensitive to increased policing efforts because they can place key security-reducing activities in locations outside the reach of security services.[27] Understanding such reactions can help with a range of policy issues.

One issue governments struggle with is how to allocate scarce counterterrorism resources between proactive measures designed to raise the risks to terrorist actions and defensive measures designed to protect high-value targets. Here, an approach that highlights organizational variation suggests that a group whose political goals imply a greater need to control operatives—one that is seeking a specific change in government policy, for example—will place a much higher value on communicating with operatives. Because such a group cannot adapt by reducing its level of communication without sacrificing political effectiveness, investments in intercepting communications can pay great dividends over a long period of time. For groups whose political goals do not require that they apply violence carefully— for example, spoilers that are simply trying to stymie a peace process—such a strategy will not have enduring effects, because the group can sacrifice control over operatives for security without significantly compromising its political goals. Investing in protecting

[27]For related arguments about the value to insurgents of having a place where they can safely coordinate operations and transmit information, see Abdulkader H. Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

prominent targets is likely to be the most efficient policy against such groups.

For a more concrete example of how organizationally informed analysis can provide policy guidance, consider an analyst charged with assessing whether a new counterterror policy is working. The number of attacks or nature of violence being conducted by a group is an ambiguous indicator on this score. Because success for terrorists is measured in terms of political impact, not in terms of numbers killed or attacks conducted, the vast majority of terrorist organizations try to achieve a politically optimal level of violence that is less than what they could manage if they sought only to kill. As such, an observed increase in the rate of attacks can mean the group has become more efficient, or it can mean leaders have been placed under so much pressure that they gave up control and operatives responded by ramping up the rate of attacks, reasons for which we discuss later in this chapter.

Given this ambiguity, a better process for evaluating policies is to look at organizational changes. Analysts should first ask whether the conditions exist for terrorists to prefer substantial hierarchy in their organization. Those conditions are present when groups are large enough that leaders need to delegate, when operatives will not conduct those activities exactly as leaders would like absent some supervision, and when unsupervised operatives are likely to take politically or financially damaging actions. If those conditions are in place, and a group decentralizes in response to government policy changes, that can be understood as a sign that the policy is working. Leaders giving up valued control in exchange for survival can signal counterterror success. If there are no changes in the group's organization, or if more central control is being exerted in a group that should prefer hierarchy, there is evidence that the policy is not working.

Alternatively, consider a policy maker charged with calibrating how much pressure to apply against a group. The most common method of analyzing terrorist organizations in policy documents is to treat them as unitary rational actors. From this perspective, cracking down on terrorist organizations is always the best policy. Doing so, the argument holds, will either push them toward negotiations or, if they are so extreme that negotiations are not an option, will more rapidly end their campaign. As we will see though, terrorist leaders often struggle to control their operatives. In particular, leaders in terrorist organizations, or potentially violent organizations, are often the ones preventing operatives from engaging in higher levels of violence. Government actions that force leaders to trade control for survival can paradoxically lead to higher levels of violence. They can also make it impossible for leaders to uphold deals made with governments as the changes required to survive in the face of

intense government pressure make it impossible for them to enforce the terms among their operatives.[28]

The history of the French left-wing group the *Gauche Prolétarienne* is instructive.[29] In the early 1970s, the organization's leaders were able to enforce a principled decision to reject terrorism at a time when similar left-wing organizations across Europe were moving underground and embracing violence.[30] Instead, the group's leaders shifted into peaceful activism and advocating for left-wing causes in French intellectual circles. Had the French government cracked down on the group more aggressively, the leadership might have given up some control and they would have been unable to rein in their rank and file. The leaders of this group retained such control and were eventually able to disband in 1974.

In many ways, this is the most important reason to understand control and hierarchy; doing so highlights the fact that counterterrorism policies in the present constrain future options for settling a conflict. Certain policies may push terrorist leaders to give up control over their operatives. For example, Israel's policy of targeted assassinations against senior Hamas leaders in spring 2004 helped create a situation in which the group's more moderate leaders in Gaza and the West Bank were unable to enforce ceasefire agreements. This made it impossible to break the cycle of violence that started with the Second Intifada. If Israeli leaders were sincere in their public statements about wanting a truce and negotiated settlement, this policy was counterproductive. More generally, a strategy that puts so much pressure on an organization that leaders lose their ability to control operatives leaves the government with no way to end the conflict except to kill or imprison everyone in the group. If a government decides that it cannot win militarily and needs a negotiating partner, it may actually want to enact policies that allow terrorist leaders to increase control over their operatives. While applying significant pressure is valuable in dealing with many groups, there are tradeoffs to doing so that policy makers should be aware of.

To make these arguments more concrete, it is useful to look at two specific situations: Israeli policy toward Hamas in the 1990s and British policy toward the PIRA in the 1990s. In both cases a government was trying to compel a terrorist group to participate in a negotiated

[28]Issues of how terrorists' internal cohesion relate to negotiating strategies feature prominently in Peter R. Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2007): 128–147.

[29]I thank Martha Crenshaw for pointing out this example.

[30]Martha Crenshaw, "Why Violence Is Rejected or Renounced: A Case Study of Oppositional Terrorism," in *A Natural History of Peace*, ed. Thomas Gregor (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996) 256–257.

settlement. If one treated the groups as unitary rational actors, then in both cases it was obvious that putting maximum pressure on the groups was the optimal thing to do. Yet in both cases, that strategy would have been counterproductive. In the case of Hamas, the Israeli government did put the group under great pressure, especially after it started conducting suicide bombings in 1994. The net result of going after the group, however, was to empower the more militant faction, which was relatively immune from Israeli pressure because its managers were operating from Jordan, and later from Syria. As we will see in chapter 8, by cracking down on Hamas in the Occupied Territories, the Israelis paradoxically made it harder for the leaders who were inclined to negotiate to control their operatives. In that case most of the group behaved in ways consistent with negotiations (i.e., refrained from attacks), but a few militants carried out enough high-profile attacks to contribute to the failure of the Oslo process. In the PIRA case, as we will see in chapter 7, key leaders such as Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams were struggling throughout the 1990s to rein in their organization. To do so they had to be able to restrain operatives who consistently demanded more action against the British. Arresting them and their closest deputies, as the British surely could have done, certainly would have made it harder for the PIRA to operate, but it also would have removed the only people who could deliver on promises of restraint that the group was making at the negotiating table. In both of these cases an agency theory perspective highlights costs to security crackdowns that are not apparent if we treat terrorist groups as unitary actors.

1.4 WHAT ABOUT 9/11?

The devastating and shocking attacks of September 11, 2001 ignited an unprecedented fear of terrorism and led to major changes in U.S. foreign policy, including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the attacks may seem an obvious example of how terrorist groups are especially deadly and highly capable, I would argue they in fact provide evidence to the contrary. The attacks were only possible because al-Qa'ida had the space to operate, organize, and create a hierarchical system under which thousands of terrorists were trained and monitored. Since 1996 the group had been operating under relatively safe circumstances in Afghanistan, where the government was, for unrelated reasons, not particularly open to cooperating with other governments or agencies. Within this fairly closed system, hostile to foreign intelligence efforts, al-Qa'ida was able to remain protected from outside scrutiny.

The group was openly raising money from wealthy donors and moving funds around through antiquated trust networks without any particular security precautions. Several days before the 9/11 attacks, $26,000 was returned by the hijackers to an intermediary, a move that reflected an obvious lack of concern about the funds being tracked.[31]

With the sense of security they clearly had, al-Qa'ida leaders built a large, relatively formal organization that created a huge intelligence signature. For al-Qa'ida, that organizational structure also made it possible to run the training camps at which leaders sorted through hundreds of trainees, looking for the very best operatives. Having this many people to choose from, train, reject, and ultimately groom allowed the best of the best to stand out and led Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (the 9/11 attack's mastermind) to Mohammad Atta and his eventual accomplices. These were people who had the motivation, English skills, and social background to successfully make it through flight training in the United States and carry out the attack. But, they were rare and would not have come to the group's attention without the institutional infrastructure al-Qa'ida built in Afghanistan.[32]

Once those individuals were recruited and identified, the remainder of the 9/11 plot still required substantial planning and support infrastructure, at least relative to most terrorist attacks, all of which created additional leads for intelligence agencies. In early 2000, for example, intelligence officials had taken surveillance photos of one of the trained hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar, as he met with various al-Qa'ida operatives in Kuala Lumpur and other areas of Malaysia.[33] He was photographed meeting with multiple people in what is referred to as "the Malaysia meetings" by the intelligence community and the FBI.[34] Through this surveillance it was determined that while traveling on a Saudi passport, Mihdhar had a multiple entry visa to the United States, and his passport was even photocopied and sent to the CIA. Another of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi, was also photographed while in Malaysia and during meetings with other operatives.[35] Intelligence officials had lengthy files and detailed information on Hazmi and Mihdhar by the time they reached

[31]John Roth, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff report to the Commission* (Washington, DC: National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 3.
[32]The comparison between the 9/11 hijackers and subsequent largely incompetent al-Qa'ida operatives such as Richard Reid could hardly be more stark.
[33]Office of the Inspector General, *A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks* (November 2004), Report (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006) 243.
[34]Ibid., 244.
[35]Ibid., 236.

Malaysia, and extensive reports and reviews have been done to determine how these two were tracked and photographed but not intercepted, especially once in the United States. Dozens of cables and communications were sent to the FBI and CIA and between agents who were responsible for monitoring activities of suspected and known al-Qa'ida operatives. These individuals were not operating in secret, though they may have been trying to do so, and many of their moves were well documented and photographed at the time.

Ultimately, it was multiple errors by the counterterrorism community that enabled the events of 9/11 to take place, not the fact that al-Qa'ida was able to operate a complex mission without a great deal of hierarchy and the accompanying security vulnerabilities. The system al-Qa'ida created was never successfully kept secret and could never have been so, given its size. Even with the lower level of attention given to terrorism before 9/11, the locations and purposes of al-Qa'ida training camps were known and the group's operatives tracked, at least until they entered the United States in the case of two of the 9/11 pilots.[36] In this sense, then, the 9/11 attacks are best understood as the exception that proves the rule. When terrorist groups have a great deal of operational space and can build large, relatively formalized organizations, they can indeed be quite deadly. Terrorist groups, of course, can no longer operate in that manner without attracting a great deal of lethal attention from various governments, and it is hard to imagine such permissiveness will be allowed any time in the near future. This should be reassuring, the types of organizational activities that were necessary for the 9/11 attack create obvious security vulnerabilities and limit the chances groups can conduct truly massive attacks.

1.5 ARE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS REALLY SO FAMILIAR?

The argument that terrorist organizations are surprisingly mundane and normal, at least from an organizational perspective, is distinct from much of what has been written on the subject. A common refrain in discussions about terrorist groups since 9/11 has been that many of today's most deadly terrorist groups are organized as loose networks and so belong to an analytically distinct category from older groups such as the Palestine

[36]For a detailed discussion see ibid., 287–308.

Liberation Organization or M-19.[37] Perhaps that is true, but it does not mean that is a more dangerous organizational form. Quite the opposite. To the extent that terrorism is much less centrally organized today than in the past reflects organizational changes driven by the aggressive counterterrorism efforts that followed 9/11. Historically, terrorists choose hierarchy and formal organization whenever the security situation allows them to do so.

Al-Qa'ida is an especially salient example of this. From the mid-1990s through late 2001, al-Qa'ida made every effort to become a fully bureaucratized organization, complete with employment contracts specifying vacation policies,[38] explicitly documented roles and responsibilities for different jobs including detailed descriptions of the experiences required for senior leadership roles,[39] security memos written by a specialized security committee,[40] and standardized questionnaires for those arriving at training camps.[41] Al-Qa'ida did not move to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban government from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key al-Qa'ida leaders, including Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa'ida's "dean of students," Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the attack on the USS *Cole* (DDG-67). In response to these and other key losses, al-Qa'ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group's consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize.[42] Essentially, al-Qa'ida traded operational control and financial efficiencies for security and organizational survival.[43] That al-Qa'ida has decentralized does not mean this is a preferred or more dangerous organizational form, it simply means that al-Qa'ida opted for security when faced with the hard tradeoffs discussed in this chapter.

[37]See, for example, the summary provided in Peter Grier, "The New Al Qa'ida: Local Franchiser," *Christian Science Monitor* (July 11, 2005). Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html.
[38]Harmony, AFGP-2002-600045.
[39]Harmony, AFGP-2002-000078 and AFGP-2002-000080.
[40]Harmony, AFGP-2002-000038.
[41]Harmony AFGP-2002-600849.
[42]Joseph H. Felter et al., *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), 7–9. Robert Windrem, "The Frightening Evolution of al-Qa'ida," *MSNBC.com,* (June 24, 2005). Online at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8307333.
[43]Even this characterization of al-Qa'ida is problematic. In late 2004, elements of the group were still engaging in centralized personnel movements, despite their supposedly decentralized state. Harmony, AFGP-2005-0003304.

There are many more examples that suggest terrorist groups choose greater levels of hierarchy when the operational environment allows. Palestinian militant organizations developed quasi-government structures under the umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Organization during their period in Lebanon from September 1970 until their eviction by Israel in mid-1982.[44] The PIRA opted for more hierarchy whenever it could, only shifting away from a hierarchical, albeit compartmentalized, military model in the face of a major government crack-down in the early 1990s. This was accompanied by increasing restrictions on the group's use of the Republic of Ireland as an operational safe haven.[45] Hezbollah likewise introduced hierarchical structures as it grew from a loose collaboration of militant units into a coherent organization from 1984 on.[46] These groups sought hierarchy for the same reasons other organizations do: it makes them more effective by supporting resource sharing, specialization, economies of scale, and reduced contracting costs.[47] Hierarchy can also help terrorist groups screen potential operatives, both to minimize internal disciplinary problems and to avoid recruiting government agents. Israeli agents, for example, reportedly took advantage of insufficiently centralized recruiting by Palestinian Islamist groups to run agents who would "recruit" Palestinians into small two- or three-person cells for Hamas or PIJ. The agents would then order their cells to attack Israeli checkpoints or patrols which, being forewarned of their presence, could easily capture or kill them.[48]

Despite the oft-cited prevalence of the "network" model of loose organization among jihadi militants, foreign elements of the Iraqi insurgency

[44] James Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), "Part Two: The PLO," 83–130.

[45] Horgan & Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," 27.

[46] Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6, no. 3 (1994): 303–339. See also Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 67–78.

[47] For an outstanding analysis of the problems hierarchy can solve, and those it cannot, see Gary J. Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[48] Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 77. It was in part because of such concerns that Hamas required potential trainees at camps in Sudan, coming from inside the Occupied Territories, to be recommended by the central leadership in Damascus; see Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 186.

exhibited a fair degree of hierarchy and bureaucratization. Letters from commanders in the al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia network at the height of the war in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 complained that existing rules restricted their operational options and that the requirement to get permission before conducting attacks wasted time and compromised the chances of success.[49] Alongside this frustration with existing procedures, one of these letters requests greater bureaucratization, pleading with the leadership that "whenever we meet with you, you tell us that this is the right way, but we want this in writing by the state council, so all of our members would observe it, but if it's not written it will go away after you're gone, if you die or get killed, the council after you . . . will stay on good grounds."[50] Such requests are actually a plea for the introduction of standing rules of engagement. Wanting clear, consistent rules or guidelines is a desire familiar to anyone who has served in a standard military organization. More important, complaints about bureaucracy accompanied by the desire to cement favored operating procedures should be expected in any organization. Organizational rules inevitably favor some member preferences over others, and so should be contested. Such arguments are a sign that terrorist organizations are not so unique after all.

1.6 CAN WE TREAT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AS RATIONAL?

There is a natural tendency to shy away from treating terrorists as rational actors. It is not comfortable, after all, to work through logical arguments that justify killing innocent civilians to achieve political change, nor is it comfortable to think of murderers as having logical reasons for what they do. Yet there is ample evidence that terrorists behave rationally in most respects. Moreover, pointing out the mundane side of terrorism helps to demystify these groups. Terrorism gains much of its power from the exaggerated weight society gives to its practitioners' capabilities. This was especially true in the United States after 9/11. No small group of individuals can bring down a state, much less a functioning modern economy such as Israel, Pakistan, or the United States. Even weak states such as Afghanistan and Yemen are not placed at risk by the isolated

[49]For a summary, see "Al-Qa'ida in Iraq Hampered by Bureaucracy and Loss of Sunni Support," Combating Terrorism Center, April 20, 2006. Online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC%20-%20Zarqawi%20Letters%20Analysis.pdf. See Harmony IZ-060316-01, IZ-060316-02, and IZ-060316-03.
[50]Harmony, IZ-060316-01.

actions of small groups.[51] This should be obvious if we pause for a moment and distance ourselves from the shock of even the worst terrorist events.

With that distance, it is clear that the hierarchical structures of control and precise calculations about attacks, operations, and internal bureaucracy that we see in the historical record require some form of rational thinking and decision making. Al-Qa'ida's compensation practices provide fascinating examples of just how rational a terrorist group can be, at least when it comes to managerial practices. Its leaders used a rather interesting incentive scheme to screen operatives for their previous organization in 1989 in Afghanistan. Long before western companies such as online shoe company Zappos starting offering newly trained employees $2,000 to leave the company, bin Laden offered new recruits $2,400 if they changed their mind about wanting to commit to his group.[52] Zappos has been lauded for this "buyout" offer as it encourages people who are not committed to the organization's values and mission to leave. If $2,000 (or $2,400) is more attractive than the mission at hand, then it is even more beneficial for the Zappos CEO, or head of al-Qa'ida, to see you on your way.

Similarly, compensation was determined in what can only be deemed as a rational manner. During direct examination at the Africa Embassy bombing trial, al-Fadl was asked to recount his interactions with bin Laden concerning complaints about his salary in 1991 and how bin Laden justified paying others more money. The following is part of that exchange:

> QUESTION: What did Usama Bin Laden say to you when you complained about the salaries of Abu Fadhl al Makkee, Abu Hajer, and Abu Abdallah Lubnani?
>
> ANSWER: He say some people, they traveling a lot and they do more work and also they got chance to work in the country. Some people, they got citizenship from another country and they go back over there for regular life, they can make more money than in group. And he says that's why he try to make them happy and give them more money.[53]

Put into academic terms, bin Laden set his employees' wages at what they could earn if they left the organization, just as any good

[51] For a post-9/11 perspective on the failure to correctly estimate the threat from terrorism, see John Mueller, *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

[52] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 141–142.

[53] Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl testimony: Direct examination, *U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al.,* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, pp. 257–258.

profit-maximizing manager would do. This is what economists refer to as their outside option. Evidence of this kind of rationality is pervasive in studies of terrorist organizations, even those employing suicide bombers. This type of rationality is not unique to al-Qa'ida human resources practices, though. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more educated, better trained, older suicide bombers are more effective and therefore are sent to attack targets that are more valuable.[54] In other words, rational choices are made about which bombers will be assigned to specific targets, with political impact, likelihood of success, and ability to avoid being intercepted all taken into consideration.

Exactly how rational terrorists are in making organizational decisions is an open question, and one that is not really germane for our purposes. As a starting point though, we just need to observe that terrorist decision making in strategic situations has three salient traits.[55] First, terrorist organizations match means to ends, as in the example above in which bin Laden set salaries to make sure everyone stayed sufficiently motivated given other options.[56] Second, they examine a limited number of options, choosing the one that yields the highest expected gain. In the first Bali bombing, for example, and in the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the terrorists considered a subset of available targets, took into account how well defended they were, and adjusted their target choices when site-specific protections lowered the expected impact from hitting the original targets.[57] Third, in strategic interactions, terrorists and government officials typically consider the impact of their actions in a fairly nuanced way. A 1992 Hamas policy memo outlining the pros and cons of participation in the first Palestinian municipal elections, for

[54]Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21, no. 3 (2007): 223–238.

[55]On terrorists' tactical choices, see C.J.M. Drake, *Terrorists' Target Selection* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). For a review of the political economy literature on terrorist decision making, see Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work," *Political Economist* 10, no. 1 (2008): 1–12.

[56]For a nice development of the argument that terrorists are "procedurally rational," see Max Abrahms, "Are Terrorists Really Rational? The Palestinian Example," *Orbis* 48, no. 3 (2004): 533–549.

[57]On Bali, see Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism* (Singapore, 2003). For a more detailed review of the literature which supports this approach to terrorist decision making, see David D. Laitin and Jacob N. Shapiro, "The Sources of Terrorism: An Ecological and Organizational Perspective," in *Terrorism and Economic Development*, ed. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

example, considers Hamas's possible actions and Fatah's reactions to them.[58]

I will call such decision making intendedly rational, by which I mean terrorists match means to ends by explicitly comparing the value of different actions given limited information about the world. Beyond the examples above, there is a great deal of evidence that terrorist organizations explicitly and correctly adjust to the changes in the costs and benefits of different courses of action.[59] For business firms this kind of rationality usually means attempting to maximize profits. For terrorist organizations, political impact is the appropriate maximand and there are many examples of terrorist organizations struggling to find the appropriate organizational structures to meet their political ends. Abu Bakr Naji's *The Management of Savagery* is probably the most well-known example of Islamist terrorists analyzing how best to organize,[60] but similar rationalist language was used by Hamas political bureau chief Musa Abu Marzuq to describe his group's decision-making process regarding suicide attacks.[61]

In the next chapter, we will treat terrorist groups as the intendedly rational organizations they so clearly are. In chapter 5, we will examine

[58]Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 122–130. Note that this memo is not game-theoretically rational in the sense that it does not consider how Hamas should respond to Fatah's reaction, nor does it seek to identify a stable strategy such that neither side would want to do anything different. For a review of the issues involved in modeling such decision processes, ones in which actors look only a few steps down the game-tree, see John Conlisk, "Why Bounded Rationality," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34, no. 2 (1996): 669–700.

[59]When one type of attack becomes more difficult, terrorists switch to another type and the baseline rate of attacks remains relatively consistent. Further, there is a great deal of evidence that terrorist leaders demonstrate exactly the kind of consequentialist logic required for intendedly rational behavior. On substitution effects see Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970–1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002): 145–165. On consequentialist decision making in al-Qa'ida, see many examples in Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). On reactions to political competition between terrorist groups, see Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). For a more general review of theoretical work on terrorist decision making, see Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): 473–507. For a more recent review see Jacob N. Shapiro, "Terrorist Decision-Making: Insights from Economics and Political Science," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, no. 4–5 (2012): 5–20.

[60]Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, translated by William McCants (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006)

[61]Mishal, Shaul, "How Hamas Thinks," in *The Middle East Peace Process: Vision Versus Reality*, ed. Joseph Ginat, Edward J. Perkins, and Edwin G. Corr (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 93, 96.

the internal strategic motivations behind terrorists' organizational choices by assuming a different kind of rationality, game-theoretic rationality. The assumptions there will be stronger, since game-theoretic rationality assumes that all the participants in any given interaction are doing the best thing they can taking into account the fact that everyone else is also doing the best they can, and so on. In some sense we are on weaker ground in treating terrorists as game-theoretically rational than as intendedly rational, since there is no comparable direct evidence that they analyze problems that way. Despite its descriptive inaccuracy, game-theoretic analysis has proven extremely useful in understanding business firms, political parties, and other social organizations, and there is no reason to believe it is not similarly useful in analyzing terrorist groups.

1.7 PLAN OF THE BOOK

The primary goal in this book is to develop a deeper understanding of why terrorist groups organize as they do in order to shift the way we think about these groups and how experts approach them. Chapter 2 begins that effort by analyzing the fundamental organizational challenges of terrorism in greater depth. Using a wide variety of evidence it examines why terrorist groups, since the 1880s, have struggled with the terrorist's dilemma and lays out an argument about how and why group solutions to that dilemma vary predictably in response to four factors:

1. The demand for discrimination in the use of violence, or how important carefully targeted violence is, given the group's political goals.
2. The level of uncertainty about which targets serve political goals, or how hard it is to judge what kinds of attacks will advance a group's goals.
3. The extent of preference divergence in the group, or how much people in an organization disagree about how to best use violence to accomplish their stated goals.
4. The intensity of government security pressure, or how risky it is to engage in the communications required to manage a given organization.

To further illustrate the inescapable nature of the terrorist's dilemma, chapter 3 provides an insider's view on the managerial challenges inherent in terrorism by analyzing all 108 memoirs I could find written by participants in terrorist organizations that carried descriptions of individual's activities in those organizations.[62] This approach addresses one of the key

[62]I owe a debt to David Patel, who suggested this approach.

challenges in studying the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations; the relative dearth of data on what actually happens inside these inherently secretive institutions. Aside from a few highly salient examples (Al-Qa'ida, Fatah, Al-Qa'ida in Iraq), the internal correspondence of terrorist organizations has not been readily available to scholars and so it is hard to pinpoint the pervasiveness of hierarchy and control inside these groups.[63] As we will see, agency problems are pervasive in terrorist organizations and security-reducing paperwork and bureaucracy were present in many of them.

In order to deepen our understanding of how those tools are used, chapter 4 analyzes one of the most prominent terrorist groups in the last twenty years, al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), using a host of the group's internal documents to study its financial and operational management. Because these documents were unavailable when the theory was developed, they facilitate a relatively clean, out-of-sample test of several core assumptions and predictions. They also provide rich insights into how one organization sought to solve its dilemmas.

As chapter 4 demonstrates, many dilemmas arise out of the tendency of terrorist operatives to behave in counterproductive ways from the leadership's perspective. This pattern highlights the incompleteness of the first analytical cut in chapter 2, which treats the terrorist's choice of organizational form as a decision-theoretic problem of choosing the best balance between security and control for achieving the group's goals. As the AQI materials so richly demonstrate, in any organization made up of thinking human beings, the level of control terrorist leaders actually exercise depends on the specific internal dynamics of a group. Terrorist operatives have their own ideas about what to do and these ideas do not always coincide with those of their leaders. A group's solution to its fundamental dilemma depends on the outcomes of the strategic interactions between terrorist leaders and their operatives.

Chapter 5 thus studies those strategic interactions in detail. It begins with a discussion of how the covert nature of terrorism inevitably

[63]For analyses drawing on the U.S. government's extensive collection of internal documents from al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida in Iraq, see: Jarret Brachman and William McCants, "Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 4 (2006): 309–321; Felter et al., *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*; Jacob N. Shapiro and Clinton Watts, eds., *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007); Brian Fishman et al., *Bombers, Bankers, and Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008); Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman eds., *Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa'ida and Its Periphery* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010).

creates opportunities for operatives to expropriate organizational resources for their own purposes, leading to the security-efficiency tradeoff. It then turns to an analysis of the security-control tradeoff, modeling the tradeoff as arising from an unusual agency problem in which principals are better informed than their agents about which actions will best serve the political goal. The chapter looks at how this tradeoff plays out, since communicating with these agents creates security risks and sanctioning them for misbehaving is costly. The game-theoretic analysis provides rich intuition for what we should expect to see in terms of differences between organizations that vary in distinct ways on the key variables of discrimination, uncertainty, preference divergence, and security.

With that intuition we turn to a series of three comparative studies of terrorist organizations from 1880 through the present. Chapter 6 analyzes the organization of pre-Revolutionary Russian terrorist groups in the 1880s and 1900s. Understanding these groups is useful in many ways. First, and most important, many of the organizational pathologies of terrorism are starkly illustrated by the travails of what were really the first modern terrorist organizations. Second, comparing these groups offers an opportunity to test hypotheses about the relationship between uncertainty and control.

Chapter 7 studies the three most prominent terrorist groups operating in Northern Ireland from the 1960s through 2003: the Provisional IRA, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Because the history of terrorism in Northern Ireland is so well known the case provides an excellent venue for testing hypotheses about the relationship between discrimination and control. The history of the groups fighting in Northern Ireland also provides a critical illustration of the policy importance of this kind of organizational analysis. From 1987 on, leaders on both sides of the Northern Ireland conflict understood the broad contours of a negotiated settlement, but it took them many years to work the internal politics of their organizations to the point at which ceasefire orders were obeyed.

Chapter 8 turns to the Middle East, assessing the organizational evolution of the main Palestinian terrorist groups from 1989 through 2005. In addition to testing hypotheses about the relationship between preference divergence and control, the Palestinian case allows us to compare an Islamist group to a secular nationalist one, helping to illuminate what may or may not be unique about Islamist terrorism. Not surprisingly, there is some evidence that one Islamist group, Hamas, is substantially different in terms of how severe a problem it had with operatives, but the group clearly faced similar organizational challenges to its secular compatriots.

By providing a series of three within-conflict comparative case studies, these chapters allow us to control for potentially important factors such as the quality of government intelligence services. Each case study also provides a rich environment for checking various assumptions of theory and for verifying that the causal processes described in chapters 2 and 5 actually drive organizational outcomes.

Chapter 9 reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy recommendations that flow directly from the organizational analysis. One potential criticism of this analysis is that it focuses too heavily on organizational outcomes while ignoring the kinds of behavioral outcomes of greatest interest to policy makers: who gets attacked, when, and by which method. The policy recommendations show this concern to be misplaced by demonstrating how systematically taking terrorists' organizational challenges into account can yield better counterterrorism policy. In particular, there are subtle ways to push groups into adopting security-reducing management practices that will work against some groups, but not all, and the organizational impacts of counterterrorism policies suggest that governments anticipating negotiations with terrorists may not want to put them under maximal pressure, as doing so can make it impossible for them to deliver on commitments made at the bargaining table. Ultimately, we cannot efficiently fight organizations that we do not understand.

CHAPTER 2

The Terrorist's Dilemma

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The terrorist's dilemma is straightforward and nearly inescapable. To start, political and ideological leaders, or the principals, must delegate certain duties—such as planning attacks, soliciting funds, and recruiting—to agents, the middlemen, or low-level operatives. If all agents are perfectly committed to the cause at hand, agree with leaders on how best to serve the cause, and are privy to the same information as leaders about how different actions will advance the cause, then this delegation poses no problem. Under those conditions, the preferences and beliefs of the principals and their agents will be perfectly aligned, and the agents will act just as the principals would like. However, that rarely happens. Operatives' views of how to use violence almost always deviate somewhat from that of their leaders. When the preferences of leaders and agents are not completely aligned, the covert nature of terrorist groups necessarily implies that agents can take advantage of the situation to act as they prefer, rather than as their principals would like.

While similar agency problems exist in any organization, they are dramatically magnified for terrorist groups, both because monitoring agents can be exceedingly costly and because the benefits of delegation are muted in terrorist organizations. The costs for terrorist groups are obvious; monitoring agent activities requires additional communications and record-keeping, which thereby increases the risk of death or imprisonment for everyone in the group. One police constable in Ulster during the Irish civil war, for example, reports that when he searched the home of the suspected leader of a Loyalist vigilante gang in May 1922, he found "... the minutes of the various meetings for about nine months previously" which "... threw a great deal of light on the authors of various outrages during the previous months." The officer then describes how he used the information in those minutes to arrest the rest of the gang.[1] There are

[1]Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, T/2258/1, pp. 6–7. I thank Tim Wilson for pointing out this example. More generally, the IRA in Ulster kept detailed minutes

many examples of terrorists' record keeping causing security problems, which suggests the benefits to delegation may be lower for terrorist groups than some other organizations, or at least that the logic of delegation is a bit different for them.

That benefits of delegation are noted for terrorists requires some explanation. As a general matter, delegation is often efficient. When agents have better knowledge than their principals about the task at hand, or about how actions relate to outcomes, the principals may be better off delegating to an agent than completing the task on their own, even if their preferences differ substantially.[2] The logic is simple; delegating to people closer to the mission entails efficiency gains, which can overcome the losses from agents who take advantage of their autonomy.[3] Whether there are advantages to delegation depends, of course, on the types of decisions agents are making. Delegation is most obviously advantageous when success depends on situational information that can only be known to those physically observing a target; where, for example, on a telephone pylon to plant a bomb or at what specific moment to launch a truck bomb attack at the entrance to a military base. In such situations, giving authority to those close to a situation to resolve details can offer a significant advantage.

Delegation is less likely to be advantageous when making strategic decisions that require integrating many sources of information, such as what types of targets should be hit. Terrorist operatives rarely have the same understanding of political impact as leaders. In more formal terms, principals in terrorist organizations are likely to be better informed than their agents about the mapping from actions to political outcomes because the exigencies of avoiding government forces often means agents have to live relatively isolated lives, making them ill-informed about the political impact of their own actions. This is true even though modern technology

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of meetings and the contributions made from various individuals throughout the Irish civil war, even as these records were being used against them. T. K. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 147.

[2]Jonathan Bendor and Adam Meirowitz, "Spatial Models of Delegation," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004): 293–310.

[3]This is every bit as true for traditional corporations or political organizations as it is for terrorist groups. A well-known example of the advantages of delegation is the North West Company, which successfully competed in the Canadian fur trade against the much larger and more technologically advantaged Hudson Bay Company from 1779 until the early 1810s. The North West Company succeeded largely by delegating a great many decisions to agents in the field, allowing them to adapt to local conditions in the remote northern parts of Canada as they saw best, something the Hudson Bay Company did not begin to do until 1809. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, *Economics, Organization, and Management* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) 6–9.

enables access to media and monitoring of political situations. Remaining isolated and sheltered is often a requirement of these agents. When small groups of highly motivated people, risking their lives for a cause, live together in close proximity for extended periods, they naturally reinforce each others' ideological tendencies, leading them to be even less savvy about how attacks will be perceived.[4]

These types of information asymmetries, in which principals know more about how to accomplish goals than their agents, are actually quite common. Whether by dint of experience, or because they have more developed social networks, senior leaders often know more than their subordinates about how to respond to the current political environment. This is especially true in organizations such as terrorist groups (or the military and law enforcement agencies for that matter) in which managers often work their way up from the lower ranks and therefore can draw on a much larger experiential base when deciding what to do given ambiguous information. The experience gained from many years in the struggle provides a rich knowledge base about how to respond to a given environment that subordinates will generally lack. This information structure, in which principals have better task knowledge than their agents, is the opposite of the structure presumed in most studies of delegation. It means that terrorist leaders are less likely than managers in other organizations to find that the costs of delegation are offset by its benefits. That said, terrorist leaders still delegate and when they do, there is often a great deal of disagreement.

Before examining why there is so much disagreement within groups, we need to define what we mean by "preference divergence," which requires differentiating between divergence in underlying preferences and divergence in induced preferences.[5] Induced preferences are a function

[4]This dynamic was first described in J. Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 3, no. 1 (1989): 15–43. Of course, when groups have a safe haven so operatives do not have to live underground, these dynamics are lessened, operatives will better understand a political situation, and therefore the beliefs of leaders and operatives will be more likely to be aligned. This is one of the reasons that groups with operational safe havens can be more deadly. As we will see in our analysis of Hamas, the fact that the group could run its military operations safely from Jordan, and later from Syria, allowed it to manage hierarchical military organizations in ways that groups whose leaders lived within the Occupied Territories could not. Indeed, many of the disagreements over strategy within Hamas in the 1990s stemmed from the fact that political leaders living in Gaza were significantly more exposed to Israeli counterterrorism operations than the military leaders living outside the country. For related arguments regarding the utility of safe havens to insurgents, see Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*.

[5]I thank Jon Bendor for helping me clarify these differences.

of underlying preferences about what should be done, the information individuals receive about the world, and beliefs about the actions implied by specific information. People who have exactly the same underlying preferences can have very different induced preferences in two ways: (1) if they receive different information; or (2) if they have different beliefs about what to do given that information. Members of the African National Congress's militant wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, saw the same actions by the South African government as Nelson Mandela and his allies did in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, but disagreed with Mandela's push to decommission the wing. They felt doing so would reduce their ability to gain concessions in the future more than it would help with the peace process, and they did not trust the de Klerk government to follow through on its commitments.[6] Basically, they had a different theory about what the optimal action was given the political environment. This was a difference in induced preferences. Throughout this chapter preference divergence refers to differences in induced preferences, which can stem from different underlying preferences, different information, or different beliefs. In later chapters we will explicitly discuss how the different sources of preference divergence operate in terrorist groups.

Two disputes within the Southeast Asian militant Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) nicely illustrate these concepts. Differences in underlying preferences played a key role in preventing cooperation between two factions in JI in early 2004. Noordin Mohammad Top, the leader of the breakaway faction within JI who had conducted all of the group's major attacks since the first Bali bombing, approached Sarwo Edi Nughroho, a mid-level leader in JI's mainline military wing, looking for support.[7] Noordin asked Sarwo to provide operatives, funds, and explosives to support jihad, which Noordin defined as "... fighting America, and its interests, assets, citizens, and allies, wherever they may be."[8] Sarwo refused, "because we have different chains of command, in addition to which our vision, mission and selection of targets is different."[9] Essentially, Sarwo did not support Noordin because the two had different underlying

[6]Frank B. Wilderson III, *Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2008) 110–111, 129, 131, 143.

[7]For a thorough discussion of Noordin's organization, see International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," *Asia Report* 114 (2006).

[8]This account and the quote above appear in Budi Setyarso, Imron Rosyid, and Ivansyah, "The Teacher's New Group," *Tempo*, April 10–16, 2007. *Tempo* is a well-respected Indonesian news magazine that publishes a high-quality English edition.

[9]Interrogation deposition of Suparjo, alias Sarwo Edi Nugroho, March 27, 2007, quoted in International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base," *Asia Briefing* 95 (2009): 11–12.

preferences about what JI should do with its military forces.[10] According to his interrogation deposition, Sarwo went on to advocate that Noordin adopt more targeted uses of violence, arguing that "... you don't have to use bombs everywhere but by kidnapping or shooting, or using other methods, you are more likely to hit the right target," to which Noordin allegedly replied "Okay ... Thanks for your input."[11]

Differences in beliefs created conflict in JI over whether the group should get involved in communal violence in Ambon in 1999. In the middle of that year, JI leader Abdullah Sungkar ordered one of JI's regional commands, *Mantiqi II*, to send fighters to Ambon. Members of the *mantiqi* resisted doing so for several months because they felt the conflict was not a religious one, but rather a political conflict between indigenous Ambonese and newly arrived migrants from Java.[12] Here, both leaders and operatives saw the same information about the violence, but their beliefs about how to interpret it led to divergent preferences over getting involved.

Groups have recurring problems with local leaders engaging in counterproductive violence because of such differences in induced preference. In late 2001, for example, senior JI leaders reached the conclusion that a period of peace in Poso in Central Sulawesi, a region that had been wracked by Christian-Muslim violence throughout the year, could serve the group's interests by allowing for the kinds of intense ideological outreach they believed would make the region a long-term safe haven.[13] This decision was not made without debate and many local militias were unhappy with their leaders' decision to participate in the peace process in Poso.[14] Violence in the area continued though at a low pitch until May 2003 when it began to pick up substantially, culminating in an intense series of sectarian attacks against Christians, in October 2003. These attacks attracted government attention to the area, leading to many arrests and reducing its value as a safe haven, at least temporarily.[15]

These types of disagreements are not limited to how to use violence; they also occur over finances and how to spend money. L'Hussein Kherchtou, a member of al-Qa'ida's operational cell in Nairobi during the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, testified in the bombing trial for the

[10] After the first Bali bombing a split emerged within JI between those who felt the time was right for terrorist attacks and those who felt violence was proving counterproductive for the group's long-term goals. The split grew worse over time. Author interviews, Jakarta, April 10–18, 2007.
[11] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base." 12.
[12] Author interviews, Jakarta, February 21 and April 13, 2007.
[13] International Crisis Group, "Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," *ICG Asia Report* 74 (2004) 14.
[14] Ibid., 15–16.
[15] Ibid., 21–22.

prosecution because he disagreed with the spending priorities of the senior members of his team. Not only was he bitter that al-Qa'ida turned down his request that the group pay for his wife's C-section, but he also felt the group was treating him as a second-class citizen by refusing him these funds while paying for air travel and lodging for Egyptian members who went to Yemen to get new passports.[16] Kherchtou also testified about a Sudanese member of al-Qa'ida, Abu Didala Sudani, who stole money and had to leave the group and about general dissatisfaction within al-Qa'ida about the fact that some Egyptian members of the group received favorable treatment.[17]

As these examples illustrate, terrorist leaders constantly face organizational dilemmas. Regardless of their political goals, they benefit from exercising some control over their agents. Doing so requires two things: (1) monitoring agents, so that undesirable behavior is detected; and (2) punishing them when they do not behave as principals would like. Both are problematic in terrorist organizations, especially compared with how Western companies, such as banks or law firms, sanction employees. To start, monitoring the agents reduces leaders' security because it requires additional communications and creates links between leaders and those most likely to be identified and captured by the government or anti-terrorist efforts. Leaders of al-Qa'ida, for example, have attempted to use auditing to check up on their agents, as illustrated in a 1999 e-mail from Ayman al-Zawahiri, then second in command of al-Qa'ida, to a Yemeni cell leader. In that e-mail, al-Zawahiri complains that the Yemeni leader is spending too much money and is not properly reporting his expenses.[18] Clearly, such communications are a huge security risk. But even with them, the very nature of terrorist activities means leaders cannot flawlessly monitor even if they want to.

There is a substantial random component to whether or not an attack succeeds. Suppose a leader requires regular reports from a cell planning a set of attacks. Everything looks to be in order up to the day of the first attack, but then the cell is arrested and the attack does not take place as planned. There is an inherent ambiguity here for the leaders. Did the cell fail because it was not operating faithfully, perhaps because the member in charge of logistics was misappropriating resources? Or was it merely that

[16]L'Hussein Kherchtou testimony: Direct examination, *U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al.,* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, pp. 1280–1284, 1307–1316.
[17]Ibid., pp. 1383–1385, 1492–1494, 1536.
[18]These communications were revealed in great detail on the hard drive of Ayman al-Zawahiri's laptop, which was purchased in a Kabul computer shop by *Wall Street Journal* reporter Alan Cullison shortly after the fall of Kabul. Cullison, "Inside Al-Qa'ida's Hard Drive," *Atlantic Monthly* (September 2004).

government forces got lucky?[19] Unless counterterrorism officials provide detailed information to the public on how they broke the case, the terrorist leaders can never know for certain.

Even if they resolve this uncertainty and decide someone needs to be punished because they did not perform properly, reprimanding agents who take unauthorized action can be costly and pose additional risks. Within terrorist groups, agents hold two implicit threats over principals: (1) they can defect to the government; and (2) they can attack the principals, physically, politically, or both. The case of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, who testified in the Africa Embassy bombing trial and was a key source on al-Qa'ida for the United States for many years, exemplifies the former threat. He got caught stealing money from al-Qa'ida, went on the run when it became clear he would not be able to repay the stolen money, as the group demanded, and approached the U.S. government in June 1996 in an attempt to save himself and his family.[20]

The second threat arises from the fact that the agents in terrorist organizations are often the tactical operatives who specialize in violence, meaning leaders cannot threaten them without risking retribution. For this reason terrorist principals sometimes fear their agents. This problem plagued the leadership of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA), loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, groups that could not put a stop to the politically damaging mafia-style activities of their operational cells.[21] As David Ervine, a former UVF bomb-maker, put it: "in a military organization the admiral doesn't have to worry about the sailor getting off watch and shooting him. My admiral did have that concern."[22] Similar constraints on leaders occurred in other groups. When evidence first emerged in mid-1908 that Ezno Azef, chief of the Combat Organization of the Russian Party of the

[19]This kind of measurement problem is a motivation for vertical integration in business firms and other institutions in society. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 4. Dave Siegel and I explore the organizational implications of this kind of uncertainty for terrorist financial systems in Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations," *Interational Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (2007): 405–429.

[20] *U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al.,* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, pp. 382–391. For an illuminating profile of al-Fadl, see Jane Mayer, "Junior: The Clandestine Life of America's Top Al Qaeda Source," *The New Yorker* (2006).

[21]Andrew Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21 (1998): 331–361. Andrew Silke, "Drink, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part Two," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 23 (2000): 107–127.

[22]Author interview, David Ervine, March 8, 2006.

Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), was a police agent, his deputy Kaprovich threatened to shoot the entire PSR central committee if it investigated him.[23] Some terrorist groups circumvent agents' abilities to retaliate by pressing operatives' families through explicit physical threats as well as implicit threats of exclusion from valued social networks.[24] But many leaders do not have the ability to do so, either because the operatives are not embedded in dense social networks or because threatening family members is politically unacceptable.

The range of problems outlined above fall into the larger category of what economists and political scientists call agency problems. As we will see in great detail throughout the book, these problems are pervasive in terrorist organizations. Indeed, it is exactly the terrorist organizations that most effectively deal with agency problems that stand out for being most effective and resistant to counterterrorism. As my colleague Eli Berman has long argued, Hamas is so effective exactly because its extensive network of nonviolent community institutions provides a rich set of mechanisms for mitigating agency problems by carefully screening agents and holding them accountable when necessary. Hence, it is less vulnerable to Israeli agents and less likely to have operatives take undesired actions than any other Palestinian group.[25]

More generally, agency problems arise when three conditions exist: (1) a principal needs to delegate certain actions or decisions to an agent: (2) the principal can neither perfectly monitor the agent's actions, nor punish him with certainty when a transgression is identified;[26] and (3) the agent's preferences are not aligned with those of the principal.[27] The framework of agency theory has been used with great success to explore a wide range of issues including corporate governance, pork-barrel spending in Congress, the behavior of regulatory agencies, civil-military relations, and problems of violence against civilians in insurgent organizations.[28] Here I use it to

[23]Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 39.

[24]This latter dynamic is discussed in great detail in Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.*

[25]Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* ch. 5.

[26]Observing outcomes is insufficient to prevent agents from taking advantage of delegation if the mapping from actions to outcomes has a random component.

[27]David M. Kreps, *A Course in Microeconomic Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Chapters 16 and 17 provide an excellent general development of agency theory. The best application of this perspective to the general challenges of hierarchy is Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas.*

[28]On civil military relations, see Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). On problems of tactical control in insurgent organizations, see Scott G. Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict*

frame a discussion of the organizational challenges faced by terrorists. All organizations face these three conditions more often than not and, for a range of reasons, terrorist groups are particularly likely to do so. The second condition typically exists because of the covert nature of terrorism and the third one for a range of reasons we turn to next.

2.2 WHY PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE?

From the mid-1990s through 2001, two of the West's most implacable terrorist foes, Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu Khabab, carried on what appears to have been a long-running feud within al-Qa'ida. Abu Hafs joined al-Qa'ida early on and served as the group's military commander from 1996 onward. Abu Khabab was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who ran his own camps in Afghanistan and began working closely with al-Qa'ida in the late 1990s as an explosives expert. That two such individuals competing for prominence in a global terrorist organization would not get along is hardly surprising. It may seem unexpected, however, that their feud would entail lengthy arguments about reporting requirements, travel reimbursements, and the proper accounting for organizational property. One doesn't generally think of terrorist masterminds bickering over expenses and writing notes like the one Abu Hafs sent to Abu Khabab in the late 1990s, taking him to task over what amounts to expense reports:

> When I came back from my trip, I heard about some of the incidents that took place between you and the brothers. I was very upset about what you did. I am going to mention some of these matters, and I hope that you can explain your point of view with respect to these issues by writing a detailed letter because I won't be able to see you.
>
> 1- Regarding the tickets: I obtained 75,000 rupees for you and your family's trip to Egypt. I learned that you did not submit the voucher to the accountant, and that you made reservations for 40,000 rupees and kept the remainder claiming that you have the right to do so. We believe that you do not have the right to do that and a brother should take only what he needs for the trip. I would like you to know that we have never given such an amount to any one else at all.[29]

Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 111–130. On motivations for violence against civilians by insurgent organizations, see Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker, "Portrait of a Failed Rebellion," *Rationality and Society* 17, no. 1 (2005): 5–34.

[29]Harmony, AFGP-2002-001111.

The letter goes on, with respect to other issues with Abu Khabab's spending and salary.

> 2 - Also with respect to the air conditioning unit, you have not been charged 20,000 rupees for it . . . As you may know the furniture used by the brothers in Al-Qaeda is not considered a private property for anyone, but rather a trust.[30]

The letter becomes even more personal as Abu Hafs writes the following:

> 3 - Regarding the salary, you may also know that you added an amount of 3000 rupees to the salary for three months during your sick-leave period. I met you and told you that you are not entitled for that, and that you have to check with Abu Obaida on that. You told me that you were in need of money. I responded by telling you to send the money back to us, and we will help with whatever we can.[31]

The letter contains a litany of criticisms and questions concerning Abu Khabab's behavior and how he has conducted himself. At one point Abu Hafs asks that Abu Khabab explain why he took documents or "memos" from the Shari'a Institute and calls him out for dealing with a colleague in a "threatening manner."

It's not clear how Abu Khabab responded to each of the many letters or correspondence he received from Abu Hafs, but in one correspondence the underlying issue of control and hostility is clear. Abu Khabab writes:

> I am sending you this letter so that you may not forget in this turbulence of events what we have agreed upon regarding the [airplane] tickets and the car. As for the tickets, I hope you expedite sending their prices since I have other things that need to be done with respect to these tickets. If this is possible, please bring the money today. Note: You ought to know that we spent some of our own money to bring the family over as we have already agreed upon. The money that you have covers the round-trip tickets from Peshawar to Alexandria and vice versa.

The letters reveal a constant back and forth, tug-of-war–like assertion, threats, and requests. In one other round of asserting authority, Abu Hafs writes to Abu Khabab again, this time with somewhat less hostility, although still with the intent to control his actions or decisions:

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

> Dear honorable brother Abu Khabab: This is to advise you that the room will be ready after the 20th of this month because the tenant was late in receiving the new residence. God willing, when it is ready, we will let you know. It is possible that some of the brothers will come to you to ask for some items. I hope that you don't deal with any one of them whether they have written requests or by verbal messages unless they have a written message from me for the interest of our mission as a whole.

The dispute above is hardly unique. Scholars who have done extensive interview work with terrorists report their organizations are torn by strife and disagreement.[32] As a broad observation, there are two major areas of conflict within terrorist organizations: resource allocation and tactics. In the first area, agency problems create inefficiencies in how resources are allocated. The covert nature of the enterprise means those charged with raising, managing, and disbursing funds can take advantage of their position to spend as they would like, either by supporting unauthorized activities or, more commonly, by taking a cut for themselves.[33] Methods to mitigate these problems create operational vulnerabilities.[34] In the second area, agency problems lead to cells undertaking politically suspect behaviors such as engaging in violence that the leadership does not want.[35] Groups can ease this problem by

[32]Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem." Colin Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

[33]Problems of graft and corruption plagued Russian revolutionary organizations such as the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). See Anna Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 156–162. Efforts to restrict skimming from group funds involved a great deal of internal violence in the UVF and UDA. See here Andrew Silke, "Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 3 (1999): 8–9. The dynamics of graft in terrorist groups are examined in detail in Shapiro & Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations."

[34]For a focused analysis of the security-efficiency tradeoff, see Jacob N. Shapiro, "The Greedy Terrorist: A Rational Choice Perspective on Terrorist Organizations' Inefficiencies and Vulnerabilities," in *Terrorist Financing in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Harold Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

[35]Exactly this problem led the ideological leaders of ETA to repeatedly try to centralize control over operations. They were unable to do so because their organization had evolved from a collection of autonomous cells that were unwilling to give up control and had a greater capacity for violence than the central ideological leaders. See Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 2 (2002): 74–77. For a deeper analysis of ETA in the context of Basque nationalism, see Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh,

exercising tighter control, and, as discussed, this will compromise a group's security.

That terrorist groups suffer from these problems at all may seem puzzling. Following 9/11, many analyses of terrorist organizations began with the assumption that members of these groups are uniformly motivated by the cause, are equally willing to sacrifice for that cause, agree on what the cause is, and see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end.[36] Of course, substantial evidence indicates this is not the case. The history of many long-running terrorist groups, the Basque terrorist group ETA for example, are a catalogue of ideological struggles, disciplinary problems, and factional splits.[37] As the shock of 9/11 faded, a more nuanced view emerged in policy documents from 2005 to 2011,[38] motivated in part by the body of evidence from captured al-Qa'ida documents.

Those documents are full of sometimes vitriolic letters between members of the group, who are debating ideology, strategy, and tactics. Hassan al-Tajiki's Third Letter to the Africa Corps (al-Qa'ida's operation in Somalia in the 1990s) is typical of debates within al-Qa'ida. Hassan writes, "Here once again I remind you of one of your fatal mistakes, which is the quick changing of strategic targets, whereby now every action is tactical and improvised."[39] The June 2005 letter allegedly from al-Qa'ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri to the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is another well-known recent example.[40] In that letter

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A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

[36]The following are examples of this approach: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* (New York: Random House, 2003); William F. Weschler and Lee S. Wolosky, *Terrorist Financing Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); Jean Charles Brisard, *Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing*, Report (JCB Consulting, 2002); Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*; and Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corportation, 2004).

[37]On ETA see Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), especially ch. 2 on ideological struggles in the group's early years and ch. 4 on conflicts triggered by the end of the Franco regime.

[38]See, for example, Rick "Ozzie" Nelson et al., *A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011).

[39]Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 25. The best analysis of leadership schisms in al-Qa'ida is Vahid Brown, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989–2006*.

[40]For a summary of the controversy over the letter's provenance, see Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, "The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda," In *Current*

Zawahiri kindly notes that the leaders in Afghanistan "do not know the full truth" of the situation in Iraq, but then urges Zarqawi to stop beheading people because it is politically counterproductive. Zawahiri argues,

> Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable—also—are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages . . . we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media . . . And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.[41]

None of this should be surprising. Historically, terrorist groups have splintered precisely because of differences in opinion about how to conduct their campaigns.[42] For example, the Irish Republican Army has spawned at least five splinter groups since the mid-1970s, including the Provisional IRA, Official IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Evidence from Indonesia suggests that the cohesion of Islamist terrorist groups is similarly tenuous, although conflict at the upper levels does not always preclude low-level cooperation.[43] And, as noted above, there was infighting and conflict over strategic focus and arcane points of doctrine within al-Qa'ida both in Africa in the 1990s and following the 9/11 attacks.[44]

Even when there is no observable conflict within groups, leaders often engage in costly efforts to monitor their agents, suggesting that the potential for disagreement exists. For example, some leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah required members to report their travel expenses as a way of determining whether there was any corruption. That they never had problems with corruption could mean that agents either did not

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Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 3, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2006), 47–48.

[41]ODNI News Release no. 2-05. Online: at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/dni101105.html, among others.

[42]The cleanest theoretical analysis of factional politics in terrorist groups is Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Terrorist Factions," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3 (2008): 399–418. For a psychological perspective on how terrorists come to see violence as counterproductive over time, see John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[43]A detailed history of the splits and fissures within the Indonesian militant group Darul Islam (DI) is provided in International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," *ICG Asia Report* 92 (2005). See also International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," *ICG Asia Report* 83 (2004), 16–18.

[44]See for example Harmony AFGP-2002-600053 and Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. For a summary, see Brachman and McCants, "Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook."

have different preferences from the leaders, or the monitoring deterred corruption.[45]

2.2.1 Preference Divergence Over Spending

Preference divergence over spending can take many forms. Most commonly, it appears because operatives believe they should be entitled to keep some resources for themselves, as in the example above where Abu Hafs confronted Abu Khabab about his decision to keep the unspent portion of his travel advance. Another example is that of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, who violated group norms by keeping a portion of the profits from trading he did for al-Qa'ida in Sudan in 1994–45.[46] Sometimes, though, the existence of preference divergence has to be inferred when we see operatives behaving in ways that manifestly hurt the group's goals.

The varied behavior of Syrian coordinators involved in transporting foreign fighters into Iraq for AQI illustrates this point. In 2006, the U.S. military captured a cache of personnel records from the AQI unit that controlled the border with Syria. A large number of these "Sinjar Records" (187) listed information about the Syrian coordinator who facilitated a fighter's travel through Syria. These records report what fighters paid their coordinator and the amounts varied widely, as some coordinators charged almost everyone, while others rarely charged.[47] From AQI's perspective, the best coordinators were those who charged nothing as foreign fighters typically contributed any funds they had left to AQI when they arrived in Iraq. But some coordinators clearly had different preferences over spending than the AQI leadership, and that leadership was in no position to enforce its will on agents working in another country.[48]

Broadly speaking, all that is required for there to be preference divergence over spending is that operatives be less than perfectly committed to the cause. Regardless of leader preferences over spending, they will want every bit of money passed down to be spent on operations.[49]

[45] Author interview, Jakarta, February 20, 2007. Al-Qa'ida units operating in Africa in the early 1990s also had to file detailed expense reports. Harmony, AFGP-2002-800573.
[46] *U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al.,* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, pp. 383–385.
[47] Brian Fishman ed., *Sinjar Two: al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Foreign Recruiting, Finances, and Future* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008), 47–49.
[48] Many of these coordinators were not formally part of AQI, but functioned as its agents in the sense that the group delegated to them the task of moving people into Iraq.
[49] I thank Jim Fearon for pointing this out.

In this light, even highly committed members cause problems if they are not perfectly dedicated.[50] To return to the example with which we started this section, in the late 1990s, al-Qa'ida's senior military commander Abu Hafs identified a number of areas in which the group's primary explosives expert and the manager of one of its training camps, Abu Khabab, was expropriating organizational resources. Among these was an instance in which Hafs gave Khabab 75,000 rupees to travel with his family to Egypt, but Khabab did not "... submit the voucher to the accountant ... ." Hafs looked into the matter and apparently learned that Khabab had spent only 40,000 rupees on his reservation, pocketing the difference in violation of al-Qa'ida policy. Khabab had devoted his life to jihad and by all accounts he was quite committed to the cause, yet he still appears to have been lining his pockets at al-Qa'ida's expense.[51]

So why do we see such divergent preferences, even among committed operatives? First, within the population of new terrorist recruits, there is almost always a distribution of commitment to the cause. Those who facilitate suicide bombings in Iraq, for example, are not typically willing to send their own children to conduct attacks.[52] Some who traveled to Afghanistan to train with al-Qa'ida were surprisingly fickle. As one of the Harmony documents details, a group of Tajik mujahideen became so demoralized by the intimidation and bullying from other jihadi forces that "the majority of the young men snuck away and went back looking for work with their old area commanders."[53] Moreover, groups often recruit violent individuals whose key qualification is being a thug, not ideologically committed.[54] Commitment matters for preference divergence over spending because the more an operative cares about things other than advancing the group's political goals, the harder it is for leaders to prevent them from expropriating group resources. Variance

[50]Though one Iraqi insurgent manual on how to manage intelligence agents does note that monetarily motivated individuals can be easier to control than those who are in it for the cause. Harmony, ISGZ-2004-M1000074-0148, p. 10.

[51]See the series of letters between Khabab and Hafs in Harmony, AFGP-2002-001111, especially p. 6.

[52]See Aparisim Ghosh, "Professor of Death," *Time* (October 17, 2005).

[53]Harmony AFGP-2002-600053, Letter Four, 50.

[54]Recruitment of criminals was prominent in Russia in the first years of the twentieth century, especially among Anarchist revolutionary groups. See Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 135–135. More recently, JI has been recruiting career criminals, *preman*, for their special skills in petty crime and violent action. See International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," *ICG Asia Report* 63 (2003): 24. In both cases, these individuals' lack of discipline and tendency to mix criminal activity with fund-raising for the group created problems.

in commitment, in other words, leads to preference divergence over spending.[55]

That initial variance is magnified by the natural selection process that occurs over the course of a terrorist's career. Over the course of many years in the jihad, the most committed members, or at least the most risk-acceptant ones, are more likely to volunteer for dangerous or inherently fatal assignments but also the most likely to stick around. So long as the less committed terrorists do not leave at a higher rate than that at which the more committed are being killed or captured, we should expect the proportion of committed individuals in a cohort to be decreasing over time. As well, we should expect the distribution of commitment within a group to become more bimodal, divided between the surviving highly committed individuals and the less committed who took fewer risks.[56] That change over time can have different effects on preference divergence depending on how groups promote and sort their personnel. If the probability of rising high in the ranks of terrorist organizations (conditional on being alive) is positively correlated with having carried out dangerous missions, then it could be that while high-commitment people are less likely to survive, conditional on surviving, they are more likely to be chosen as leaders. This would mean that over time the rank and file within a cohort will be overwhelmingly the semi-committed and risk-averse, while the leaders are overwhelmingly the highly committed or risk-acceptant.[57] If, on the other hand, promotion is only weakly correlated to one's operational history, then the fact that many terrorist organizations use individuals who have been around for some time to handle logistical and management tasks can create its own problems.[58] The logic of this "promotion" process is simple: those who have been around know the business, but are also more likely to be known to government, and so are less likely to successfully conduct

[55]Protestant paramilitaries reportedly used threats to compel individuals to join the group. Predictably, such individuals proved less than completely committed. For examples of compulsory recruitment, see Silke, "Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," 12–13. In situations in which leaders receive a noisy signal about whether their financial operatives are expropriating organizational resources, Siegel and I show that the less committed the financial middleman, the more precise the signal required for operatives to forego skimming. Shapiro & Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations." 421.

[56]By cohort I mean the group of individuals who join at a particular point in time.

[57]I thank Ethan Bueno de Mesquita for this excellent point.

[58]In some groups, fund-raising is seen as a low-risk activity, and transfer or promotion into financial positions is used as a reward for past services. Fund-raisers arrested in Northern Ireland, for example, face substantially less severe sentences than younger colleagues charged with violent crimes. Four years is typical for extortion. See Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail."

tactical operations.[59] But given selection based on missions that logic also means that, on average, those handling financial and logistical tasks are almost certain to be more risk-averse and less committed than the rank and file.

Even without these kinds of adverse selection processes, patterns of government counterterrorism exacerbate preference divergence because participants in terrorist support networks face dramatically lower levels of risk than tactical operatives. Beyond not being asked to participate in risky or inherently fatal ventures, they are less likely to be dealt with by government forces. When they are dealt with, support personnel are less likely to be killed. And when arrested, they face more lenient treatment. When governments do succeed in capturing logisticians and other support network members, they face dramatically lower consequences than operators or senior leaders. A particularly telling example is the Jemmaah Islamiyah cell that was broken up in Singapore in late 2001. The cell provided fund-raising services to JI and was engaged in making logistical arrangements for an al-Qa'ida attack in Singapore. Of the more than thirty people arrested, the thirteen engaged in direct logistical support each received two years in prison.[60] Those engaged in fund-raising activities were released but not permitted to leave the country.[61]

This risk differential driven by government counterterrorism practices exacerbates the selection effects identified above. Essentially, the lenient treatment observed for those tasked with managing funds and distributing them to operational cells means that the threshold level of risk acceptance and commitment required for participation in support activities is much lower than for participation in tactical roles. Thus, individuals with a given level of commitment might participate in support activities while balking at other roles within the organization. Seeking to maximize operational capability, terrorist groups would concentrate such individuals in support roles, freeing up the true believers for riskier operational duties.[62] Stepping

[59]On the IRA, see Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure"; and Andrew Silke, "Rebel's Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 1 (1999): 59. On Hamas, see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*.

[60]A corollary to this line of argument is that lenient punishment for financiers may not be bad, as it creates the conditions for inefficiency and conflict in terrorist organizations.

[61]Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 158–160.

[62]Note the link between risk differentials and preference divergence over spending depends on groups having a limited population of potential members. If there were indeed a surfeit of competent, committed terrorists available, we would expect many more attacks than we see. The available evidence is that good recruits are relatively

outside the financial realm and looking at the assignment of suicide bombers to targets in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is strong evidence that terrorist organizations give their more capable personnel harder missions.[63] Analogous personnel decisions in financial management should lead to consistent variance in commitment between levels of the organization.

The Harmony documents suggest al-Qa'ida has inadvertently encouraged just such preference divergence by striving to put individuals in the jobs for which they were most suited.[64] One captured document describes the roles and responsibilities of the various committees on which al-Qa'ida members can serve. In this document the Military Committee lists the following goals:[65]

- Preparation of freedom fighting young men, their training, and organizing them for combat.
- Organization and supervision for combat participation on the battlefield.
- Preparation of programs and military procedures.
- Offering what is needed of military mechanics for combat.

Compare this with the four listed goals of the Administrative and Financial Committee included in the same document:

- Offering the best of administrative services for all the group members and their families.
- Undertake the work of hospitality for the guests of different kinds in the most generous possible manner of hospitality.
- Undertaking the work of accounting, keeping books on the front, which safeguards the group's general funds.
- Undertaking the financial work for the group.

Clearly, the preferences of individuals attracted to supporting requirements such as "providing hospitality" and "keeping books" are likely to differ substantively from those who select into positions responsible for

scarce in most conflicts. The war in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts may have been exceptions. On the scarcity of recruits in Southeast Asia, see International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," 31.

[63] Benmelech and Berrebi, "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers." 2007.

[64] Harmony AFGP-2002-800654, AFGP-2002-003721, AFGP-2002-800652, and AFGP-2002-800655.

[65] Harmony AFGP-2002-000078 and AFGP-2002-600178 list various roles individuals can aspire to within these committees, along with job descriptions and compensation guidelines.

organization and supervision of combat participation on the battlefield.[66] Further, if there is a positive correlation between individual commitment and career potential for violence, then placing people in the riskiest jobs they are willing to accept means that those filling violent positions will be more committed on average than those fulfilling noncombat roles.

Groups may even refrain from centrally directed personnel movements to avoid creating connections between cells, yet still suffer preference divergence. Because of security considerations, some terrorist organizations recruit directly into specific positions with little opportunity for movement. Such groups often fill positions using a strategy of recruitment through existing social ties.[67] Any member tasked with the recruitment and early ideological training of potential members will have access to a limited population. From this population, the recruiter will need to fill various spots. If commitment to a group's ideology follows a single-peaked distribution, with the purely ideological or purely venal individuals being rarer than those who place moderate weight on the cause, then it will be harder for the recruiter to find potential tactical operatives than logisticians. This means that if a group needs a large number of fighters, there are unlikely to be enough highly committed recruits left over to fill logistical roles. In other words, unless the recruiter knows a huge number of potential members, he is likely to place individuals in the riskiest positions they will accept and will thus end up with less committed individuals filling financial roles.

2.2.2 Preference Divergence over Tactics

So what does preference divergence over tactics look like? Take the dispute discussed above between Noordin Mohammed Top, one of the most extreme members of JI, and the more moderate Sarwho Edi Nugroho. As we saw, the dispute turned on how discriminate JI should be in its attacks. During the critical conversation in which he rejected Noordin's request for support, Nugroho claimed he asked Noordin, "Why not choose cleaner

[66] Joseph Felter first provided this analysis in *Harmony and Disharmony*, 16–17.

[67] Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), an Algerian terrorist organization, uses just such a recruitment system in expatriate Algerian communities in France. See Mohamed Sifaoui's journalistic account of his penetration of a GSPC fund-raising and recruiting cell in Paris, in Mohamed Sifaoui, *Inside Al-Qa'ida: How I Infiltrated the World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2003). Hamas used this strategy when it was first building its military wing in the 1990s.

targets where the risk of hitting the wrong people is lessened . . . . You have to consider whether an operation is productive or counterproductive in the interests of furthering religious outreach or generating more slander of the Muslim community."[68] Nugroho is posing questions here about the relationship between the tactical use of violence and its overall political impact. He clearly has a different theory about that relationship than Noordin, leading him to prefer more discriminate targeting practices. This kind of preference divergence over tactics is quite common. This should not be not surprising; people in almost all political organizations disagree frequently and intensely about how their actions will be perceived by the public. But the very nature of terrorist operations leads to three additional mechanisms that make this kind of preference divergence especially common within terrorist groups.

The first mechanism is that people who are good at conducting violence, those who make ideal recruits as far as their ability to carry out operations, often have an underlying preference for violence, leading them to seek more violence than is politically desirable. Early Marxist militants were the first to document the problems created by the correlation between skill at violent action and the amount of violence operatives thought was appropriate. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party had regular problems in the 1890s and 1900s with local cells conducting revenge attacks that could not be justified by Marxist theory.[69] In like fashion, the PIRA suffered repeated problems with Active Service Units (ASU), made up of combat specialists, pushing for violence when the organization as a whole wanted to limit attacks.[70] Protestant paramilitaries suffered similar problems of control. As a former UVF bomb-maker put it, "we had some very heinous and counterproductive activities being carried out that the leadership didn't punish because they had to maintain the hearts and minds within the organization."[71] The UVF and UDA also faced problems with recruits who, with a predilection for criminality, would form splinter groups because staying devoted to the political cause meant forgoing profitable criminal opportunities.[72]

[68] Interrogation deposition of Suparjo, alias Sarwo Edi Nugroho, March 27, 2007, quoted in International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base."
[69] Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 49–50. Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 28–29.
[70] Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA* (London: Corgi, 1994), 203. M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 120–121.
[71] Author interview, David Ervine, March 8, 2006.
[72] Silke, "Drink, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part Two," 116.

Islamist groups face similar challenges. As already noted, JI suffered both excessive violence and criminality because of its recruitment of *preman*, career criminals, to fill out paramilitary units,[73] and excessive violence created headaches for leaders among the foreign elements of the Iraqi insurgency.[74]

There is something of a trap here for any organization that adopts limited nonterrorist uses of violence in response to government pressure. Such organizations are often forced to adopt more violent tactics than the strategic situation demands in order to retain the allegiance of their most radical cells.[75] This trap affected Italian and German left-wing militants. Given the tactics of state police, these groups depended on violent factions for survival, which pushed them into high levels of violence against civilians, even when this was not politically ideal.[76]

It is not always the case, of course, that operatives want more violence than the leadership. Sometimes they want less and this too can cause tension. A number of operatives left the Basque group ETA, for example, because they felt the group was being insufficiently cautious in its attacks.[77] As one operative put it referring to the ETA bombing of the Hipercor shopping center on June 19, 1987, which killed twenty-one and injured forty-five more: "The feeling was that this was just so, well, over the top, that this was not the enemy and that the methods we used had to be targeting the enemy and not so, so indiscriminate."[78]

The second mechanism is that those operating underground often receive different information about the political impact of their actions than their leaders. In larger groups, in which the leadership is organizationally isolated from operational cells, or when it is geographically separated from them, these informational differences can be quite problematic.[79] Islamist groups suffered deeply because of this problem during the Syrian jihad from 1979 to 1982, where local cells repeatedly made attacks that the outside leadership opposed given their knowledge about the larger

[73]International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous."
[74]See, e.g., Fishman, *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al Qa'-ida in Iraq*, 12–13. Harmony, Zawahiri letter.
[75]David Allen Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1981).
[76]Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[77]Reinares, "Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study of Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 5 (2011): 793–795.
[78]Ibid., 794.
[79]The June 2005 Zawahiri letter highlights this problem in Iraq.

political situation.[80] Of course, information differences do not always mean operatives push for more violence. Sometimes the opposite is true, as when Hamas's Amman-based leaders authorized attacks by the group's military wing when the Gaza-based political leadership wanted to maintain a low profile.[81]

The third mechanism is that the cognitive dynamics of an underground organization often lead operational cells to lose touch with their original goals and come to value action in its own right. These underground groups are often quite isolated—having external contacts creates security risks and can be potentially life-threatening—and typically spend a tremendous amount of time discussing the group's ideology and mission, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle of radicalization in underground cells.[82] As a result, these cells typically seek to do more violence than those removed from the situation would like. Walter Laquer, prolific historian and early terrorism scholar, summarizes the resulting tendency wonderfully when he discusses how in revolutionary terrorist groups "there was almost always dissension and competition between the political and terrorist wings of the movement, and a tendency towards full autonomy among the terrorists."[83]

The psychology of this is quite understandable. Cell members have, after all, been recruited to take huge risks and do terrible things for a cause. And being asked to live cooped up with little outside contact for long periods of time while awaiting the right moment to be employed can be quite disappointing.[84] As we will see in chapter 6, the resulting psychological dynamics plagued the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), whose main organization for attacking high-profile targets, the Combat Organization, came to view itself as an elite vanguard whose primary allegiance was to the Revolution, not to the PSR.[85] Pre-Revolutionary Russian terrorist organizations all had problems with members becoming more extreme the longer they spent in underground

[80]Harmony AFGP-2002-600080.

[81]These disputes within Hamas are discussed in more detail in chapter 6 and are well described in Muhammad Muslih *The Foreign Policy of Hamas* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 36–38.

[82]One of the earliest articulations of this tendency is in Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (1987): 13–31.

[83]Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1977), 84.

[84]On this dynamic in Iraq, see NMEC-2008-612449, pp. 19–20. For a summary of these dynamics informed by the Northern Ireland case, see J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (1990): 193–211.

[85]Amy Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," *Russian Review* 38, no. 2 (1979): 147.

combat organizations. Georgi Plekhanov, occasional ideological Lenin rival within the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), noted repeatedly that the process of training for and conducting military operations would shift operatives' preferences in favor of violence.[86] In the early 1950s, the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) had problems enforcing a decision to use more discriminate violence because members who had become proficient at violence naturally wanted to put their skills to use.[87] This problem of gradual preference divergence had an interesting impact on the Italian Red Brigades. Over time the group had to devote an ever-larger portion of its energies to attacks that appealed only to the membership, ones that ended up being costly in terms of outside support.[88]

As noted, such preference divergence, and the counterproductive violence it engenders, was also a serious problem in foreign elements of the Iraqi insurgency. One captured letter from AQI leaders to a Ramadi cell leader in 2005 admonishes him to "Stop the killing of people unless they are spying, military, or police officers. We have to find a secure method because if we continue using the same method, people will start fighting us in the streets."[89] The recipient of this letter was ordered to attend a personal meeting two days later to discuss this and other matters of contention between himself and the leadership. The effort to deal with this particular instance of preference divergence, holding a personal meeting in a heavily surveilled war zone, created an obvious security risk. The alternative to that meeting, continued politically damaging attacks, must have been deemed even worse than that risk.

Overall we see three internal dynamics leading to preference divergence over tactics: (1) individuals recruited because of their skills in violence will tend to have an underlying preference for more action, or different actions, than leaders would prefer; (2) leaders and their covert operatives receive different information about the world; and (3) the cognitive dynamics of underground organizations lead operational units to see the world differently than their leaders, typically interpreting the same information as implying more violence. All three result in agency problems. For counterterrorism operations this means that discord, and the resultant opportunities to create fissures within groups, will almost certainly be present in any group of a reasonable size. For terrorists, this means there

[86]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 262–263.
[87]Lucian W. Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 104–106.
[88]Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, 120, 174.
[89] Harmony IZ-060316-02.

is almost always demand for the hierarchical structures that can help contain the agency problems that preference divergence creates. We will not always see such hierarchy, it creates security costs that can overwhelm its benefits, but the demand for hierarchy will almost always be there.

2.3 HOW GROUPS RESPOND TO PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE

Terrorist groups employ a range of strategies to minimize the financial inefficiencies and operational mistakes (or agency losses) that arise from preference divergence. This section examines some of the most common strategies in greater detail and highlights the security vulnerabilities they create, including:

1. Organizing group activities so that it is easier to detect shirking by operatives.
2. Creating bureaucratic mechanisms such as auditing.
3. Punishing those who deviate from the leader's preferred actions.
4. Encouraging trust-inducing relationships among members.
5. Creating mechanisms to screen out potentially problematic individuals from the pool of would-be terrorists.

There are a range of ways in which terrorist leaders can organize so that they obtain information on what their operatives are doing. Providing funds only on a need-to-have basis, for example, is an effective way for principals to prevent less-committed individuals from taking advantage of funds that are in their control. The Embassy bombings in Africa, the Bali bombings, and the 9/11 attacks were all funded in this fashion. In each case operators received a certain amount of money, spent everything, and had to request more from central leadership. By increasing the frequency of transfers and reducing their size, leaders built up better knowledge about the nature of the relationship between what was being spent and the success rate they observed. This reduces the scope of what the agents can get away with. However, because each additional transfer entails communications and financial transactions, there is a security cost to this strategy.

Bureaucracy and paperwork are another way to acquire information about what agents are doing.[90] Requiring agents to provide periodic,

[90]The specific value of bureaucracy (or extensive informally recorded institutional memory) in small groups with finite recruiting pools, a description of many terrorist groups, is discussed in the next chapter and analyzed game-theoretically in Jacob N.

detailed reports on their activities is a system many groups have used.[91] Such reports make it easier for leaders to track agent spending and to know whether they are using resources in unapproved ways. This efficiency, however, comes at the cost of additional communications traffic, which means an increased risk of compromise. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, for example, kept extremely detailed, fairly centralized records of its financial activities—records that proved very useful for understanding the group and hunting down its fighters when they were captured by American forces in 2007 and 2008.[92]

Punishing agents who do not behave as the principals would like depends on both identifying deviant behavior and being able to wield a threat over agents. Dedicated sub-organizations can be very useful for identifying problematic operatives, which is why many organizations create security bureaucracies. Hezbollah, for example, created a security bureaucracy early on to police itself. It was called Special Security Apparatus, and the group was responsible for counterintelligence operations against Amal initially and later against Israeli agents.[93] While this provided better security, it diverted resources from the struggle with Israel. The security challenge is that, while being able to identify unfaithful agents can be useful, punished agents, or those who fear punishment, can always follow the example of Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl and go to the government.[94] This security cost is especially high for transnational groups that have agents in areas where they lack operational capabilities, and hence the means to violently deal with agents who cooperate with government forces.

Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations," *World Politics* 64, no. 1 (2012): 39–78.

[91]For examples of auditing in al-Qa'ida, see Harmony AFGP-2002-600689, AFGP-2002-003652, AFGP-2002-800573, and the series of four *Wall Street Journal* articles by Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins on December 20, 2001; December 30, 2001; December 31, 2001; and January 16, 2001.

[92]These captured documents are used extensively throughout this book and formed the basis for the excellent analysis in Benjamin Bahney et al., *An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corportation, 2010).

[93]For an early account see Ehud Ya'ari, "Rafsanjani May Not Be Able to Deliver," *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1989. On the Hezbollah security bureaucracy more generally see Carl Anthony Wege, "The Hizballah Security Apparatus," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 7 (2008). More broadly on Hezbollah's organizational evolution, see Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*.

[94]Governments can enhance this security cost by providing protection to defectors. The British "supergrass" program, for example, made it harder for the PIRA to deter arrested agents from giving evidence in exchange for freedom from prosecution.

Punishment in terrorist groups is often violent. The PIRA periodically tortured and killed suspected government agents, and the Kenyan Mau Mau executed some who stole from the group.[95] But it need not be this way. Take the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labour Party) in Angola; they used criticism/self-criticism sessions to generate a situation in which units punished minor infractions without leadership intervention.[96] The Philippine Hukbalahap rebels, censured commanders who pushed a settlement with the Philippine government in the 1950s by suspending them from the group, but executed those found to be expropriating organizational resources.[97] In some cases, punishment can simply mean exclusion from valued social and community resources.

JI, for example, ostracizes members who cooperate with the Indonesian authorities but does little else to punish them. Indeed, the threat of losing access to valuable community resources provides strong incentives for operatives to remain faithful in some religiously motivated groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, but also in a range of other settings in which there are temptations to take advantage of delegation.[98] Certain orthodox Jewish communities in Israel and the United States, for example, can sustain rich mutual aid networks in part because joining the community requires sacrifices that reduce people's options if they leave (attending seminary until the age of forty in the Israeli case) and, those who take advantage of the community, by not repaying a loan or by cheating on a business deal, lose access to all of its support.[99]

A related way of dealing with agency problems is to encourage members to enter into trust-inducing relationships such as marriage within their group. Those who enter into marriages within the movement face a larger cost than unattached members if they are caught behaving against their leader's wishes. Not only do they lose a future income stream, but even when not attacked violently are typically ostracized, losing familial and community connections as well. Such a strategy is central to the success of the *hawala* funds transfer system and many other financial networks operating in loosely regulated environments, including diamond

[95]Mohamed Mathu, *The Urban Guerrilla, Life Histories of the Revolution* (Richmond, BC: LSM Information Center, 1974), 31.
[96]Rui de Pinto and Don Bar, *The Making of a Middle Cadre* (Richmond, BC: LSM Information Center, 1973), 82–83.
[97]Luis Taruc, *He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerilla Leader* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 131–132, 151–152.
[98]This discussion draws on Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.*
[99]On these dynamics in the Syrian Jewish community in New York, see Zev Chafets, "The Sy Empire," *New York Times Magazine* (October 14, 2007).

traders and bankers in medieval Europe.[100] It is also used extensively in Islamist terrorist organizations with both al-Qa'ida and JI encouraging intermarriage among members' families.[101]

Of course, if a member embedded in a dense network of strong ties is captured, myriad opportunities for compromise are created. Here the rapid rolling up of more than seventy people involved in the ad hoc network supporting the 2004 Madrid bombings is instructive. Take Jamal Zagoum, one of the ringleaders of the Madrid train bombings.[102] Zagoum ran a cell phone shop in a busy Madrid neighborhood. He was responsible for supplying and activating the phones that triggered the bombs. Phones that were found at the scene of the bombing were traced by authorities back to Zagoum's shop. Police then arrested Abderrahim Zbakh, another one of the bombers, who worked with Zougam in his shop. Another mobile phone, this one found inside an unexploded bag bomb, led authorities to trace the explosives to a mine in northern Spain. From there the investigators were able to determine that Jose Emilio Surez Trashorras, a police informant and known drug trafficker, had been involved in the plot. He was ultimately charged with supplying explosives to the bombers. In the weeks following the attacks, several mobile phone cards, believed to have been used in the bombings, led authorities to an apartment in a Madrid suburb, where seven key suspects blew themselves up when surrounded by police. All told, eleven suspects were arrested within a week of the bombings. The network of dense social ties that facilitated trust and cooperation within the group also meant it was rapidly broken up after the attack.

Only three months after the initial attacks, seventy people were identified as being part of the network that orchestrated the bombing. Of those, twenty-three people within the network were directly related and

[100]On hawalas, see Lisa C. Caroll, *Alternative Remittance Systems Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnic Money Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent*, Report (Interpol, 2004). On bankers see Catherine S. M. Duggan, *Money From Strangers: Group Boundaries and Indirect Regulation in Developing Financial Markets*, Unpublished manuscript (Stanford University, 2007).

[101]On JI see: International Crisis Group, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia," *Indonesia Briefing* (2002); and Zachary Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," in *The Making of a Terrorist* (Vol. 1) ed. James J. F. Forest, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). On al-Qa'ida see examples in Brown, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989–2006*, 18; and Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 154.

[102]The following draws on Tim Golden and Craig Smith, "Spain Arrests 5 More Suspects in Madrid Bomb Attacks," *New York Times*, March 19, 2004.

many of the remainder were connected by past experiences or observable work and social ties.[103] To start, many of the accused were petty criminals or were known to be involved in drug dealing. And many of the men involved with the train bombing proved to be undisciplined and fairly distractible. One defendant, Rafa Zuhier, was removed from the courtroom during the trial for making faces, behavior that is not exactly typical of tightly controlled, well-focused operatives. Some were not even that committed. There was no indication that Trashorras, who was convicted of supplying the explosives for the attack, had any ideological investment in the attack.[104]

The loose connection of friends and associates that was discovered to be at the heart of the Madrid bombing reveals a group of people who had become radicalized, but were not particularly cautious or deliberate. Indeed, how could they be since their ties were established long before they contemplated any nefarious activities? Yet, without the kinds of safeguards a more hierarchical organization might impose, the connections between those involved was established early on. Some of those connections were identified by examining call records and noting the particular intensity of calling between certain people, but others connections were identified by examining familial and social ties.[105]

Clearly, from the point of view of a long struggle, this is not a very effective way to organize. Because government counterterrorism efforts naturally involve scrutiny and attention toward a terrorist's personal and social network, relying on making these ties stronger enhances security only as long as no one in the group is identified. Once they are, these networks create cascading vulnerabilities for the group as authorities work through the social networks of operatives who have been identified.[106] Recognizing the vulnerabilities inherent in relying on established, visible networks, the group that would become Hamas turned its military operations over to more junior personnel in 1986, sacrificing the skills and experiences of its more seasoned operatives because those

[103]José A. Rodríguez, *The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength*, Manuscript (University of Barcelona, 2005).
[104]Fiona Govan, "Profiles: Madrid Train Bombers," *The Telegraph*, October 31, 2007.
[105]The connections discussed here were established during the Madrid bombing trail in Spain and discerned from translated court transcripts. See in particular *Juzgado Central de Instruccion*, pp. 52, 70–73, 88–89.
[106]When the Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ) was recruiting in fall 1970, they asked at least one person to help them identify people who had not been arrested or taken part in demonstrations because those people were being watched. Carole de Vault, *The Informer* (Toronto, ON: Fleet Books, 1982), 110–111.

operatives were too easily traced by Israeli security forces.[107] The strengths and weaknesses of such networks were also on display in JI extremist Noordin Mohamed Top's network, which was quite deadly for a time, but which unraveled relatively quickly once police had a few initial leads following the July 17, 2009 hotel bombing in Jakarta. Using security video footage from the hotel, police identified the individuals involved and worked through their contacts to identify the man who rented the room where the attack was prepared. Once arrested, he provided information on a number of compatriots, and from there the police were able to work through family connections to rapidly identify additional suspects.[108]

Terrorist leaders may also reduce preference divergence by requiring initiation rites that: (1) screen out less committed recruits, or (2) facilitate punishment by making it hard to leave the group, reducing members' implicit threat over the leadership, as Sun-Ki Chai first pointed out in his pathbreaking 1993 piece on the organization of anti-government violence.[109] The German Red Army faction required prospective members to participate in bank robberies before allowing them to join, a pattern similar to that which Franz Fanon describes the FLN using during their war with the French in Algeria.[110] Some accounts suggest that participation in Hamas's social service organizations served a similar screening function, as did the training program in Afghanistan for al-Qa'ida.[111] The PIRA in the 1970s reportedly assessed the commitment of potential members by having them serve in an auxiliary force whose mission was

[107]Mishal and Sela *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 34. See also Mosab Hassan Yousef, *Son of Hamas* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2010).

[108]For a summary see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base." On network externalities generally see Walter Enders and Paan Jindapon, "Network Externalities and the Structure of Terrorist Networks," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 2 (2010): 262–280.

[109]His was the first work to apply agency theory to terrorism. Sun-Ki Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 1 (1993): 99–110.

[110]On the German Red Army factions, see Klaus Wesmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists," in *Political Violence and Terror*, ed. Peter Merkl (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). On the FLN, see Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 67.

[111]On Hamas, see Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*. On al-Qa'ida, see "Testimony of FBI Agent John Anticev on Odeh," *United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al.,* 5 (7) 98 Cr. 1023, 27 February 2001, 1630–1638. See also Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering Al-Qa'ida* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corportation, 2002), 5.

community policing.[112] The problem for groups is that committing violent offenses, attending training camps, and participating in public auxiliaries all involve acts that can identify individuals to the government.[113]

An alternative screening strategy is to demand the kind of lengthy ideological debates between prospective members and their recruiters which are an old screening tactic of militant organizations, one practiced by GSPC, the Red Brigades, ETA, and others. Essentially, weeks or months of late-night debates about fine doctrinal distinctions are too laborious for anyone not extremely committed to the cause. This is analogous to the role of education as a screening mechanism for business firms.[114] The argument in that context is that most of what you learn in college is not of direct value for most corporate jobs, but that those for whom college is hard will not be good at those jobs. College thus serves to screen, not to educate.

This strategy, however, has several problems. One is that those who are extreme in their ideology are not always the brightest. Another is that ideology can be faked. Both facts are eloquently summarized by Abu Iyad, the second-in-command of Fatah until his death in 1991 and alleged head of Black September, which was responsible for the 1972 kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. In his autobiography Iyad relates how Fatah suffered a great loss in January 1971 when the Jordanian security services—with whom the group had been fighting—seized a large number of arms caches. Iyad writes that Fatah

> later conducted investigations enabling us to unmask a number of their agents, who for the most part had passed themselves off as fanatic militants advocating a maximalist position. This only served to reinforce my conviction that diehard extremists are either imbeciles or traitors.[115]

Screening for ideological purity, moreover, may weed out people with useful skills who do not have the patience for lengthy doctrinal debates, or the education to participate in them. As a result, groups may be missing out on potentially effective operatives who happen to be impatient or less

[112]Andrew Silke, "Rebel's Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 1 (1999): 61.

[113]Former trainees in Afghanistan, for example, have received significant scrutiny around the world, with those who evince even tangential ties to currently active groups being arrested on the basis of attending training. See for example the arrest and prosecution of the Lackawanna Six in the United States in September 2002.

[114]Michael Spence, "Job Market Signalling," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87, no. 3 (1973): 355–374.

[115]Abu Iyad and Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (New York: Times Books, 1981), 92.

committed.[116] A related problem experienced by Russian Marxist terrorist organizations is that in order to bring in more recruits, groups often have to lower their standards for ideological purity. Doing so increased the frequency of counterproductive actions and reduced security by bringing people into the group who were susceptible to monetary inducements from government agents.[117] Ultimately, all strategies to reduce agency problems also come with security costs.

2.4 THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGE OF BALANCING SECURITY WITH EFFICIENCY AND CONTROL

Terrorist organizations face two tradeoffs that create organizational dilemmas and ultimately limit how effective terrorists can be. For each we can identify three conditions that must obtain or there is no real tradeoff to consider. In both cases the three conditions outlined almost always coexist and therefore terrorists almost never have an easy organizational decision.

The *security-control tradeoff* creates a dilemma when: preferences over tactics are not perfectly aligned, so that some agents want to attack different targets or want to conduct more or fewer attacks than their leaders;[118] principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents' tactical planning nor wield a threat of violence over them; and political goals are being placed at risk by the types of tactics operatives would employ if left to make their own decisions. All three conditions are necessary. If a group's political goals are not being put at risk, for example, then leaders have no reason to pay the security costs of exercising control.

The *security-efficiency tradeoff* creates a dilemma under similar conditions when: agents below the leadership are less than perfectly committed or want to spend money differently than leaders would like;[119] principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents' uses of money nor credibly punish them for observed infractions; and resources are constrained so that

[116]Of course, as one Yemeni militant notes, groups do need some members who are educated to carry out effective operations. Harmony, AFGP-2002-800517, 37.

[117]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 160–162.

[118]This can occur because operatives have different preferences over violence than leaders or because leaders and their operatives receive different information about the appropriate targets. The difference between the impact of these is explored in the game-theoretic models presented in the next chapter.

[119]No matter what their preferences are between spending on attacks and allocating resources to salaries or other private goods, leaders want every cent passed down allocated to achieving political impact, often through violent operations. I thank Jim Fearon for pointing this out.

leaders will not just accept the financial inefficiencies created by agency problems. Once again, all three conditions are necessary for the joint condition. If a group's resources are unconstrained, for example, then it need not care about financial efficiency.

Under either of these sets of conditions, terrorist organizations will face a meaningful tradeoff, either with efficiency or control. We can think of the extent to which they do so as depending critically on four variables: how discriminate they need to be in the use of violence given their political goals; how much uncertainty there is over what operatives should do given what they observe about the world; how much divergence there is in underlying preferences within the group; and the level of security pressure they are under from government forces. The reminder of this section examines each in turn.

2.4.1 The Impact of Discrimination

A clear implication of the discussion so far is that the more discriminate a group needs to be, the more value it will see in building organizational structures to exercise control. One place we see clear variation on discrimination is in the Northern Ireland conflict. The political goals of the Provisional IRA required great care in the application of violence. The group had to place sufficient military pressure on the British to compel them to give up Northern Ireland, while at the same time avoiding excessive violence that could cost them the support of moderate Catholics or make it politically impossible for British politicians to "abandon" the Protestant majority. By comparison, the main political goals of Loyalist organizations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force were to: (1) maintain the political status quo; and (2) deter Republican violence against Protestant civilians. One way to maintain the political status quo was to convince British leaders that the Protestant majority opposed any moves away from a union with Great Britain. The mere existence of violent organizations that opposed any concessions sent that message of community opposition, regardless of how those organizations used violence. More generally, theories of deterrence suggest that sometimes the threat of an unpredictable reaction to an attack, as opposed to a discriminate and well-targeted one, is the best way to deter a potential foe.[120]

This perspective turns our attention to what exactly it is about ideology that influences how groups organize. If we were to place groups into

[120]This is analogous to Thomas Schelling's famous "threat that leaves something to chance."

commonly used ideological categories such as "Islamist" or "separatist," we would find a great deal of variance in how groups within each category are organized. Hamas looks quite similar to Hezbollah, but both are organized quite differently than Palestinian Islamic Jihad. What matters for organizational choices is not that these three groups share an "Islamist" ideology. What matters is the specific operational guidance drawn from their political goals. As we will see in detail in chapter 6 with the early Russian marxist organizations, and in chapter 7 with both Loyalist and Nationalist groups in Northern Ireland, these goals matters deeply for how different groups organize.

2.4.2 The Role of Uncertainty

Uncertainty affects the trade-offs in a number of ways. First, it makes it harder for leaders to know if operatives achieve a given result because they got unlucky, or because they were taking advantage of the organization. This is a standard moral hazard problem and, as we will discuss in chapter 5, the more prevalent the issue, the more valuable it is for leaders to invest in efforts to monitor and control financial transactions.[121]

Second, and more interestingly, groups vary in the level of uncertainty operatives have over what kinds of violence will serve the group's goals. For some groups, it is very hard for those living underground to know what targets to hit just by studying the group's ideology, while for others the ideology provides clear guidance. The clearest variation on uncertainty is between different pre-Revolutionary Russian terrorist organizations. The largest anarchist organizations espoused an ideology that defined anyone who profited from the existing economic system as a legitimate target. This made identifying appropriate targets very easy: anyone who was an agent of the state, who appeared to be middle class or higher, or who frequented an establishment serving the bourgeoisie and upper classes was considered a good target. By comparison, the reasons the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries adopted terrorism included protecting the revolutionaries by making agents of the state cautious through the threat of retaliation for specific wrongs and forcing the population to think politically by committing high-profile acts. The first of these required knowledge of individual actions; simply identifying someone as an agent of the state was insufficient. The second meant identifying targets that would draw a high level of public attention in a manner consistent with

[121] Dave Siegel and I use game theory to explore the impact of this kind of uncertainty in depth in a series of papers.

the group's ideological message. Coordinating high-profile assassinations with other party efforts requires more information than just identifying the members of a certain class, hence a group wanting to use violence in that way would see more value in communicating with and controlling tactical operatives.

2.4.3 The Impact of Preference Divergence

The more that the preferences of principals and agents in terrorist groups diverge, the worse it is for the principals to have operatives doing what they want. Suppose a cell within an organization wants to conduct a mass-casualty attack. A leader who believes that it is politically ideal to have a bomb go off with no casualties has a stronger incentive to monitor and control that cell than a leader who believes five to ten casualties is optimal. Similarly, the more financially constrained a group is, the more costly it is to have financial agents skim organizational resources.[122]

Identifying variation on preference divergence is tricky, as the observed level of conflict in a group is a function of both underlying preference divergence and the amount of control leaders exercise, as the models in chapter 5 will highlight.[123] Readily observable actions, such as internal violence, are a clear indicator of preference divergence. However, the absence of such violence does not provide evidence that there is no preference divergence. An apparently united organization is consistent with three situations: no preference divergence; preference divergence and very effective control; or leaders who are not trying to exert control.

First-person accounts and expert knowledge are critical for distinguishing among these possibilities. There was, for example, no readily

[122]One woman who was solicited to raise funds for the FLQ by allowing them to rob her as she couriered money to the bank was offered 20 percent of the take for allowing the robbery to happen. See de Vault, *The Informer*, 113–134. She refused, but perhaps if the group had been less financially constrained, and so could have been more generous, the result would have been different.

[123]It is easy to identify when preference divergence causes problems. For example, in 1993 al-Qa'ida operatives offered financial assistance to the Somali militant group al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) if it would act as their agent by attacking U.S. forces. Al-Ittihad's leaders turned al-Qa'ida down, responding that "... the time is not right to start conducting jihad .... [we] must work against the Americans through political means." But suppose al-Qa'ida had been able to offer sufficient resources to make attacking the Americans worth it for AIAI. Would we then say there was no preference divergence? See Harmony, AFGP-2002-600110, 8–10. For more on AIAI leader Hassan Aweys, see Shapiro and Watts, *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, Appendix B-III.

observable internal violence over Jemaah Islamiyah's (JI) decision to send fighters to Ambon in response to communal violence in mid-1999. Detailed accounts of the decision, however, reveal that it triggered a great deal of disagreement over whether the time was right for JI to initiate violence. Indeed, there were actually multiple disagreements about what to do in Ambon. JI's senior leader, Abdullah Sungkar, ordered the group to get involved. The leaders of the JI regional command responsible for Ambon, *Mantiqi II*, were reluctant to do so. Lower level operatives in *Mantiqi II* pushed to join the fight. In this instance senior leaders and local operatives both believed violence had greater political utility than did the regional leadership.[124] A number of JI members from other areas, who were dissatisfied with the regional leaders' cautious approach, decided to leave to fight in Ambon without the group's permission.[125] JI's leaders tried to dissuade these members by telling them that they and their families would receive no support from JI if they were killed or injured in Ambon.[126] However, the members were not deterred, and as efforts to control their agents failed—and as the conflict in Ambon took on an increasingly religious tone—the leaders' preferences shifted and they decided to commit JI to the conflict.[127]

When comparing two groups, we can say one has higher levels of preference divergence if expert opinion and first-person accounts clearly report more disagreement in that group, regardless of whether those disagreements translate into unauthorized action.[128] The Palestinian case provides a clear contrast on this score. Fatah's militant organizations integrated a very heterogeneous group of operatives who, by all accounts, had frequent intense disagreements over a wide variety of matters. In contrast, Hamas recruited its militants from a much more homogeneous population, one that had been pre-screened through religious institutions. There is little evidence of disagreements between Hamas operatives and their leaders.[129]

[124]International Crisis Group, "Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," 4.
[125]Ibid., 4–7.
[126]In more mundane terms, JI tried to control these members by threatening to take away their insurance coverage. Author interview, Jakarta, February 21, 2007.
[127]Once they did, JI's leaders exercised considerable control over how resources sent to Ambon were spent. Author interview, Jakarta, February 21, 2007.
[128]Unfortunately, this definition does not distinguish between the intensity of divergence and the prevalence of divergence. For example, suppose that in Group A 90 percent of the agents had preferences that were slightly different from the leadership's, while in Group B 20 percent of the agents had preferences that were hugely different than the leadership's. It is not clear which group we should think of as having higher preference divergence.
[129]There is, however, ample evidence of disagreements between Hamas's leaders.

2.4.4 The Impact of Government Counterterrorism

The impact of government pressure on the tradeoffs is quite straightforward. The harder government forces are working and the more effective they are at identifying and exploiting the signals given by managerial activities (by surveilling people attending meetings, tracking leads from captured documents, etc.), the costlier it is for groups to employ the tools that can solve agency problems. Hence, all other things being equal, groups under heavy government pressure will organize in ways that give up control and efficiency relative to otherwise similar groups under less pressure. All other things, of course, are rarely equal, and some groups adopt new organizational technologies over time, enabling them to ease this tradeoff. The adoption of security bureaucracies is one such technology. Both Hamas and Hezbollah adopted these early on. As we will also see in the Northern Ireland case study, the PIRA shifted from a straightforward hierarchy to a new hybrid cellular-hierarchical structure in the late 1970s which allowed it to do better on both security and control.[130] Such technological innovations, however, are rare.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Terrorist leaders face a familiar organizational dilemma, balancing the need to control operatives with the costs of doing so. While the dilemma is particularly dire in terrorist organizations in which exercising control can put the leader's life at risk, it is quite common from an organization theory perspective. Every private firm or government bureaucracy struggles with the question of how much autonomy to grant, how much to audit, and how to deal with transgressions. Terrorist organizations are no different in dealing with similar conundrums. They just pay an unusually high cost for trying to solve them.

There are a number of ways in which preference divergence creates organizational problems for terrorist groups, and each method for dealing with it creates its own security risks. The tension between the need to control operatives and the costs of doing so creates a difficult tradeoff for these groups. I have argued briefly that a group's solutions to these

[130]David Siegel and I explore a different dimension of organizational technology, memory, in Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations."

tradeoffs should vary in response to four factors: (1) the discrimination in the use of force demanded by a group's political goals; (2) the level of uncertainty operatives face about which attacks will serve the political goal; (3) the amount of preference divergence in a group; and (4) the level of government security pressure. Essentially, terrorist leaders will be more likely to err on the side of control and efficiency when resolving their organizational dilemmas when the demand for discrimination is high, the uncertainty of their operatives is large, the amount of preference divergence is substantial, and government security pressure is modest.

This discussion has so far left these variables loosely defined. We will be more precise later in the book. For now, the key point is that terrorist groups suffer the same managerial challenges as any other human organization. In terrorist organizations, these challenges lead inescapably to the twin security-efficiency and security-control tradeoffs. For terrorist organizations, there is simply no way out of their organizational dilemma, and while their chosen solutions may vary, they almost always do so in sensible ways given the tradeoffs they face. Before examining those tradeoffs in greater detail, we turn to the first empirical chapters of the book. Examining how the tradeoffs played out in AQI and in a range of terrorism memoirs will help develop the intuition needed for a deeper analysis of the managerial dilemmas terrorists face.

CHAPTER 3

The Insider's View on Terrorist Organizations

3.1 ORGANIZING TERROR

So far we have seen many reasons to expect agency problems in terrorist organizations and have discussed a range of individual examples of such problems, how they play out, and how groups strive to manage them. What we lack is sound evidence on how widespread these problems actually are within terrorist groups. Unfortunately, any effort to assess the prevalence of agency problems is hampered by the relative dearth of data on what actually goes on inside these inherently secretive institutions.

While much has been written on terrorist organizations, little of it provides a solid basis for making claims about the prevalence of the organizational dilemmas discussed in this book. Most scholarly accounts rely on a combination of inferences from public communiques and evidence from interviews. Some of those interviews are with group members, but more often they are with agents from the intelligence services that are combating terrorist organizations. Examining internal documents cannot solve this problem either (though doing so is useful in other ways, as we will see in the next chapter) because, aside from a few highly salient examples such as al-Qa'ida, Fatah, and al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the internal correspondence of terrorist organizations has rarely been preserved. When it has been—for example, police files in France and Spain on ETA—it is not accessible to scholars. Overall, the existing literature provides little direct evidence on how the challenges of hierarchy and control have played out across a broad range of groups.

Looking at memoirs and autobiographies written by terrorists or former terrorists provides a way to fill in this evidentiary gap. Former participants in a broad range of groups have written memoirs, and this chapter looks at one hundred such accounts from participants in forty different groups. For these purposes, terrorist groups are defined as those whose use of violence regularly violated the principles of distinction and

proportionality under the law of armed conflict for at least one year of their existence.[1]

Collectively, these autobiographies serve a number of purposes. First, they offer some of the richest sources available for details on what goes on inside terrorist groups. Because most such groups do not leave a large documentary record of their politics, bureaucracy, and operations, individual accounts provide the only effective publicly available window into how these organizations operate day to day. They are, in effect, primary source material and can provide a great deal of direct, nuanced evidence on how terrorists deal with the dilemmas inherent in managing violent covert organizations.

Second, and more important, the memoirs provide a way to how widespread agency problems are among terrorist groups, because they cover forty terrorist groups operating from 1880 through to the first decade of the current century. By looking at how often the specific indicators of agency problems show up in these accounts (e.g., how often the memoirs report substantial disagreements over tactics) we can get a sense for the prevalence of these indicators among terrorist groups.[2]

Admittedly, the memoirs do not provide a complete account of groups, they do not represent a random sampling from the universe of terrorist groups, and there are many groups whose members have never written memoirs. Thus, some caution is warranted in weighing the evidence in this chapter. That caution should be mitigated, though, by the fact that these documents are almost surely biased against reporting the patterns we have been discussing, rather than overstating their prevalence. After all, what former terrorist sitting down to write the history of his or her valiant struggle for a cause would want to write about the bureaucratic challenges of being a terrorist? Using these memoirs to assess the pervasiveness of organizational dilemmas in terrorist groups is thus a conservative approach and unquestionably underestimates the extent of the dilemmas.[3]

[1]This is an intentionally inclusive definition that picks up some groups normally thought of as insurgents such as the Greek Cypriot insurgent organization EOKA. Since there is no bright line between insurgency and terrorism, this inclusiveness seemed appropriate for assessing organizational issues. Skeptical readers should discount stories from groups they do not consider to be terrorists.

[2]David Patel first suggested this approach to me in the fall of 2007 and I am glad I could follow his outstanding advice.

[3]An alternative approach to studying how groups organize and the consequences of that would be to develop panel data on the following variables at the group/year level: (1) violent actions, (2) organizational structure, (3) government counterterrorism practices, and (4) organizational goals. That way one could, for example, regress lethality on the level of centralization to see if there was a link. Unfortunately, the information needed to reliably do so simply does not exist. Information on government counterterrorism

Despite that bias, we will see that agency problems are well documented and pervasive in terrorist organizations, and that security-reducing paperwork and bureaucracy were present in many of them. The majority of memoirs describe hierarchical organizations with multiple levels of authority, and many report intense disputes over which targets to hit and how to carry out attacks. Overall, it is striking that so many terrorist memoirs contain accounts of exactly the kinds of organizational problems I discuss in earlier chapters.

Our analysis of the terrorist memoirs begins with a discussion of how these accounts were chosen and of the process that leads some terrorists to write these accounts. We then look at what the memoirs reveal about the frequency of specific indicators of agency problems across groups. Following that quantitative analysis, we review a series of anecdotes from the memoirs that highlight each indicator and provide a richer understanding of exactly how the terrorist's dilemma plays out in practice.

3.2 DATA

This section provides background information on the 108 memoirs used in this chapter.[4] I began collecting these memoirs by surveying the secondary literature on terrorism and the historiography of specific groups to identify primary sources in English, French, and Spanish.[5] I also

strategies over time is too spotty to permit meaningful coding of annual-level variation, except for a handful of countries. That spottiness pales in comparison to the massive gaps in our knowledge of the organization of terrorist groups, gaps that are particularly large for more obscure groups that did not kill Westerners in significant numbers and have therefore not been studied by the security community in any depth. Moreover, the histories that do exist tend to focus on politics, not organizational issues, and while some note major changes in group structure, they do not systematically collect information on what goes on between those changes. All of this means that any data on group structures over time is going to be extremely noisy for all but the most well-documented groups. That measurement error surely correlates with groups' activities—because groups that kill in large numbers are more likely to have good histories written on them—meaning any statistical analysis faces major barriers.

[4]Portions of this section and the next first appeared in Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations," relying on a slightly smaller dataset.

[5]I did not find any prominent Arabic sources that met the inclusion criteria. One prominent scholar who has studied jihadi writings for many years, Thomas Hegghammer, attributed this to the absence of autobiography as a genre in jihadi writings. Private communication, Thomas Hegghammer, August 18, 2009. The documents closest to

consulted a number of prominent experts on terrorism and specific conflicts. From this review I identified 167 potential autobiographies of individuals involved in terrorist groups. Of these books, 111 carried informative descriptions of individual operational activities. I was able to procure and analyze 108 of those. Most are traditional memoirs, but a few are histories that contain substantial direct testimony by the former terrorists.[6]

The memoirs that were analyzed in detail span the modern history of terrorism, from Marxist groups in Russia in the late nineteenth century and Western European leftist groups in the 1970s, to Islamist groups today. Fifty-five of these memoirs were written by participants in nationalist groups, thirty-nine by participants in social revolutionary groups (or mostly leftist groups seeking major changes in society), seven by participants in social reactionary groups, six by participants in jihadi groups, and one by an anarchist. Geographically, thirty-seven were written by participants in European groups, thirty-nine by participants in African groups, seventeen by those in Middle Eastern groups, eleven by participants in North American groups, eight by participants in South American groups, and six by participants in Asian groups. Not surprisingly, parties that ended up in government provided the most memoirs, with twelve people who fought for the Provisional IRA, twelve from the African National Congress, and ten from the Mau Mau, contributing to the sample. Urban guerrilla organizations from highly literate societies were also highly represented, with the pre-1972 IRA and Weathermen each contributing seven and six memoirs, respectively and M-19 (a Colombian urban guerrilla organization) adding five more.

For many terrorists, participation in a group is a highly significant life event, often the most important thing they will do. Whatever the reasons for joining in the first place, terrorists by and large accept substantial risk in order to advance highly salient political goals, such as defending one's community, freedom from colonial rule, or the transformation of their country's economic system.[7] Understandably, those who survive the

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our criteria were written by members of al-Qa'ida and are included in the Harmony database.

[6]See, for example, Padraig O'Malley, *Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007).

[7]On reasons for joining, see the review of the psychological literature in Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2005): 3–42 . See also the explicit arguments about individual motivations in: Richard Pipes, *The Degaev Affair: Terror and Treason in Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Christopher Reuter, *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide*

experience of being part of a terrorist group or operation have a tendency to want to share their story, and thus a fair number of former terrorists write memoirs.[8] Because terrorism continues to be a fascinating subject, many of these memoirs are actually published, and a large number are translated into English.

One may rightfully be concerned that the characteristics of terrorists who write memoirs could bias inferences about the internal organization of terrorist groups. As mentioned, those who write memoirs have strong motivations to cast their actions in the most favorable light. Of the 108 memoirs examined here, only eighteen cast the author's actions in a negative way.[9] We can, therefore, expect that most of these authors will recall their participation favorably and will minimize discussions of intra-organizational strife and discord. It is not clear, however, how this bias should affect the likelihood that they accurately recount the institutional structures that governed their participation. In addition, bureaucracy, paperwork, and organizational minutiae are inherently boring topics for the target audience of these memoirs (though hopefully not for the readers of this book) and so we could expect these memoirs to underreport mundane organizational details and therefore underreport the extent to which bureaucracy and hierarchy are used to solve organizational dilemmas.[10] On average, then, these authors can be expected to understate the extent of preference divergence and overstate the level of cohesion within groups. Few people, after all, want to recount the time they risked everything for a particular cause while sharing anecdotes that make the organization for which they were working look bad.

Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the 21st Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

[8] Whether the proportion is higher than for other people involved in high-risk political activity is hard to know. As a comparison, about 91 of the 1,931 individuals who have served in the U.S. Senate have written memoirs, about 4.7 percent.

[9] A related issue is that the sample is biased toward countries that have a tradition of autobiography, or were colonies of countries that do. Few Islamist terrorists write memoirs, for example, while many Irish terrorists do. Any concerns that the relative dearth of Islamist voices in these memoirs would bias us toward finding high levels of record keeping should be allayed by the fact that the internal papers of three prominent Islamist or Arab organizations—al-Qa'ida, al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and Fatah— have come to light and all show a keen affinity for paperwork during key moments in their histories. We will study al-Qa'ida in Iraq in detail in the next section.

[10] As noted, only eighteen of the memoirs were written by people who view their time as terrorists in a negative light. The results are substantially the same when dropping these memoirs. I have also omitted several books sometimes cited as terrorist memoirs that are transparently fraudulent.

3.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

For each memoir, I collected a variety of information including the organization(s) the individual was in, factors that could bias their memoirs including whether they were repentant or a government agent, and a vector of dichotomous variables indicating whether they mention each of the following:

- Disagreement over political goals
- Disagreement over tactics
- Disagreement over target
- Disagreement over money or logistics
- Problems maintaining discipline
- Multiple levels of hierarchy
- Operatives being punished by leaders
- Security-reducing monitoring, defined as keeping records on paper or electronic media that could help government authorities kill or capture group members or significantly disrupt their activities

Overall, every single one of these appeared in at least thirty-two books, and some were present in many more. The right-hand column of table 3.1 shows how often each pattern occurs in the memoirs, as does the top figure in each column. The figures in the off-diagonal show the number of memoirs in which different combinations of patterns occur. Of the thirty-three memoirs discussing conflicts over political goals, for example, nineteen discuss problems maintaining discipline and fourteen report instances in which operatives were punished by leaders. Of the sixty-three memoirs that discuss disagreements over tactics, thirty-one also report disagreements over money or logistics.

Five important findings became clear through this analysis. First, the majority of groups experience problems because of the heterogeneous preferences of their members. Of the memoirs, seventy-nine of 108 report nontrivial agency problems. Second, most groups are decidedly hierarchical and eighty-eighty of the memoirs discuss three or more levels of authority in the organization. Third, security-reducing monitoring of group members is common; thirty-two memoirs mention it. This monitoring ranged from the Warsaw Underground's audit department,[11] and the Irgun's detailed tracking of weapons given to them by Jewish

[11]Stefan Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939–1945* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 2004), 334–335.

Table 3.1. Organizational Issues in Terrorist Memoirs

	Disagree over political goals	Disagree over tactics	Disagree over targets	Disagree over money or logistics	Problems maintaining discipline	Multiple levels of hierarchy	Operatives punished by leaders	Security-reducing monitoring	Total (Proportion)
Disagree over political goals?	33								33(.31)
Disagree over tactics?	28	63							63(.58)
Disagree over targets?	15	37	40						40(.37)
Disagree over money or logistics?	16	31	23	33					38(.35)
Problems maintaining discipline?	19	45	34	31	51				51(.47)
Multiple levels of hierarchy?	30	59	38	36	49	88			88(.81)
Operatives punished by leaders?	14	36	27	27	37	43	44		44(.41)
Security-reducing monitoring?	13	25	17	20	21	30	22	32	32(.30)

soldiers in the British Army,[12] to the Mau Mau requirement that commanders provide village leaders with receipts for food expropriated during the Emergency.[13] Fourth, rates of record keeping are roughly similar in nationalist groups (19 of 55) and social revolutionary ones (11 of 35).

Fifth, there is a great deal of variation in how much these phenomena are observed together. Across memoirs the tetrachoric correlation—a measure of how much memoirs that contain evidence of one pattern also have evidence of another—ranges quite a bit. All memoirs discussing disagreements over strategy and tactics also report multiple levels of hierarchy. Most memoirs reporting disagreements over spending also report disagreements over targets; the correlation between these indicators is 0.66. Few memoirs report operatives being punished, but of those that do, most also report political and tactical disagreements. While we cannot interpret these figures as representing population averages at the group level—the obvious concentration of memoirs in certain groups makes that untenable—they do show unambiguously that there was no escaping the core organizational challenges that are present in all groups.

Indeed, if we define bureaucracy as the combination of hierarchy and security-reducing paperwork, then 28 percent (30 of 108) of the terrorists in our sample observed enough bureaucracy to report it in their memoirs. Interestingly, these memoirs were not unduly concentrated in specific groups. Of the forty-five groups represented in these memoirs, participants in sixteen (36%) reported bureaucracy, participants in thirty-eight (84%) reported multiple levels of hierarchy, and participants in thirty-six (80%) discussed specific agency problems. Overall the evidence is quite strong that bureaucracy has been present in a wide range of terrorist groups over a long period of time.

3.4 CONTENT ANALYSIS: SOME GOOD STORIES

The autobiographies contain hundreds of interesting stories and some specific examples are worth discussing at length because they provide vivid illustrations of key organizational issues.

In particular, they show that terrorists consider the tradeoffs between security and control, that they often face disagreements over money

[12]Tzila Amidor Heller, *Behind Prison Walls* (Hoboken, NJ: Jabotinsky Press, 1999), 254.
[13]Waruhiu Itote, *Mau Mau General* (Nairobi: East African Institute Press, 1971), 285–291.

and tactics, that they have problems maintaining discipline, and that operatives are regularly punished for taking actions which harm groups in some manner. At the root of these issues is the fact that participants in terrorist groups often have very different ideas than their leaders about what should be done. As we will see, the resulting disputes play out in a number of fascinating ways.[14]

3.4.1 Terrorists Consider the Tradeoffs between Security and Control

The best place to start is with the fact that terrorists are often quite aware of the implications of different organizational structures. Debates over how much autonomy to give the combatant "assault force" in the Irgun, a Zionist terrorist group operating in Palestine from 1931 to 1948, revolved around the familiar problem that less autonomy meant greater control for leaders but more operational risk.[15] Luis Taruc, a one-time commander in the Philippine Hukbalahap Communist insurgency in the Philippines, describes how his group reorganized in the early 1950s partly because operatives were not being sufficiently disciplined in their use of violence or raising of funds.[16] That discipline was subsequently instituted by executing wayward members.[17]

Similar self-conscious organizational choices are apparent in Naim Qassem's interesting account of Hezbollah's history.[18] Qassem, the group's deputy secretary-general (second in command) provides an account that is half memoir and half ideological tract justifying Hezbollah's political and past actions. Despite its obvious biases, the account is informative, particularly when Qassem recounts how Hezbollah's founders settled on a "hierarchical pyramid structure" after some debate, and then articulates ten principles that structure supported.

> Individuals were required to observe and comply with their assigned Party functions, the most important of which was resistance activity. Making

[14]Mulla Krekar, former second-in-command of the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan's (IMK) military department and original leader of Ansar al-Islam, highlights this in his memoir when he discusses disputes within the IMK in 1992 about whether to accept funds from Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to fight Iraq, and in November 2001 over whether to sign a peace agreement ending years of low-level fighting with the PUK. Mulla Krekar, *Med egne Ord (In My Own Words)* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), 96–98.
[15]Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (New York: Nash Publishing, 1977), 79–80.
[16]Taruc, *He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerilla Leader*, 71–74.
[17]See multiple examples at ibid., 151–152.
[18]Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi Books, 2005).

> available the appropriate job description framework was another Party priority, alongside the distribution of functional responsibilities and authority boundaries needed for effective goal execution and the facilitation of coordination amount the Party's various units.[19]

As we might expect in a group with such healthy respect for how hierarchy can contribute to effective action, the group seems to be quite disciplined. Qassem tells one particular story that highlights Hezbollah's ability to control its operatives. After routing Israel's proxy in Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), following the Israeli withdrawal from its security zone in Lebanon on May 25, 2000, Hezbollah successfully prevented its fighters from retaliating against SLA collaborators. As he describes it:

> some of the young combatants . . . had a desire for vengeance—especially those who were aware of what the collaborators and their families had inflicted on the *mujahideen* and their next of kin across the occupied villages. Resistance leadership issued a strict warning forbidding any such action and vowing to discipline those who took it, whatever the justification.[20]

Critically, Qassem is not claiming his fighters refrained from killing collaborators because they agreed with the leadership's political logic. He is saying that they wanted to seek revenge, that their preferences were in fact very different from their leaders', but that they were restrained from doing so by the threat of being found out and punished.

Such constraints are not the only reason for paperwork, and sometimes it is used to help manage complex operations. Two examples from Gerry Bradley's quasi-memoir of his time in the PIRA stand out on this score.[21] The first example concerns coordinating operations. When Bradley was in charge of the IRA's "third battalion" in Belfast in 1973, he ". . . had seven companies to coordinate. . . " and to ". . . prevent companies from clashing in their operations, every company OC sent in a 'chock' (a written report) to Bradley each day, listing the operations proposed in the company areas."[22] The second example is about making the best use of the group's personnel. As Bradley and his co-author describe it, "In 1973 towards the end of Bradley's tenure as OC, the Belfast adjutant, Jim Brown, called him to a meeting and asked that he get the men in each company in the battalion to write out a 'chock', listing all the operations they'd been on—

[19]Ibid., 159–160.
[20]Ibid., 130.
[21]The book is co-authored with a reporter and uses a mix of first and third person narrative.
[22]Gerry Bradley and Brian Feeney, *Insider: Gerry Bradley's Life in the IRA* (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2009), 121.

essentially a CV. That way, brigade would be able to select the best men for the squads. Bradley thought it was madness to have documents like that floating around. Although the chocks wouldn't be signed, it would be obvious who the men were in each case."[23]

3.4.2 Disagreements over Money

Disagreements over money appear in a number of the books. One of the best examples comes from the autobiography of Michael Baumann, a member of the Movement of the 2nd of June, a small leftist group operating in West Germany in the early to mid-1970s. Baumann recounts how the group conducted a series of bank robberies in 1975, and promptly split into two factions amidst disputes over how to spend the money.[24] Sean MacStiofain, head of the PIRA from 1970 to 1972, describes similar disagreements over how to allocate the "Northern Defense Fund," which was raised from community contributions after the 1969 Bogside riots.[25] In MacStiofain's telling, the dispute was over how much of the funds should go to the Army Council, which would distribute them as needed throughout the organization, and how much should be spent locally in Belfast. Disagreements over resources are not always so explicit and are sometimes reflected in operatives who scheme to alter the allocation of resources. A nice example of this is when Cecilia Bobrovskaya, a prominent Bolshevik in the 1905 revolution, describes how during the November 1905 violence in Moscow, she "... resorted to all sorts of ruses to get an extra agitator from the Center," which controlled where "agitators" (basically specialists in violence) were assigned.[26]

The more mundane disagreements over spending—such as how some operatives prefer to keep a cut of organizational spending for themselves and often have the discretion to do so are on display in Ngugi Kabiro's description of what it was like to run guns for the Mau Mau during the Kenyan Emergency. Kabiro recounts how the salesclerk at a sporting goods shop identified him as a Kikuyu and approached him about selling arms.[27] Kabiro sensed an opportunity to make some money since he was friends

[23]Ibid., 160.
[24]Bommi Baumann, *Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann's Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerrilla* (New York: Grove Press, 1979), 104–105.
[25]Sean MacStiofain, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 129.
[26]Cecilia Bobrovskaya, *Twenty Years in Underground Russia: Memoirs of a Rank-and-File Bolshevik* (New York: International Publishers, 1934), 126–127.
[27]Ngugi Kabiro, *The Man in the Middle: The Story of Ngugi Kabiro* (Richmond, BC: LSM Information Center, 1973), 40–42.

with several of the Mau Mau's "Nairobi fighters" and knew the group was interested in buying guns. He had them put him in touch with Kinyua, "[who] was a leading fighter in the city and the elders [had] assigned him the task of handling these matters [i.e., buying guns]."[28] After meeting with Kinyua, Kabiro went to see the salesclerk, who quoted him a price of 800 shillings for six pistols and ammunition. Kabiro then informed Kinyua of this arrangement, but quoted him a price of 1,000 shillings. The deal was made and Kabiro made 200 shillings, but he was worried that "... Kinyua might somehow find out about my self-calculated commission ... putting me in hot water with the Mau Mau fighters and thus endangering my life.[29]

In Kabiro's story, the inherent difficulty of measuring how much the operative (in this case Kabiro) took for himself created an opportunity for self-dealing that was inefficient from the organization's point of view and so should be punished, hence his fear of being caught. Other Mau Mau memoirs actually complain about people like Kabiro. Mohamed Mathu, for example, who led urban operations during the Kenyan Emergency, complains that[30]

> in Nairobi our movement had attracted many men who had earlier been driven by unemployment and hunger into a life of crime. These men were employed in eliminating traitors and were very active in stealing guns, ammunition, other necessary supplies and money. They would not, however, perform these services for nothing. They always insisted on being paid for the goods they managed to acquire. This selfish desire to make personal gains out of the revolution did much, as I now look back, to damage and perhaps destroy what began as a just struggle against British colonial rule. Too often the high principles of revolution were thrown aside for personal wealth. ... I knew that even some of the elders on the Central Committee were putting money from the dues we paid (each member paid a monthly "poll tax" of 20s) into the bank for their private use.

Given that these types of problems were widespread (they appear in 38 memoirs), it is not surprising that many leaders seek accountability for how funds are spent. For example, when Margrit Schiller received money from Ulrike Meinhoff to start a new Red Army Faction cell she reports that Meinhoff admonished: "That is revolutionary money, I want to know exactly what you spend it on, it's not to be squandered."[31]

[28]Ibid., 41.
[29]Ibid., 42–43.
[30]Mathu, *The Urban Guerrilla*, 18.
[31]Margrit Schiller, *Remembering the Armed Struggle: Life in Badder-Meinhof* (London: Zidane Press, 2009), 51.

3.4.3 Disagreements over Tactics

Disagreements over tactics took many forms throughout the various memoirs. Within some groups, the argument was about whom to kill. Waruhiu Itote's account of leading Mau Mau fighters describes a lengthy debate over the treatment of women and children at a meeting on July 8, 1953.[32] In the end, the group decided to pass a ban on killing women and children, as doing so had proven politically counterproductive. In general it seems that the Mau Mau had problems maintaining discipline in the use of violence, at least early on. As Josiah Mwangi Karluk, a prominent Kenyan politician assassinated in 1975, describes it, the Mau Mau initially had serious problems with violent and criminal individuals who "misuse[d] the organization. Even Kenyatta himself became an object of suspicion to thugs and there is strong evidence of plots to assassinate him."[33]

Disagreements over tactics were similarly evident in discussions within the ANC about a plan promulgated by its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), for guerrilla operations in the summer of 1963, what was then called Operation Mayibuye. The disagreements were not over whom to kill, but rather about whether the use of violence was a good tactical choice at that point in time. Rusty Bernstein, then a member of the ANC Central Committee, claims that

> "My objections to operation Mayibuye were wholly political... It proceeded from a wholly inadequate analysis of the real balance of power in the country, and glossed over real consideration of our own or the government's weaknesses, or strengths... It was based on a fairly simplistic military assessment of the logistic problems of guerrilla warfare rather than on a social and political program me which also encompassed armed force.[34]

Such disagreements were not unusual in MK and most memoirs by ANC leaders discuss them. Leading ANC member Ahmed Kathrada, for example, terminated his participation in an MK regional command in early 1962 because he had "reservations" caused by two incidents. The first was a discussion in which he raised concerns about civilian casualties in the planned bombing of a Portuguese labor office in Market Street in Johannesburg and was brushed off by "comrade X." The second was during a visit to the same individual in which he finds him assembling a

[32]Itote, *Mau Mau General*, 129–138.
[33]Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, *"Mau Mau" Detainee: The Account by a Kenya African of His Experience in Detention Camps* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1975), 23.
[34]Rusty Bernstein, *Memory Against Forgetting: Memoirs from a Life in South African Politics 1938–1964* (London, New York: Viking, 1999), 251.

bomb in his living room, demonstrating poor operational security.[35] He disagreed, in other words, with how they were managing the tactical side of the struggle. Fatah second-in-command Abu Iyad reports a related set of disagreements at a meeting in fall 1964 in Kuwait when one side wanted to wait to begin guerrilla operations until Fatah was a mass movement, while the other thought violent action would impress upon the Palestinian masses Fatah's dedication and would thereby win them greater support.[36]

In other groups, debates were less about who to kill than about what types of activities to focus on. Bill Ayers's memoir *Fugitive Days* describing the fraught history of the Weather Underground, a leftist group operating in the United States in the 1970s, offers many examples of disagreements about how much energy to spend on military action relative to political organizing.[37] Other memoirs from participants in the same group confirm this account[38] and also cite disagreements over whether civilians who associated with U.S. military members were legitimate targets.[39] Weather Underground leaders also tried to control operatives' personal lives to prevent emotional attachments they felt could weaken the group's security, going so far as to try to regulate the sexual activities of members. For example, the group's Seattle collective, or cell, ordered one couple to break up and set up a "sleeping schedule" that determined which members would have sex with which other members.[40] At one point members from the national organization, the "Weather Bureau," traveled to different collectives to reorganize individuals and break up monogamous relationships.[41]

A slightly different debate about which kinds of activities to focus on shows up in Guela Cohen's memoir of fighting in the Lehi (aka Stern Gang), a radical offshoot of the Jewish militant group the Irgun, which fought the British from 1940 until Israel's independence. Throughout most of the book Cohen emphasizes the group's fight against the British occupation of Palestine and the ostracism and opposition they face from the Jewish mainstream, particularly over their decision to continue attacks against the British during World War II. Even in her descriptions of a mostly single-minded group, however, Cohen reports on disagreements

[35]Ahmad Kathrada, *Memoirs* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 142–143.
[36]Iyad and Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, 42–43.
[37]Bill Ayers, *Fugitive Days: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 197–198.
[38]See, e.g., Larry Grathwohl and Frank Reagan, *Bringing Down Tomorrow: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen* (New York: Arlington House, 1976), 67–68.
[39]See, e.g., Mark Rudd, *Underground: My Life with SDS and the Weathermen* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 215–216.
[40]Susan Stern, *With the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 114–115.
[41]Ibid., 187–188.

within the Lehi about what to do once the war was over. Following the Allied victory, the Lehi and Irgun joined with the less militant Haganah to form a united Insurrectionary Front against the British. Some Lehi members saw this cooperation as a weakening of the group; one leader argued that "... a partial war involving all the people was preferable to a total war involving only part of the people..." and others felt that compromising to work together with the more mainstream underground groups was equivalent to surrendering their cause altogether.[42]

3.4.4 Problems Maintaining Discipline

Problems maintaining discipline are prevalent in the memoirs and are reflected three ways. First, leaders describe them indirectly. Itote, for example, writes, "One of the continuing problems of our forest army was to maintain integrity against those who wished to use it to further criminal purposes."[43] Cecilia Bobrovskaya, who went to Kostroma in Central Russia in May 1906 to help organize RSDLP units, reports that the "... armed workers units, which had played such a militant role in the October–December days in 1905, although formally connected with our Party organization, began gradually to drift away from it and finally broke up into disorganized groups of *boyeviki* [i.e., fighters] independently becoming 'expropriators,' and bringing the poison of decay into our ranks. The Kostroma *boyeviki* were no exception, and all attempts of our committee to influence them were in vain. The *boyeviki* went one way, the Party another."[44]

Second, problems maintaining discipline are described with reference to specific incidents, as when Mac Maharaj, a leader of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, reports that he had trouble controlling two local commanders during his command of the ANC's last violent campaign, Operation Vula in August 1988.[45] One of these operatives, Harry Gwala, endangered the security of the Operation by telling people about Maharaj's presence in South Africa, and also resisted efforts to rein in violence between ANC supporters and those of the Inkatha Freedom Party, a Zulu ethnic party. The other, Govan Mbeki, failed to follow directions from ANC leaders outside the country to avoid involvement in organizing violent

[42] Guela Cohen, *Woman of Violence: Memoirs of a Young Terrorist, 1943–48* (Tel-Aviv: Yair Publishers, 1990), 98–103.
[43] Itote, *Mau Mau General*, 139–141.
[44] Bobrovskaya *Twenty Years in Underground Russia: Memoirs of a Rank-and-File Bolshevik*, 151.
[45] O'Malley, *Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa*, 284–290.

activities. Both did so, according to Maharaj, because "They were the visible presence of ANC leadership in the country, and because they were in the country, both believed they had the right to a certain autonomy from Lusaka [where the ANC leadership were]."[46]

Mohamed Mathu, the Mau Mau operative who managed operations in Nairobi, similarly describes one disciplinary episode in which an operative's love life caused problems:[47]

> One of our sentries was pushed into the room. He had abandoned his post and gone to the home of a nearby woman-friend. The others tracked him down and now wanted to punish him. We calmed the man down and discussed the case at some length, finally deciding that since it was his first offense we would let him off lightly. He was demoted in rank from a colonel to a captain.

Third, operatives directly describe violating orders. "Avner," a member of the Stern Gang, reports his refusal to stop a planned series of attacks in Europe in 1948 in a way that is worth quoting at length.[48] He begins by summarizing a letter he received in the summer of 1948:

> *Yorem*, said the letter, *the changed situation since operation B, no longer justifies the action of your group in Europe... Hide the arms in a safe place and keep contact with your adherents. Come to Paris at once, I want to see you.*

Avner then describes how "Striking a match [he] set fire to the letter," and then tells his co-conspirators that:

> Sometimes one must ignore individual orders of the group in order to remain faithful to its general spirit.

Occasionally, the same individual describes disobeying orders from his superiors and having trouble managing his subordinates. Boris Savinkov, the second-in-command of the Terrorist Brigade of the Russian Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), the most active terrorist organization in pre-Revolutionary Russia, reports disobeying his superiors when he helped plan a failed attempt to kill Tsar Nicholas II at a ball in January 1905. Although the PSR Central Committee was supposed to authorize targets, the St. Petersburg cell of the Terrorist Brigade authorized the operation because, its leaders argued, they should assassinate the tsar if they could, even if the Central Committee formally opposed it, and even though all knew that they were violating party discipline by planning to do so.[49] Savinkov also reports that his subordinates gave him problems in

[46]Ibid., 285.
[47]Mathu, *The Urban Guerrilla*.
[48]Avner, *Memoirs of an Assassin* (London: Blond, 1959), 138–139.
[49]Boris Savinkov, *Memoirs of a Terrorist* (New York: A. & C. Boni, 1931), 92.

another operation. When Ezno Azef, the leader of the Terrorist Brigade, was absent leading up to the planned assassination of Interior Minister von Plehve in March 1904, authority devolved to Savinkov, who felt that the unit was not sufficiently prepared to carry out their planned attack. Savinkov decided instead to pursue a lower value target, something he hoped would later "... be of value in the other enterprise." There was disagreement within the group about Savinkov's decision, and although a few agreed with him, many others believed that they had adequate strength to take on the original target. The result was a compromise in which the group took on both targets, leaving each side too weak to accomplish their goal and ultimately both attacks failed. Azef expressed considerable disapproval on his return, though the group did later manage to assassinate von Plehve in July 1904.[50]

Lest one get the impression that all groups have problems maintaining discipline, it is worth noting that some memoirs reflect remarkable levels of control by leaders. For example, Rui de Pinto, a fighter in the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labour Party (MPLA), describes how a column of fighters traveling through Congo to fight in what was then Portuguese Angola surrendered to a much smaller Congolese army unit.[51] They did so because they had orders not to resist if they encountered Congolese forces, orders given because the MPLA leaders did not want a conflict with the Congo government. A similar set of orders motivated by the same strategic logic led an ANC column to surrender to unarmed Botswanan police in 1963.[52]

3.4.5 Operatives Being Punished

Operatives who are violently punished for various transgressions feature prominently in a number of the memoirs. One of the most striking examples comes from Baya Gacemi's memoir of her time in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). She tells of the time a fund raiser named "Djamel" was killed. While the killers claimed it was because they heard he was an informant, Baya reports that other members of the group thought he was killed to cover up the fact that his killers had been stealing from him.[53]

[50]Ibid., 31–35.
[51]Rui de Pinto, *The Making of a Middle Cadre: The Story of Rui De Pinto* (Richmond, BC: LSM Press, 1973), 78–79.
[52]Norman Duka, *From Shantytown to Forest: The Story of Norman Duka* (Richmond, BC: LSM Information Center, 1974), 78–80.
[53]Baya Gacemi, *I Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 67.

Another interesting example of operatives being punished comes from Lev Korbonski's description of his time leading an underground army in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War II.[54] He describes a young operative named Arpad whose ambition led to frequent conflicts with his compatriots. Korbonski's description of what happened to Arapad provides a clear example of how the ability to denounce their fellow fighters to the authorities can empower operatives. It also highlights just how well-documented internal disciplinary proceedings were in the Polish Underground:

> Several years later I read the documents concerning his trial before a military court of the Home Army, which twice sentenced Arpad to death for having denounced to the Gestapo a colleague in the organization who had competed with him for an office. The first sentence was not sanctioned by the Commander of the Home Army, and the matter was sent back to court for retrial. The military court passed the death sentence for the second time and, as I learned, Arpad was shot by an execution squad but not killed; after which he went into hiding.[55]

For some groups, though, punishment was deemed insufficient to ensure proper discipline at all times and so they invested a lot of time in indoctrination, with many left-wing groups using so-called criticism/self-criticism sessions for this purpose. These were essentially group meetings, at which everyone would discuss each other's failures. Rui de Pinto, a mid-level operative in the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), described the process as:

> necessary because there were always difficulties and problems coming up and it would not have been possible to solve these with only external discipline. For example, we were allowed to leave the camp to walk around for several hours on Sundays—just to walk around a bit and so on. It sometimes happened that a comrade would return a bit late. But no one would come up to him and say: "You are late, why?" No, it was not necessary. The comrade would come forward himself and say, "I am late" and explain his reasons.[56]

The criticism sessions, in other words, served to align preferences and prevent discipline problems before they started. They were an alternative to post hoc punishment.

[54]Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939–1945*, 175–176.
[55]Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939–1945*, 176.
[56]Pinto, *The Making of a Middle Cadre: The Story of Rui De Pinto*, 84.

A final, somewhat amusing example of punishment is found in Larry Grathwohl's account of his time in Weathermen. Grathwohl, who eventually became an FBI informant, describes how one member violated orders not to bring marijuana to the group's December 1969 National Council meeting in Flint, Michigan.[57] The member was arrested for possession and the group punished his poor discipline by refusing to bail him out of jail. This punishment was gentler than what many groups would do but carries a potential cost for the group; letting an underground operative languish overnight in jail wondering if his comrades have forsaken him has to raise the risk of that operative revealing critical information. In this case, the member did not rat out his colleagues, but the risks they took seem clear.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Examining the terrorist autobiographies provides a rich view into the dynamics of terrorist groups. All of the problems outlined in chapter 2 are present in some of these memoirs, but certainly not in all of them. This should be expected, and not just because some of the former terrorists view their time in these groups through a more favorable, less objective, perspective. The terrorist's dilemma does not necessarily lead to conflict. If there is no preference divergence or uncertainty, there is no need for control and much lower potential for intra-group conflict. Since the intensity of preference divergence and uncertainty will vary across groups and over time, we should expect to see groups where there is no evidence of conflict. What is most probative about the memoirs is that a broad cross-section of terrorists describe organizational dynamics that are certainly consistent with the notion that these groups struggle with hard tradeoffs among security, efficiency, and control. Memoirs written by Russians in the 1900s, Jewish nationalists in Palestine after World War II, Kenyan nationalists in the mid-1950s, African nationalists in South Africa in the 1960s, nationalists in Northern Ireland throught the twentieth century, anti-establishment college kids in the United States in the 1970s, Palestinian nationalists in the 1980s, Algerian Islamists in the 1990s, and Lebanese Islamists in 2005 all describe a similar set of organizational dilemmas. While different terrorist groups clearly manage these dilemmas in different ways, each is fundamentally constrained by them and all, as a result, are at a massive disadvantage against the prevailing authorities.

[57]Grathwohl and Reagan, *Bringing Down Tomorrow: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen*, 109–110.

CHAPTER 4

Organizing Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Operations and Finances

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As we saw in the last chapter, agency problems and the resulting dilemmas have been an issue for a broad range of terrorist groups since at least 1878. Additionally, bureaucratic tools have frequently been part of group solutions to their organizational challenges. To deepen our understanding of how these bureaucratic tools are used, this chapter focuses on al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), one of the most prominent terrorist groups of the last twenty years, and uses a host of the group's internal documents to study its financial and operational management. Because these documents were unavailable when the theory was developed, they facilitate a relatively clean, out-of-sample test of several core assumptions and predictions. They also provide rich insights into how one organization sought to solve its dilemmas.

If the claims made in previous chapters are correct, then internal documents from AQI should reveal a number of patterns. First, there ought to be a high level of disagreement within the group over both tactics and spending as AQI was a diverse group operating in a challenging security environment, one in which credible punishment of operatives was quite difficult. Second, there should be evidence that AQI leaders were aware of the political value of exercising control and that the communications required to do so would create security risks. As well, concerns with public perceptions should be implicit in communications about how fund raising or military operations are conducted. Third, the portion of AQI for which we have detailed internal correspondence—what we will call the Sinjar organization—should exhibit a nontrivial level of bureaucracy because: (1) controlling violence is critical to its political mission; and (2) it operates with a very diverse membership that does not share a common vision of exactly how to use violence to achieve shared political goals.

The data for this chapter come from a sample of 109 internal documents captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq's Syrian border. These documents provide a striking insider's view of the management challenges facing AQI.[1] Many of the documents are written in the name of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an ostensibly Iraqi organization that AQI created in late 2006 to put an Iraqi face on their activities.[2] The majority of the documents (70) are typed or were found on computer files, and slightly more than half of the documents (61) are either standardized forms or are handwritten according to a common format. A number of the documents are actually blank standardized forms for everything from tracking weapons,[3] and receiving group funds,[4] to swearing allegiance to the ISI.[5]

While some of the documents are undated and the exact dates on many others remain obscure, the production dates for thirty-seven of them can be identified with relative certainty. These documents were produced during the eleven-month period from September 2006 through August 2007, and contain information about the Sinjar organization's finances going back to March 2006.[6] These documents have strengths and weaknesses that must be weighed when determining how much confidence they should provide in my arguments. On the negative side, the documents do not represent a random sample of all ISI documents captured in Western Iraq from September 2006 on, much less a random sample of all ISI correspondence produced during this time period. We cannot therefore be certain they are representative of the group's internal correspondence. Moreover, some of the staid managerial tone in the

[1]For a more wide-ranging analysis of these documents, see Fishman, *Sinjar Two: al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Foreign Recruiting, Finances, and Future*. For an earlier use of these documents to study agency problems in terrorist groups, see Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations." These documents and others captured in early 2007, which are unclassified but not yet publicly available, formed the basis for the analysis in Bahney et al., *An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq*. The documents used in this chapter are broadly similar to those in Bahney et al.'s analysis of AQI finances.

[2]The exact differences between AQI and the ISI are unknown, but most analysts agree that ISI was a rebranding of AQI and not a distinct organization. For a summary, see Martha Crenshaw, "Mapping the Militants," Stanford University; online at http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants.

[3]NMEC-2007-657916.

[4]NMEC-2007-657782.

[5]NMEC-2007-637854.

[6]The vast majority of the documents are written in the name of the "Border Emirate" of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), or bear its logo, though the earliest documents were completed shortly before AQI and its allies publicly declared the independent ISI across a swath of Western Iraq on October 15, 2006.

translated documents may be due more to the translators' experiences in highly bureaucratic government organizations rather than to original author affinities for Western business jargon. This translation issue should not be too concerning, however, because we will focus on the substantive content of the documents, not on the language used.

On the positive side, we should keep in mind that this evidence surely understates the extent of preference divergence in AQI. As we will see in the next chapter, we observe such obvious evidence of disagreement only when the organization's combination of monitoring and punishment fails to properly motivate its members. Even absent the obvious disagreements such failures engender, the incentives that make it worthwhile for groups to invest in security-reducing bureaucracy and management tools remain present, as long as there is sufficient preference divergence and uncertainty.

Collectively, the documents provide a window into AQI's operations in Western Iraq, covering a wide variety of institutional minutiae including:

- forty-four signed pledges by fighters agreeing to conditions for different activities;
- forty-three managerial reports covering personnel, equipment, and finances;
- ten internal receipts for funds disbursed to group members;
- nine internal policy memos;
- four press releases.

Understanding the situation in Iraq during this time period is critical for putting the documents into context. By many accounts, AQI's relationship with the local population in Western Iraq began to sour in the summer of 2006.[7] For the ISI, carefully targeted violence and the appearance of financial efficiency became critical elements in the struggle for legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.[8] This meant the ISI had to both control operations and convince the locals it was doing so. In this light, seemingly obscure bureaucratic actions can be understood as contributing to the ISI's ability to present itself as a disciplined,

[7]A good summary of how this process played out in Ramadi can be found in Kimberly Kagan, "The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq," *Iraq Report (The Weekly Standard)* (2007) and Bill Roggio, "Securing Eastern Anbar Province," *Long War Journal* (2007).

[8]For an analysis of the ISI's "pitch" to Iraqis and the wider Arab world see Brian Fishman, *Fourth Generation Governance: Sheik Tamimi Defends the Islamist State of Iraqi on Governance: Sheik Tamimi Defends the Islamist State of Iraq*, Report (Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). For a discussion focused on divisions between Sunni insurgent groups in 2007–8, see Evan F. Kohlmann, *State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq*, Report (NEFA Foundation 2008).

well-run, financially circumspect organization. For example, having the group's financial administrator (identified only as Shahin) sign as a witness on the outgoing leader's summary of the group's activities in September 2006 would make it easier to hold him accountable for any subsequent financial shortfalls, enabling more senior leaders to enforce rules about spending and fund raising.[9]

4.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF AL-QA'IDA IN IRAQ

The group that eventually became al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was formed by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi sometime between late 2003 and April 2004 under the rubric *Jama'at al-Tawahid wal-Jihad*, literally the Group of Monotheism and Jihad.[10] Zarqawi had fled Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion in 2001 and took command of the Arab component of Ansar al-Islam, a primarily Kurdish Sunni militant organization operating near the town of Khurmal, then a Kurdish-controlled part of Northern Iraq. In October 2004, Zarqawi publicly declared his allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed his group *Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, which translates to the Organization of Jihad in the Country of Two Rivers, aka al-Qa'ida in Iraq. The extent of functional links between al-Qa'ida leaders and AQI has never been clear, though the linked names clearly served public relations purposes for both sides—by facilitating recruiting efforts for Zarqawi and by making al-Qa'ida seem relevant.[11]

Even before it became AQI, Zarqawi's group was conducting a systematic campaign of terrorist attacks across Iraq. The first major attack by the group was the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, which was followed by high-profile attacks on the UN headquarters for Iraq in Baghdad on August 19 and on the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf on August 29. All told, these attacks killed at least 135 people and injured 357 more.[12] Throughout 2004 and 2005, AQI conducted attacks across Iraq ranging from suicide bombings against hardened targets such as the Green Zone, to vehicle-borne explosive devices in markets, to the kidnapping and

[9]NMEC-2007-658016.
[10]Bahney et al., *An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq*,, 81.
[11]Brian Fishman, "After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 19–32.
[12]Global Terrorism Database. Accessed August 2, 2011.

videotaped beheading of foreigners.[13] In 2005, the group was responsible for at least 56 attacks, which claimed 675 lives and injured 1,485 more.[14]

According to a January 2004 letter allegedly written by Zarqawi to al-Qa'ida's leaders, the strategic logic was that Iraq's Sunnis would flock to AQI's banner if they were sufficiently radicalized, which would happen if AQI's attacks provoked a sufficient Shi'a backlash.[15] AQI was attacking Iraqi civilians because "... targeting [Shi'a] in religious, political, and military depth will provoke them .... If we succeed in dragging them into sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands of the Sabeans."[16] In many ways, this strategic logic is a variant of the "terrorism as awakening the masses" kind of argument that Russian Marxists used in the 1900s, and bears a strong resemblance to the "action-reaction cycle" posited by leftist groups in Europe and South America in the 1970s. The key difference is that in those cases the goal of terrorism was to provoke the state into violent atrocities that would reveal its true nature to a quiescent population. For AQI, it was to provoke militias allied with state leaders (e.g., the Shia militia *Jaish al-Mahdi*) into such actions.

As one might expect, a strategy predicated on creating an existential threat to the Sunni community by killing Iraqi civilians was not well received by many nationalist insurgent groups, nor by average Iraqis. In spring 2005, Sunnis from the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim (together with Albu Nimr tribe fighters from the city of Hit) created an anti-insurgent militia dubbed the "Hamza Brigade." There was substantial fighting between this militia and AQI throughout the summer.[17] In July 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second in command, sent a letter

[13]Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, Report (U.S. Department of State, 2006), ch. 8.

[14]Figures from the Global Terrorism Database, which provides the best accounting of domestic terrorism while including information on perpetrators. The NCTC Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data are more complete, but do not attribute attacks to specific groups. Accessed August 2, 2011.

[15]Fishman, "After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq."

[16]The letter in question was released by the Coalition Provisional Authority on February 12, 2004, and is archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20040714002639/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html. While most scholars accepted its provenance, some argue it was unlikely to have been written by Zarqawi as it was at odds with al-Qa'ida statements being made at the time. See, for example, Evgenii Novikov, "Baathist Origins of the Zarqawi Letter," *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 6 (2006).

[17]For more details on this and other conflicts between AQI and tribes in Anbar, see Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): 7–40.

to Zarqawi calling into question his aggressive attacks against civilians.[18] By fall 2005, there was continued fighting between AQI and tribal militias from the Albu Mahal and Dulaimi tribes, in al-Qa'im and Ramadi in Anbar governorate in Western Iraq. In November, the "Anbar Peoples Council" was formed to resist AQI. The Council was organized by a combination of elders from the Fahad tribe as well as former insurgents from the 1920s Brigade (a prominent secular nationalist Sunni guerrilla faction), all of whom were angered by AQI's criminal activities and efforts to get involved in their traditional smuggling businesses.

Partly in response to the political problems the group was having with indigenous insurgent groups, AQI tried to form an umbrella organization with several other small Iraqi insurgent groups, but the so-called Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) was never more than a name. It had no permanent administrative structures and did not significantly coordinate actions across preexisting groups.[19] Over the course of 2006, tribal organizations in Western Iraq became increasingly dissatisfied with AQI's religious zealotry and efforts to move into racketeering and smuggling businesses that traditionally had been a major revenue source for them.[20] Since many of the indigenous insurgent organizations in Western Iraq were manned by these tribal militias, these conflicts naturally led to fighting between AQI and other insurgency groups.

AQI's increasing alienation from the tribal organizations in Anbar governorate became highly publicized with the "Day of Awakening" conference held by several Anbari tribes on September 17, 2006. This was the first public announcement of what had since become known as the Anbar Awakening, a term now applied broadly to the decision by local Sunni nationalist militias, many of whom had been part of the insurgency, to ally with the United States and begin fighting AQI. One month after the "Day of Awakening," AQI announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claiming to be the legitimate state over a large portion of Iraq including Anbar governorate,[21] and then issued a press release detailing the new state's administrative structure.[22]

[18]The letter became public in October 2005 and can be accessed at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zaraqawi-english-translation.

[19]On clashes between AQI and other elements of the Iraqi insurgency, particularly the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), see Sabrina Tavernise and Dexter Filkins, "Local Insurgents Tell of Clashes with Al Qaeda's Forces in Iraq," *New York Times*, January 12, 2006.

[20]Fishman, *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al Qa'-ida in Iraq*, 3.

[21]Ibid., 4.

[22]Uthman bin abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi, "Informing the People About the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq," *World News Network*, January 7, 2007. For an analysis of Sheik Tamimi's release see Fishman, *Fourth Generation Governance: Sheik Tamimi*

The announcement of the ISI and other efforts to reorganize AQI had little impact on relations between the ISI and other insurgent organizations which deteriorated steadily from January 2007 on.[23] These conflicts played out in an unusually well-documented manner in the Arab Jabour neighborhood of Baghdad in May 2007 when fighters in the ISI killed twelve members of the prominent Sunni nationalist group *Jaish al-Mujahideen* (Army of Mujahideen).[24] The conflict amounted to an intergroup feud that appears to have started when the ISI killed a *Jaish al-Mujahideen* leader who they felt was "... an agent working for the Americans, assisting to build a new sewage system." This killing kicked off a series of tit-for-tat attacks and the establishment of competing checkpoints by the groups. In one letter a local ISI member justified the violence by noting that *Jaish al-Mujahideen* forces in their area, who were cooperating with American forces, had attacked ISI forces in the past, and that the subtribe from which the twelve fighters hailed had taken money to provide information on ISI fighters and organized to fight them.[25]

In light of the discussion in previous chapters, two aspects of this incident are worth noting. First, the local ISI leader felt the need to write to his supervisor to clarify what happened, claiming that "This incident was mentioned through media channels, giving nothing but the wrong impressions."[26] Such a motivation for writing reflects a concern with being held accountable for politically questionable violence by his superiors. Second, the local leader reveals additional standardized communications within AQI when he writes that the *Jaish al-Mujahideen* "... have created so many obstacles against the [ISI], they are too numerous to list at this time, but [are] documented in our court memos."[27] Presumably the court memos refer to some type of regular reporting that he expects will provide his boss with the context in which his actions can be properly interpreted.

From 2007 on, AQI's relations with indigenous insurgent organizations such as the IAI and the 1920 Revolution Brigade only worsened. An internal document about "lessons learned" from an ISI member detailing

Defends the Islamist State of Iraqi on Governance: Sheik Tamimi Defends the Islamist State of Iraq.

[23]An excellent summary of these disputes is provided in Fishman, *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al Qa'-ida in Iraq*, 6–15.

[24]This incident is described in two letters to an ISI sheik. Harmony 100607 Sheikh Ltr details the justification for the killings and attempts to correct what the author claims are the "... many errors in the reporting...". Harmony 100607 Jaysh al-Muj provides a straightforward account of the al-Rabbi branch of the al-Jabour tribe to which the twelve fighters belonged.

[25]Harmony, 100607 Jaysh al-Muj.

[26]Harmony, 100607 Sheikh Ltr.

[27]Ibid.

the group's problems summarized five key issues, four of which explain reasons for why the Iraqi population was turning against the ISI.[28] These included the hardships imposed on citizens who provided support for AQI and the increasing ability of Coalition forces to exploit rifts among insurgent factions. In response to these changes, AQI backed off efforts to combat Coalition forces in late 2007 and early 2008, reverting instead to a more underground terrorist model. Nevertheless, its influence continued to wane throughout 2009.

On April 18, 2010, AQI's last two prominent commanders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri—who took over from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as leader of AQI—and Abu Abdullah al-Rashi al-Baghdadi—the putative head of the MSC and a frequent producer of ideological tapes—were killed in a joint Iraqi-American operation outside of Tikrit. Al-Masri's successor, Huthaifa al-Batawi, who had been arrested in late 2010, was also killed in an attempted jail break on May 8, 2011. The group engaged in a number of coordinated attacks across Iraq in the first half of 2012, but as of this writing the current leader Abu Dua has not been able to return the group to anything approaching its former influence.

4.3 MANAGING AQI

Several patterns in this data buttress this book's theoretical arguments about how terrorist groups use bureaucracy to deal with preference divergence and the resulting internal conflict within an organization. First, we see much evidence in these documents of disagreements between various levels of the organization over which forms of violence are politically useful, how violence should be used, and how resources should be spent. Second, we see ISI leaders discussing the political value of exercising control over their operatives and acknowledging that the communications required to do so create security risks. Third, we see a non-trivial level of bureaucracy in the Sinjar organization. This fits our theoretical intuition as: (1) controlling violence was critical for AQI to accomplish its political mission; and (2) it operated with a very diverse membership, which disagreed a good deal about how to conduct its campaign. Fourth, there is some evidence of a steady trend toward greater bureaucratization in the ISI, suggesting its leaders found it worth the inherent security cost, even as the Anbar Awakening and changes in U.S. strategy made the tactical situation more difficult. This section examines each of these findings.

[28] NMEC-2007-612449.

4.3.1 Disagreements over Tactics and Spending

AQI's internal correspondence offers plenty of evidence of disagreements on both tactics and spending at all levels of the organization. Senior leaders threaten wayward members who are engaging in "theft and looting"[29] and direct subordinates to be more careful about how they kill people. Shortly after an Iraqi working for AQI assassinated Sheikh Nasr al-Fahadawi, the leader of the Fahad tribe, leaders instructed operatives that, "For the rest of the statues [people] who met with Al-Jafari, we have to get them securely [meaning secretly] and make them anywhere far [get them far away] and kill them, and not like what we did with Nasr Al-Fahadawi. . . . Leave no evidence after the killing and bury them in far-away places and not like what we did with Nasr al-Fahadawi in front of the people."[30] Such communications are mirrored by memos sent up the chain of command from local leaders seeking to justify their attacks on other insurgent organizations,[31] reassure leaders about how they are dealing with the political situation in their local area,[32] and bring leaders attention to potential spies within the organization.[33] In at least one instance the member of an organization ostensibly allied to AQI, Ansar al-Islam, writes to AQI seeking an explanation for the killing of one of their former members and complaining about a *fatwa* issued by one geographic division of AQI.[34]

A number of these problems are well highlighted in the lengthy "lessons learned" document written by an AQI member in 2007.[35] On the tactical side, disagreements over the use of violence are highlighted by passages in which the author discusses the problem of local leaders being overly cautious. He relates the story of an AQI unit in Anbar that refrained from attacking Coalition forces, much to the author's disgust, because they were focused on attacking Iraqis who had turned against the insurgency. He describes the incident as follows:

[29]NMEC-2007-637813.
[30]IZ-060316-02. On the assassination of al-Fahadawi and its strategic context, see Alfred B. Connable, "Intelligence Assessment in Late 2005 and 2006," in *Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, American Perspectives*, ed. Timothy S. McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler pp. 120–138 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2009), 129.
[31]NMEC-2007-637011 and NMEC-2007-636973.
[32]NMEC-2007-639155.
[33]NMEC-2007-658086.
[34]NMEC-2007-637001.
[35]NMEC-2007-612449.

> It reached a stage where one of the brothers who was stationed close to one of the IEDs that was originally set to target one of the renegades, saw one of the Americans convoy passing by and did not set off the IED, and he was later asked about his behavior and he answered, and we wish he did not, that he did not have orders to attack the Americans???!!!!.[36]

From the author's point of view, one of the catalysts for such tactically negligent behavior seems to be the insufficient commitment of many Iraq members of AQI. He complains:

> Some considered the jihadist work as an additional duty, as he wanted to continue in his worldly life, and help the Mujahidin every once [in] a while. You find one looking to get married again, the other one is thinking of feeding his children, deserting weapons and fighting. The third one is trying to evade the military burden and trying to be an administrator.[37]

These types of disagreements were not limited to tactical matters. Less-than-optimal financial practices also loom large in the document. The author complains of several major financial problems facing the group, the last of which is explicitly about how local leaders were spending money:

> The third economical issue is bad economic management especially when there are many demands from the fighters for money from the Emirs and ignoring any efforts for self-sufficiency. Brothers start asking for many unnecessary things like soda beverages, clothes and many other things that the brother wouldn't think about buying it if the money had to come from his pocket.[38]

The author also complains multiple times about how those responsible for bringing foreigners into Iraq to fight would often take all the money that prospective fighters had brought with them under false pretenses, thereby robbing the insurgency in Iraq of much-needed funds.[39] As he describes the problem:

> The moment a brother meets the group at the borders, and sits with them, the group will ask him to surrender any amount of money and belongings he has on his person. Then they take his money and belongings under the pretext of security. They then tell him that the brothers in the Islamic state will secure all his needs and he does not need his money; hence, the brother is forced, out of modesty, to give all that he owns.[40]

[36]Ibid., p. 25.
[37]Ibid., p. 31.
[38]Ibid., p. 41.
[39]Ibid., pp. 14, 22.
[40]Ibid., p. 14.

To solve the problem of transporters taking money from new recruits (which meant a greater financial burden for AQI units within Iraq), he advocates a combination of monitoring, punishment, and organizational reform of the groups' personnel system.

> Reshape coordinators and border's facilitators. Force them to abide to the State's guidance such as passing the publications to new personnel at the Land of Jihad, follow the guidance precisely and hold accountable those who exploit finance and staff members under the State's name for the interest of some sectors commanders without informing the proselytization and coordination department of such an act.[41]

4.3.2 The Political Value of Exercising Control

What is clear from these documents is that ISI leaders saw political value in exercising control over subordinates, even when doing so was costly. The group's leaders repeatedly note that they must control their subordinates because engaging in too much violence or fund raising through robbery and theft can damage their cause.[42] The ISI's mid-level managers similarly had problems with personnel engaging in politically problematic fund raising that hurt their relationship with the locals.[43] A December 2004 "Threat Announcement" from AQI highlights the political impact of such actions when it lists the names of people who took part in "mugging and looting" and disavows them in the following harsh terms:

> Due to the increase of illegal activities from theft and looting from those who claim to be part of Jihadi organizations and have committed such act in the name of their organization, let it be known [that] we at Al Qaeda organization in the land of two river are free from all their wrong doing and their acts we have sworn to expel those whom allow themselves to exploit the blood or the money of the Muslims.[44]

[41]Ibid., p. 59.
[42]IZ-060316-02, NMEC-2007-637813, NMEC-2006-612449.
[43]Press reporting on coercive fund raising by foreign fighters includes: David Loyn, "Iraq's Migrants from Violence," *BBC News*, January 10, 2008; Michael R. Gordon, "G.I.'s Forge Sunni Tie in Bid to Squeeze Militants," *New York Times*, July 6, 2007; Vanessa Arrington, "Most Likely Kidnap Victims in Iraq Are Iraqis," *Associated Press*, March 30, 2006; and Hamza Hendawi, "Kidnappings Fund Insurgent Attacks," *Houston Chronicle*, February 8, 2006.
[44]NMEC-2007-637813.

The discussion of "expelling those who exploit" suggests that the appearance of financial impropriety hurt AQI politically. Similar concerns with public perceptions are implicit in a series of later ISI memos that lay down administrative rules which provide leaders the ability to monitor how their operatives spend money.[45] Two requirements from these memos stand out:

1. For every amount paid out of the Muslim people funds, the recipient is required to provide two signatures, in his own handwriting, one for receiving the money and another one to show how the money was spent.
2. All properties, small and large, will be inventoried, a report will be kept. We will keep a copy of the report, and all changes will be annotated from the previous report.

These are sensible requirements for most any organization, except for one that is ostensibly covert. For a covert organization, such record keeping presents dramatic security risks and only makes sense if the group's leaders are either deeply concerned with the costs of operatives engaging in unauthorized behavior, or willing to give up a measure of security in order to be able to demonstrate financial propriety to a skeptical public. Both possibilities reflect a deep concern with the political impact of inappropriate actions.

The leaders of the Sinjar organization were also keenly aware that they operated in an environment in which becoming known to Iraqi or American government forces created dramatic security risks. The security costs of even the smallest amount of information leaking out to counter insurgents was especially stark for organizations such as Sinjar because their enemy, the Coalition Forces, could strike anywhere without the constraints security forces face in traditional counterterrorism operations. The British, for example, could not use indirect fire weapons against Provisional Irish Republican Army (P-IRA) meetings in Belfast in the 1990s. Coalition forces in Iraq had fewer constraints.

Given this fact it seems quite reasonable that a Sinjar organization memo detailing standard reporting procedures specifically admonishes local leaders that:

> All information is to be uploaded on a [flash USB], and sent every week to the administrator of the Emirate of Borders. Due to the security risk involved, do not keep any information.[46]

[45] The list of rules appears in a series of three slightly amended memos, two of which have standardized expense forms tacked on at the end, presumably to ensure that ISI operatives do their paperwork correctly. NMEC-2007-657945, NMEC-2007-657926, and NMEC-2007-657877.

[46] NMEC-2007-657926.

Despite such concerns, the Sinjar organization persisted in using standardized forms (which suggests regular reporting of the same details about operations and expenditures),[47] keeping lists of operatives and equipment,[48] demanding reports from lower-level units,[49] and sending intra-organizational memos on everything from recommendations for a movie memorializing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to a meeting agenda with a proposed organizational chart to be discussed.[50] Put simply, these documents show that for at least a one-year period, the Sinjar organization repeatedly sacrificed operational security for managerial control. In doing so, the group's leaders appear to have been motivated by a deep concern with managing the public perception of their organization.

4.3.3 AQI Bureaucracy and Paperwork Requirements

AQI followed what is known in the management literature as an "M-form" hierarchy, in which a central management structure with functional bureaus is replicated at multiple lower geographic levels. In this form each geographic unit has substantial autonomy, and issues between them—such as adjudicating disputes or distributing centrally managed resources —are handled by the central organization. Bahney et al. (2010) provide an outstanding big-picture view of AQI's management drawing on a larger sample of AQI documents that are employed here and are worth quoting at length. Of particular note is the extent of the functional differentiation within AQI, which reflects a great deal of thought being put into how to best manage the group's activities.

AQI structured its bureaucracy similarly at the provincial and sector levels. Both the provincial and western Anbar units had administrative emirs who represented and accounted for each sector's administrative system, and they both had bureaucratic sections (with a specific division of labor), namely: "movement and maintenance," "legal," "military," "security," "medical," "spoils," and "media."

There were, however, differences between the units. The western sector bureaucracy had a slightly more elaborate division of labor than the provincial administration, and the provincial group funded a

[47]NMEC-2007-657694, NMEC-2007-658008, NMEC-2007-657694, NMEC-2007-658008.
[48]NMEC-2007-658070, NMEC-2007-657674, NMEC-2007-657911, NMEC-2007-657921.
[49]NMEC-2006-657777, NMEC-2007-657926, NMEC-2007-657945.
[50]NMEC-2007-637123 and NMEC-2007-657738, respectively.

number of ancillary units unseen at the sector level. Specifically, the provincial bureaucracy included a Mujahidin Shura Council, a council for cooperation between many Sunni insurgent groups, although from the documents it is unclear what this council did. In addition, the provincial bureaucracy contained an Administrative Council, which oversaw all functional bureaucratic departments and may have maintained unique revenue streams; a General Treasury, which appeared to be a shared fund for other AQI provinces or for central AQI leadership; and a Mail section, which we believe controlled a system of couriers. The western Anbar sector also had functional departments not seen in the provincial administration, such as "boats," "relief and depots," and the "Soldiers Chamber (salaries)."[51]

All of this functional differentiation indicates a well-developed hierarchy designed to optimize the group's performance, just like in traditional organizations.

In many ways this kind of bureaucracy is exactly what we should expect to see in the ISI. Hierarchical, bureaucratic structures are the most common ways in which humans deal with the challenges of exerting control over organizations made up of people with diverse preferences, and the ISI certainly had those. People who are adept at carrying out violence, or those who make ideal recruits because of their eagerness and ability to conduct operations, should be expected to have an underlying preference for violence which leads them to engage in more violence than is politically desirable. We know from its own writings that the ISI faced this dynamic. Most of the ISI's fighters were foreigners who had traveled long distances to kill and die for a cause in which they deeply believed.[52] These fighters came from a wide variety of different countries and different socioeconomic backgrounds.[53] They were exactly the kind of diverse, highlymotivated group of operatives that should be expected to seek out violence and combat for their own sake. Outside of any other considerations, ISI leaders likely had a great need to exercise control simply due to the nature of their operatives.

[51] Bahney et al., *An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq*, 32.
[52] The aforementioned AQI "lessons learned" document, for example, complains of foreign fighters who arrived without "knowing the harsh reality of jihad" and therefore "... are becoming frustrated and incompetent from continually sitting idle and from remembering the repeated promises of glory for which many left their countries." NMEC-2007-612449, pp. 22–24.
[53] Joseph H. Felter and Brian Fishman, *Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records*, Report (Combating Terrorism Center, 2007).

Managerial control was exercised, at least in part, by using bureaucratic tools such as the group's "Fighter Registry Report[s]." These reports provided a useful leadership tool.[54] Each details the group's personnel in three categories: "incoming fighters," "permanent Emirate fighters," and "exiting brothers." For incoming fighters the reports provide names, dates of arrival, the work they will do (martyr or fighter), and the assets they brought with them. For permanent fighters, the reports list individual names and information on "salary" and "work" for a number of individuals. For "exiting brothers" the report gives the individual's "reason for leaving," who gave permission for them to leave, and their dates of departure. Although exit interviews are common tracking tools used by many human resource managers, such record keeping presents a potential disaster for an organization whose members depend on anonymity for survival.[55]

Perhaps the most striking example of ISI paper work that created security problems is the membership commitment forms found in the Sinjar documents. These forms memorialized members' commitments to a set of standards and typically included a photograph of the member, his thumbprint, and his signature. For those joining as "martyrs," the commitment was typically some variant on the following conditions:

> 1 - My entering to Iraq and requesting a martyrdom operation was purely due to my personal desire and I have no hidden agenda to convert any fighter after entry therein and swear to Allah on the above. 2 - To listen to and obey the Emirs responsible for me in all activities. 3 - In the event I withdraw from executing my obligation, the organization shall have no obligation to me. I would leave Iraq through any suitable means. 4 - Never to divulge any of the true information to any side under any circumstances.[56]

For fighters leaving Iraq for medical treatment there was a different document to sign, often complete with a thumbprint or picture, that committed the person to the following:

> 1- Listen and obey all orders of the Emir during this trip for treatment. 2 - Adhere to all security regulations during this trip. 3 - Refrain from disclosing

[54]Chronologically these are NMEC-2007-657921, NMEC-2007-657680, NMEC-2007-657775, and NMEC-2007-657927.

[55]Other Islamist terrorist organizations use personnel tracking spreadsheets. At least one manager in Al-Qa'ida (Abu Huthayfa) in the late 1990s called for the establishment of a database on al-Qa'ida members and programs, the goal being to guide the organization and the broader jihadi movement by the study of its people. AFGP-2002-003251, p. 2. Within AQI, one member advocated building files on potential operatives to help make sure they were suited to the job. ISGZ-2004-M1000074-0148, p. 9.

[56]See for example NMEC-2007-657961 and NMEC-2007-657964.

any accurate information to anyone, regardless of the circumstances. 4 - Not returning to Iraq without orders, at the end of my treatment.[57]

From the perspective of a terrorist leader these are perfectly sensible things to ask of your operatives. Keeping paperwork with pictures and thumbprints recording those pledges, however, seems rather problematic in the context of a covert terrorist organization. It is not clear exactly why such records were kept in light of the security risks they created, but they would not have been necessary unless there were considerable worries about how the group's agents might behave.[58]

4.3.4 Changes in Reporting over Time

Internal documents from the Sinjar organization suggest a trend toward increasing efforts at control over time, particularly in terms of financial management. Documents serving similar functions became much more formal and detailed during the period analyzed. There is an illustrative contrast between two documents that report monetary income, expenses, personnel entering and departing, and equipment status for defined periods. The first document covers the two-month period from October 29 to December 21, 2006.[59] The second covers the fifteen-day period from January 27 to February 10, 2007.[60] The first difference is that the latter document, and subsequent ones like it, cover much shorter time periods, suggesting the reporting frequency required in the Sinjar organization increased over time.[61] The second difference is that, while the first document breaks expenses down into large categories— such as "Guest houses," "Returnable debts," and "The brother's salaries"—the second document records each disbursement individually, noting the amount in dinars, recipient, and purpose for each payment while summarizing the total amount disbursed to each individual.

A similar increase in bureaucratization can be seen in how the organization tracked its personnel. In October and November 2006, the

[57] See for example NMEC-2007-657960, NMEC-2007-657965, NMEC-2007-658005, NMEC-2007-658025, and NMEC-2007-658048.
[58] One possibility is that such documents serve as commitment devices which make it harder for individuals to leave the group and return to normal life, but there is no evidence AQI leaders used them this way. For the first explanation of the logic of commitment devices in terrorist groups, see Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence."
[59] NMEC-2007-657676.
[60] NMEC-2007-657731.
[61] The other such report is NMEC-2007-657680.

Sinjar organization reports its personnel activities in relatively informal notes.[62] In December the personnel memos are typed but still appear ad hoc.[63] In January the first "Foreign Fighter Registry Report" appears with a standard format.[64] These reports appear with the same format in February and March.[65] Finally, in May 2007, the "Islamic State of Iraq Salah al Deen Province Media Office" issues a memo that directs all "sections and media personnel" to:

> Requesting [sic] an application for everyone of your soldiers in your district, if they have not done that before, please send them via postal service, in order for us to have all those who pledge of allegiance. If you did not have enough applications and if you don't have the capabilities for copying please inform our office to secure your needs.[66]

While it is certainly considerate of the "media office" to handle local cells' photocopying needs, the solicitousness seems a bit strange given its security implications. It only makes sense if the organization found some level of standardizing personnel records to be of great value and felt they had to make it easy for field offices to provide the information. Note that this in itself is an agency problem, the solution to which would create security risks: leaders wanted reports but worried their operatives wouldn't fill them out when told to do so, but sending couriers around with forms to make it easy to report created additional opportunities for compromise.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The Sinjar documents provide the best public evidence on the financing and management of one of the most important terrorist organizations of the last twenty years. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq was the most deadly terrorist organization in the world from 2001 to 2011. From February 2003 through December 2010, AQI and its various incarnations conducted 365 terrorist attacks in Iraq, killing at least 4,374 people and injuring 10,038 more, not counting attacks on military targets.[67] The group helped spur a civil

[62] NMEC-2007-657696, NMEC-2007-657973.
[63] NMEC-2007-657941.
[64] NMEC-2007-657921.
[65] NMEC-2007-657850, NMEC-2007-657775, and NMEC-2007-657927 respectively.
[66] NMEC-2007-637927.
[67] Global Terrorism Database. Search for all attacks in Iraq conducted by al-Qa'ida, AQI, ISI, and MSC between February 1, 2003 and December 31, 2010.

war in Iraq that killed at least 100,000 Iraqis and displaced as much as 20 percent of the country's population. While AQI may be an outlier among terrorist groups in that it operated for the most part in a country undergoing intense military conflict, it is also a critical case from a policy perspective insofar as former AQI operatives will surely form the core of future groups.

The Sinjar organization documents were not available when the theoretical arguments in this book were developed. From a scientific perspective, they facilitate what we can think of as an out-of-sample test of my theory, akin to a physical scientist seeking new data to replicate patterns observed in a prior experiment.[68] They demonstrate a series of organizational patterns that illustrate how terrorist groups struggle with the hard tradeoffs between maintaining control of violence while avoiding destruction by adversaries. The documents show a group which clearly organized in ways that were intended, at least in part, to strike a balance between maintaining appropriate levels of control and avoiding excessive security breakdowns.

That the group was organized this way does not mean it was always realistic about the security-control tradeoff. The "lessons learned" document mentioned above unintentionally captures the tension between security and control in its last section, which lists the following among thirty-two specific points on how local leadership councils could be more effective:

> 7. To refrain from turning the state into a formal one and to ensure that the statehood is void of bureaucracy in all its administrative affairs.
> 8. To use the principle of greed and fear to hold all leaders and soldiers accountable for dereliction.
> . . .
> 19. Make the soldiers adapt to honesty with their [Emirs]. . . by writing down any obstacle or problems in front of the accused ones and document[ing] the complainer's issues and details to confirm its accuracy.[69]

How the middle goal is to be accomplished without a modicum of bureaucracy to identify and track dereliction is unclear, especially when it comes to financial matters. The latter goal seems to constitute a bureaucratic procedure, so although it would certainly help achieve goal number 8, it's not exactly consistent with goal number 7.

Overall, what is perhaps most striking about the Sinjar documents is how ordinary they are. The organization charts, accounting spread-

[68] Such out-of-sample tests are a useful check on the tendency to tell "just-so" stories which neatly describe a given set of observations but do not reflect broader trends that will be seen in other settings.
[69] NMEC-2007-612449, pp. 46–48.

sheets, personnel forms, and internal correspondence justifying specific decisions up and down the chain of command constitute a familiar set of organizational tools. While they reveal certain tensions and tradeoffs specific to managing a terrorist organization—Toyota Motor Corporation does not incur the same costs as AQI for setting up a meeting to make sure employees deal with their adversaries in an appropriate manner—their form is completely mundane. In the next chapter we will build on this insight to develop a more formal understanding of the managerial dilemmas terrorists face.

CHAPTER 5

The Tradeoffs

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Terrorist organizations cannot at once be reliable, resilient, and secure while also under the perfect control of their leadership.[1] Some groups come close to this organizational ideal, but none fully achieve it and most fall well short. This chapter explains why being simultaneously secure and centrally managed is so difficult. The answer lies in the strategic interaction between terrorist leaders and their operatives.

As we have seen, those relationships are often fraught with tension and conflict. The terrorist memoirs and internal correspondence show that terrorist organizations suffer from a broad range of agency problems. These problems reduce their effectiveness, shape their operations, and push them to adopt institutions that are clearly problematic from a security perspective. We have an excellent idea of how al-Qa'ida and AQI dealt with these organizational dilemmas, but for most groups we do not get to see a trove of internal documents. We therefore need to interpret observed behavior in light of what we know about groups' operational environments and a theoretical framework for thinking about how agency problems play out in terrorist groups. Building on what we have learned from the primary source data, this chapter offers such a framework and identifies several patterns that provide valuable insight for looking at the historical record.

In general, terrorist groups face an organizational dilemma whenever leaders and their operatives have different induced preferences. This can happen because they have different information about what is best for the cause or because they have different preferences about how to act. In either case the leader must figure out how to control the agent. These control problems can take a variety of forms.

[1]I owe Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and David Siegel a deep debt for many conversations over the years that vastly improved this chapter. I have used language they suggested in a number of places.

One is a familiar moral hazard problem that creates the tradeoff between security and financial efficiency. Moral hazard problems occur when one party (the principal) delegates actions to another (their agent), who may take actions that are not perfectly observed by the first party but that affect the first party's welfare. In the terrorist context, middlemen are often called on to manage funds for an attack. As we have seen, these middlemen are not uniformly driven by accomplishing a mission, but many are driven, at least in part, by monetary rewards. Inherent in the success or failure of any attack is the possibility that any number of random things may go wrong: bombs may fail to detonate, operatives may get unlucky and be recognized by the police, or other members of the network may be recruited as government agents and sell out their comrades. Because of these, when a leader observes only the success or failure of an attack, it is necessarily unclear whether his middlemen were responsible for the outcome, whether the attack was derailed because of a random component, and the extent to which resources may have been appropriated for personal use.

Greedy middlemen therefore need only pass on as much money to operatives as is required to achieve an acceptable number of successful attacks. For middlemen more focused on the rewards obtained than the goals achieved, "acceptable" may simply mean the middleman is not fired or killed. When middlemen are entrusted with tens of thousands of dollars,[2] the scope for graft is substantial, so the security costs of keeping the types of records held by AQI may seem quite reasonable (though their existence is a bit unexpected for a covert organization).

The security-control tradeoff that has troubled terrorist leaders from Lenin to Zarqawi arises out of what we can think of as the core problems of managing violent, covert groups. The first problem is that operational terrorists often have different preferences over targets than their leaders, perhaps because they define political impact differently or because operators are not maximizing political impact as the leadership understands it. By exercising greater control, leaders can mitigate the impact of this preference divergence, but doing so has a security cost.[3] Moreover, exercising control requires that leaders be able to sanction operatives who misbehave, something that can be costly for terrorist

[2]Malaysian Wan Min bin Wan Mat testified at the trial for one of the Bali bombers that he moved roughly $35,000 from Jemaah Islamiyah's central leadership to the cell that conducted the first Bali bombing.

[3] *Jihadi* public intellectual Abu Musab al-Suri discusses this problem and how different organizational structures ameliorate or exacerbate it in his discourse on the *jihadi* experience in Syria in the 1980s. See Harmony, AFGP-2002-600080, 28–29.

organizations in which operatives wield implicit and explicit threats over their leaders.[4]

The second problem is that terrorist leaders often have different information about the relative political value of targets than the operatives themselves, either because they understand the group's motivating doctrine better or because they have more contact with people who are outside of the group. Such problems have been noted by leftist terrorists operating in Europe in the 1900s,[5] by militant islamists fighting the Syrian government in the 1980s,[6] and by foreign insurgents operating in Iraq.[7] Communicating leaders' information, however, has security costs. Even if a leader's preferences over targets is perfectly aligned with those of the operators, groups may face a tradeoff between security and control when operating in an uncertain environment.

Developing intuition for how groups resolve control problems requires understanding the impact of four parameters highlighted in earlier chapters: preference divergence, uncertainty, discrimination, and the level of government counterterrorism. Table 5.1 outlines each of these, highlights the factors that affect each, and identifies what substantive parameter each parameter determines.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds to build the intuition behind table 5.1. Section 5.2 discusses the problems of managing terrorist funds and shows how a basic moral hazard problem creates the tradeoff between security and efficiency for terrorist organizations. Section 5.3 studies the challenges of managing terrorist violence, presenting a simple model to show how each of the three core problems of terrorist organization contribute to the security-control tradeoff. Section 5.4 concludes by summarizing the key common results.

5.2 MANAGING TERRORIST FUNDS: THE SECURITY-EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF

The moral hazard problem facing terrorist groups is an inescapable consequence of the nature of terrorist activity; operations are hard to

[4] As discussed in chapter 2, terrorist leaders faced the possibility that operatives displeased with their treatment will either start cooperating with the government or violently resist any punishment by the organization.

[5] James Frank McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938" (Ph.D diss., University of Michigan, 1976), 181.

[6] Harmony, AFGP-2002-600080, 5, 43–44.

[7] Harmony, IZ-060316-02.

Table 5.1. Key Parameters for Organizational Structure of Terrorist Groups

Parameter	Factors that Affect It	The Parameter Determines
Preference divergence between leaders and operatives	Diversity of membership within the group	How differently operatives would like to use violence
Discrimination in use of violence required by a group's political goals	How the target population responds to violence	Disadvantage of allowing agents to simply do what they prefer, in terms of the scale of violence or location of the attack
Uncertainty about the mapping from targets to political goals	The group's theory of how action translates into political change	How hard it is for operatives receiving no instructions to choose the same targets leaders would prefer
Level of government counterterrorism	Risks of communicating with operatives or disciplining them	How costly it is to use the kinds of managerial tools we saw al-Qa'ida and AQI using

monitor and the link between what leaders can observe and what their operatives actually do is highly uncertain. This is clearest in the case of producing violence when the outcome of any single attack depends in large part on chance. Consider a Hamas or Islamic Jihad leader during the Second Intifada who learns that a suicide bomber dispatched to Jerusalem was caught. The leader cannot know for certain if the operative got unlucky by running into an unexpected checkpoint, or if the middleman facilitating his passage sold him out. More generally, there is often a great deal of ambiguity about how agents have acted and whether failures can be attributed to their not exerting full effort (what the agency theory literature refers to as shirking) or to circumstances beyond their control.

In many ways this is a standard principal-agent dynamic, one that arises whenever principals receive noisy signals of agent effort. Such noisy signals are present whenever the observable outcome of an agent's actions does not perfectly reflect what he or she did—as when a student's test grade only imperfectly reflects how hard she studied or when the outcome of a lawsuit is not completely determined by how many hours the lawyers put in—and are pervasive in human organizations. In normal organizations these noisy signals motivate record keeping and lead to disputes over petty details, such as whether a traveling salesman's expenses are justified. They do both in terrorist organizations as well.

Take for example a letter written by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida second-in-command, to a Yemeni cell on February 11, 1999. He writes in a tone that feels entirely familiar to anyone who has ever managed, or been managed, in a hierarchical organization:

> With all due respect, this is not an accounting. It's a summary accounting. For example, you didn't write any dates, and many of the items are vague. The analysis of the summary shows the following:
>
> 1. You received a total of $22,301. Of course, you didn't mention the period over which this sum was received. Our activities only benefited from a negligible portion of the money. This means that you received and distributed the money as you pleased . . .
> 2. Salaries amounted to $10,085, 45 percent of the money. I had told you in my fax . . . that we've been receiving only half salaries for five months. What is your reaction or response to this?
> 3. Loans amounted to $2,190. Why did you give out loans? Didn't I give clear orders to Muhammad Saleh to . . . refer any loan requests to me? We have already had long discussions on this topic . . .
> 4. Why have guesthouse expenses amounted to $1,573 when only Yunis is there, and he can be accommodated without the need for a guesthouse?[8]

Zawahiri's note continues to electronically chastise his subordinates through seven more bullet points.

What is so probative about this example, and others like it, is that many would cite al-Qa'ida in the later 1990s as the terrorist organization least likely to suffer from agency problems and other organizational pathologies. It was, after all, a fanatical group conducting suicide attacks and using its network of training camps to extensively vet potential members, both of

[8]Cullison, "Inside Al-Qa'ida's Hard Drive."

which suggest the group would be filled with highly committed agents.[9] Despite this, al-Qa'ida clearly suffered problems with agents spending money in ways that frustrated leaders.

That fact makes perfect sense from the perspective of this book. Al-Qa'ida was operating small cells of operatives with diverse backgrounds over vast distances in areas of the world with poor communications infrastructure. Therefore, it should have had trouble monitoring and discipling agents. And, as we should also expect, agency problems over spending occur in smaller, more localized organizations as well. During the Christian-Muslim violence in Poso in late 2000, for example, a relatively senior Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member arranged to raise funds from oil company workers to be channeled through one local militia, KOMPAK-Solo, to JI and another local militia, Mujahidin KOMPAK. The workers were so concerned about the probity of these transfers that they appointed an auditor to oversee the funds.[10] This auditor's involvement exacerbated tensions between Mujahidin KOMPAK and JI, and the relationship deteriorated to the point that formal authorization by senior leadership was required for members of the groups to share weapons, something they had done freely in the past.

5.2.1 Probabilistic Success and Simple Management Tools

Moral hazard problems are endemic in the financial management of terrorist groups because of their covert nature.[11] The basic issue is that for most activities undertaken in terrorist organizations, leaders receive a noisy signal of whether their operatives dedicated all the resources they were given to the activity at hand. This is most stark with terrorist attacks, where the success or failure of an attack includes a significant random component. An attack may fail, for example, because operatives pocket funds for themselves and end up without enough to maintain decent

[9]On the use of camps to screen operatives, see testimony of FBI Agent John Anticev on Odeh, February 2001. *United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al.* 5 (7) 98 Cr. 1023, 27, 1630–1638.

[10]International Crisis Group, "Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," 9–10.

[11]Because the formal models dealing with the problems discussed in this section are complex relative to the additional intuition one gains from working through them, I walk through the logic of key results from my long-running collaboration with David A. Siegel, but leave the math to journal articles more suited to the task. Shapiro and Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations," Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations."

operational security or to purchase sufficient material. Likewise, failure can occur when a government simply gets lucky by catching an operative through his or her involvement in unrelated activities.

The 1993 World Trade Center attack neatly illustrates how financial constraints can contribute to terrorist failure. Shortly after noon on February 26 of that year, approximately 1,500 pounds of home-made explosives were detonated on the second level of the World Trade Center parking garage. Six people were killed and more than 1,000 were injured. But, it could have been much worse; the F-350 Econoline van rented by the terrorists had a cargo capacity of more than 4,000 pounds. Ramzi Yousef, the leader of the attack, later testified he did not have enough money to purchase sufficient materials to build a larger bomb. He also claimed the attack was rushed because his cell ran out of money.[12] While there is no evidence Yousef was spending organizational resources unwisely, that is not always the case. Imagine Yousef's leader observing the attack and wondering why more people were not killed. He has no way of knowing if Yousef's cell ran out of money because he was not given enough, or because Yousef spent the funds on things unrelated to the attack. The magnitude of the attack, in other words, is an imperfect signal of the effort put forth by Yousef.

But it's not just skimming that can lead to failure. Bad luck plays a role as well. The case of would-be LAX bomber Ahmed Ressam illustrates this point. Ressam had been trained in Afghanistan and was sent to the United States to carry out a series of attacks timed around New Years Eve of 2000. Fortunately he was stopped by U.S. Border Patrol agents as he tried to enter the United States from Canada on December 14, 1999. According to some reports, the border agents singled him out for greater scrutiny because he was nervous, fumbling, and sweating profusely.[13] It turns out Ressam had caught malaria in Afghanistan, and some believe that malaria symptoms contributed to him behaving in ways that drew the agents' attention. If true, it means that had an infected mosquito not landed on Ressam at some point during his training, the planned attack on LAX may have succeeded. This is a case of sheer bad luck from al-Qa'ida's point of view.

When leaders, who are watching the outcome of a given operation, get such noisy signals about effort, operatives inherently have opportunities to pocket funds while leaders remain unable to efficiently trace actual

[12]Matthew A. Levitt, "Sponsoring Terrorism," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 4, no. 11–12 (2002).

[13]Steve Miletich and Mike Carter, "Malaria May Have Unmasked Ressam," *Seattle Times*, June 1, 2001. Mike Carter, "Clark Book Has Errors about Arrest of Ahmed Ressam," *Seattle Times*, April 12, 2004.

money or accounts. There is no easy solution to this problem for leaders. Too much control and oversight will put leaders at risk, while too little means operatives have opportunities to keep resources for themselves, knowing that it will be hard to detect whether a failed mission was due to insufficient effort or just bad luck. Since leaders have a choice between spending money on attacks and on other activities, such as ideological outreach, rational behavior by leaders implies that when the resulting "agency losses" become too great given a limited budget, it may no longer be worth it for leaders to direct their operatives to engage in violent activity.

So what is a terrorist leader to do? Most normal organizations solve such problems by writing contingent contracts that give their personnel a stake in the organization's success. Law firms follow a partnership structure, businesses use stock options, and sales firms pay commission. These kinds of contracts are largely impractical for terrorist organizations. First, they increase security risks as they entail substantial additional communications. Second, there is often a great deal of uncertainty about how long individuals in these organizations will remain in place.

Instead, the general pattern seems to be that terrorist operatives receive some form of salary from their respective organizations and then funds for specific attacks are either provided in an initial lump sum, or on a need-to-have basis. The block grant method appears to have been used for the three Thai members of JI who were carrying $50,000 to support operations when they were arrested in Phnom Penh in May 2003.[14] Both the first Bali bombing and the September 11 attacks followed the need-to-have model in which operatives would receive a fixed amount less than the total needed and would request additional funds when they started to run low.[15] Although there is some evidence that Hambali, the key middleman for the 2003 J.W. Marriott bombing in Jakarta, received a substantial bonus following the attack,[16] there are no well-documented cases in which a terrorist operative or facilitator financed an attack and received payment from the group leader after the attack had

[14]Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamyiah," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25 (2003): 194.
[15]For the Bali bombing figures, see Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah," *National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis* 14, no. 5 (2003). For the September 11 attacks, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), section 5.4. See also John Roth, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff report to the Commission*, appendix A.
[16]Private communication, Phil Williams, April 11, 2005.

succeeded. The contingent payment model just does not seem to be used in terrorist groups.[17]

Given the lack of standard, contingent contracts, terrorist leaders really have two options. One is that leaders can punish agents whose average performance falls below a threshold. As discussed above, the ability of terrorist agents to go to the government makes using punishment difficult, because in a covert system the agent holds an inherent threat over the organization. If he is particularly dissatisfied with his punishment, he can go to the authorities, as Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl did. Because agents have this option, punitive strategies should only exist when the organization can wield a credible threat of violence over the agent or their loved ones. While it is possible for some localized groups such as the PIRA to use the threat of murder to condition their agents, that approach is much less practical for transnational groups. And even in local groups, punishment is problematic. In the PIRA, threats of harsh internal discipline created incentives for some operatives to seek protection from the British, exactly the opposite of the incentive the organization wished to create. Moreover, such penalties can make groups less attractive to potential recruits. For example, Palestinian groups operating in Lebanon between 1976 and 1983 that were known to punish theft, reportedly had to pay higher wages to operatives than groups that did not, presumably to make up for the amount that agents could have been embezzling.[18]

The second option leaders have is to end their relationship with problematic agents and deny them the ideological and pecuniary benefits of participation. If middlemen are patient enough, then this incentive proves sufficient to motivate even those agents solely interested in pecuniary gain to act at least partially in the organization's interests. This works because of a simple dynamic; the value of future gains can outweigh the benefits of cheating the system in the present period. Suppose a terrorist leader follows a simple rule: use an agent until he fails and

[17] For students of traditional economic organizations, this can be very surprising. My best guess as to why we do not see contingent contracts in terrorist organizations is that measuring whether agents have hit some performance benchmark is very hard for terrorists. In firms, profits can be measured in dollars and cents. There is no analogous measure for "political impact." In settings where one party can manipulate the measurement of performance, contingent contracting can break down for a number of reasons. For a specific model see Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, "Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts," *Economic Theory* 2 (1992): 1–26. For a summary of the literature on contracts and measurement issues, see Canice Prendergast, "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," *Journal of Economic Literature* 37, no. 1 (1999): 7–63.

[18] Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It*, 86.

if he fails, replace him. A rational agent must then spend enough on a given attack to guarantee a probability of success that balances the value of staying in the organization with the value of what he can take for himself. Exactly how this dynamic plays out will depend on the operational environment, but across all settings the easier it is to detect failure and skimming by agents, the less of a problem the leader will have.

5.2.2 How Bureaucracy and Paperwork Can Help Maintain Discipline

The moral hazard problem just discussed leads to a security-efficiency tradeoff because all the strategies to ameliorate it entail actions that create operational vulnerabilities. The tradeoff is clear and stark when we think about the simplest thing that terrorist leaders can do to improve their ability to monitor their operatives, collecting additional signals about how hard their agents are working. Normal organizations conduct this type of monitoring all the time. They require their personnel to fill out expense reports, document their time, send memos summarizing meetings, and so on. Even when enforceable contracts are available, collecting additional independent indicators of what an agent is doing (which frequent reporting does) is valuable. It reduces the variance of the signal a principal receives about his agent's effort and (weakly) improves outcomes for the principal across a broad range of interactions.[19] In the terrorist context, as in many other settings, establishing a bit of bureaucracy with rules to check up on agent performance can provide the data necessary to better distinguish "lucky" successes from "unlucky" failures. Agents, knowing the data to make such determinations are available, will be incentivized to higher levels of effort.

Depending on the group's situation, the fixed security costs of collecting additional signals may not prove worthwhile to terrorist leaders, which is partly why we see so much variation in how groups organize. As a general proposition, theoretical models suggest that collecting additional signals regarding effort is more likely to be worthwhile when: (a) groups are resource constrained, so that the loss from agents skimming organizational funds is a relatively serious problem; and (b) when groups have relatively uncommitted agents who would skim too much to be worth using unless

[19]Bengt Holmström, "Moral Hazard and Observability," *Bell Journal of Economics* 10, no. 1 (1979): 74–91.

they can be well monitored.[20] Under those conditions, collecting the additional signal can make it possible for groups to conduct more attacks and may therefore be worthwhile.

The security-efficiency tradeoff is a bit more nuanced when it comes to dealing with a situation in which the leader does not know his agents well, either because he is unsure as to their preferences over targets or because he is uncertain about how committed they are to the cause. This is referred to as the adverse selection problem. When adverse selection is an issue, leaders in any organization have two options. One is to write incentive-compatible contracts. In the terrorist setting, such contracts are implicit; leaders pay a wage that is extremely low given the level of risk, ensuring that only the agents who truly believe in the cause will be willing to work for the group. This method weeds out certain agents and retains only the most committed, i.e., those who receive sufficient value from fighting for a cause that they are willing to make less than they might have otherwise. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq seems to have consciously employed this approach. There, "The compensation structure was flat; pay was not differentiated by type or skill of labor, or position in the group ... [it] provided a basic amount of economic security for members based on a rough metric of household need—family size—and nothing more."[21] These low wages should have screened out all but the most committed, yet the group's leadership still insisted on high levels of record keeping. They likely did so because the second option leaders have for dealing with adverse selection is to keep track of how agents are performing and then use that information to fire individuals whose performance is weak, thereby motivating them to work harder. As a practical matter, this type of tracking requires some form of record keeping.

The security-efficiency tradeoff is subtler still when it comes to thinking about how the moral hazard and adverse selection problems play out in small, heterogenous organizations. For most organizations studied in the larger principal-agent literature—typically business firms—it is reasonable to assume that the pool of available agents is effectively infinite so that principals can fire an agent at will and easily find a replacement to fill the position who will typically have the same preferences as the person just

[20] These two conditions are analogous to groups having a high demand for discrimination or facing high levels of preference divergence, the effects of which we will discuss in the next section. Readers interested in these results should review the summary of the relevant literature in the online appendix to Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations."

[21] Benjamin et al., *An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq*, 46. Note that al-Qa'ida did not follow this approach. As bin Laden apparently told L'Hussein Kherchtou, he paid people more if they could make more on the outside.

fired.[22] Consequently, if there is a large pool of potential operatives—the situation we normally think of businesses being in—there is no reason to offer a poorly performing agent, or one who has failed on previous missions, another chance to prove himself. It is more efficient to move on and find a new operative. Doing so creates stronger incentives for those working in the organization.

But, personnel management is different for terrorists. Fortunately for the rest of us, terrorist principals are often constrained by the limited pool of talent available to them. Even among populations that believe deeply in a cause, few individuals are willing to become terrorists, and recruiting new members entails additional security risks. This constrains leaders' disciplinary repertoire (firing may not really be an option) and leads to a set of imperatives for leaders of small, heterogenous terrorist organizations, imperatives that record keeping can help meet. First, leaders need to be able to motivate agents who are imperfectly committed, and use sanctions when necessary. There are situations in which even the best agents will fail occasionally, and in those cases the one-strike-and-you're-out system may not be effective. Deciding which agents should be punished requires tracking individuals' histories, which of course requires keeping detailed records. Second, because the set of possible operatives is often small, terrorist leaders need the ability to employ disciplinary strategies that fall short of permanently firing wayward operatives. Keeping records on agents' past performance makes it possible to punish individuals in a small organization in ways that are what game theorists call time-consistent. This is a fancy way of saying that in order for threats to motivate people, they must be real. Leaders must be willing to carry out their threats when the time comes to do so.[23] Record keeping can help here by making it easier to maintain an organizational history. The history facilitates punishment by, ironically, making it more costly for leaders to

[22]Formally, in a repeated game with an infinite pool of agents, there is never any reason to rehire someone who has been fired. If a new draw from the pool of potential operatives were better at the time the agent was discarded, surely this continues to be the case at any later time. Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram, "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model," in *Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation*, ed. William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[23]Parents who have tried to quiet rowdy children on a long car trip will be familiar with the problem. Threatening to pull the car over unless the child stops kicking the back of the seat in front of them may seem like a good idea. But if the child continues and the parents stick to their threat, they too have to sit on the side of the highway, which is unlikely to serve them very well. Knowing that, a particularly savvy child may just go on kicking. For a full analysis of how record keeping solves time-consistency problems for terrorists, see Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations."

fail to carry out their threats. In other words, it eases the time-consistency problem.[24] Third, because "managers" are at high risk for being killed or captured, records are essential in order to preserve institutional memory. If only one manager knows of a specific agent's performance record, the information is useless if that person is killed. Record keeping allows for institutional memory in the absence of predictable personal relationships between principals and agents.

These benefits may seem a bit abstract, so it is worth taking a moment to walk through the logic of how record keeping can help managers. Consider an organization in which leaders get noisy signals regarding agent efforts, such as the success or failure of a terrorist attack. Let's assume there are two agents—one good and one bad. The good agent is not perfectly committed to the cause and he still wants to spend money a bit differently than the leadership, but he's a better operative by a long shot. Setting up a rule that punishes the good agent by not using him for a time after he's failed clearly can help leaders extract greater effort from him. This becomes tricky when the leader gets to the point where that agent has failed, which happens with certainty eventually. At that point the leader still does better in the next period by using him over the bad agent. The threat of punishment can only be credible if the leader pays a price for not punishing, which happens when operatives are able to identify and react to deviations from the leader's equilibrium strategy by taking actions that reduce the leader's utility in the future, say, by behaving as though they can ignore the leader's threat from that point on.[25]

As a practical matter, such a reaction requires clearly established disciplinary standards that are understood throughout the organization, something not unlike corporate culture.[26] Given this requirement, it seems sensible that the urban branch of the Kenyan Mau Mau insurgency (the Land and Freedom Army) kept minutes of the meeting at which it chose punishments for a variety of rules violations.[27] Two rules from the minutes are worth mentioning. First, the Land and Freedom Army (LFA)

[24]This is akin to increasing the next benefits to punishing operatives who behave badly, which as we will see in the next section makes it easier to maintain high levels of control.
[25]This kind of reputational dynamic will be familiar to any parent who has struggled with denying their child something that will make the child and the parent momentarily happy (e.g., a trip to the ice cream shop) in order to set a longer term precedent (e.g., you will listen to me when I say it's time to clean up your toys).
[26]David M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in *Rational Perspectives on Political Science*, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[27]The Land and Freedom Army operated a combination of an urban terrorist group and logistical support organization for the Mau Mau forest fighters during the Kenyan emergency, 1952–54. Mathu, *The Urban Guerrilla*, 21.

implemented a very clever rule that created incentives for operatives to exert maximum effort to avoid capture: "3. If any fighter was arrested while he still had ammunition in his gun, he would not be given legal assistance by the Committee." Second, the LFA used a discipline strategy that punished agents only after multiple failures: "The punishment for violating these rules was simple. For the first offense, a man would be warned. Second offenders would be killed."[28]

These rules highlight two important facts. First, terrorist organizations take seriously the incentives created by their internal disciplinary rules. Second, terrorist organizations sometimes see value in being able to employ the types of more forgiving rules made possible with institutional memory. This is not always the case. The Greek Cypriot organization EOKA, for example, had remarkably strict rules that mandated death for failures, such as breaking under torture, that many organizations forgive.[29] In his memoir, General Georgios Grivas, leader of the EOKA, writes about the justification for such severe punishment in the case of one operative who provided information to the British: "I was moved by the depth of Samaras's remorse and by the tragic position of his family who, torn between love and duty, had thrown themselves on my judgment. Yet I had no hesitation whatsoever in ordering the execution: first, to expiate the memory of a traitor; secondly, for the honour of the dead man's family; thirdly, as an example to other EOKA men."[30]

Overall, bureaucracy and paperwork can prove useful to terrorist groups. Written records, of course, are not the only way to gain these benefits. Maintaining a thorough oral history of who has done what and when, for example, would serve similarly in helping organizations to reduce agency problems. But, just as papers can be captured and read, operatives can be captured and forced to talk, so there is ultimately no escaping the tradeoff between efficiency-enhancing record keeping and organizational security.

5.3 MANAGING TERRORIST VIOLENCE: THE SECURITY-CONTROL TRADEOFF

At first glance, the problem of controlling violence in terrorist organizations looks very much like the standard problem of delegation in which a

[28]This is a version of the "gentle-trigger" strategy discussed in Shapiro and Siegel, "Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations."
[29]George Grivas, *Memoirs of General Grivas* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 49, 157–159.
[30]Ibid., 159.

principal gives responsibilities for some task to an agent who has limited discretion regarding how to carry it out. In normal organizations, the motivation for delegation is that the agent is better informed about local conditions and therefore can do a better job of managing the details of the task. This remains true in terrorist organizations. Operatives close to an attack are best equipped to decide exactly where to plant the bomb, when to pull the trigger, and the like. There is, however, a crucial difference for terrorist leaders. When it comes to the political impact of an attack, the information advantage is the reverse of that in standard models of delegation.[31] While terrorist agents may be better informed about how to make sure an attack happens, terrorist principals are typically far better informed than their agents about the mapping from an attack happening into political outcomes. This will generally be the pattern in covert political groups, in which the exigencies of remaining unknown government forces—avoiding contact with known political activists, refraining from overt political discussions, and secluding oneself from normal social interactions—mean agents are likely to be relatively ill-informed about the political impact of their actions.[32] In such settings, leaders can share information to help their agents achieve better outcomes, dictating that attacks happen at politically opportune times, for example. But doing so comes at a cost, as the communication with more senior leaders necessarily compromises operatives' secrecy to some degree.

One example from the Russian terrorist experience neatly illustrates this distinction. In Spring 1906, the Central Committee of the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (a Russian terrorist group we will discuss in great detail in the next chapter) approved the assassination of two senior government officials by the party's Combat Organization, but mandated that they be killed before the opening of the first session of the Duma on April 27, 1906. The creation of the Duma was a major concession by the Tsar following the 1905 Revolution and the Central Committee inferred that conducting attacks while it was sitting would be seen as acting in bad faith. One of the two targets was killed before the Duma opened, but the Combat Organization could not get to the second in time and so

[31]For a review of models of delegation, see Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas H. Hammond, "Theories of Delegation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 235–269. The model in this section does not fall into either of their two canonical categories.

[32]This physical disconnection can be compounded by psychological processes in which small, isolated groups operating in a high-risk environment develop their own particular self-reinforcing view of the world. See, for example, Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 27–28.

called off its plans.[33] In this case the agents knew best how to accomplish the assassination—where on the street to station operatives to maximize the chances of killing these officials, for example—but the political leaders understood the mapping from the planned assassinations into political changes.

Even though it has been understudied, this kind of information structure is actually quite common. Whether by dint of experience, or because they have more developed social networks, senior leaders often know more than their subordinates do about how to respond to the environment. This is especially true in organizations such as the military, in which managers work their way up from the lower ranks and can draw on a much larger experiential base when making decisions. The intuition we will develop in the model below has relevance beyond the immediate setting. Many managers face settings in which delegation is exogenously determined and must choose strategies to control their agents. Delegation is not always about who can do a better job; often it is about the exigencies of the situation, or the limited work capacity of leaders.

Once again, the terrorist's organizational challenge looks quite similar. To see how it plays out in detail, this section develops a game-theoretic model to provide greater intuition on the security-control tradeoff. The goal is not to build "the model" of terrorist organizations. Rather, the model serves to highlight specific dynamics which create a tradeoff between security and control and provides intuition about the roles of government counterterrorism as well as preference divergence, uncertainty, and discrimination (our core independent variables). It can be interpreted as a robustness check on the verbal theory discussed in earlier chapters. Many other models of the managerial dynamics of controlling attacks are possible, but this one captures the key organizational dynamics in a relatively straightforward manner.

Given that our goal for the model below is to build intuition, we will not derive the full set of equilibrium for the model.[34] Instead, we will focus on the conditions for what we can call normal organizational behavior to occur in equilibrium. In most organizations, loosely speaking, leaders tell their employees what they would like to happen, employees carry out those requests, and leaders remain uncertain whether employees took the desired action because they wanted to, or because of the threat of disciplinary proceedings for not doing so. In the terrorist context, this amounts to leaders communicating what targets they want operatives to

[33]This story is detailed among other places in Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 36–37.
[34]For the full derivation, see the working paper "Models of Terrorist Organization" at http://www.princeton.edu/jns/papers.html.

hit and the operatives attacking those targets. We can think of this as the high-control equilibrium.

In the model presented here, the high-control equilibrium is possible in an interaction between a terrorist boss, B, and his agent, T, when three conditions are met:

1. T must prefer doing what B wants rather than attacking her preferred target and being sanctioned for doing so, what we will call the Motivational Constraint (MC).
2. It must be in B's best interests to sanction T if she takes actions that reveal she does not share B's preferences about targets, but not otherwise, what we will call the Credibility Constraint (CC).[35]
3. B must find that gains from communicating with his preferred target outweigh the security costs of doing so given beliefs about T's preferences and the assumption that MC and CC are met (SC).

As a practical matter, these conditions being met requires that hitting the right targets is important enough to leaders that they are willing to pay the security costs of communicating; that there is sufficient uncertainty about targets that T is unlikely to choose correctly from B's perspectives and that preference divergence is small enough that operatives can stomach doing what leaders want.

Readers who do not gain intuition from reading through game-theoretic models may wish to skip to the next section, though the text is intended to be clear to anyone who has taken an introductory course in game theory.

5.3.1 Setup

The basic setup is quite simple. There are two actors, a terrorist boss, B, and an operative, T. There are two targets. B and T have different preferences over targets, basically different beliefs about what is politically optimal, but B's preferences are unknown to T and T's preferences are unknown to B. The group has to conduct a series of two attacks.[36]

[35] This is analogous to the time-consistency issue raised in the last section.

[36] Note that we are not concerned here with a principal-agent problem in which the principal and the agent each get separate information and try to come to some sort of best choice despite different preferences, as in Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* 50, no. 6 (1982): 1431–1451, or Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3, no. 2 (1987): 287–335. Rather, this is a model in which B is always right from B's perspective, and we want to know how T's differences affect how B manages the interaction.

5.3.1.1 Sequence of Play

There are two targets, $\theta \in \{1, 2\}$. Before the interaction begins, B collects information through some process and calculates (without loss of generality) that hitting target 1 will best serve the group's political goals, so its preferred target, $\theta_B = 1$. T also collects information through her own process and the probability that she also decides that target 1 is the best option is $1 - \rho$, with $\rho \in [0, \frac{1}{2}]$.[37]

This probability, which is common knowledge, captures the theoretical concept of uncertainty over targets given information about the world. Since B's preferences are unknown to T, and T's preferences are unknown to B, uncertainty peaks at $\rho = \frac{1}{2}$. Anything more than that and they know it's more likely than not that the other party does not share their preferences. Notice, this is different from the usual notion of uncertainty in game-theoretic models. Throughout this section, uncertainty refers to the chance that B and T's preferences are not aligned.

After preferences are realized, the following stage game is repeated twice:

1. B decides to communicate about what target it wants hit or not, paying cost c if she does. Here c captures the marginal risk B incurs from government counterterrorism when he communicates; think of the increased risk from a courier being intercepted, for example.[38]
2. T chooses where to attack, at target 1 or target 2.
3. Having observed T's choice of attacks, B updates his prior beliefs about the probability that T's preferred target is target 1, to ρ_1 and can decide to sanction T or not, paying cost s if he does. We can think of s as the unit cost of punishment given prior investment in a security apparatus. Here s captures factors such as the probability that the punished agent

[37]We can think of these preferences as being drawn from two different but correlated distributions. Suppose, for example, that the information the players get about the world is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with $\mu_B = 0, \sigma_B = 1$, $\mu_T = 0$, $\sigma_T = 2$, and correlation $\hat{\rho} = .75$ so that there is more variance in the information T gets, but the information is correlated. Assume that both players prefer target 1 if their information $x_i \leq 0$. With this underlying probability structure, ρ in the model is just $Prob(x_B < 0, x_T > 0 | x_B < 0) = Prob(x_B > 0, x_T < 0 | x_B > 0) \approx .33$. Notice too that in this setting the symmetry of the probability model for the preferences means that ρ does not depend on the signal. When that is not symmetric, then T's expectation about B's preferences, call it ρ_T, will depend on the signal it gets. As this makes the analysis more complicated but doesn't change the comparative statics in a meaningful way, I have chosen the simpler information structure.

[38]Security costs that do not depend on whether B communicates are captured in the discount factor, δ, which will be discussed under payoffs.



Figure 5.1. Extended form of security-control tradeoff game.

changes sides or retaliates against the group. T suffers disutility r from being sanctioned and is not rehired.

4. If B sanctions, then the act of doing so provides information to potential recruits about his preferences, so that the new T is more likely to shares B's preferences and therefore $\rho_2 < \rho$. We can think of this as the pool of T's learning something about the type of targets B likes given information about the world, and so those who do not agree stay away, rendering the remaining potential recruits more likely to share B's preferences.[39]
5. In the next round, B's preferences remain the same, as do T's if she is rehired. If a new T is hired, that T's learning from B's actions in the first round are captured in the fact that $\rho_2 < \rho$, uncertainty is reduced.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the first stage of this interaction, assuming $\theta_B = 1$ and suppressing information sets at the last node. For readability the figure does not show the branch where $\theta_B = 2$, but note that T knows his own preference but is uncertain as to B's, as illustrated by the information sets. Note also that some of the information sets in the final move for B may not be there in equilibrium.

[39] A simpler model could drop the second period and simply examine the 1-period interaction under two conditions: (1) when punishment is credible through some unmodeled value B gets by maintaining his reputation; and (2) when that value is less than the cost of sanctioning.

5.3.1.2 Payoffs

In each stage, B gets utility $b > 0$ if T attacks his preferred target and 0 otherwise. T gets $t > 0$ for attacking her preferred target and 0 otherwise. Thus ρ captures the probability of preference divergence and t captures its intensity when it occurs. Payoffs in the second period are discounted by $\delta \in [0, 1]$, which can be thought of as capturing the portion of the risk operatives face from government counterterrorism efforts regardless of whether B communicates.

Preference divergence is captured in t, which represents how much T values doing what it feels best, regardless of B's desired target. The key effect of t is to determine whether MC can be met: whether T will find the cost of being sanctioned, r, sufficiently high that she wants to attack where B says even if that is her least preferred target.

Discrimination is captured in b, the value to B of having an attack on its desired target. As we will see, b determines whether it is worth it to B to take the actions required to achieve a high level of control (communicating its preferences and sanctioning T if she does not attack where told).

As noted, uncertainty is captured in ρ, the probability that B and T do not share preferences over targets.

Looking forward from the start of the game, B's expected utility from the high-control equilibrium—in which he communicates about which target to hit and T always attacks that target in the first round and then hits her preferred target in the next round—is

$$b + (1 - \rho)\delta b - c, \tag{5.1}$$

and T's expected utility under the high-control equilibrium is

$$((1 - \rho) + \delta)t. \tag{5.2}$$

As we should expect from any reasonable representation of this interaction, the benefits to both B and T from the high-control equilibrium are increasing in the probability that they share preferences and in the probability that they will remain free to conduct an attack in the second period.

5.3.2 The High-Control Equilibrium

The high-control equilibrium is the Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies in which the B communicates, T attacks the target B told her to regardless of whether it is her preferred target, and B rehires T for the next period. Such behavior is a PBE if two conditions are

met: those behaviors are optimal at every stage given the other player's strategy and beliefs about the other player's preferences (both on and off the equilibrium path); and beliefs are determined by Bayes' rule where possible. The easiest way to see how this all plays out is to work backwards, discussing each player's optimal strategic behavior at each stage of the game.

The first thing to notice about the interaction is that sanctioning is not a credible threat in the final period. B cannot impact any future actions by T since the game ends after the last sanctioning stage. T will therefore just take her preferred action in period 2 and is guaranteed a payoff of δt for being rehired. Knowing this, B will never communicate in the second period, as it doesn't impact T's actions, and so B's value for the second period is $\delta(1-\rho_1(\cdot))b$ if he sticks with the same T after period 1 and $\delta(1-\rho_2)b$ if he sanctions T for poor performance and hires someone new. Here $\rho_1(\cdot)$ represent B's beliefs about the probability that T also wants to hit target 1 after seeing her first period action.[40]

Let O signify the case where T obeys B and $\neg O$ indicate when T does not, so that $\rho_1(C, \neg O)$ is B's belief about T's preferred target given that B communicated and T did not follow B's orders. In the high-control equilibrium we are interested in $\rho_1(C, O)$, what B believes is the probability T shares his preferences given that he communicated and T attacked where told.

B's ability to influence T's actions in the first period depend on MC being met, on the threat of being fired motivating T who do not share his preferences; when T shares B's preferences there is no problem. Whether the threat does so is a function of three factors: how likely is it that T will get to carry out the second attack given the operational environment, which is captured by δ; how much T values hitting her preferred target, which is captured in t; and how effectively B can punish T, which is captured in r. If being sanctioned is not that bad for T (given the inherent risks of being a terrorist) and the value of hitting her preferred target, if $r < (1-\delta)t$, then there is no incentive to do what B wants and T has a dominant strategy of attacking her preferred target. If, however, the net benefit of hitting her preferred target and getting sanctioned is less for T than the benefit of hitting the target B wants now and then hitting her preferred target in period 2, if

$$r \geq (1-\delta)t, \tag{MC}$$

then T will listen to B if it communicates honestly in equilibrium.

[40]In a PBE these beliefs must be derived from Bayes' rule, taking into account both B's communication strategy and T's actions.

Suppose (MC) binds so that T has an incentive to avoid being sanctioned. B's strategy about sanctioning must hinge on whether the improvement in the outcome from sanctioning given what he learned from T's actions, $\delta b\rho_1(\cdot) - \delta b\rho_2$, exceeds the cost of sanctioning T, s. (CC) thus involves two constraints. First, B must want to fire if T takes actions that reveal her to have different preferences. Second, B must want to retain her when T does what she is told. If, after all, T is going to be fired in any case, then the T who does not agree with B about targets has no incentive to obey him in the first period. More formally, for the high-control equilibrium to work, it must be the case that the cost of sanctioning divided by the benefits of hitting the good target, $\frac{s}{\delta b}$, is less than the reputational benefit (given beliefs) if T does not hit B's preferred target, but more than the reputational benefit (given beliefs) if T obeys:

$$\rho_1(C, O) - \rho_2 \leq \frac{s}{\delta b} < \rho_1(C, \neg O) - \rho_2. \tag{CC}$$

Of course what B believes after T's attack, $\rho_1(\cdot)$, depends on his communication strategy and T's best response to that.

As is normal in these settings, figuring out which beliefs are consistent with equilibrium requires us to first posit strategies conditional on off-the-path beliefs for B and T (i.e., what B believes if T does something unexpected) and then check to make sure that everyone wants to follow their equilibrium strategy at each point in the game and that on-the-path beliefs are consistent with strategies. To understand how (CC) works, we can start at the point where B has communicated honestly about what he observed (we'll check that this is optimal conditional on (CC) being met in a few pages) and consider the following strategies and beliefs:

- T's beliefs. Since B's strategy is to communicate honestly, T believes the signal is what he says with probability 1 (i.e., that B is not lying). PBE places no restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path; I will assume that if there is no communication (which won't happen in equilibrium), T assumes B shares her preferences about targets with probability ρ.
- T's strategy. Attack the target B identified if he communicates, and if not, attack the target that yields the highest expected utility given B's firing rule.
- B's beliefs. Since the T's pool on attacking where told if B communicates, no learning occurs in equilibrium and $\rho_1(C, O) = \rho$. If T attacks a target it is not told to attack (which won't happen in equilibrium) assume it has different preferences so that $\rho_1(C, \neg O) = 1$. Again, PBE places no restrictions on off-the-path beliefs, so this assumption is fine.[41]

[41] Formally, for any $\rho_1(C, \neg O) > \rho$ there will be some $\frac{s}{\delta b}$ such that CC is met.

- B's strategy. Retain T on seeing an attack at B's preferred site and fire otherwise.

Consider T's decision first and assume that B's strategy and beliefs are as above. If T receives the same signal as B, then her utility for attacking her preferred target is $t+\delta t$ and her utility for attacking the other target is $-r$, so she attacks where told. If T receives a different signal from B, then she gets $t-r$ for attacking her preferred target and δt for hitting her preferred target in the second period. Since (MC) is met, attacking B's preferred target has to be optimal. That takes care of play on the equilibrium path for T.

Now what about B? For this to be an equilibrium, it has to be that there is no profitable deviation from this strategy given beliefs, no matter what T does. Plugging B's beliefs into equation (CC) gives us a constraint on the range of sanctioning costs for which B's strategy is optimal given the level of uncertainty and the quality of the T who is expected to be hired in the next round,

$$\rho-\rho_2 \leq \frac{s}{\delta b} < 1-\rho_2. \tag{5.3}$$

Assuming $\frac{s}{\delta b}$ is in that range, there can be no profitable deviation for B.

To check whether B will want to communicate, though, we need to discuss what T's optimal action is given her beliefs if B does not communicate but follows his equilibrium strategy otherwise.[42] Assume that if B does not communicate T infers they share preferences with probability $1-\rho$. Given B's strategy, T's expected utility from attacking her preferred target is then $t+(1-\rho)\delta t-\rho r$ and her utility from attacking the other target in the present period is $\rho\delta t-(1-\rho)r$. Setting up the inequality for when T will attack her preferred target and rearranging yields $t(1+\delta)\geq -r$, which is clearly true. Thus, if B fails to communicate, T's best response given off-the-path beliefs is to hit her preferred target.

With that in hand we can consider whether B would want to communicate honestly given that (MC) and (CC) are met. If B plays his equilibrium strategy and communicates honestly, then T attacks his preferred target regardless of her preferences, and B gets

$$U_B(C_H) = b-c+(1-\rho)\delta b. \tag{5.4}$$

And if B does not communicate he gets

$$U_B(NC) = b(1+\delta-\rho-\delta\rho\rho_2)-\rho s, \tag{5.5}$$

given T's best response to that one-period deviation.

[42]Recall that we just need to check 1-period deviations.

To verify that neither communicating dishonestly nor not communicating are profitable one-period deviations for B, we simply need to check whether the payoff from taking those actions would yield a higher expected utility. If B sends the opposite message to the signal he gets, then T's equilibrium strategy means she will attack the target B does not like, B will then resume equilibrium play by firing T, and so B gets

$$U_B(C_D) = -c - s + (1-\rho_2)\delta b \tag{5.6}$$

which cannot be a profitable deviation[43].

Solving for when $U_B(C) \geq U_B(NC)$ defines c^*, the largest cost of communications for which B finds it worthwhile to guarantee his desired outcome in the present period by communicating. This c^* is the security constraint, (SC). Rearranging the inequality a bit yields the condition that it is an equilibrium for B to communicate whenever

$$c \leq c^* = \rho(s + b(1 - \delta(1-\rho_2))). \tag{SC}$$

So long as (SC) is met, there can be no profitable deviation for B.

5.3.3 Comparative Statics

The three conditions for the high-control equilibrium to work contain within them the core insights from this model.

Consider the motivation constraint first. For (MC) to bind it must be that $r \geq (1-\delta)t$. This simple expression highlights several comparative statics. First, as preference divergence increases, there is a point at which the motivation to do what B wants will break down and so any T who receives different information than B about the optimal target will ignore B, attack where she prefers, and be fired for doing so. Thus, the high-control equilibrium breaks down when preference divergence is too high. Second, when government enforcement becomes extremely effective, so that δ is quite small, lower levels of preference divergence will lead to a breakdown in discipline. Third, B needs to wield a credible threat against its agents to enforce discipline: no matter how small t gets, some r is always necessary.

(MC) raises a second, subtler point. The absence of conflict does not imply an absence of preference divergence. In the high-control equilibrium, B communicates, never gets a bad result in the first period, and never has to punish his agents. This accords with the intuition from terrorist bosses

[43]To see this, note that the $U_B(C_H) - U_B(C_D) = b(1 - \delta(\rho - \rho_2)) + s > 0$.

like Nasir Abas who report monitoring their agents but never having any problems.[44] This also accords with the experience of Hamas, which requires detailed accounting of expenditures in its charitable wing, but experiences almost no corruption.[45] Given the form of (MC), this point also highlights the potential for discontinuous changes in terrorist group behavior due to management issues. As overall security pressure ramps up, and so δ drops, there can be a sudden breakdown in control when (MC) stops being met. Whether that leads to more or less violence will depend, of course, on whether leaders were encouraging operatives to conduct more attacks or holding them back and encouraging them to be precise.

For (CC) to bind, the cost of sanctioning must be within a certain range. At first this may seem odd, but considering a few extreme examples makes the logic clear. Recall that for (CC) to bind, it must be that $\rho - \rho_2 \leq \frac{s}{\delta b} < 1 - \rho_2$. Suppose there is very low uncertainty so that ρ is arbitrarily close to 0 and that $\rho_2 = 0$ so that B can guarantee a compliant agent by sanctioning. The left side of eq. (5.3) will be vanishingly small and the right side will be 1. In that case, (CC) will be met as long as the discounted value of the second-period attack exceeds the cost of sanctioning. Suppose, on the other hand, that the first agent is expected to be terrible so that ρ is arbitrarily close to $\frac{1}{2}$, but that we still have $\rho_2 = 0$. Then there will be much less space for (CC) and as soon as the discounted value of hitting the right target in the next period significantly exceeds the cost of sanctioning, (CC) will no longer be met. In plain English, when the current agent is expected to be terrible, she will be fired as long as the next agent is better and getting a good attack is worth the cost of sanctioning, but that means she no longer has an incentive to do what B wants. Finally, if ρ is arbitrarily close to $\frac{1}{2}$ and ρ_2 is just a bit smaller, then the right-hand side of eq. (5.3) will be tiny and the value of hitting the right target must be quite large relative to the cost of sanctioning before B is willing to pay the cost and gamble on getting a good outcome in the second period.

The comparative statics for (CC) are relatively intuitive. As the level of discrimination required by T's political goals, b, goes up, B's gains from firing on getting a bad outcome [the right-hand inequality in (CC)] increases and thus he will sanction T at a higher sanctioning cost (s) or smaller probability of surviving into the next period (δ). Note too that as b goes up, the level of uncertainty at which B will refrain from firing if T does as she is told goes up as well. As the level of uncertainty goes up, however, B becomes more willing to fire T even if T obeys because

[44] Author interview, Jakarta, February 20, 2007.
[45] See, for example, Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, ch. 4.

the expected value of replacing her goes up. The high-control equilibrium can break down when there is too much uncertainty over targets because, ironically, with so much uncertainty, B can do so much better by making an example of the initial T.

SC highlights a very basic point: when the security costs of communicating get too high, it never makes sense for B to communicate his preferences. This is a critical point. If T's preferred attack involves more casualties, then a security crackdown which makes c larger can, paradoxically, lead to more violence because it destroy's B's ability to control his organization. We often see terrorist organizations do things that look like they are self-destructive from an organizational point of view, things that look like superfluous violence. This simple theoretical perspective offers a possible answer for why that is: when there is incomplete control in a terrorist organization, the underlying heterogeneity of preferences among terrorists is allowed to express itself.[46]

(SC) also highlights some more subtle points. Assuming that (MC) and (CC) are met, then communicating is worthwhile for B so long as $c \leq \rho(s + b(1 - \delta(1 - \rho_2)))$, which highlights four results. First, the highest security cost at which communication makes sense (in the high-control equilibrium) is increasing in the value of discrimination. In this model, discrimination represents the value to B of hitting the right target, but it could also represent the value of killing the right number of people, or of killing people of the right ethnicity.[47] Second, the largest security cost for which B will communicate is also increasing in the cost of sanctioning because when the high-control equilibrium is possible, B avoids the costs of sanctioning by communicating his preferences in the first period. Third, when the probability of preference divergence (or uncertainty) gets large, (SC) becomes easier to meet because the value of communicating gets larger. Fourth, as the probability of the terrorists being arrested regardless of what they do goes up (i.e., δ goes down), it becomes easier for (SC) to be met because B places relatively more weight on getting the attack he wants in the present period.

The model highlights two further points. First, when the security risks of communicating get too large, the optimal organizational behavior from the perspective of internal management can lead to sub-optimal outcomes

[46]I thank Eli Berman for this nice phrasing.

[47]One can easily imagine a continuous version of the model in which B sends a signal about how many people to kill and T, who may have a bias toward more violence, has to choose how many to kill. In that setting, discrimination would be parameterized as the loss to B from killing too many, or too few, people. See, for example, Jacob N. Shapiro, *Bureaucracy and Control in Terrorist Organizations*, manuscript (Princeton University, 2008).

from a larger political perspective. There is a tension, in other words, between the incentives of managing and organization and the incentives of achieving political change. Second, this model reinforces the importance to B of recruiting carefully before the game starts. As preference divergence, t, goes down, it becomes easier to meet (MC) and thus easier to maintain the high-control outcome. Moreover, if B can drive t to 0, then there exists an equilibrium in which he communicates and T attacks the target he wants in both periods, regardless of her preferences (because with $t = 0$ she is indifferent). The model thus provides an agency-theory explanation for the fact that terrorist groups that can better screen their members (e.g., Hamas) are more politically effective.

We began this section with the core problems of managing terrorist violence: (1) terrorist leaders and their agents can have different preferences about where to attack given fixed information; and (2) they can receive different information about what is politically optimal. The first of these is captured in (MC), which determines whether the threat of sanctioning constrains T's actions. The second is captured in the notion of uncertainty around T's preferences, which captures (CC) which defines whether B will find it worthwhile to punish bad behavior. The extent of the political costs of operatives doing as they would like is captured in (SC), which determines whether it is worth it for B to communicate about what he would like done.

5.4 DISCUSSION

The discussion in this chapter highlights key facts about managing violent covert organizations. The fundamental one, which should no longer be controversial, is that the probabilistic nature of terrorist success means leaders have an inescapable moral hazard problem. This in turn leads to a demand for standard organizational tools that can help reduce the losses from moral hazard. Those tools do so in part by making it easier to discipline operatives. Regular reporting makes it easier to know what agents are doing and also makes it possible to punish them appropriately when they do something bad. Killing wayward operatives at their first failure is not always the best option: terrorist leaders may sometimes wish to use more restrained disciplinary procedures, and keeping an organizational history can help them do so. Finally, regular reporting conveys information to operatives about what leaders desire. As anyone who has worked in a modestly sized organization surely recognizes, what management asks you to report on conveys a strong message about what they care about.

But, critically, it is not always worth it for organizations to use these tools. The gains to employing them depend on levels of preference divergence (over targets or greed), the discrimination (over targets) required by political goals, and the amount of uncertainty (over targets as in section 5.3 or over money spent as in section 5.2). When the gains of communicating and disciplining agents are too small, groups should eschew their use and we should thus expect a great deal of variance in how groups are organized. After all, the factors affecting the value of using management tools vary greatly across conflicts and over time.

Beyond these broad observations, certain common threads run throughout the discussion above. The first is that the impact of government counterterrorism is generally to reduce control. Making it costlier to communicate or less likely that the actors will be able to conduct a second attack reduces incentives for leaders to try to exercise control.

The second common thread is that the costliness of hitting the wrong targets is a key factor. The greater the discrimination required by a group's political goals, the more control leaders will exert. This suggests that giving groups a stake in the political process, so that they become concerned with maintaining popular support, can have two beneficial effects. First, it can cause them to become more discriminate in their attacks—perhaps by focusing on legitimate military targets, thereby sparing civilian lives. Second, that increased value for discrimination can push them to adopt security-reducing mechanisms to exert control, potentially rendering a government's counterterrorism task easier.

The third common thread is that leaders will exercise more control, and be more likely to sacrifice security in order to do so, when there is more uncertainty about how specific targets or methods of attack will support political goals. This result should not be surprising, but put more generally it has predictive value. The greater the information advantage of the principals, the more likely they are to exert control.

Finally, we saw that greater preference divergence leads to decreased control for two reasons. First, greater preference divergence makes it harder to credibly signal about the nature of the world. The less B and T agree, the more B will try to mislead T when he does signal. This means the amount of information T can take from the signal is relatively small. Second, the greater difference between the targets B and T would like to attack, the greater the threat B must wield to compel T to behave as he would like. In general, greater preference divergence can be thought of as raising the price of exerting control.

Table 5.2 summarizes the common findings from this chapter. In thinking about these predictions, it it important to keep in mind the distinction between control as an observable action (communication or punishment) and control as an outcome (getting what B wants). The

Table 5.2. Predictions about control

IV Change		Effect on DV
PD ↑	$\Longrightarrow$	Control ↓
DIS ↑	$\Longrightarrow$	Control ↑
UN ↑	$\Longrightarrow$	Control ↑
CT ↑	$\Longrightarrow$	Control ↓

CT = government counterterrorism; PD = preference divergence; DIS = discrimination required; UN = uncertainty in operational environment.

analysis above focused on outcomes, but derived some predictions about actions. In particular, when preference divergence is low, leaders can get high levels of control without ever communicating or punishing. If preference divergence is moderate, leaders can exercise high control with communications but without needing to punish (even though they must be able to). When preference divergence gets too large, control breaks down and we should see neither punishment nor communication.

In the subsequent chapters, we will look at both outcomes and actions that reveal efforts to exercise control. Doing so is made a bit easier by the fact that these things often move together when other variables are held constant. Consider, for example, the result of increases in the level of preference divergence. Control as an outcome occurs when B gets the attack he wants, which only happens with certainty when preference divergence is small enough that the threat of being sanctioned motivates T to B's desired action. B never communicates unless this is the case. Therefore, both the likelihood of control as communication and the likelihood of control as B getting his desired action are decreasing in preference divergence. Both action (communication) and outcome (getting the desired action) move the same way. These same patterns are evident for parameters that effect the range of possible equilibria. In the model in 5.3, if there is so much preference divergence that the threat of sanctioning does not motivate T to take B's desired action in the first period, then B does not communicate and T attacks her preferred target. Once again, both control as action (communication) and control as outcome (getting the desired outcome in the first round) are decreasing in preference divergence.

That said, the expectations in table 5.2 are not really testable in a traditional social science sense. Each group operates in a unique context and there is no obvious reference point from which one could measure

relative levels of the independent variables across conflicts. The best one can do is to employ a series of within-case comparisons that take the conflict as the case. By choosing conflicts with multiple groups that are similar on two of three group-specific variables, we can look to see if these comparative expectations are met. The next three chapters do just that. As we will see, this chapter's expectations are met to a large extent, suggesting the intuition provided here offers a useful guide to understanding terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER 6

Uncertainty and Control in Russia

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Many of the organizational pathologies of terrorism are starkly evident in the history of the earliest modern terrorist groups. Between 1878 and 1909, leftist terrorist groups in Russia struggled to find the right balance between security and control and had constant problems with more militant members defecting to other organizations. Operatives in "combat detachments" often lost sight of their group's political goals and engaged in ill-directed attacks, which damaged their organizations' reputations and slowed progress on their political objectives. Embezzlement was endemic among militant organizations, yet émigré leaders were unable to contain the problem because they could not credibly punish their operatives in Russia.

Examining this history is useful in several respects. First, the simple fact that so many of the patterns of terrorist organization described in the preceding chapters figured prominently among groups operating more than one hundred years ago reinforces the notion that certain dilemmas are simply an inevitable part of organizing terror. That fact also debunks the notion that today's terrorist threats are somehow fundamentally different than those of the past. Managing terrorism requires certain basic functions that give rise to the same set of dilemmas, whether in nineteenth-century Russia, or in twenty-first-century Iraq. Second, there are clear differences between the main Russian terrorist organizations in the level of uncertainty over targets implied by their political doctrines, allowing us to examine uncertainty's impact in a relatively clean manner. Third, the history of these groups is extremely well developed, in part because the archives of the Tsarist secret police were preserved, giving historians a rich set of investigative and interrogation reports to work with. Finally, the scale of violence in Russia was much greater than in Northern Ireland or Palestine. Between October 1905 and the end of 1907, close to 4,500 government officials and a similar number of civilians were killed or injured in terrorist attacks. While the major terrorist organizations were severely degraded after 1907, terrorists caused more than 7,500 further casualties

from January 1908 through mid-May of 1910.[1] Examining this case thus complements the AQI case study in confirming that organizational dynamics described in preceding chapters are not unique to small-scale conflicts.

6.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIAN TERRORISM

The history of pre-Revolutionary terrorism in Russia can be divided into two key waves. The first wave from 1878 to 1884 involved one core group, *Narodnya Volya* (NV), the People's Will. At its height, NV had approximately 500 active members and perhaps 2,000–3,000 active supporters.[2] Members of the group assassinated a number of high-level officials in 1879 and 1880 and conducted numerous attempts on Tsar Alexander II's life before finally succeeding in March 1881. The central NV organization in Russia was crushed within several weeks of the assassination as police traced the network of connections among its members, a process not unlike that followed by the Spanish police after the March 2004 Madrid train bombings.

From April 1881 on, local NV units continued the violence, albeit with less intensity and a focus on lower level officials. Several émigré leaders returned to Russia to rebuild NV as a unified national organization, but all were arrested before they could make significant progress.[3] In October 1884, NV leader G. A. Lopatin was arrested with membership lists for most of the local NV circles in Russia, and the authorities rapidly dismantled the group.[4] No group emerged to take NV's place and for the next fifteen years, the utility of terrorism was hotly debated by revolutionary theorists, but almost no attacks were conducted, with the notable exception of the March 1887 attempt to kill Tsar Alexander III.[5]

[1]For figures on deaths from terrorism and robberies by terrorist groups, see Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 21–26.

[2]Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia," 174. Astrid von Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populism: the Narodnaya Volya, 1879–83," in *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982) 48–49. Adam B. Ulam, *In the Name of the People* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 327.

[3]Vera Figner is the most well-known of these leaders.

[4]Naimark, "The Workers' Section and the Challenge of the 'Young': Narodnaia Volia, 1881–1884," 296.

[5]The best discussion of debates about terrorism during this interim period is Norman M. Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary*

The second wave of pre-Revolutionary terrorism began in 1901 and involved three groups. The first was the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), founded in January 1902 when a number of smaller regional organizations came together and adopted terrorism as a core party activity. Their theory was that terrorism would put pressure on the ruling classes to reform, grab the attention of the peasantry thereby motivating them to rebel, and deter repressive measures by state officials who feared terrorist retribution.[6] Over the next two years, the PSR developed both local "combat detachments" and a centrally controlled "combat organization." The second group, post-1901, was the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) which did not become involved in terrorism until 1905. There were two wings within the RSDLP: the Bolshevik faction, which adopted terrorism after October 1905 when, following ten months of increasing revolutionary activity across Russia, it became clear that having an active terrorist program was a political necessity; and the Menshevik faction, which maintained a principal opposition to the use of terrorism until the 1917 Revolution, though some local Menshevik groups were quite violent, particularly in the Caucasus. Indeed, between October 1905 and the end of 1907, the only major revolutionary movement in Russia that did not openly embrace terrorism was the Menshevik wing of the RSDLP. The third post-1901 group was the Anarchist movement, which never developed an over-arching national structure, but was responsible for a substantial portion of terrorism in Russia from 1905 onward. Throughout this chapter, members of the PSR will be referred to as SRs, and members of the RSDLP will be referenced as SDs, as is the convention in English-language histories of the Russian Revolution.

By 1908 it was clear that the revolutionary moment had passed and the major parties stopped supporting terrorism, in part because doing so was no longer politically popular. As the PSR and RSDLP leaders began to rein in their activists, the more militant members left to join the Anarchists or various local Maximalist organizations.[7] The RSDLP expedited this process by purging its most militant members.[8]

Movement Under Alexander III. For a detailed account of the plot to kill Tsar Alexander III, see Pomper, *Lenin's Brother: The Origins of the October Revolution*

[6]Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 24–26.

[7]For example, the SR combat detachment in Sevastopol split in mid-1907 because one faction wanted to ignore the party's orders to limit their attacks and refrain from revolutionary expropriations. See Christopher Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07* (London: MacMillan, 1988), 163–164.

[8]Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 68.

By the end of 1908 the PSR organization in Russia had simply fallen apart, as activists who joined during the height of the revolutionary excitement became frustrated with more mundane political activity.[9] Even the Anarchist movement lost its momentum between 1908 and 1909 as genuinely idealistic Anarchists abandoned the cause out of frustration at seeing their movement become an excuse for robbery and petty crime.[10] While terrorism would remain a constant element of Russian political life through the 1917 Revolution, the second wave of Russian terrorism effectively ended in 1910.

A number of now-familiar themes emerge from a more detailed review of this history. First, the SRs and SDs struggled to control their operatives, both in terms of the targets they chose and in terms of their use of organizational funds. Second, all three groups experienced problems with members in the underground becoming progressively more extreme and losing sight of the political impact of their actions. In the SRs and SDs, this extremism generally took the form of engaging more aggressively than leaders would like in "factory terror" and "economic terror". Factory terror involved attacks against repressive factory owners and the security forces supporting them. Economic terror, sometimes referred to as expropriations, involved robbing government offices, banks, businesses, and private citizens. The money they stole was supposed to support revolutionary activity but often ended up financing the operatives' own conspicuous consumption.[11] Third, debates about the utility of terrorism often turned on the question of whether or not leaders could exercise sufficient control over the terrorists while maintaining an adequate level of security against government forces.

6.2.1 Comparing Russian Groups

The level of uncertainty for the three groups active between 1900 and 1909 varied in clear ways. As we will discuss in greater detail later in this chapter, the major lines of Anarchist ideology during this period defined anyone who benefited from the existing economic system as a legitimate target. This meant identifying appropriate targets was very easy for Anarchists; someone just needed to be of the right class. The PSR had

[9]Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 226.
[10]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 152–153.
[11]For an extremely detailed account of the problems of embezzlement that surrounded economic terror, see ibid. ch. 5.

a more complicated theory of how terrorism would work, one that required attacking people who were directly responsible for bad actions and whose targeting would motivate the peasantry. This latter requirement implied finding people who were well known but not popular, no easy task and one that implies more uncertainty about targets. Once the RSDLP decided to engage in terrorism, its ideological justifications for doing so involved acting as an expression of the mass movement, or attacking those the workers wanted attacked. This made identifying targets easier for SD combatants than for the SRs, but not quite so easy as for the Anarchists. In the context of the theoretical arguments in chapters 2 and 5, this leads to two testable comparative hypotheses:

H_1: The PSR leadership will exercise a greater level of control than the Anarchist leadership.

H_2: Once the RSDLP leadership decide to engage in terrorism, they will exercise less control than the PSR leadership.

Of course, for such a comparison to be informative, we need to have a good idea about how these groups differ on the other three factors influencing control in terrorist groups: (1) the nature of the membership and hence level of preference divergence; (2) the value of discrimination to the group; and (3) the level of government pressure.

On the first score, the SRs and SDs clearly recruited from different populations. Table 6.1 shows how they compare along demographic and occupational lines drawing on two excellent existing studies.[12] The most

[12]Data on PSR local leaders come from a subset of 157 members who were delegates to regional and local party congresses and conferences (Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 224). PSR national leaders are delegates to the First Party Conference (ibid., 230, n. 20), with data from *Protokoly pervoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii partii sotsialistov-revolyutsionerov, august 1908* (Paris, 1908). For age data, see Perrie, ibid., 230 (PSR) and David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968), 23 (RSDLP). For education data, see Perrie, p. 239 and Lane, p. 23. For PSR occupation data, the Working class consists of the occupations Worker and artisan, and Clerical and shop worker, while White Collar is made up of Minor professional, Professional, and Student (Perrie, pp. 245–246; see note 39 for a description of how occupations were coded). For the RSDLP, the Working class consists of "Worker," Factory/mill worker, Handicraftsman, Printing, railway worker, and Lower medical, others. White Collar consists of Professionals and intelligentsia, Teacher, "Sluzhashchie," and Traders, landlords, and clergymen (Lane, pp. 22–23). RSDLP members from the Peasant estate who are not placed into any other occupation are coded here as Peasants. Under nationality, "Russian" here combines Great Russian, Little Russian (Ukrainian), and White Russian (Belorussian) nationalities, as some Russian statistics do not list these separately (Perrie, p. 237). See Perrie, p. 236 for member data and p. 237 for national leader data. RSDLP nationality data (Lane, p. 44) are on 201 delegates to the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP, citing *V S'ezd RSDRP: Protokoly* (1959), pp. 656–659.

Table 6.1. Demographics of Party Members (percent by category in columns)

Age	PSR				RSDLP			
	Local Leaders	National Leaders	Terrorists	**Total**	Bolshevik	Menshevik	Unknown	**Total**
10–19	31.5	1.7	21.9	41.3	6.3	13.0	2.5	4.5
20–24	37.0	13.4	45.3	38.4	32.3	35.5	24.2	32.9
25–29	15.8	31.6	15.1	10.2	28.6	27.0	35.0	27.6
30–44	13.0	36.5	16.5	7.9	30.7	22.0	35.8	32.5
Over 45	2.8	16.8	1.4	2.2	1.5	2.5	2.4	2.2
Education								
Pre-Secondary	35.1	—	—	47.2	19.4	13.3	23.9	20.2
Secondary	42.3	—	—	42.8	31.3	34.7	28.6	30.8
Higher	22.6	—	—	10.0	49.4	52.0	47.4	49.0
Occupation								
Peasant	1.9	—	5.0	7.7	5.5	5.6	5.2	5.3
Working	47.1	—	66.9	58.4	58.5	53.9	76.2	68.9
White Collar	51.0	—	26.7	33.0	36.0	40.4	18.6	25.7
Other	0.0	—	1.4	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nationality								
Russian	—	75.4	—	79.4	78.3	34.0	—	57.2
Jewish	—	14.8	—	13.5	11.4	22.7	—	16.9
Other	—	9.8	—	7.1	10.3	43.3	—	25.9

Note: PSR data come from biographies of 1,029 members of the Society of Political Prisoners and Exiles who were part of the PSR between 1901 and 1916 (*Politicheskaya katorga i ssylka; biograficheskii spravochnik chelnov Obshchestva Politkatorzhan i Ssyl'no-poselentsev*, 1934). Calculations from figures in Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," RSDLP data come from a sample of RSDLP members with surnames beginning with A and B, from the *Deyateli revolyutsionnaogo dvizheniya v Rossii: bio-bibliograficheski slovar'*, ed. V. Vilenski-Sibiryakov et al. (1927–33). Calculations from figures in David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968).

striking differences are that the RSDLP had a much higher proportion of operatives with post-secondary occupation, the PSRs had many more young activists under the age of twenty, and the PSR appears to have been much less ethnically diverse. Given that the PSR had many more young, poorly educated operatives, we might expect it would face a bit more preference divergence.

While the two groups appear to have placed a similar value on avoiding the wrong targets, the SRs faced much higher levels of government pressure because of the prominent role terrorism played in their program. While the SRs and Anarchists faced similar levels of government pressure, the Anarchists recruited a much higher number of criminals and had an ideology that was intrinsically opposed to central control. When using the Russian case to test H_1 and H_2 we will explicitly take these limitations into account.

The history of pre-Revolutionary terrorism in Russia also provides a rich set of examples that offer further insight into how terrorist management works. Three patterns stand out. First, leaders of different organizations in Russia clearly recognized the security-control tradeoff and refrained from terrorism when they could not achieve an acceptable outcome on both dimensions. Second, Russian terrorist leaders were quite concerned that the dynamics of underground organization would lead to greater preference divergence over time. Third, patterns of personnel movement between groups reflect the sources of preference divergence discussed in chapters 1 and 2 in that when operatives defected, they typically did so for groups that were more extreme.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides a history of terrorism in pre-Revolutionary Russia. Section 6.3 tests comparative hypotheses about the relationship between uncertainty and control. Section 6.4 looks for evidence of the behavioral patterns that follow from the theory but do not involve cross-group comparisons. Section 6.5 concludes by summarizing the evidence from the Russian case.

6.3 A HISTORY OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

6.3.1 The People's Will and Its Successors: 1879–1884

The roots of *Narodnya Volya* reach back to the summer of 1876, when two groups of revolutionary intellectuals came together to form *Zemlya I Volya* (ZIV), Land and Freedom. One group, the "propagandists," focused

on providing logistical support for efforts to advance the revolution in the countryside.[13] The other group, the "disorganizationists," focused on defending the organization and the revolution through the use of violence against government officials. In fall 1876, the plan for disorganization included "The systematic extermination of the most evil or prominent individuals in the government."[14] Right from the start there was a great deal of tension between these factions, and although the majority of the group's members were propagandists, they were never able to control the "disorganization squad."[15]

Beginning in February 1878, the members of ZIV assassinated a series of government officials.[16] There appears to have been no over-arching strategy or central direction to this wave of assassinations.[17] The only goal seems to have been to hit government agents and mid-level officials whenever possible. This move into terrorism occasioned a great deal of debate within ZIV. Members of the group made four arguments against terrorism: (1) the government easily replaced those killed, but retribution fell on society as a whole; (2) the expenditure of party resources based on a desire for revenge rather than motivated by the interests of the people was unjustified; (3) terrorism used too many resources and was incorrectly predicated on the assumption that government was the enemy when it was really the bourgeoisie; and (4) if terrorism was used for other than defensive purposes, it would "only bring down harsher reprisals and alienate moderate elements completely."[18]

Unhappy with the criticism they were receiving from moderate elements, the more radical militants in ZIV formed a secret subgroup in June 1879. This group would form the nucleus of NV. They adopted a set of rules for a centralized, hierarchical organization and called themselves the "Executive Committee." Their organizational charter had sixty-five highly detailed Articles and replicated the functional division of labor from ZIV.[19] An effort to reconcile the two factions by dictating that the majority of party funds go to propaganda failed and in late summer 1879,

[13]Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia," 180.
[14]Cited by Deborah Hardy, *Land and Freedom: The Origins of Russian Terrorism, 1876–1879*, 48.
[15]Ibid., 51–54.
[16]Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, 600–610.
[17]On the lack of central direction for high-level assassinations in 1878 and early 1879, see Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia," 180–181.
[18]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 34–39, 49–50.
[19]Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, 40–43, 49–52.

ZIV split with each faction taking a new name. The propagandists formed *Cherny Peredel*, Black Repartition, while the disorganizationists formed *Narodnya Volya*, the People's Will.[20]

The People's Will took inspiration from European terrorism that had started with the Carbonari, a secret society that led uprisings against French rule in Spain and Italy. "Frustrated with the failure of daggers and pistols to bring down their quarry, terrorists later in the nineteenth century began to use chemistry to further their causes. They sometimes used poisoned bullets."[21] Ultimately it was "dynamite grenades," or bombs, that became the weapon of choice and were used by the People's Will to assassinate Alexander II.[22]

Between 1879 and 1881 political terrorism by NV was essentially the sole province of the Executive Committee, which ran NV as a strictly hierarchical organization. Almost immediately after forming NV, the Executive Committee decided to focus all their efforts on killing Tsar Alexander II.[23] This focus meant dedicating all the group's financial resources to terrorism and withholding financial support from the NV "Workers' Sections" that were set up in many major factory centers in 1880.[24] The Workers' Sections were intended to focus on building the political awareness of factory workers. They were not prohibited from engaging in terrorism, but had clear guidelines for when to do so. "Central local groups" had the discretion to "...pass death sentences on private persons, spies in [their] midst, and government officials all the way up to the Governor, whose assassination must have the sanction of the Executive Committee."[25] NV engaged in local terrorism throughout 1879 and 1880 and also conducted a number of unsuccessful attempts on the tsar's life. The details of these attacks were supervised to the last detail by members of the Executive Committee, who selected the personnel for each attempt and even mapped out the positions from which they were to throw their bombs.[26] By early 1881, the Russian security services were effectively

[20]Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populsim: the Narodnaya Volya, 1879–83," 53. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*,, 654–657.
[21]Pomper, *Lenin's Brother: The Origins of the October Revolution*, 88.
[22]Ibid., 89.
[23]Naimark, "The Workers' Section and the Challenge of the 'Young': Narodnaia Volia, 1881–1884," 274.
[24]Ibid., 278. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, 706–707.
[25]Cited by Ulam, *In the Name of the People*, 328–329.
[26]Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, 710–711.

cracking down on the Executive Committee, with each arrest generating information that helped to identify additional suspects.[27] On February 27, the Executive Committee's main operational planner was arrested and the group decided to rush their latest plan for attacking the tsar.[28] The attack succeeded on March 1, 1881, and the Executive Committee was crushed in the subsequent reaction. Of the dozen most important NV leaders in St. Petersburg, only Vera Figner, a leading revolutionary, escaped.[29] The core NV organization in Russia was destroyed and remaining members of the Executive Committee in Paris lost any ability they had had to control the Workers' Sections.[30]

While the assassination led to the destruction of the Executive Committee, it proved to be a recruiting boon for the Workers' Sections and helped local NV units in other ways. Freed from the Executive Committee's supervision, these units operated with greater spontaneity and no longer had to contribute financial and human resources to the terrorist campaign.[31] During this period the issue of whether terrorism even helped the cause remained an open question for local NV units. In the winter of 1881, the St. Petersburg Workers' Section decided that terrorism "depleted the revolutionary forces to no purpose."[32] Their logic was that terrorism demanded strict centralization, which in turn facilitated devastating mass arrests like those of the spring of 1881. From their perspective, strictly hierarchical organizations were just too easily penetrated by the police.[33]

Several efforts were made in 1882 and 1883 to regenerate the central NV organization in Russia, but all came to naught, largely because Sergei Degaev, a highly placed member of the Executive Committee, was also a

[27]Ulam, *In the Name of the People*, 351–356. This early experience with cascading compromise played a major role in motivating the PSR Combat Organization's insistence on strict separation from the rest of the PSR.

[28]Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, 710–711.

[29]Naimark, "The Workers' Section and the Challenge of the 'Young': Narodnaia Volia, 1881–1884." 274.

[30]Norman M. Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III*, 46–47.

[31]Naimark, "The Workers' Section and the Challenge of the 'Young': Narodnaia Volia, 1881–1884." 274, 281–282.

[32]Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III* , 81–82.

[33]This is the earliest explicit discussion of the security-control tradeoff. For a more thorough analysis of debates over terrorism within NV between 1881 and 1884, see Naimark, "The Workers' Section and the Challenge of the 'Young': Narodnaia Volia, 1881–1884."

police spy.[34] Degaev's identity was revealed in late 1883 and he escaped to the United States. Further attempts to rebuild NV did no better. In October 1884, G. A. Lopatin, a long-time revolutionary and leader of NV's administrative committee, was arrested in St. Petersburg during a trip focused on rebuilding connections between the NV Workers' Sections. He was carrying a list of his contacts in a number of revolutionary organizations. Police used this information to arrest more than five hundred revolutionaries in October and November, effectively ending NV as an organization.[35]

6.3.2 Socialist Revolutionaries in the Lead: 1901–1904

The second major wave of of terrorism in pre-Revolutionary Russia began in February 1901 when an expelled student acting alone assassinated the Minister of Education, N. P. Bogolepov. The killing took place against a background of increasing social tension caused by the deep economic recession that had started in 1899.[36] Bogolepov's assassination received very different responses from the two main revolutionary factions. Grigorii Gershuni, then leader of a radical faction that would emerge as the core of the SR "Combat Organization," responded by committing his organization to a course of terrorism and naming the Minister of Internal Affairs, the man responsible for Russia's police force, as his next target.[37] Vera Zasulich and other prominent leaders in the nascent SD organization argued it was too soon for terrorism.[38] Such acts were meaningless, the group argued, because the political and social forces that could take advantage of a weakened government did not yet exist in Russia.[39] Despite

[34]For a detailed discussion of Degaev's role in foiling efforts to rebuild NV, see Pipes, *The Degaev Affair: Terror and Treason in Tsarist Russia*.

[35]Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III*, 64–65, 109.

[36]Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 12.

[37]Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia," 184–185.

[38]A core Menshevik argument against terrorism from 1901 onward was that it would distract the group from its key task of organizing the proletariat. Leopold H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955).

[39]Oleg Vital'evich Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 284. The RSDLP was officially formed in 1898, but had little presence in Russia until Lenin began organizing the network that would become the SD party in 1900. See Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 11. The SD Party would not hold its first representative party congress until

these differences, local SR and SD organizations formed joint committees throughout 1901 to conduct ideological outreach among the workers.[40] These joint committees would not survive the competition between the groups that emerged with the founding of the SR party in January 1902.

SR groups in the major cities had been working to establish regional organizations since at least 1896.[41] By 1901, the SR movement consisted of a set of loosely connected regional organizations. These organizations espoused varying opinions on several ideological issues, including how much emphasis to place on terrorism relative to other aspects of revolutionary activism.[42] In late 1901, the regional SR organizations informally agreed to unify and officially voted to form the PSR in January 1902. From its founding, the PSR announced its intention to pursue terrorism as a core party activity.[43] By April 1902, the SRs had established the "Combat Organization" as a distinct organization within the PSR. The Combat Organization was intended to take direction from the SR Central Committee with respect to the timing of attacks and choice of targets, but would be completely independent in all other matters, and its members were to have no contact with the rest of the party.[44] The thinking in establishing this independent body was that success at using terror—by which SR leaders meant the assassination of high-level officials—required specialists operating with a high degree of secrecy.[45] In parallel with the central Combat Organization, local SR units began to develop their own combat detachments. These were meant to engage in "defensive terrorism"; the assassination of local officials or right-wing militants who engaged in especially egregious violence against revolutionary forces.

With its terrorist wing established by mid-1902, the PSR engaged in fairly consistent patterns of terrorism through 1903. The major changes during the year were organizational. Ezno Azef took over the PSR Combat

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1903. See Paul Le Blanc, *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1990), 68.

[40]Michael Melancon, "'Marching Together!': Left Bloc Activities in the Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1900 to February 1917," *Slavic Review* 49, no. 2 (1990): 240.

[41]Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 19–21.

[42]Nurit Schleifman, *Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902–14* (London: MacMillan, 1988), 3–5.

[43]Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 24.

[44]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 111.

[45]Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 26–27.

Organization from Gershuni after the latter's arrest and was appointed to the PSR Central Commitee. Azef was a more hands-off leader than Gershuni and he left the details of Combat Organization operations to his deputy, Boris Savinkov.[46] Azef was also a police spy, a fact that would remain undiscovered by his compatriots until 1908.[47]

The year 1903 was one of great change for both the Anarchist movement and the RSDLP. That spring an Anarchist group was established in the town of Bialystock and a group of Anarchist émigrés in Geneva began a party paper.[48] In June, a series of pogroms swept through the Pale of Settlement, the portion of Russia where Jews were allowed to permanently settle, which extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea and included much of modern-day Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. The pogroms radicalized the population and prompted a host of young Jewish activists to defect from various Marxist organizations to the Anarchist movement, where they could more violently act against the state that had failed to protect their communities.[49]

In late summer 1903, the SDs held their 2nd Party Congress. It was a tense meeting and the party split over the issue of how broad membership in the RSDLP itself should be. Lenin favored a narrow, elitist party because he felt that if the proletariat were not led by the revolutionary intelligentsia, they would descend into trade unionism and settle for improvements in their economic condition.[50] Julius Martov and Georgii Plekhanov, two of the most prominent Menshevik leaders, countered that the party membership should be as broad as possible. Lenin lost on this key point but won on most other areas of contention, so his followers were termed the Bolsheviks (majoritarians) while Martov's followers adopted the Menshevik (minoritarian) label.[51] Both factions of the RSDLP maintained their principled opposition to terror in the face of its growing popularity among the Russian populace.[52] At least, they

[46]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 109, 117.
[47]Ezno Azef's career as a police agent is detailed in Anna Geifman, *Entangled in Terror: the Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000).
[48]Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 38–39.
[49]Ibid., 17–18.
[50]Ibid., 9–10.
[51]For a detailed discussion of the internal politics of the RSDLP and its political strategy before and during the 1905 revolution, see Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Worker's Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
[52]Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 294–295.

did so at the national level; at the local level there was less opposition, particularly in the Caucasus.[53]

The year after the SD factions split was a difficult one for the organization. The SD's energies were spent on factional debates and on dealing with a series of successful police actions against SD organizers.[54] Meanwhile, the local SR organizations were flourishing. For example, in April several small SR groups in what is now Belorussia and Lithuania formed a regional organization whose terrorist tactics attracted a flood of new activists. This recruiting success came at a price, as the party was "...flooded with 'militant elements, disastisfied with the slow progress of purely organizational work.' This led to serious internal fissuring."[55]

In July 1904, the SR Combat Organization achieved its greatest success to date, assassinating Serge Von Plehve, the extremely unpopular Minister of Internal Affairs. Phleve's assassination dramatically increased the flow of financial contributions and recruits to the PSR.[56] Indeed, 1904 began a three-year period of sustained growth for the SRs as their aggressiveness won over defectors from the more quiescent SDs and attracted new activists excited by the prospect of taking immediate, violent action.[57]

6.3.3 The Revolutionary Years: 1905–1907

On Sunday, January 9, 1905, several thousand striking workers marched peacefully to the Tsar's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to present a petition calling for an end to the Russo-Japanese war and the institution of an eight-hour workday. Army troops stationed around the palace met the crowd with gunfire, killing several hundred demonstrators and triggering widespread civil unrest throughout the capitol. While the immediate unrest caused by "Bloody Sunday" subsided after a few days, the killings are generally considered to have triggered the "revolutionary tide"

[53]Private communication, Ronald Suny, March 11, 2009.
[54]Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism*, 208.
[55]See the 1907 analysis of the SR organization in the North-West Oblast cited by Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 144.
[56]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 133.
[57]Using the biographies of 1,029 members of the Society of Political Prisoners and Exiles who were in the PSR, Perrie shows that 66 had defected from the SDs, roughly 6 percent of the SRs in the sample. See Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 227–228.

of 1905.[58] Throughout 1905, the organizations we are focusing on formed only a small part of the revolutionary movement. Many of the strikes and other actions were led by local "soviets," democratic assemblies made up of representatives from all corners of the revolutionary movement including liberal parties like the Kadets and trade unions, as well as Marxist groups such as the PSR and RSDLP.

Bloody Sunday greatly enhanced the stature of extreme parties. It led to a major increase in recruiting for the PSR, which was the main party conducting terrorist attacks.[59] It also triggered the explosion of the Anarchist movement. Between January and June the Anarchist movement spread out from the Pale to the rest of Russia.[60] The Anarchists organized in neighborhoods or factory circles, which gathered into federations in larger cities. These federations engaged in all manner of revolutionary activities, including both terrorism and ideological education for workers and peasants.[61]

In April 1905, the RSDLP leadership recognized that a broad-based revolutionary movement might be coming together sooner than they had expected and the 3rd RSDLP Congress, held in London by the Bolsheviks without Menshevik participation, endorsed the idea of cooperation with the PSR. Although the endorsement did not lead to much formal cooperation, it made sense from a practical standpoint. Because of their long experience with organizing violence and their large following in the military, the SRs had the skills needed for an armed uprising.[62] The decision to authorize cooperation was also a pragmatic move in that it was already going on inside Russia; prohibiting it would have been tantamount to issuing orders that would not be followed.[63] In addition to authorizing cooperation with the SRs, the Bolsheviks at the 3rd Party Congress decided to begin preparing their own fighting groups and planning for an armed revolt.[64]

[58]Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 57.
[59]Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 249.
[60]Anarchist violence was most prevalent in the South, but spread throughout the entire country. Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* 42–43, 47–48.
[61]Ibid., 43
[62]Melancon, "'Marching Together!': Left Bloc Activities in the Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1900 to February 1917," 241.
[63]This dynamic was not new to 1905. In 1901–2, the authors of the SD party paper *Iskra* argued unsuccessfully against forming local SD-SR committees. See Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 299.
[64]Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism*, 125.

In May 1905, the Japanese Navy decisively defeated the Russian Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, adding new power to arguments that fundamental changes in the government were needed.[65] Shortly thereafter, in June, the Black Sea Fleet mutinied, reflecting both dissatisfaction within the military over the conduct of the war with Japan and a growing sense that the government was irretrievably incompetent. By August, the government was trying to tamp down the unrest by granting greater autonomy to the universities—which were hotbeds of activism—and by making vague promises of a "consultative assembly." None of this was enough to satisfy a population eager for change, and in mid-October 1905, the St. Petersburg Soviet called a general strike in the capital.[66] The strike led directly to a set of concessions by the tsar. His "October Manifesto" guaranteed certain basic civil rights and established concrete plans to elect a national assembly, the Duma, which would be seated in May 1906. The SR Central Committee responded to the October Manifesto by calling for a temporary halt to terrorism to see whether the government would follow through on its political commitments.[67] The order was followed by the Combat Organization but was largely ignored at the local level, where assassinations of policemen and other security personnel continued apace.[68]

By late 1905, the RSDLP leaders' attitudes toward terrorism were becoming quite supportive. Lenin took a step beyond his earlier endorsement of cooperation with the SRs and began advocating for decentralized terrorism by local detachments. This decision was driven by both political and ideological considerations. On the political side, Lenin was concerned about his party's ability to compete with the PSR, whose use of terrorism had become extremely popular in the tumultuous atmosphere of 1905.[69] On the ideological side, Lenin recognized that members of the proletariat were now using terror tactics. This meant that terrorist acts could now be construed as part of the mass movement. Lenin's principal objection to terrorism, that it was the wasteful pre-occupation of the revolutionary intelligentsia, no longer made sense.[70]

[65]Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 57.
[66]Socialist parties held 21 of 50 seats on the St. Petersburg Soviet. Of these 21 seats, the SRs held three and the SDs six, which were split evenly between the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. See Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990) 42. This small proportion gives a good sense of the relatively small role the PSR and RSDLP played in the 1905 revolution.
[67]Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 153.
[68]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 40, 68.
[69]Ibid., 91–92.
[70]Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 321.

With this as a political backdrop, the Moscow SDs organized an armed uprising that began on December 6, 1905. The group was fearful that the revolutionary momentum would stall in the face of the accommodations embodied in the tsar's October Manifesto, which promised a range of civil liberties such as freedom of speech as well as the establishment of an elected body—the State Duma—which would have to approve new legislation.[71] This was the first major event of the 1905 Revolution in which a socialist party took the lead.[72] On December 10 the Moscow strikers set up barricades in various areas throughout the city and the SD fighting detachment began combat operations, which consisted mainly of shooting from rooftops at army troops sent in to clear the barricades.[73] Although the uprising received widespread support in Moscow, it did little to prompt revolutionary action elsewhere. For example, the St. Petersburg SRs had stockpiled weapons before the strike but did not distribute them or take action to support the strikers.[74] The uprising was a dismal failure and by December 17, the revolt was squashed by troops sent from St. Petersburg.

Each of the main socialist parties drew a different lesson from the failure of the 1905 revolution. The SRs decided that an increased level of terrorism would be required.[75] At the 1st PSR Congress in January 1906, the Central Committee decided to rebuild the central Combat Organization and to allow the combat detachments to resume their campaign against local government officials.[76] Unhappy with the few restraints placed on terrorism at the Congress, a group of SR activists broke off to form the Union of SR-Maximalists.[77]

On the SD side, Lenin and other senior Bolsheviks felt the root of the failure was the party's lack of military preparation. The Menshevik leaders argued to the contrary that it was the failure of the masses to rally around events such as the Moscow Uprising which doomed the revolution. That failure demonstrated the party's need to spend more time on agitation, worker education, and propaganda.[78] Absent the appropriate background

[71] Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism*, 125–126.
[72] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 49–50.
[73] Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism*, 127.
[74] Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 84–85.
[75] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 165.
[76] Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 154. Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 36.
[77] Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 73–75, n. 138.
[78] Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 491.

sentiment in the population, Plekhanov argued, "It wasn't worth taking to weapons."[79]

Despite the decisive defeat of the Moscow uprising, revolutionary activity continued throughout 1906 and PSR membership peaked at about 40,000 members. SR and Bolshevik combat detachments engaged in frequent attacks against local officials and conducted an ever-increasing number of expropriations.[80] On the SR side, the move into expropriations was driven by the fact the contributions to the party began to decline, while the amount required to maintain the mass party recruited in 1904 and 1905 continued to grow.[81] On the SD side, the move into expropriations generated some resistance. At the 4th Party Congress in Stockholm in April, the Mensheviks managed to pass a resolution condemning expropriations. The Bolsheviks on the ground in Russia paid no attention.[82] In Tbilsi (then known as Tiflis), for example, a young Joseph Stalin had created a team of "revolutionary fighters" in mid-1905 and when the 4th Party Congress condemned expropriations, he and his fellow Bolshevik leaders in the area turned the group into a purely Bolshevik unit with Stalin shielding the group, and its fund-raising efforts, from the local Menshevik party organization.[83] The funds raised through such expropriations helped the Bolsheviks elect more delegates to the 5th Party Congress in May 1907, where they would overturn the prohibition against such activity. Once again, political leaders who could not threaten their operatives were not able to get them to use violence in ways the political leaders felt were appropriate.

On April 27, the elected body promised in the October Manifesto, was seated against this backdrop of continuing violence. It was to be a short-lived experiment in democratic governance. In late June, the tsar dissolved the Duma because he was unhappy with his inability to control it, triggering a surge of terrorism throughout Russia. Most of the attacks in the surge were carried out by the SR-Maximalists and by small, unconnected Anarchist groups.[84] In response, Prime Minister

[79]Cited by Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 324.
[80]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 92–96.
[81]See McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 210.
[82]Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 19–20.
[83]This history is nicely described in Erik van Ree, "The Stalinist Self: The Case of Ioseb Jughashvili (1898–1907)," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11, no. 2 (2010): 275–276.
[84]Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905*, 168.

Pyotr Stolypin introduced a system of field court-martials for civilians designed to raise the cost of participation in terrorism. (It is likely no coincidence that the system was introduced one week after an attempt on Stolypin's life.) The system allowed governors and commandants of military districts to turn over to military courts those whose guilt was deemed so obvious as to require no further investigation. Defendants were not allowed witnesses or council and verdicts had to be reached in forty-eight hours, with sentences to be carried out within twenty-four more.[85] During their eight-month existence, the field court-martials executed some 1,000 militants.

By the fall of 1906, the PSR leaders had become uncomfortable with the central role expropriations had assumed in their combat detachment activities. When the second PSR Party Council met in October, they passed a resolution warning that expropriations had a demoralizing effect on the party, attracted undesirable elements, and lowered party prestige.[86] The Council also placed two restrictions on expropriations, ruling that: (1) expropriations could only be conducted with the approval of the SR regional committees; and (2) operatives who engaged in expropriation from private individuals or businesses would be kicked out of the party.[87] Ultimately, these restrictions were not followed, largely because rank-and-file activists did not understand the distinction between state and private expropriation.[88]

Seeking to solve this problem, the 2nd PSR Congress in January 1907 ruled that expropriations were only to take place under the auspices of the Central Committee. This rule was largely ignored and, over the course of 1907, the local PSR combat detachments descended ever further into pure criminality.[89] Breakdowns of party discipline over the issue of expropriations were part of the PSR's slow decline.[90] Local SR organizations in St. Petersburg, Sevastopol, and the North-West Oblast, for example, were destroyed by a combination of declining membership

[85] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 170.
[86] Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 74. PSR Party Councils involved meetings of the senior party leaders. PSR Congresses involved much larger meetings to which local SR organizations throughout Russia would send delegates.
[87] Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 76–77.
[88] Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 74.
[89] Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 78. Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 74.
[90] Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 201.

dues, police action, and the steady defection of combatants unhappy with restrictions on terrorism and private expropriations.[91] By the end of 1907 the police had arrested or exiled some 15,000 SR activists.[92] This was quite a blow for a group that had peaked at 40,000 activists.

By early 1907, the failure of terrorist activity was clear to many local SD organizations, which began disbanding the combat detachments that had not already defected to more militant factions.[93] In May 1907, the Fifth RSDLP Congress passed a resolution banning "partisan activity," which included both locally directed terrorism and expropriations. The resolution ordered the disbanding of special fighting detachments because they were "inclined to be attracted to terrorist tactics in the revolutionary struggle and to encourage partisan activities and expropriations."[94] The change from the RSDLP leadership's position of late 1905 could not have been more stark.

Terrorist activity continued throughout 1907 and 1908, but by this point the violence was being conducted largely by breakaway factions, individual Anarchists, and criminals using the revolution as an excuse for private gain. In May 1908, suspicions were raised that Azef, the former leader of the SR Combat Organization, might be a government agent.[95] The SR leadership denied the accusations and put Azef's accuser on trial. As the trial progressed, however, the evidence of Azef's guilt became overwhelming, and in November 1908 the party voted to kill him. The Azef affair thoroughly discredited the use of terrorism among the remaining SRs, although violence by Anarchists and local combat detachments continued for two more years. November 1908 effectively marked the end of the second wave of pre-Revolutionary terrorism in Russia. By the time the 5th PSR Party Council met in May 1909, the group's only functioning organizations in Russia were in Baku, the Urals, and St. Petersburg.[96]

[91] Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 127, 150, 163–164.
[92] Nurit Schleifman, *Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902–14* (London: MacMillan, 1988), 66.
[93] Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 101.
[94] Cited in Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 68.
[95] McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 147–148.
[96] Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 193.

6.4 UNCERTAINTY AND PATTERNS OF CONTROL

The Russian case offers two opportunities to test this book's predictions about the relationship between uncertainty and control. The first comparison is between the PSR and the various Anarchist organizations.[97] The Anarchists' ideology made it much easier to identify good targets given limited information. In accordance with H_1, Anarchist leaders exercised lower levels of control than SR leaders. While the organizational differences between the PSR and Anarchists are in the right direction, this should be weighed against the fact that the Anarchists opposed central control for ideological as well as practical reasons,[98] and so we cannot know how much of the difference in control is due to that ideological preference.

The second comparison is between the PSR and the RSDLP once the SDs decided to engage in terrorism at the end of 1905. A key aspect of SR theories about terrorism was that it was a method through which the revolutionary intelligentsia could play a galvanizing role in motivating the revolution. For the SDs, in contrast, terrorism was acceptable only as part of a mass movement and had to be part and parcel to that movement, conducted by operatives who were literally on the ground with the masses and acting in concert with them. Therefore, the SR operative had to find targets that he or she felt would help inspire the people to revolt. The SD operative merely had to attack that which the workers he was surrounded by wanted him to attack. Figuring out the subtle use of terrorism that would rally the masses without turning off moderates has always been a tricky task for terrorist groups. These differing views on how to use violence imply a much greater level of uncertainty over targets for the PSR operative. As H_2 predicts, when the SDs decide to engage in terrorism, they make far fewer attempts to control their operatives.

[97] Unfortunately, the only thorough English-language history of Russian Anarchists during the period under consideration is Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*. I have used other sources wherever possible, but Avrich's work remains the definitive account. My discussion of the Russian Anarchists rests heavily on it, as do most historians' discussions of the subject.

[98] Ibid., 34. The clearest summary of the main lines of Anarchist thinking can be found in Paul Avrich, "The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution," *Russian Review* 26, no. 4 (1967): 341–343. While Avrich is writing there about the views of the Anarcho-Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists in 1917, these views had changed little since 1905 and maintained at their core a suspicion toward hierarchical arrangements of all types.

6.4.1 Socialist Revolutionaries and Anarchists

By 1905, the largest Anarchist organizations, groups such as *Chernoe Znamia* (The Black Banner), were espousing ideologies that defined as a legitimate target anyone who profited from the existing economic system or protected it.[99] This made identifying appropriate targets very easy: anyone who was an agent of the state, who had money, or who frequented an establishment serving the bourgeoisie and upper classes was a good target. A typical Anarchist from Bialystok posed the following rhetorical question to his comrades: "Would it make any difference which bourgeois one throws the bomb at?"[100] Clearly the answer was, "No," as the letter writer died trying to bomb a Paris café shortly after penning those lines. The smaller Anarchist organizations held similar views about choosing targets. For the *Beznachalie* (Without Authority) group, any act against government officials, policemen, or property holders was valuable because it led to class conflict.[101]

By comparison, mainline SR theorists posited three goals for terrorism: (1) protect the revolutionaries by making agents of the state cautious through the threat of retaliation for specific wrongs; (2) force the population to think politically by committing high-profile acts; and (3) put pressure on the state to achieve a "disorganizing effect" that would get the state to make concessions.[102] The first of these clearly required knowledge of individuals' actions. Unlike for the Anarchists, simply identifying someone as an agent of the state was insufficient. The second meant identifying targets that would draw a high level of public attention in a manner consistent with the group's propaganda efforts. Coordinating high-profile assassinations with other party efforts certainly required more information than just identifying the members of a certain class. The third goal would seem to be served by attacking any bureaucrat. It did not enter, however, into SR thinking until well into 1905. The level of uncertainty facing SR operatives thus dropped in late 1905 and into 1906.

Even after this change, though, the SR leaders placed a premium on efficiency in the use of violence which had no obvious parallel in Anarchist

[99]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 211–212.
[100]Cited by Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 65.
[101]Ibid., 49–50.
[102]Manfred Hildermeier, "The Terrorist Strategies of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Russie, 1900–14," in *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 83.

thinking. The focus on going after individuals who could be attacked with a relatively high probability of success meant that the level of uncertainty facing SR operatives was greater than for Anarchist combatants. Finding easy targets for the PSR operative required surveilling several officials, deciding if their assassination would achieve the desired political impact, and then determining who was most poorly protected. In January 1905, for example, PSR Combat Organization members in St. Petersburg learned the schedule of Minister of Justice Murav'ev. Even though Murav'ev had not been targeted by the Central Committee, and even though local members deemed him an insignificant target, Savinkov argued that "If there was a chance to kill Murav'ev, it was impossible not to take it if only because the assassination of Trepov and Grand Duke Sergei were not guaranteed to be successful."[103] Savinkov's argument won out, and on January 19, the Combat Organization tried to kill Murav'ev.

For the Anarchist combatant, whose leaders were unconcerned with efficiency, calculating which targets would best advance the cause at minimum cost was unnecessary. Identifying any feasible target and attacking it was all their motivating political theory required.

Given these differences, we should certainly expect lower levels of control in Anarchist organizations than in the PSR. In fact, there is little evidence that the intellectual leaders of the various Anarchist factions made any significant efforts to control their operatives. This is true of Anarchist leaders who remained in Russia, men like the relatively well-known anarcho-syndicalist Lev Chernyi, and of émigré Anarchist leaders like Peter Kropotkin, the most prominent Anarcho-Communist theoretician of the period. Although Kropotkin and a few other Anarchist leaders occasionally inveighed against the excesses of their movement, especially the heavy use of expropriations, there is no evidence that they took concrete steps to exert control over Anarchist circles operating in Russia.[104] This is not to say the Anarchists had no organization. Anarchist factions called periodic conferences, produced serialized journals detailing their political views, arranged joint meetings with other revolutionary factions, organized "battle detachments" that were distinct from their propaganda arms, and in 1907, the émigré leaders came together to form an Anarchist Red Cross to support Anarchist

[103]This story and quote are found in Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 55.

[104]On the highly conditional arguments for restraint coming from the émigré Anarchists, see Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* 59–63. Anarchist leaders espousing restraint were a distinct minority. See Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 126–127.

prisoners in Russia.[105] Anarchist leaders simply did not try very hard to control these organizations' uses of violence.

By contrast, the SR Central Committee engaged in a constant struggle to control their operatives. Prominent SR theoretician Viktor Chernov summarized the motivations for doing so when he argued that "... control [over terrorism] exercised by the central party apparatus was necessary to ensure the efficient use of resources, to make a careful selection of targets, to aid in the success of the terrorist missions, and, above all, to coordinate this aspect of party work with all other ongoing efforts."[106] These reasons for control applied to the central Combat Organization and to the regional and local combat detachments, but there is interesting variation in the extent to which control was actually exercised over the different SR terrorist units.

From very early on, the members of the Combat Organization chafed at restrictions placed on them by the Central Committee. The Combat Organization's leaders tried repeatedly to gain control over the timing of attacks and choice of targets, matters that fell under the direction of the Central Committee according to party statute.[107] Many of those in the combat organization felt that terror was the most important tool the Party had and, as Savinkov put it, "... the complete independence of the Combat Organization in technical and administrative matters was essential to the success of terrorist activity."[108]

The first signs of tension in the PSR emerged in the spring of 1903 when Chernov attempted to ensure Central Committee control over the Combat Organization by ordering the group to keep the Central Committee informed of its activities. Although the majority of Combat Organization members opposed this proposal, a compromise was worked out that retained some oversight for the Central Committee.[109] By early 1905, the Combat Organization's sense of autonomy was becoming deeply problematic. After Bloody Sunday in January 1905, the Combat Organization initiated a plan to assassinate the tsar without seeking the Central Committee's approval. The plan was ultimately called off when the ball at which they planned to attack the tsar was cancelled at the last

[105]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 133. Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 50–51, 55, 62, 113.
[106]Cited by McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 181.
[107]Hildermeier, "The Terrorist Strategies of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Russie, 1900–14," 85.
[108]Cited by McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 134.
[109]Ibid., 133–134.

minute. Savinkov later claimed the plan would have gone ahead even if Central Committee ordered it to stop.[110]

Despite such tacit disobedience, direct orders from the Central Committee were generally obeyed. After the October Manifesto the SR Central Committee ordered a temporary halt to terrorism.[111] The Combat Organization followed the order over Savinkov's objections.[112] When the Central Committee decided to resume terrorist activities in January 1906, it was able both to designate targets for the Combat Organization and to control the timing of attacks.[113] Overall, the Central Committee exercised a reasonable level of control over the combat organization.

The SR Central Committee was less successful at controlling the local combat detachment fund-raising practices. Concerned that expropriations by the combat detachments were having a demoralizing effect on the party—attracting undesirable elements and lowering party prestige—the October 1906 meeting of the SR Party Council passed a resolution restricting expropriations.[114] The resolution authorized expropriating money and weapons belonging to the state provided that: (1) the expropriations were under control of the SR regional committees; and (2) weapons were used only against agents of the state. The resolution also asserted that those conducting expropriations from private citizens would be expelled from the party. The logic was explained by Grigori Gershuni, the original leader of the SR Combat Organization, who argued "...the party had to fight this evil...not because of the 'sanctity of private property,' but because these [acts] destroy and corrupt...[the SR] organizations, debase the revolution, and sap its strength."[115] This resolution and similar ones issued by regional SR committees had little impact.[116]

Efforts to control local units' targeting choices fared somewhat better, though only when they dealt with the actual targets. Directives from

[110]Ibid., 135–136.
[111]Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 153.
[112]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 139–140.
[113]In two cases the Central Committee called off attacks when they were not completed by politically-determined deadlines. See Geifman, "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization," 36; and McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 141–142.
[114]Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 74. The SR Party Council was basically the Central Committee and representatives from the SR regional committees.
[115]Quoted in Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 76.
[116]Ibid., 76–77.

the PSR Central Committee to stop attacks altogether were repeatedly ignored. After the Central Committee's call to halt terrorism following the October Manifesto, for example, many combat detachments continued attacking local officials.[117] A subsequent call by the SR Central Committee to temporarily halt terrorism at the opening of the First Duma in 1906 was similarly disregarded.[118] But, while the local combat detachments were unresponsive to the Central Committee's dictates to stop terrorism, they did respond to restrictions on their targeting choices. The January 1906 PSR Congress, for example, condemned factory terror and agrarian terror—attacks on factory owners and landowners respectively—in very clear terms, and the resulting restrictions imposed by regional committees were one of the main reasons the SR-Maximalists gave for splitting from the party.[119] This specific case, as well as the frequent defections to the Maximalists noted by so many authors, only makes sense if the Central Committee's restrictions on targeting choices were being enforced at the local level. After all, if the restrictions were simply empty threats, then why would they drive people to leave the organization?

There is also direct evidence that the restrictions were effective. Chernov argued in 1910 that one reason the SRs had such a problem with operatives leaving the group was that those who joined the group because it practiced terrorism tended to leave for the SR-Maximalists or Anarchists when they discovered the party limited the use of terrorism.[120] Moreover, the very combat detachments that rarely followed orders from the Central Committee about the timing of attacks were responsive to their local party committees until mid-1907, when discipline in the combat detachments completely broke down.[121]

Overall, it is clear that despite all the problems they had controlling their operatives, the SR leaders exercised a greater level of control than did the Anarchist leaders, and tried to exert much more control than they

[117]Ibid., 68.

[118]Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 69. On the general pattern of the combat detachments disobeying orders about tactical matters, see Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 69.

[119]On the condemnation, see Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 156. On the reasoning for splitting, see Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 65.

[120]Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 156.

[121]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 58. Importantly, the regional committees sometimes authorized the combat detachments to engage in the very factory terror that had been place off limits by the Party Congress. See Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 201.

managed. While H_1 is supported, this result cannot be fully attributed to differences in the level of uncertainty between the two groups. The Anarchists' general aversion to hierarchy could also explain the result.

6.4.2 Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats after 1905

Comparing the levels of control in the PSR and RSDLP, once the latter moved into terrorism, provides another opportunity to examine the impact of uncertainty. Both groups placed a similar value on discrimination in 1906, with their leaders frequently expressing concern about weakening the revolutionary cause through inappropriate uses of violence. As the history above shows, both groups also faced similar levels of preference divergence during the revolutionary years, struggling with rank-and-file members who wanted to carry out much more violence against lower-level officials than leaders would have liked. The groups differed substantially in two areas. The first was in the level of government pressure they faced. The second was in the level of uncertainty implied by their arguments about the role of terrorism in advancing the revolutionary cause.

On the first score, the PSR was under significantly more pressure from the Russian government than the RSDLP because of its open embrace of terrorist tactics.[122] The model in chapter 5 suggests that greater security pressure should lead to lower levels of control because it creates incentives not to communicate. The frequent statements by SR and SD leaders that communications between leaders and combatants had to be restricted to preserve security provides evidence that this was indeed the case. Given that, the difference in security pressure should lead us to expect more control in the RSDLP. So, if we find more control in the PSR, that offers especially strong evidence regarding the role of uncertainty in motivating efforts to exercise control.

As we saw in the previous section, SR theoreticians felt that terror by the revolutionary intelligentsia could play a galvanizing role. This meant that while terrorism needed to be "...guided by the needs of the [mass] movement..." it could be used even if masses were

[122]The Russian security services placed more agents in the PSR than in the RSDLP and those agents were concentrated in the parts of the PSR responsible for terrorism. By contrast, the police focus against the RSDLP was on the group's political organization. See Nurit Schleifman, *Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902–14* (London: MacMillan, 1988), 66–68, 81.

not yet engaging in revolutionary violence.[123] For the SD leadership, terrorism was only productive as part of mass revolutionary violence.[124] Reflecting this view, Plekhanov argued that terror had different effects on the revolutionary movement at different times. During peaceful times, terror had to be tightly controlled lest its use disorganize the terrorists themselves by causing the state to crack down.[125] During times of uprising, however, Plekhanov argued that terrorism disorganizes the enemies of the revolution.[126] Essentially, Plekhanov argued that terrorism became warranted when the uprising started in February 1905.[127]

Given this position, it makes sense that the SD leadership strenuously objected to getting involved in terrorism before 1905. Although some SD organizations created combat detachments as early as 1901, these were not meant to conduct attacks against state officials. Instead, they were intended to help the RSDLP keep the allegiance of party members interested in violence and to respond to right-wing militant attacks against unarmed demonstrators.[128] From 1902 until late 1905, the SD leadership exercised tighter control than the SR Central Committee in order to ensure that SD units stuck to defensive terrorism against right-wing militants.[129] Their ability to do so was, admittedly, lower in places like the Caucasus where specific local grievances meant operatives were particularly motivated toward terrorism,[130] but the overall pattern was less SD terrorism.

After a year of increasing civil strife and revolutionary activity, however, the majority of SD leaders switched their attitudes toward terrorism, and by late 1905, Lenin and even a few of the Menshevik leaders were arguing

[123]Cited in McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 111.

[124]In mid-1904, a group of sailors in Sevastopol formed a revolutionary organization and began discussing staging a mutiny, but the plan did not pan out because the local SDs insisted the initiative for armed struggle should come from civilians. See Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905*, 57.

[125]Lenin made a similar argument about terror weakening the revolution if conducted in the absence of a mass uprising.

[126]Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 314.

[127]Ibid., 315.

[128]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 262–263, 486. The main right-wing militant group was the Black Hundred. For a good review of the evolution of the Black Hundred up to the 1917 Revolution, see Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), section I.

[129]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 487.

[130]See for example the discussion of events in early to mid-1905 in Tbilsi in van Ree, Erik, "Reluctant Terrorists? Transcaucasian Social-Democracy, 1901–1909," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 1 (2008): 138.

for decentralized terrorism by the SD combat detachments.[131] The core SD position boiled down to the idea that using terrorism to get the masses moving in the right direction was likely to fail, but once moving in the right direction violence could then be used to keep the momentum going.[132] For the SD operative this meant a good target was one that the proletariat members wanted to attack.

While both the SD and SR party leaders were concerned with keeping the violence within acceptable boundaries, it was much easier for SD operatives to know what those boundaries were.[133] As H_2 predicts, when the Bolsheviks engaged in terrorist operations from late 1905 through 1907, they did so with less control by party leaders than did their SR counterparts.[134] Whereas the SR leadership at both the national and regional levels regulated terrorism and regarded it as means for achieving their ultimate goals, SD terrorists generally used violence to accomplish immediate, local objectives.[135] Once the revolutionary tide of 1905–1906 had passed, the population became less supportive of violence and it became harder to know what the appropriate boundaries were. As a result, the SD leadership sought to re-assert control over their operatives and move away from terrorism.[136] In May 1907 the Fifth RSDLP Congress adopted a resolution that ordered the special fighting detachments to be disbanded because "partisan activities"—i.e., locally directed terrorism—were compromising the party in the minds of the "broad masses."[137]

Essentially, because the SD's ideological justification for terrorism made it very easy to pick targets, the group made few efforts to exert control over its operatives between late 1905 and early 1907. When choosing good targets became difficult again, the party leadership turned against terrorism. This stands in stark contrast to the SR leadership that supported terrorism throughout their party's existence and always exerted some

[131]Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 324.
[132]For a nice discussion of the comparative plans of the RSDLP and PSR, see Sidney Harcave, *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905* (New York: MacMillan, 1964) 1964, 263–273.
[133]On the SRs see McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 183.
[134]For a description of the essentially anarchic nature of Bolshevik terrorism, see Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 92–96.
[135]On SD terrorists, see Ibid., 122.
[136]On Lenin's discussion of the need for greater control with the passing of the revolutionary moment, see Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 330.
[137]See translation of "Resolution on Partisan Activities" in Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 68.

control over their operatives' tactical choices. Comparing the SRs and SDs from late 1905 through early 1907 thus also provides support for H_2.

6.5 OTHER ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN TERRORISM

Many theoretically relevant aspects of Russian terrorism do not fit neatly into a comparative framework based on variation in uncertainty, but do provide valuable evidence regarding terrorists' managerial dilemmas. This section examines two such areas: (1) the deliberations over using terror in NV and the RSDLP; and (2) the sources and consequences of preference divergence in the PSR and RSDLP.

6.5.1 Deliberations over Terror in Land and Liberty and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party

Whether to engage in terrorism was a matter of great debate in both *Zemlya I Volya* (Land and Liberty) and the RSDLP.[138] Concerns with balancing security and control were at the center of the debate in both groups. While much of the theoretical discussion in earlier chapters dealt with the situation in which a group had decided to engage in terrorism and was merely seeking the best way to organize for that activity, it has strong implications for what debates about whether or not to use terrorism should look like.[139] We could easily add a stage to the beginning of the game in section 5.3, for example, wherein the leader decides whether or not to engage in terrorism, balancing the utility from optimally organized terrorism against the utility from focusing on other activities. In such a setting, groups would not engage in terrorism unless they could both: (1) exert the level of control required to make terrorism advance their political goals; and (2) achieve a sufficient level of security for their operations to have a reasonable probability of success. This discussion leads naturally to the following hypothesis:

[138]Using terrorism was not a matter of debate in NV since NV was formed by those members of Land and Liberty who decided to engage in terrorism.

[139]In other work, Siegel and I explicitly model the situation in which a group has to decide between investing in attacks or spending money on other activities like ideological outreach or social service provision. Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations."

H_3: Groups will refrain from terrorism if they cannot simultaneously meet a security constraint and a control constraint.

H_3 can be tested by examining the arguments made against terrorism in Russian groups that rejected the tactic. If those arguments rest on the notion that these two constraints could not be simultaneously satisfied, that can be counted as evidence in support of the hypothesis.

The need to control violence played a central role in Russian militants' debates about terrorism from the very beginning. In the mid-1870s, the leaders of ZIV who opposed terrorism, men like Georgii Plekhanov who would go on to be one of the leading Marxist thinkers in Russia and an opponent of terrorism throughout his life, began arguing that terrorism would hurt the cause by alienating moderate supporters.[140] The proponents of terrorism in ZIV, many of whom would go on to form NV, countered that this concern was misplaced for two reasons. In the first place, terrorism was necessary because the Russian peasantry was passive and would not take up the revolution absent a series of galvanizing events.[141] In the second place, the risks of losing the general public's sympathy were outweighed by the value of terrorism for "agitation"; or raising the political awareness of the people and drawing them to the side of the revolutionaries.[142] Notice the debate was not about whether terrorism could succeed under sufficient control, but rather about whether the benefits from loosely controlled terrorism outweighed the costs. Both sides took it as given that terrorist operatives needed a great deal of autonomy to have sufficient security.

By 1878, several years of increasing militancy within ZIV had shown that the secrecy required by terrorist activities inevitably reduced practitioner ability to understand the full political impact of their actions.[143] Both the advocates and opponents of terrorism thus understood there was an inherent tension between organizing for security and carefully targeting terror.[144]

[140]McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 49–50.

[141]Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 57.

[142]Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia" 181. McDaniel, "Political Assassination and Mass Execution: Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia, 1878–1938," 86.

[143]See for example the disagreements between militants and "propagandists" in ZIV described in Deborah Hardy, *Land and Freedom: The Origins of Russian Terrorism, 1876–1879*, 126–129.

[144]When ZIV split into NV and *Cherny Peredel* (Black Repartition), the core disagreement was not that terrorism could not be conducted with sufficient control. Instead, Plekhanov's main objection to terrorism was that by focusing on terrorism over organizing workers to demand economic rights, those favoring violence were favoring the

From 1901 to 1905, debates in the RSDLP about whether to get involved in terrorism turned on two issues. The first was the concern that terrorism would inevitably crowd out other party activities.[145] The second was the question of whether sufficient control could be exercised over terrorism while achieving a level of secrecy that would allow terrorist units to achieve tactical success. The SD leaders' concerns on this second score were that: (1) avoiding detection required combatants to have less contact with the masses;[146] and (2) party leaders could not provide the necessary guidance because secrecy also required that the terrorists have a great deal of autonomy.[147] Taken together, these concerns meant that moving into terrorism would inevitably lead to uncontrolled, counterproductive attacks.

This discussion alone is not sufficient to show support for H_3, as the economic determinism inherent in the SD ideology might have led the SDs to reject terrorism even if they felt it could have been organized in a way that met both constraints. Lenin and other SD leaders repeatedly argued that individuals could not move history, only mass movements could. They even suggested that prominent individual actions could prove counterproductive by making the masses more passive as they waited for the next dramatic act.[148] It is unlikely, however, that the SD leadership's objection to terrorism was motivated primarily by economic determinism. Lenin and others actually showed considerable flexibility over time on the issue of individual agency and terrorism. In 1903, Lenin argued quite clearly that the only events that can have a lasting historical impact are "...events which are born of the sentiments of the masses and not 'staged for a special purpose' by one organization or another."[149] This would seem to unequivocally deny the possibility of individual agency. Yet only two years later, as Lenin was preparing for the April 1905 Party Congress, he wrote a draft resolution that supported terrorism as a means

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new Bourgeoisie over the interests of the people. While ZIV's members understood the security-control tradeoff, those who left the group over terrorism did so for ideological reasons, not because they felt the tradeoff could not be satisfactorily resolved. See Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populsim: the Narodnaya Volya, 1879–83," 53.

[145]Both Plekhanov and Akselrod argued along these lines. See Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 297, 307.

[146]Ibid., 257.

[147]Both concerns are discussed in Plekhanov's December 1901 article "What is Next?" See Budnitskii, *Terrorizm v. rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: Ideologiia, etika, psikhologiia (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX v.)*, 292–293. On the problem that terrorism was insufficiently linked to the mass movement, see also Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 485.

[148]For an example of both arguments in 1902, see Ibid., 304.

[149]Cited in Ibid., 323–333.

of developing expertise and skills that would be needed in the eventual mass uprising, implying individual acts had some potential role, though not through a direct mechanism.[150] By September 1905, Lenin was arguing that terrorism was justified because it was no longer individual action, but part of a mass movement.[151] Clearly, the ideological objection to terrorism based on a rejection of individual agency was not what prevented the SDs from embracing terrorism.

In the wake of the collapse of the 1905 Revolution, the Bolshevik faction adopted a set of tactics that were akin to guerrilla warfare. These tactics involved expropriations and assassinations by individuals and small, isolated groups.[152] Such groups could not be connected to a mass movement in the manner envisioned by Lenin in September 1905. As such, Lenin's endorsement of these groups can be interpreted as a compromise on the ideological point of individual agency. This eventual compromise thus suggests that issues of control did indeed motivate Lenin and the SD's earlier rejection of terrorism, that it was not simply a logical consequence of their economic determinism. When Lenin later reflected on the failure of the 1905 Revolution, he attributed it not to an inappropriate reliance on individual action, but to the inability of the party to exercise sufficient control over terrorism.[153]

The support for H_3 is thus mixed. While both ZIV and the RSDLP recognized the security-control tradeoff, neither explicitly rejected terrorism because they could not find a satisfactory solution to it. The members of ZIV who rejected terrorism did so mainly because they felt that conspiratorial violence would not lead to their desired end state. The SD's rejection of terrorism from 1901 to 1905 was driven in part by a concern that they could not meet both the security and control constraints, but other factors were pushing in the same direction.

6.5.2 Sources and Consequences of Preference Divergence in Russian Terrorist Organizations

Chapter 2 identified two internal dynamics in terrorist organizations that lead to preference divergence over tactics: (1) individuals recruited because of their skills at violence will tend to seek more action, or different actions, than leaders would prefer; (2) the cognitive dynamics of underground

[150]Cited in Ibid., 398.
[151]Ibid., 409–410.
[152]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 440–442.
[153]Ibid., 442.

organizations will lead operational units to see the world differently than their leaders do. Prominent PSR and RSDLP leaders clearly identified the first dynamic. Debates over the use of terrorism among the SDs and SRs often included the concern that engaging in terrorism attracted undesirable types and would therefore lead to problems as people who did not understand the group's ideology, or who did not believe in it, would engage in actions that hurt the revolutionary cause.

A key part of the Menshevik leaders' arguments against terrorism, for example, was the concern that recruiting the types of people required to succeed at terrorism would create problems of preference divergence. Pavel Akselrod, one of the leading Menshevik intellectuals, summarized the issue in a speech at the 4th RSDLP Congress in April 1906.

> Having made it our main practical aim to prepare and carry out elaborate terrorist plans and mass uprisings—and there is no political sense in such actions unless they involve actual military tactics and force on a large scale—we should have to fill the ranks of our party... with members who had the right personal qualities for such activity, the right skill and experience and so on. But these qualities are by no means always combined with those that are required if a man is to be a staunch Social Democrat, politically aware and devoted to the cause of the proletariat."[154]

There were two specific political problems Akselrod and other Menshevik leaders associated with filling the party with such people. The first was that doing so would lead to more expropriations and ad hoc attacks, which would reduce public support for the party.[155] The second was that those with the right qualities for violence would likely want the party to take power in its own name and including them would therefore risk turning the organization into a "... party of puchists."[156]

Russian terrorist leaders also expressed concerns about the cognitive dynamics of terrorism. The SR leaders argued that if the party began engaging in expropriations, the activists would come to value such economic terror in its own right and would become impossible to control.[157] This very problem became evident at the regional level when the SR leaders in the North-West Oblast violated PSR doctrine by passing a resolution tolerating Maximalism as an ideological course and giving

[154]Translation in Abraham Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 61.
[155]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 428.
[156]Martov cited by Ibid., 448.
[157]Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," 75.

approval to factory terror in response to lockouts by owners.[158] Despite their concerns about economic terror, neither the PSR nor the RSDLP leaders appear to have been concerned that covert units would come to have different views on what types of attacks would serve the cause. It was mainly subsequent analysts who found evidence that operating in small conspiratorial units divorced Russian operatives from the political realities of their actions and enhanced a set of psychological processes that led to increasing radicalization over time.[159]

While the recognition by Russian terrorist leaders that internal dynamics can drive preference divergence is strong evidence for the basic theoretical approach suggested earlier, these dynamics also have further observable implications:

H_4: Leaders of terrorist organizations will face increasing problems with preference divergence as the conflict goes on and their operatives spend more time operating underground.

H_5: When operatives defect from an organization, they will most often do so for a group that is more extreme in its use of terrorism.

Turning to H_4, there is a clear trend toward increasing preference divergence over time among the SD combat detachments. Menshevik activist Peter Garvi noted in December 1905 that the Bolshevik combat detachments were becoming increasingly self-sufficient and disconnected from the SD leadership, trends that would lead them to lose sight of the larger political environment.[160] Several of the national SD parties—those formed to represent the various minority nationalities in the Russian empire—formed combat detachments in 1905, only to see those detachments' activities spin out of control to the point where many of their members had to be expelled from the party.[161] Even though the Bolshevik leadership initially approved of private expropriations, the units conducting expropriations got further and further out of control over time, eventually conducting far more robberies than were required to fund the party.[162]

While these trends seem to have been most dramatic in the RSDLP, the PSR was not immune. From the beginning, the SR Central Committee had a hard time getting the Combat Organization to follow orders, and

[158]Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 146.
[159]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 169–170. Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 156–157.
[160]Newell, "The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878–1917," 433.
[161]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 106–110.
[162]Ibid., 116–117.

the problem became worse from 1903 through 1905. Members of the Organization came to see themselves as an elite revolutionary vanguard serving purposes beyond those of their party.[163] This led to problems, such as the unauthorized plan to assassinate the tsar in January 1905. The PSR Combat Organization had its own treasury, which enhanced the unit's autonomy, giving it the freedom to push for ever more control over the timing of attacks and selection of targets.[164] In the regional SR combat detachments, preference divergence over spending also grew over time as combatants conducting expropriations began embezzling party funds.[165]

The Russian case provides similarly strong evidence in support of H_5. Here we can rely on Perrie's (1972) study of the biographies of 1,029 individuals who participated in the SR party at some point between 1901 to 1916. Perrie reports that of the 167 individuals who switched parties, 149 (89%) moved to organizations in which terrorism played a more central role.[166] This systematic evidence is buttressed by the fact the while there is almost no anecdotal evidence of individuals switching to more moderate groups, there are many examples of individuals, and even entire units, shifting their allegiance to more extreme organizations.[167]

Moreover, there is a clear trend in the Russian case of groups finding it hard to stop terrorism once they have endorsed it. When the SD central leadership turned against terrorism in 1907, their orders were not followed throughtout the organization. Both the 4th and 5th SD party congresses (in 1906 and 1907 respectively), as we have seen, explicitly rejected terrorism; with a focus on expropriations in 1906, and against all combat activity in 1907. Yet at the Fourth Transcaucasian SD Congress in September 1906, the Regional Committee agreed to a plan to expand the use of special terrorist groups down to the level of city districts and did not decide to halt terrorist activities until their next congress in February 1908.[168] In essence, the SDs in the Caucasus saw a higher value to terrorism than the SD central leadership and so they continued its use, in direct defiance of the central organization. This problem was also repeated at the next level down. In December 1906 or January 1907, the

[163]Knight, "Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party," 147.
[164]Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 50.
[165]For examples, see Ibid., 157–158.
[166]Moving from the SRs to the SR-Maximalists for example. Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 227–228.
[167]For examples, see: Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*, 73–75, 139; Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–07*, 125–126, 156, 163–164.
[168]van Ree, "Reluctant Terrorists? Transcaucasian Social-Democracy, 1901–1909," 151.

Tbilsi Committee of the RSDLP concluded that the use of violence against workers taking overtime was getting out of hand and forbade its district committees from attacking those individuals, but was unable to enforce the order as its district committees continued to push for attacks.[169]

6.6 CONCLUSION

Overall, the history of terrorism in pre-Revolutionary Russia provides strong support for the theoretical arguments in earlier chapters. Comparing the SRs and the Anarchists showed that Anarchist operatives faced much lower levels of uncertainty and their leaders made many fewer attempts to exert control. Turning to a comparison of the SD and SR organizations, we saw that once the SDs decided to engage in terrorism, their justifications for doing so created little uncertainty about what the appropriate targets were. As a result, the SD central leadership made fewer attempts to exercise control over their operatives than PSR leaders, at least until the SDs decided to move away from terrorism in 1907. This was true even though the SRs were under much greater security pressure.

Two other aspects of the Russian case are also probative. First, leaders in both NV and the RSDLP recognized the security-control tradeoff. Indeed, their inability to find a satisfactory solution to the tradeoff was a major argument marshaled against terrorism by those who opposed it in NV, by the Menshevik leaders, and even by the Bolshevik leaders prior to their decision to adopt terrorism in late 1905. Second, two of the phenomena that chapter 2 argued would drive preference divergence did so in this case. The PSR and RSDLP both struggled to control recruits who were brought in for their combatant skills and wanted to enact more violence than their leaders desired. Both groups also saw their members become more extreme and more disconnected from political reality the longer they operated underground.

The Russia case thus offers a broad set of evidence that managerial dilemmas of terrorism play out as we should expect from an agency theory approach. That this evidence comes from a conflict that occurred more than a century ago, and that involved very different goals than many recent conflicts, should give us great confidence that certain organizational dilemmas are both inescapable for terrorists and predictable from the outside. In particular, if we know a group's political goals and their theory

[169]Ibid., 145.

of change, we can derive expectations about how they will manage their organizational dilemmas.

Many commentators, of course, have argued that the current wave of Islamist terrorist is somehow different than prior terrorist conflicts, though such arguments become less prominent every year.[170] As more evidence has come out on how these groups actually work, it has become more and more clear that they are no different from prior ones. A formal way to assess such claims in the context of the arguments in this book is to step forward in time to look at more recent conflicts. The next chapter on Northern Ireland will focus on variation in discrimination but also will highlight just how many of the patterns first observed in Russian terrorism appear in a conflict with largely nationalist motivations. The subsequent chapter on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which there are both secular and islamist terrorist groups, enables us to assess whether religious motivations affect the terrorist's dilemma.[171] As we move forward in history, we will continue to see similar familiar patterns and organizational dynamics.

[170]For the argument that the notion of global jihad provides a powerful unifying narrative that motivates people to participate and allows them to cooperate without hierarchical structures, see David Ronfeldt, "Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare?," *First Monday* 10, no. 3 (2005).

[171]For the arguments about what is different (and not so different) about religious terrorists, see Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Ecco, 2003) and Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.*

CHAPTER 7

Discrimination and Control in Ireland

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The Northern Ireland conflict provides an excellent place to further examine how terrorist groups are organized. It is almost certainly the best studied terrorist conflict of the twentieth century. Historians started working closely with prominent participants on all sides of the conflict from almost the first day of the Troubles in August 1969 and continue doing so to this day. The conflict has been one of the longest terrorist struggles in recent history. For almost forty years the country was home to a conflict between two camps of terrorist organizations: Republicans (Catholics) who sought union with the Republic of Ireland or, at a minimum, greater independence from the United Kingdom (UK); and Loyalists (Protestants) who sought to ensure that Northern Ireland remained a part of the UK, or to make sure it did not become part of the Republic of Ireland. During this period the main Republican organization was the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). On the Loyalist side, there were two prominent organizations—the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).

The rich secondary history of this conflict is complemented by a raft of memoirs written by former fighters and some government agents. Beyond these qualitative accounts, the records of who was attacked by whom and why are so good for the Northern Ireland conflict that we can directly assess how control was exercised, both in terms of the level of care different actors took to avoid killing their own civilians and in terms of how much internal violence existed among combatants on each side. Equally important, the three main terrorist groups in this conflict differed in clear ways in terms of the level of discrimination in the use of violence demanded by their political goals, but were quite comparable on most other dimensions. As we will see in greater detail, the PIRA's goals required more discrimination than those of the Loyalist paramilitaries. Additionally, the level of discrimination required by the PIRA's goals increased over time as the group's leaders placed a greater emphasis on

politics and as the Catholic population became less tolerant of civilian casualties. Within the Loyalist side, the UVF placed a greater value on discrimination than the UDA, because its leaders envisioned themselves as a small elite outfit, but also because it became affiliated with a political party much earlier, which created greater incentives to avoid hurting Protestant civilians than the UDA faced.

Outside of these differences in discrimination, the PIRA, UDA, and UVF look quite similar on other dimensions, including preference divergence, uncertainty, and security pressure. All had their origin in the communal violence of 1966–1969. All recruited from similar working-class populations, largely by working through existing social ties. And all three were proscribed, or at least their militant wings were, for most of the conflict. In the early years of the conflict, the PIRA and UVF faced greater security pressure than the UDA, but by the mid-1980s, all faced concerted counterterrorism pressure. There was some difference in the basic quality of their recruits. The most able potential recruits on the Loyalist side joined the state security apparatus, which meant that, on average, the UVF and UDA recruited from a less talented pool than the PIRA.[1] But this difference does not seem to have been critical, and the differences we will see between the UVF and UDA provide some confidence that the differences between the Republican and Loyalist groups were not driven solely by the relative quality of their operatives.

Finally, the Northern Ireland conflict presents a stark illustration of how terrorists' internal organizational problems interact with the government's strategic calculus. In particular, from 1990 onward, if not earlier, leaders of both the PIRA and the British government knew there would be a negotiated settlement. From that point until the Good Friday Accords were finally signed in 1999, the British faced a delicate challenge. They had to put sufficient pressure on the PIRA leadership that they would accept terms the British could live with, but they could not put too much pressure on the leaders or they would lose their ability to control their operatives and so would not be able to deliver on the deal.

This chapter starts by assessing whether the relationship between discrimination and control in terrorist organizations predicted in earlier chapters holds in this conflict. Given the differences among the PIRA, UDA, and UVF in terms of discrimination, we should expect that:

[1]This dynamic is common to conflicts that see militants fighting both for and against the state and means pro-state terrorist organizations tend to be less effective than anti-state ones. For a good discussion of the differences between pro- and anti-state terrorists, see Steve Bruce, "The State and Pro-state Terrorism in Ireland," in *The State: Historical and Political Dimensions*, ed. Richard English and Charles Townshend (London: Routledge, 1999), 184–209.

H_1: PIRA leaders will exercise greater control than UVF or UDA leaders.
H_2: PIRA leaders will exercise more control over time.
H_3: UVF leaders will exercise greater control than UDA leaders because they saw a higher political value to the careful application of violence.

Our previous discussion of terrorists' organizational dilemmas also suggests that we should find plenty of evidence that:

H_4: Leaders' abilities to exercise control will be restricted by preference divergence.

To test the differences between groups, section 7.2 begins by examining the broad patterns of violence in this conflict, showing that they are consistent with hypotheses 1–3. In order to provide a sense of what to look for in the detailed case studies, section 7.3 then lays out a method for assessing differences in control across groups. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 analyze the histories of the PIRA and the two main Loyalist paramilitaries. Section 7.6 concludes by reviewing the evidence for and against the four hypotheses and discusses some of the main implications of this chapter.

7.2 DISCRIMINATION AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE

The political goals of the PIRA required great care in the application of violence. The group had to place sufficient military pressure on the British so as to compel them to give up Northern Ireland, while at the same time avoiding excessive violence that would cost the PIRA the support of moderate Catholics or make it politically impossible for British politicians to "abandon" the Protestant majority by leaving Northern Ireland. The demand for discrimination by Republican leaders increased throughout the 1980s as Sinn Féin, the political wing of the movement, took on an increasingly central role in Republican strategy.

By comparison, the main political goals of the Loyalist organizations were well-supported by indiscriminate violence. These goals were to: (1) maintain the political status quo; and (2) deter Republican violence against Protestant civilians.[2] One way to maintain the political status quo was to convince British leaders that the Protestant majority opposed

[2]The PIRA also claimed their attacks served a deterrent purpose against Loyalist violence, but this purpose was not as central in the group's statements as it was on the Loyalist side.

any moves away from a union with Great Britain. The existence of violent organizations that opposed any concessions supported this goal, regardless of how those organizations used violence. Indiscriminate violence also served a useful deterrent purpose, at least in theory. Loyalist paramilitaries clearly saw essentially random attacks against Catholic civilians as an effective means of protecting Protestants.[3] Indeed, from a theoretical standpoint, giving up some control over the response to an attack can enhance the power of a deterrent threat.[4]

There was also substantial variation in the need for discrimination between the Loyalist paramilitaries. The relatively successful Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) emerged out of the UVF in 1979 and remained closely tied to the UVF leadership.[5] By comparison, the UDA did not form its political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), until 1989 and it never achieved much in the way of electoral success.[6] Simply put, the electoral success of their political wing mattered to the UVF's leaders, which meant that hitting the wrong targets was more costly for the UVF than for the UDA.[7]

Given these differences, we should expect higher levels of control among Republicans to be reflected in the aggregated data on violence. Specifically, we should see that: (1) Republicans killed fewer civilians per attack and (2) there was more internal violence among Republicans. To test these predictions, table 7.1 summarizes the patterns of killings by the two sides in this conflict for the entire period from 1969 through 2001. To provide some context for the numbers, Northern Ireland, where the vast majority of the violence took place, was roughly 38 percent Catholic in 1991 and 40 percent Catholic in 2001.[8]

[3]Sarah Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Political, Paramilitary, and Community Groups in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: Apple Tree Press, 1984), 120–121.
[4]There are a variety of ways in which creating uncertainty about the nature of the action that will follow an attack can enhance deterrence. For examples see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 183–203. In the Northern Ireland conflict, attacks intended to deter usually led to cycles of escalation. This dynamic was quite apparent, for example, in the violence leading up to and following the 1993 Shankill Road bombing. See Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 282–283.
[5]On the closeness between the UVF and PUP, see: Ian S. Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 179; Roy Garland, *Gusty Spence* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001), 265–267; and author interview with UVF leader David Ervine, March 8, 2006.
[6]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 218–219, 228–229, 238, 381.
[7]Neither paramilitary-linked party has approached the success of the more mainstream parties, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.
[8]Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, <http://www.nisra.gov.uk/Census/>, accessed July 17, 2012.

Table 7.1. Killings in Northern Ireland, 1969–2001

Victim		Organization Responsible	
		Republican	Loyalist
Civilian		738	873
		(35.9%)	(85.6%)
	Catholic	227	686
		(30.8%)	(78.6%)
	Protestant	403	132
		(54.6%)	(15.1%)
Combatant		1315	147
		(64.0%)	(14.4%)
	Government	1088	14
		(82.7%)	(9.5%)
	Republican	185	42
		(14.1%)	(28.6%)
	Loyalist	45	91
		(3.4%)	(61.9%)

Source: Malcom Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, available at the CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet) website, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/. Last accessed June 22, 2007.

As H_1 predicts, Republican organizations killed fewer civilians than Loyalists, which was only half as many as a proportion of all their killings. Indeed, Republican attacks killed approximately one Catholic civilian for every five enemy combatants (227 to 1133), while Loyalists killed three Protestant civilians for every one enemy combatant (132 to 42). As we would expect given their increasing need for discrimination over time, PIRA killings became more selective later in that conflict.[9]

[9]For a thorough discussion of this trend see Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "The Production of Terrorist Violence: Analyzing Target Selection in the IRA and ETA," (Manuscript, Juan March Institute 2007). The authors distinguish between "control" attacks, which must be selective and "attrition" attacks that can be selective or indiscriminate. From 1970 to 1989, only 7.7 percent of PIRA violence involved control attacks while 25.4 percent did so from 1990 to 2004. De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca make a different argument than I do about why the PIRA became more selective over time. They argue that terrorists use indiscriminate violence if their supporters favor it and they have sufficient resources to pursue an "attrition strategy" against government forces. Their "attrition strategy" is contrasted with a "control strategy" which involves using discriminate violence to compel the civilian population to provide support to the

As we also expected, Republican organizations engaged in proportionally more intra-community violence than the Loyalists. This fits with the theory outlined so far. As the value of discrimination increases, terrorist leaders should be more willing to actually sanction their operatives. If, after all, the value of discrimination is low, why would leaders incur the security costs of punishment? In chapter 5, we focused on equilibrium in which the threat of punishment precluded operatives from behaving against their leaders' wishes. If we think about that same managerial problem in a probabilistic world, in which agents just mess up sometimes (or in which leaders occasionally recruit really bad operatives by mistake), then the probability of observing groups punishing operatives will be higher, all other things being equal, in groups that place a higher value on hitting the right target.

Much of this intra-community violence was driven by disciplinary actions against combatants and so provides evidence on the extent to which control was exercised through violent sanctioning. Of the 135 PIRA operatives killed by fellow Republicans, 132 (97.8%) were killed by their own organization. In general, when Republican groups killed combatants, they were four times more likely to be attacking their own personnel than the other side. By contrast, Loyalists were only twice as likely to be attacking their own personnel. That the rate of violence against one's own combatants was higher on the Republican side is consistent with the notion that Republican leaders placed a greater value on controlling the use of violence and were therefore more likely to need to sanction their own members.

At first glance a similar comparison does not work clearly within the Loyalist side as there was not a great deal of variation in the proportion of civilians killed by different groups. Of the UVF victims, 84 percent were civilians compared to 80 percent of UDA victims. There was, however, a good deal of variation in the targeting of other militants between the UDA and UVF. The UVF killed twice as many Loyalists as Republicans, while the UDA and its flag of convenience organization, the Ulster Fighting Force (UFF), killed more than three times as many Loyalists as Republicans. Initially this pattern is hard to interpret. The UVF placed a greater emphasis on discrimination, meaning it should have been more likely to punish any given infraction.

But, if we account for group size, then disciplinary violence seems to have been much more prominent in the UVF, reflecting a greater effort

group. As the troubles in Northern Ireland wore on, the Catholic population's support for sectarian violence dropped and British security forces learned more about the PIRA. The latter meant the PIRA had to devote ever more resources to security, reducing what it could use on producing violence. In the authors' theory, both changes push the group to use violence more selectively.

to control the organization. At its peak in the mid-1970s, the UDA had as many as 30,000 dues-paying members. By the end of the 1990s it was down to 2,000 members.[10] By contrast, the UVF peaked at 2,000 members in the mid-1970s and had as few as 120 members by 1998.[11] With this difference in mind we can break down the Loyalist-on-Loyalist killings into two categories: those that occurred during disputes between organizations and those that involved intra-organizational disputes. Of the forty-one Loyalists killed by the UVF, twenty-nine (70.7%) were UVF members. Of the thirty-seven Loyalists killed by the UDA, twenty-eight (75.6%) were in the UDA.[12] Since the UVF has never been more than one tenth the size of the UDA, these numbers mean the UVF was killing its own members at a rate of more than ten times that of the UDA.[13] That the two groups killed similar numbers of their own personnel, in other words, means that internal discipline was much more often enforced in the UVF. This is exactly what we should expect given the greater value the UVF placed on discrimination, and it is in line with H_3.

7.3 MEASURING CONTROL

To measure the level of control exercised by political and ideological leaders we need a simple, relatively objective way to decide which group exercised more control. One way to do this is to focus on areas of organizational activity where we can generally find evidence of whether leaders were able to exercise control. In the Northern Ireland context (and the Palestinian-Israeli one studied in the next chapter), there are six such areas:

1. Target choices
2. Operational procedures
3. Personnel assignments
4. Resource allocation
5. Fund-raising methods
6. Recruiting practices

[10] Figures based on CAIN organizational abstracts and U.S., *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Department of State, 2002), 130.
[11] Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail" 333.
[12] UDA killings count actions by the UDA and the UFF.
[13] Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail" 332.

By asking how many of these areas are controlled by the political and ideological leadership, we can generate an ordinal scale of control. A group in which five of six areas are centrally controlled can be said to exhibit a higher level of control than a group in which only three of the six are.

So, what exactly does it mean for leaders to exercise control over each of these areas? Control over target choices means that leaders either designate targets, have a chance to exercise an effective veto over targeting choices, or are sufficiently satisfied with the targeting choices of operatives that they choose not to get involved. When leaders express dissatisfaction over attacks but do not influence subsequent targeting choices, that indicates a lack of control. Control over operational procedures entails leaders being able to decide how operations are conducted or demonstrating an ability to control things like the number of connections between cells, or the process by which new members are trained. Control over personnel assignments simply means that leaders control who fills which positions, either directly or by manipulating the selection process. Control over resources requires that leaders either directly manage resources such as weapons and funds, or that they willingly relinquish control, but there is little evidence that members appropriate organizational resources for private use. Control over fund-raising requires that leaders either raise funds through a centralized unit whose procedures they control, or that they be able to limit the methods by which operatives fund themselves. Control over recruiting involves either making sure recruiting happens through an approved method, or by being directly involved in selecting and vetting new members.

With these definitions in mind, let us turn to brief analytical narratives of the main terrorist organizations in this conflict.

7.4 THE PROVISIONAL IRA

From its formation in 1969 through the present, the Provisional Irish Republican Army has probably been the most studied "secret" army in the world.[14] There is a wealth of secondary literature on the organization, from excellent histories, first-person memoirs and journalistic accounts, to scholarly analyses and the wealth of primary and secondary resources available from the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) website.[15]

[14]For the best overview of the PIRA's organizational structure, see Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure."
[15]The CAIN site contains basic background information on many aspects of the "Troubles," detailed chronologies of key periods, links to scholarly articles, bibliographies

Drawing on this literature, we can divide the organization's history into three periods:

- the early period from its formation in late 1969 to the first major truce in February 1975;
- the middle period from the ceasefire until 1989 when the leadership realized it was in a military stalemate with Britain; and
- the long, slow movement toward peace as the leadership fought a series of internal political battles from 1989 through 1997 to bring a still-militant organization to the peace table.

By July 1997, the vast majority of Republican militants had accommodated themselves to the negotiated settlement that would be embodied in the April 1998 Good Friday Accords. From that point on, terrorist violence on the Republican side would be the sole province of radical splinter groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which conducted three attacks after the Accords before declaring a ceasefire which was maintained until 2007 when the group claimed credit for shooting and injuring a policeman.[16] Rather than retread a history that is told in great detail elsewhere, my account will focus on evaluating whether this case supports the hypotheses outlined above.

7.4.1 Formation to Truce: 1969–1975

The early history of the Provisional IRA is traditionally told along the outlines best described in Richard English's *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*: failure of old IRA in 1956–62 border campaign; IRA moves left politically and military capabilities atrophy; non-nationalist civil rights movement becomes very active in 1967–68, triggering violent response from Loyalists in summer 1969; the PIRA emerges to defend Catholic communities.[17] Descriptions of the movement of the PIRA into open warfare against British forces tend to follow a similar narrative: British originally welcomed by Catholics; ham-handed peacekeeping efforts by British Army alienate the Catholic population; the PIRA gains new recruits and begins attacking British forces due to groundswell of support for doing so among rank and file; and steady escalation of violence up to 1975 ceasefire.[18]

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on a variety of topics, and the Sutton database of killings during the conflict. See <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/index.html>.

[16] Global Terrorism Database, accessed July 17, 2012.

[17] English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 81–82.

[18] The slow degradation of relations between the Catholic community and the British Army is well described in Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*

The most important pattern for our purposes is that at this early stage the PIRA's central leadership exercised little control over targeting choices, but the leaders of local IRA units did control targeting choices within their areas. This pattern of control was due largely to the fact that the PIRA began in 1969 when locally cohesive IRA units switched their allegiance from Cathal Goulding and the leftist members of the IRA leadership to Sean MacStiofain and his more nationalist compatriots.[19] Those who remained loyal to the Goulding leadership formed the Official IRA (OIRA) which competed with the PIRA for influence and recruits until 1972, when the OIRA turned away from militancy.

Tensions within the IRA began to mount in the summer of 1969 over the unwillingness of the Dublin-based Goulding leadership to do more to defend Catholic areas from Loyalist violence.[20] By August, a group of the Northern IRA leaders, mostly from Belfast, began making plans to break from the Southern leadership, which they saw as insufficiently committed both to the military defense of the Catholic community and to the idea of a united Ireland.[21] After taking over the Belfast IRA in September, the militant faction led by Sean MacStiofain split off completely in December 1969 to form the Provisional IRA, creating its own political wing, Provisional Sinn Féin, the next month.[22]

By April 1970, the PIRA had grown so large that it had to reorganize, moving from sixteen or seventeen (depending on the source) quasi-independent areas under one full-time staff to three geographically defined battalion areas in Belfast, each of which had a set of locally recruited, full-time members, supported by part-time auxiliaries and local defense committees.[23] Within these areas, leaders controlled their operatives' tactical choices to support strategic objectives. For example, during intercommunal rioting in the summer of 1970, Gerry Adams reportedly

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(London: William Heinemann, 1987), 54–137. On the bottom-up pressure within the PIRA to begin attacking British forces, see Peter Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin* (Bloomsbury, 1997), 88–89; and Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 137.

[19]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* emphasizes that there is a great deal of continuity between the old IRA and the PIRA which emerged in late 1969. The split in the Republican movement was, in many ways, about the development of parallel leadership groups, one of which won the political struggle for the allegiance of local units.

[20]The failure to defend the civil rights marchers played a lesser role. See Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 68–69, 89–90.

[21]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* , 105–107. Robert W. White, *Provisional Irish Republicans* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 52–55.

[22]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 60. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA* 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 367–368.

[23]Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 87.

ordered the Ballymurphy IRA not to break out its firearms. This led to more intense rioting in that Belfast neighborhood than elsewhere in the city. The intense rioting helped Adams' unit because it radicalized the population and created many more opportunities for the British Army to anger local youth, who would flock to join the PIRA.[24] A similar pattern of very effective local control over operatives emerged outside of Belfast. Despite being renowned for their lack of attention to orders from the Dublin leadership, South Armagh PIRA operatives scrupulously followed local orders not to fire on the Republic of Ireland police force, the Gardaí, even if it meant being arrested.[25] South Armagh was the most important border area for the PIRA and the local leadership presumably felt it was worth losing a certain number of operatives to avoid alienating the population on the Republic of Ireland side of the border.

As the violence between the PIRA and the British Army intensified in 1971, Billy McKee, the senior leader in Belfast, proved unable to control his Volunteers. The Dublin leadership's inability to punish violations appears to have been the key problem. Those who broke the rules laid down by the PIRA leadership in Dublin faced few consequences.[26] Operations were more tightly controlled in localities where discipline was easier. For example, the Derry Brigade leader, Martin McGuinness, made it a priority to avoid civilian casualties during his 1972 bombing campaign against commercial targets. The smaller population and very tightly-knit Catholic community in Derry made it relatively easy for McGuinness to impose internal discipline. As a result, his orders to abort missions because of civilian casualty risks were followed, and the campaign devastated central Derry without any such deaths.[27]

Where the leadership did exercise control during this early period was over targeting at the strategic level, specifically operations in England. The decision to begin bombings in England was made in late 1972 or early 1973 following a particularly damaging series of arrests of operatives in Northern Ireland.[28] It is not clear whether this decision was driven by: (1) a desire to take the pressure off the group by getting the security forces to focus on England; (2) the fact that Seamus Twomey, who took over as PIRA Chief of Staff following MacStiofain's arrest in November 1972, was more aggressive; (3) a strategic calculation that bombs in England could influence British public opinion against the presence of the British Army

[24]Ibid., 91.
[25]Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 406–407. Toby Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), 63.
[26]Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 137.
[27]Ibid., 154.
[28]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 152–3.

in the North;[29] or (4) a consensus on the PIRA Army Council that the attacks in Derry and Belfast were not sufficiently persuasive to the British government.[30] What is clear is that the core PIRA leadership chose the personnel for the mission,[31] set the boundaries for how careful the team had to be about civilian casualties,[32] and could turn the bombings on and off to support their negotiating strategy in the lead up to the 1975 ceasefire.[33]

Despite their inability to tightly control violence in the North, the PIRA leaders in Dublin, Sean MacStiofain and Ruari O'Bradaigh, were able to control personnel movements at the senior levels and for major operations. When McKee was arrested in April 1971, Joe Cahill was chosen as his replacement and directed the promotion paths of those moving up as a result.[34] Likewise, when Cahill held an ill-advised press conference following his escape from the British internment sweeps in August 1971, MacStiofain ordered him to Dublin, chose Seamus Twomey as his replacement, and assigned Cahill a new role running the centrally controlled portion of the group's finances.[35] MacStiofain also chose the new chain of command in Derry where the sweeps caught the group's senior leaders.[36] These personnel movements highlighted how much control the PIRA leadership exercised over personnel matters at this point.

Throughout this early period, important aspects of operational procedure were also controlled from the center, at least when operatives' actions began to hurt the group. Following the August 1971 sweeps, many PIRA operatives fled to Dundalk in the Republic of Ireland, where their poor behavior—mainly drinking and publicly brawling among themselves—began to alienate the local population. This border area was vital for PIRA operations, meaning the group could not afford to lose local support. Eventually the problem became prevalent enough that the PIRA leaders

[29]Gary McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 58–60.
[30]Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 197.
[31]For a wonderful description of the meeting where what would become known as the "Balcombe Street Gang" was chosen, see Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 125. Essentially the PIRA sought volunteers unknown to the security services, but the only people willing to risk the treason charges faced by bombers operating in England were those who were already on the run or who had been interned.
[32]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 155. Tim Pat Coogan, *I.R.A.* 5th ed. (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 388.
[33]Ibid., 398–399.
[34]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 98–99, Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 138.
[35]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 106–107.
[36]Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 145.

forbade men on the run to live further north than Dublin, so that it was easier for the leadership to monitor their activities.[37]

The PIRA central leadership also exercised a good deal of control over fund-raising during this period. The Army Council both prohibited actions they felt would hurt the cause and ensured that orders about raising funds were followed. Until May 1973, the leadership prohibited raising funds through armed robbery in the Republic of Ireland because doing so in the 1940s had brought the organization into conflict with local officials. For reasons that are unclear, the Dublin-based leaders changed their mind on this score and ordered Southern units (those operating in the Republic) to begin raising funds through robberies in May 1973. Local PIRA leaders in Kerry ignored the order, arguing that it would sour their relationship with the local civilians. Four senior leaders from Belfast went to Kerry in response, dismissed the old leadership, and replaced them with more compliant individuals.[38] In this case, the central leadership exercised control by removing agents who were not following orders.

7.4.2 Ceasefire, Reorganization, and Stalemate: 1975–1990

When a PIRA bomb exploded in Birmingham, England, on November 21, 1974, killing 19 and injuring 184, it is unlikely that many expected it to catalyze the peace process and push the PIRA into its first long-term truce. However, the bombing had three effects that paved the way for exactly that. First, it triggered widespread revulsion toward the PIRA, which the group was unable to redirect even though it denied responsibility.[39] Second, the bombing allowed for the swift passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in England. The PTA made the IRA illegal, which made it easier to prosecute prominent Republicans, and also contained a number of other useful legal tools, including the ability to issue "Exclusion Orders," which allowed the security services to detain and interrogate designated individuals entering the UK without

[37]Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh*, 73–75.

[38]This incident is noted in several sources but is best described in Sean O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism* (London: Bantam Press, 1998), 45–46.

[39]The reaction was so negative that the PIRA's competitor—the Official IRA (OIRA), which was made up of individuals who had remained loyal to the traditional southern leadership during the 1969 split—felt compelled to announce it had adopted an arms-for-defense-only policy. See Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*,413–4. See also McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 99.

having to present detailed evidence supporting the detentions.[40] Both of these effects put additional pressure on the PIRA. More positively for the group, the bombing made clear how bad it would be if the PIRA really began to engage in indiscriminate bombing, providing additional bargaining leverage in negotiations with the British. It was leverage that could be lost if the organization went too far with future attacks.[41]

These three factors combined to give Republicans favoring a truce the upper hand in internal deliberations. Secret talks between PIRA leaders and the British had been taking place since at least January 1974 and with the conditions created by the Birmingham bombing, these at last led to a temporary ceasefire in December 1974. Over the next two months the terms of a long-term truce were worked out. During the process, the PIRA briefly called off its ceasefire to conduct a series of six carefully calibrated bombings in London and Manchester. These bombings were designed to remind the British of just how bad things could get, without triggering a total political disaster all over again.[42] The bombings apparently did the trick of wrestling some last concessions from the Northern Ireland Office of the British government, and on February 10, 1975, the PIRA announced a cessation of hostilities in Northern Ireland.[43]

The 1975 truce had its limits though. It did not apply to PIRA bombings in England. Nor did it apply to internecine fighting within the Republican movement or to Republican attacks on Loyalist civilians and paramilitaries. Much of the violence in 1975 was locally driven, a result of low-level tit-for-tat feuding between the PIRA and both the OIRA and the UVF.[44] This violence was counterproductive for the PIRA: it increased the level of fear in Protestant communities, thereby enhancing support for the Loyalist paramilitaries;[45] and it led to substantial increases in the British military presence, especially as the truce began to break down in late 1975.[46]

[40]Ibid., 94–95, 97–98.
[41]Ibid., 90–92.
[42]In this case, "calibrating" the attacks meant using modest amounts of explosives and offering adequate warning for the police to evacuate the targeted area. See Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 419–420.
[43]For an excellent account of internal Republican politics between the initial December 1974 ceasefire and the February 1975 truce, see Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 176–186.
[44]The South Armagh PIRA in particular kept up attacks during the ceasefire. See Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh*, 20. See also Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 256.
[45]Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 132–133.
[46]For example, a particularly gruesome round of sectarian violence in South Armagh beginning in November 1975 led the British to send in Special Air Service (SAS) units

As the truce wore on without significant political gains for the PIRA, recruiting began to suffer, morale dropped, and support for the ceasefire within the group withered.[47] At the January 1976 Army Council meeting the PIRA called off the truce. In the wake of the failure, the PIRA leadership began a major reorganization intended to address three major issues: (1) the increasing level of security-force penetration of PIRA units due to the lengthy interrogations permitted under the 1974 PTA;[48] (2) the desire of leaders like Ivor Bell and Gerry Adams to have greater control over military and political activities;[49] and (3) the sense that frequent leadership turnover was hindering the organization.[50] The reorganization plan was worked out by Ivor Bell while he was in prison, was approved by the PIRA Army Council in late 1976, and was largely implemented by Gerry Adams, who was appointed to the PIRA Army Council on his release from Long Kesh prison in February 1977.[51] That the leadership could direct such a wholesale reorganization demonstrates that they had a great deal of control over operational procedures.

A more detailed look at the reorganization tells a very interesting story about the relationships among security, efficiency, and control over targeting. The reorganization plan had four key components, three of which were clearly intended to increase security. The first of these was to move to a cellular structure for military operations. The idea was to organize around small Active Service Units (ASU) of approximately four members, only one of whom was to have contact with the larger organization.[52] The ASU were intended to specialize in particular types of operations—robberies, sniping, and so on—and were to have no control

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to target PIRA operatives for the first time. See English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 171–172. SAS ambushes of PIRA volunteers in South Armagh were to take a heavy toll on the organization in the years ahead.

[47] On recruiting see Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 217–218. On morale see McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 102–103. On internal politics see O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism*, 82–83.

[48] Because the PTA allowed the British to interrogate subjects for up to a week before charging them, the proportion of arrestees who broke and shared information greatly increased. Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," 21–23, Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 255.

[49] Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 211–213.

[50] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 156–157.

[51] Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 275; Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 157–160. Moloney (164) provides a fascinating description of the machinations Seamus Twomey went through to get Adams appointed to the Army Council without violating the PIRA constitution.

[52] White, *Provisional Irish Republicans*, 139–141.

over weapons or explosives, which were to be controlled by the Brigade commanders.[53]

In theory, such a structure should have increased both security—by reducing members' knowledge of who was in the organization—and control, at least so long as local commanders did not provide weapons for operations the central leadership had not authorized, which for the most part they did not.[54] In practice, the extent to which the cellular model achieved these goals is unclear. There was resistance to the changes in rural areas. In Newry, for example, members ostensibly in different cells continued to talk and discuss PIRA business, while drinking in some cases.[55] Urban cells could not sever all ties with the old company structure because the companies were needed for logistical support; to hide guns, help people get cars, and the like.[56] Even where the organization did compartmentalize, the desired increase in control did not happen, at least not for violence at the local level.[57] Full compartmentalization, moreover, was never feasible because it would have made the group critically reliant on the few individuals who created connections between cells.[58]

The second security-oriented change was to create an internal security squad to track down infiltrators and punish those who provided information to government forces.[59] The third security-oriented change was to require all Volunteers be trained in counter-interrogation techniques.[60] Whether due to the move to a cellular structure, the introduction of an internal security service, or the requirements for counter-interrogation training, the reorganization successfully stemmed the tide of penetrations that had been so damaging.[61]

[53]The 1976 'Staff Report' detailing the reorganization was captured in December 1976 and is reproduced in Coogan, *I.R.A.*, 465–467.

[54]In December 1978, for example, the operations proposed by the Newry IRA reportedly had to be vetted up the chain of command before weapons would be issued. See Eamon Collins, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1997), 14–15.

[55]For a typical description of how compartmentalization worked, and often didn't work, in Newry, see ibid., 67.

[56]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 177.

[57]Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA* , 436–437, 468–469. Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 315–316. English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 212–213.

[58]For a nice analysis of the management of urban terrorism which highlights this point and others, see John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups," *TERRORISM: An International Journal* 1, no. 2 (1978): 169–186.

[59]Killings of suspected informers rose sharply after the introduction of the internal security department. See Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 155–156.

[60]The July 1979 killing of PIRA member Michael Kearny by the internal security unit was widely interpreted within the organization as a warning to others who might break during interrogation, as Kearny had. See ibid., 155.

[61]Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*,

The fourth element of the reorganization was the creation of a Northern command which stood between the Army Council in Dublin and the Northern units. Part of the motivation for this change was to achieve efficiency through functional specialization; Northern Command would fight the British while Southern Command, which included all units not under Northern Command, would focus on logistics. This change had the desired effect insofar as it allowed for the more rapid spread of operational technologies.[62] It also increased control over some units as the leaders of the rural units in East Tyrone and South Armagh were brought into the Northern Command hierarchy.[63]

The reorganization's overall impact on leaders' ability to control operatives' tactical choices is unclear. In general, the ASU had greater day-to-day autonomy, but access to weapons and technology were restricted and the central leadership could exercise control when they wanted to.[64] Decisions about when and how to conduct high-profile operations such as major bombings or operations in England were still made at the top.[65] On balance, the reorganization appears to have marginally increased leaders' control over big operations but decreased control over responses to sectarian killings.

In some ways, the most interesting pattern from the 1976–1979 reorganization is that it led to a more secure, more efficient organization, without a huge drop in control. On the face of it, this appears to contradict the framework laid out in chapters 2 and 3. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the reorganization also entailed the introduction of new organizational technology. Just as new production technologies in industrial organizations can lead to greater output with fewer inputs, this organizational innovation led to more security without an obvious

144–145.

[62]For an example of how Northern Command was able to spread innovations developed in South Armagh to other areas through secure channels rather than ad hoc coordination at the local level, see Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 160–161.

[63]Ibid., 157–161. Northern Command did not always follow Army Council directions, making several unauthorized attacks in February 1977, apparently without being punished for it. See Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 259.

[64]For example, when the Army Council decided it wanted to conduct a symbolic punishment attack for the Loyalist paramilitaries' behavior during the 1981 hunger strikes, it took proposals from the Brigades for targets and chose the one proposed by the Belfast Brigade. See Collins, *Killing Rage*, 94–95, 98; and Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 309.

[65]O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism*, 141–144. There were limits to the central leadership's control. Orders to avoid operating near Adams' holiday cottage were ignored and unauthorized attacks against the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) did occur. See Collins, *Killing Rage*, 154; and Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 243–244.

decline in control.[66] By 1979–1980 the PIRA had turned into a more stable organization, one that began looking to a longer struggle against the British, what those within the organization would term "the long war."[67] These changes point to the role of technical innovation and learning in determining how terrorists' managerial dilemmas play out.[68]

Two additional important patterns can be discerned in the period from the end of the re-organization through late 1988 when the leadership finally recognized the military campaign that had stalled. The first is that the senior leadership maintained the control over fund raising and personnel which they had exercised in previous periods.[69] The second pattern is that, as politics took on a larger role in the strategy of senior leaders, discrimination became more important to them, leading to efforts to exert more control. During the 1981 Hunger Strikes a number of the strikers ran successfully for parliament under the Sinn Féin banner. These victories marked the start of the "Armalite and Ballot Box" strategy, which emphasized the mutually reinforcing relationship between political and military action. Senior PIRA leaders first entered politics in a serious fashion in October of the following year when Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness were chosen by Sinn Féin to contest assembly elections in Northern Ireland. Adams and McGuinness remained on the PIRA Army Council but were divorced from operational decisions.[70] Their initial foray into politics was unsuccessful, but in June 1983, Sinn Féin won 13.4 percent of the vote in the Westminster General Election for Northern Ireland, becoming the fourth largest party in Northern Ireland.

This electoral victory was accompanied by a largely successful effort to rein in unsavory fund-raising activities such as robbery and extortion.[71]

[66]Such innovations seem relatively rare in that few groups adapt in ways that simultaneously improve both security and control.

[67]McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 115.

[68]Organizational adaptation in covert groups is studied in depth in Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).

[69]On financing see O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism*, 118–120. He describes how a cell in Galway restricted their use of armed robberies to avoid violating the preferences of the Army Council and Chief of Staff but were later ordered to increase their use of armed robbery. On the personnel side, see the discussion of the assignment of personnel to bombings in England in ibid., 149–150. On changes made following disciplinary actions, see Collins, *Killing Rage*, 165, 216–217. On the choice of personnel to run a major weapons smuggling operation see Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 17–18.

[70]O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism*, 129.

[71]Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland Since 1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 188–189. Indeed, political considerations are the reason the PIRA was never keen

Yet control over violence remained elusive. Throughout 1983 and 1984, failed or poorly thought out operations continued to cost Sin Féin political support.[72] The new-found prominence of normal politics within the PIRA was highlighted in 1985 when Ivor Bell and three fellow radicals were expelled from the organization for opposing the diversion of funds to Sinn Féin political activities.[73] By mid-1985, PIRA leaders were seeing their political prospects fall and sought to limit attacks to military targets or to individuals who would be seen as legitimate high-visibility political targets.[74] In spring 1986, Northern Command sought and received permission from the Army Council to vet most tactical operations in order to prevent electoral damage.[75] Perhaps seeking to make it even easier for local units to know whom to target, the Army Council published a list of "legitimate targets" in August 1986.[76]

None of this worked. By 1987, the extent to which the PIRA was losing support, particularly because of the civilians who had been killed, brought into question the very feasibility of making political progress through war.[77] In the February 1987 election in the Republic of Ireland, Sinn Féin polled only 1.9 percent of the vote, nicely summarizing its political fortunes. As the group's political fortunes fell, and the need for discrimination became more apparent, Sinn Féin politicians' criticisms of killing civilians became much more clear.[78]

The trend of counterproductive violence at a time when the leadership was increasingly focused on politics came to a head in November 1987 with the PIRA bombing at a Remembrance Day celebration in Enniskillen that killed eleven and injured sixty-three more.[79] Coming toward the end of a year when the PIRA had already killed nine civilians in hard-to-justify circumstances, the bombing led to the collapse of support

on straightforward protection rackets like the UDA. See Bishop and Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, 312–313.

[72]For examples see Collins, *Killing Rage*, 181–182, 191, 193; Coogan, *I.R.A.*, 503, and McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 122–123.

[73]O'Callaghan, *The Informer: The Real Story of One Man's War Against Terrorism*, 192; Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 169.

[74]McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 134–135.

[75]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 317.

[76]Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 565.

[77]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 260.

[78]Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 176.

[79]Enniskillen is frequently cited by PIRA members as an incredibly damaging event that fundamentally changed public perceptions of the group. Richard English, private communication, August 7, 2007.

for the PIRA in the Republic of Ireland.[80] The PIRA responded by disbanding the unit responsible, and in January 1988, Adams publicly stated that the accidental killing of civilians would have to stop.[81] By the fall of 1988, even the PIRA policy for how to respond to Protestant killings was changed in a way that reflected the increasing importance of discrimination to the leadership. Prior to that point the policy had been to respond quickly with an equally violent attack against Protestant civilians. After that, the policy was to only hit back if a named target could be shown to be involved in the killings. Moreover, local commanders had to vet their retaliation plans through the Northern Command leadership.[82] In 1989, the leadership set a further example of how important discrimination had become by disbanding the IRA unit in Fermanagh because of its continued sectarian killings.[83]

7.4.3 Internal Politicking and the Move to Peace: 1990–1997

By 1990, the core leadership of the PIRA had realized that they were in a military stalemate and, by their accounts, opened backchannel communications with the British government.[84] The PIRA couldn't be destroyed, but neither could they inflict sufficient costs on the British and the Loyalists to get them to give in to a united Ireland.[85] The outstanding feature of this period was that the PIRA continually struggled to find the right use of violence to meet a diverse set of concerns. First, the violence had to impose sufficient costs on Britain so that the British government would make some concessions. Targeting Britain's economic infrastructure

[80]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 278. On deaths, see Sutton database. Many PIRA members cite the Enniskillen bombing as an exceptionally damaging event for the group. Richard English, private communication, August 7, 2007.
[81]Coogan, *I.R.A.*, 580. Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 591–592.
[82]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 320–321.
[83]Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 610.
[84]The British government places the date of renewed contacts in 1993. See Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process* (London: Heinemann, 1996) , 104–109. Mallie and McKittrick provide the most detailed history of the peace process from 1987 to 1994.
[85]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 307–308. Mallie and McKittrick put the date a bit later, in 1992. See Mallie & McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process*, 315. Bell puts the date of this realization slightly later still, in 1993. See Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 634.

was seen as the way to achieve this goal.[86] Second, the violence had to be sufficiently controlled so that the group would not completely alienate other elements of the Nationalist movement. This meant concentrating on major targets in England while avoiding civilian casualties in Northern Ireland.[87] Third, the violence had to be sufficiently close to what the rank and file wanted so that the leadership could maintain control of the organization.[88] This meant maintaining a level of activity that was higher than was ideal for the first two goals.

By early 1993, the combination of increased control imposed on local operations and more aggressive action in England began to pay off. The April 1993 Bishopgate bombing in the City of London did tremendous damage to one of the engines of the British economy, leading to a brief suspension of secret talks by the British government, but also making clear the potential costs to Britain of maintaining the status quo.[89] Talks soon resumed and the bombing coincided with a series of electoral gains by Sinn Féin. This coincidence was understood within the movement as validating the leadership's Armalite and Ballot Box strategy.[90]

In December 1993, the British and Irish prime ministers issued the Downing Street Declaration, which offered the PIRA a chance to join multiparty negotiations if the violence ended.[91] This led to a great deal of tension within the organization as the rank-and-file Volunteers were confused that the Army Council did not simply reject the declaration outright.[92] In March 1994, the PIRA leadership allayed the Volunteers' concerns with a series of mortar attacks against London's Heathrow airport. These attacks solved the dilemma faced by the Adams leadership by reassuring the rank and file that the violent struggle would not be abandoned, while reminding the British what the PIRA could do if the peace process failed. Because the mortars were not primed to explode, the attack killed no one, avoiding the loss of life that would have hurt the group's reputation with moderate Republicans. It is unlikely the mortars were left unprimed by mistake since the PIRA had conducted a series of very effective mortar attacks in the 1980s and the technology was well established.

[86]McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 152–155.
[87]Ibid., 160.
[88]Ibid., 150 cites John Major making exactly this point in his memoirs.
[89]Ibid., 172–173.
[90]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 283–285.
[91]Full text available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm.
[92]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 415, 431. Indeed, a PIRA mini-convention in February 1994 came out against any possible ceasefire.

As negotiations moved on in the summer of 1994, the PIRA Army Council introduced the TUAS policy. The policy was never officially defined, but the grassroots militants were told TUAS stood for "Tactical Use of Armed Struggle." Sinn Féin's Nationalist political allies were told it stood for "Total Un-Armed Struggle."[93] This highly ambiguous policy illustrates the political dance the PIRA leaders faced as they tried to negotiate between their internal constituents and the larger Republican community. The ceasefire was accompanied by continued training and an increased focus on community policing by Volunteers—punishment beatings of criminals—as local commanders sought to keep militants from engaging in sectarian attacks or the kinds of criminality that cost the organization popular support in South Armagh during the ceasefire.[94]

In August 1994 the PIRA finally declared a ceasefire, one that was not popular with most of the organization. Over the next sixteen months the Army Council repeatedly told the Volunteers to prepare for new hostilities and then prolonged the ceasefire.[95] By February 1995 the PIRA Executive Council, the internal body responsible for representing the interests of the average Volunteer, was becoming increasingly critical of the ceasefire and morale among the rank and file dropped throughout 1995.[96] These members recognized that the longer the ceasefire went on, the more the network of supporters that made PIRA actions possible would degrade.[97] In January 1996, facing a vote to end the ceasefire at the upcoming General Army Convention, the Army Council preemptively ended the truce.[98] The need to maintain hearts and minds within the organization motivated violence that the rank and file wanted, but that leaders felt would be counterproductive.

Preparations began immediately for a major bombing in Britain. The Army Council decided on the Docklands area of London and assigned the bombing to the South Armagh IRA.[99] The Docklands attack in February 1996 was the first in a five-month series of bombings that ended only with the July arrest of the PIRA ASU in England.[100] The bombing campaign

[93]See ibid., 423. The document describing the TUAS policy is available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/tuas94.htm.
[94]On punishment beatings see Wichert, *Northern Ireland Since 1945*, 211–212. On South Armagh see Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh*, 411.
[95]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 432–433.
[96]Ibid., 439.
[97]Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, 656–657.
[98]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 440–441.
[99]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 290. Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh*, 12–13.
[100]McGladdery, *The Provisional IRA in England: The Bombing Campaign 1973–1997*, 205–206.

did little to help the PIRA negotiating position, but had to be conducted for the PIRA to remain together as an organization.[101] New teams were sent to Britain and the attacks resumed with a series of bombings and hoaxes in March and April 1997.

By mid-1997 the factions supporting an end to violence had sufficiently strengthened their political position within the PIRA to call a General Army Convention for October. When the September Sinn Féin convention endorsed the Mitchell Principles for settling the conflict, dissenting members of the PIRA Executive broke off to form the Real IRA (RIRA).[102] At the October convention, the Army Council, which favored the ceasefire, rigged the transportation arrangements so that those dissenting from the peace process would arrive last. This gave the Council first crack at convincing the delegates, with the expected result: the Convention voted to accept the Mitchell Principles.[103] After the vote, a number of more militant members, largely from rural areas, left to join the RIRA, which went on to conduct a number of bombings in 1998 and 2000.[104]

The PIRA ceasefire was almost completely maintained in the face of ongoing Loyalist violence in the late 1990s and first part of the new century. It's impossible to know if this was because: (1) the changes of the late 1980s meant that leaders had sufficient control to prevent renewed sectarian violence; (2) Volunteers who were set on carrying out more violence could join splinter groups; or (3) the internal politics of the 1990s had persuaded the vast majority of Volunteers that an end to violence best served the Republican cause. For our purposes it is sufficient to know that October 1997 marked the end of the PIRA as an active terrorist organization.

7.5 THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

As with the PIRA, the organizational history of the Loyalist paramilitaries can be divided into three distinct periods:

- the early period from the formation of the UDA and UVF in the wake of the Civil Rights movement to the first PIRA ceasefire;

[101]Ibid., 193, 208. Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 442–443.
[102]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 296–297.
[103]Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 477.
[104]Harnden, *'Bandit Country': The IRA and South Armagh*, 430–433.

- the middle period, during which the UDA became mired in criminality while the UVF responded aggressively to increased PIRA activity; and
- the final period, which saw a brief revitalization of the UDA as the PIRA moved to the 1994 ceasefire, before the UDA once again descended into criminality and internal feuding.

Throughout this history, a few now-familiar themes keep emerging. The most prominent of these is that the Loyalist leaders' ability to control their organizations were limited when the rank and file did not share their preferences. Loyalist leaders limited what they asked of their organizations to a much greater extent than their Republican counterparts. Part of the difference in how much leaders demanded was that Loyalists' goals simply did not require careful violence. Still, it is striking that when rank-and-file Loyalists wanted violence, they got it, often to the detriment of the movement's political goals.[105]

7.5.1 Formation to PIRA Ceasefire: 1966–1975

From their very beginnings, the UVF and UDA followed different organizational paths. A small group of Loyalists calling themselves the UVF began killing Catholics years before the Civil Rights movement turned violent, committing a brief spate of attacks, in April and May of 1966. After the attacks the group's founder, Gusty Spence, and the other core UVF leaders were arrested and the group essentially disappeared for eighteen months. It was rebuilt in late 1968 by a core group of militants from the Shankill Road area of Belfast.[106] The increasingly violent demonstrations and counter-demonstrations that marked the latter stages of the Civil Rights movement provided an ideal recruiting backdrop for a group claiming to defend the Loyalist population. The nascent organization was able to pick and choose

[105]Throughout the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Loyalist paramilitaries were much less careful in their use of violence than the PIRA. One of the very first attacks by the newly formed UVF, in May 1966, nicely illustrates the almost-casual targeting process that was to mark both UVF and UDA attacks. On May 26, 1966, a group of UVF men set out to try to kill a prominent IRA operative, Leo Martin. Martin was not at home when the UVF men arrived, so they set fire to his home and proceeded to a bar for a drink. At the bar, the UVF team ran into four Catholic barmen, decided on no real evidence that the barmen were in the IRA, followed them outside, and killed them. See Peter Taylor, *The Loyalists* (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), 34; David Boulton, *The UVF: 1966–73: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion* (Dublin: Gill & McMillan, 1973), 49–50; and Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald, *The UVF* (Dublin: Poolbeg, 1997), 12–13.
[106]Boulton, *The UVF: 1966–73: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion*, 108.

its recruits from the many youth gangs involved in sectarian rioting.[107] As the inter communal rioting grew worse over the summer of 1969, the UVF leadership organized militants to protect Orange Lodge marches and coordinated a series of sabotage attacks against public utilities.[108] Despite its relatively centralized beginnings, the UVF did not develop its military-style hierarchy until the summer of 1972, when Spence escaped from prison and reorganized the group.[109] By September 1972 the UVF had clear structures and a well-defined recruiting process in which the central leadership could veto undesirable recruits.[110]

While the UVF coalesced around a core group of militants, the UDA began as a coordinating body for the local defense associations that had grown up in response to the sectarian violence plaguing Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1971.[111] After a series of coordinating meetings that began in the summer of 1970, the UDA was officially formed in August 1971 by the leaders of the Shankill Defense Association, Oldpark Defense Association, Woodvale Defense Association, and the East Belfast Defense Association.[112] The process of developing some measure of control over these disparate militias was marked by frequent bloody feuds and continual tension over where control should reside and over the commitment of local organizations to the objectives of the central leadership.[113] In the end, control over violence almost always resided with the local "brigadiers."[114]

Interestingly, the variation in how the Loyalist groups were organized had a self-reinforcing quality through its influence on recruiting. During the early 1970s, the UDA and its component militias were in constant competition with the UVF for recruits and resources. The UVF pitched itself to potential militants as the "clean force," the one not engaged in racketeering or wanton violence.[115] While the UVF was more selective in its recruiting, it was no more organized early on than the UDA. A

[107]Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 29, 86–87.
[108]Boulton, *The UVF: 1966–73: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion*, 94–107, 112–113. Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 60–61.
[109]Boulton, *The UVF: 1966–73: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion*, 173–174.
[110]Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 108, 111.
[111]Steve Bruce, "Loyalists in Northern Ireland: Further Thoughts on 'Pro-State Terror,'" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 4 (1993) 50. Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 83.
[112]Steve Bruce, "Terrorists and Politics: The Case of Northern Ireland's Loyalist Paramilitaries," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 2 (2001), 31.
[113]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 24–25.
[114]Henry McDonald and Jim Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror* (Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2004), 32.
[115]Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Political, Paramilitary, and Community Groups in Northern Ireland*, 146.

UVF 'company' was often little more than a group of men who drank in the same bar.[116] Whatever the reality of the situation, the image of greater coherence and discipline helped the UVF recruit young men more willing to follow orders and accept the restrictions necessary to operate covertly.[117] This in turn eased internal control relative to the UDA.

Leaders of both Loyalist groups experienced similar problems of control that would plague the PIRA in later years. There were two reasons for this within the UDA. First, there was a notable unwillingness during this period to punish Loyalists conducting unsanctioned attacks on their own.[118] Second, there was a real lack of consensus on what the political goals should be. Andy Tyrie became the UDA's leader in late 1972 in part because of disagreements between the two most powerful "brigadiers," Charles Harding Smith and Tommy Herron. Some accounts by UDA veterans suggest the core disagreement was about whether the goal of the group should be community defense or offensive attacks against Republicans.[119] Others report that it was really about tactics, about whether the group should selectively target Republicans or simply seek to compel the Catholic community to stop supporting the PIRA.[120] Either way, Tyrie was a compromise candidate who did not have a strong power base of his own and was never able to exert much control over any aspect of the group.[121]

Within the UVF, central control was constrained in part by the members' ability to leave the group. When Spence took over again in July 1972, he sought to limit sectarian violence and focus the group on Republican activists. His efforts ran afoul of former UDA men who had joined the UVF out of dissatisfaction with the lack of action by the UDA. These men broke off to form a fringe group in August 1972.[122] Pressure from below also limited the UVF leaderships' options. By the summer of 1973, the rapid growth of the UDA led UVF operatives to push for more action, and the leadership simply could not say no.[123]

Some of their reticence to restrain their operatives' sectarian aggression likely stemmed from the fact that the Loyalist leaders just did not have

[116]Steve Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 109, 112–114.
[117]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 7.
[118]Ibid., 21.
[119]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 24–25.
[120]Ibid., 27. Crawford is reporting different points of view expressed by UDA members during his interviews with them.
[121]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 23.
[122]Boulton, *The UVF: 1966–73: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion*, 174.
[123]Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*, 115–117, Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 127.

strategic reasons to control their operatives during the early 1970s. In their own words, both the UVF and UDA sought to "terrorize" the nationalist (Catholic) community into demanding that the PIRA stop its attacks.[124] As one UVF statement put it:

> By bombing the heart of Provisional enclaves we attempted to terrorise the nationalist community into demanding the Provisinals either cease their campaign or move out of the ghetto area. By bombing business premises and other such properties which we had reason to believe were terrorist meeting places or sources of revenue, we believed we could force the Provisionals out of business or at least cause a drastic reduction in their operational activity.[125]

This goal was well served by random sectarian violence. To the extent the Loyalist leaders had to worry about controlling violence, it was to avoid alienating segments of the Protestant population whose support would be required for them to impact the political process.[126]

By late 1973 the UDA had settled into the pattern of quasi-racketeering that would mark it for the remainder of the conflict. Local leaders had divided up many of the Protestant areas of Belfast, and their extortion and protection rackets were well established.[127] Moreover, the UDA itself was generating income for the senior leadership. UDA members during the 1970s all paid regular dues to the organization. In the early 1970s these dues were spent locally, but by the middle of the decade dues were collected at "company" meetings and passed through the UDA "Battalion HQ" on the Shankill Road. This created opportunities for corruption if the wrong people were handling the money. Unfortunately for the group, the UDA suffered a serious adverse selection problem according to one prominent UDA member.[128] The problem was that UDA commanders were not paid. This meant that people with jobs were unwilling to give up their regular income to seek mid-level positions. These positions were thus filled by those who were unemployed or had criminal backgrounds.[129] Quite predictably, these individuals took advantage of their positions to skim from the members' contributions.

During the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) Strike in May 1974, the UVF and UDA worked well together to provide vital community services

[124]Indiscriminate retaliation for specific attacks was part of this strategy. See Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 125–126.
[125] *Combat*, April 1974, cited in Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*, 144.
[126]Coogan, *I.R.A.*, 447.
[127]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 18–19.
[128]Sam Duddy described an adverse selection problem, he did not use that terminology.
[129]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 59, from interview with Sam Duddy.

and enforce the strike. Even though leaders of both groups wanted a ceasefire in the latter half of 1974, competition between them soon led to a steady increase in sectarian and internecine attacks.[130] The UDA leadership could not have halted the killings even if doing so had been a priority. They simply did not have sufficient power, nor did they have the ability to use violence to punish deviations, over local units.[131]

The UVF faced similar problems of control, but for slightly different reasons. The key reason was that extreme sectarian views were continually being reinforced by the intense bonding that went on in the more covert UVF units,[132] a process similar to that which plagued the combat organizations of early Russian groups. Because of this, UVF operatives generally wanted to implement more violence than their leaders. In late 1974, UVF leaders' ability to restrain their operatives took a hit as the UVF-backed political party's abysmal showing in the October 1974 elections destroyed the credibility of claims that restraint was the path to political influence.[133]

The UVF continued its sectarian attacks in 1975, despite the February PIRA ceasefire. By late 1975, however, the unpopular violence was taking an obvious toll on the UVF. Gruesome attacks, such as the execution-style killing of the popular Miami Showband and continued feuding with the UDA, began to strain relations with the community and reduced the quality of recruits coming in to the UVF.[134] Moreover, as the violence increased, so too did the number of incarcerated operatives, creating a negative feedback loop. By late 1975 a large portion of UVF operators were busy with the robberies needed to raise funds to support the families of hundreds of prisoners. These robberies further damaged the group's reputation.[135] In October, a group of the longer-serving UVF men staged a coup intending to reduce sectarian violence and re-focus the group on attacking known Republicans.[136] While the new leaders were able to control much of the group, they were either unwilling or unable to control their most extreme sectarian units.[137]

[130]Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*, 102–103, 106–107.
[131]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 58–59.
[132]Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Political, Paramilitary, and Community Groups in Northern Ireland*, 178–180.
[133]Ibid., 187–189.
[134]Ibid., 189–191.
[135]Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 189.
[136]Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Political, Paramilitary, and Community Groups in Northern Ireland*, 191.
[137]Specifically, the gang that would become known as the Shankill Butchers. See Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 153, 155.

7.5.2 Ceasefire and Organizational Divergence: 1976–1987

The eleven-year period following the end of the first lengthy PIRA ceasefire would see the Loyalist organizations move in very different directions. But the divergence did not begin immediately. In the first two years after the PIRA ceasefire, four factors caused an across-the-board decline in Loyalist violence.[138] First, as the security services became more aggressive against the PIRA, there was less demand for paramilitary activity in the Loyalist community. Second, PIRA violence dropped, further reducing community support for Loyalist paramilitary activity. Third, the security services became more aggressive against the UVF and UDA, penetrating both groups quite effectively.[139] Finally, the UDA leadership became more focused on crime and its leaders didn't want to give up the comfortable lifestyle this provided.[140] From 1980 to 1985, Loyalist violence remained at its lowest levels since the formation of the UVF and UDA in the early 1970s.

In 1979 the UVF followed the PIRA example and shifted to a more cellular mode of organization. The core changes followed those made by the PIRA, shifting to small teams for operations, restricting communications between teams, and establishing an internal security arm.[141] The change appears to have worked for UVF and the organization remained relatively stable over the next eight years. Major operations were centrally planned throughout the 1980s and were coherently connected to political events.[142] UVF violence began to pick up only after the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. By 1987 the UVF was quite effectively putting pressure on the PIRA by carefully targeting its operatives.[143]

For the UDA, the period after the ceasefire was marked by a steady slide into criminality.[144] As the 1980s wore on, there was increasing displeasure

[138]For a good summary of the first three, see Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*, 137–138.

[139]Jim Cusack and Max Taylor, "Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation—Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 3 (1993), 3.

[140]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 115.

[141]These changes were first discussed by UVF prisoners in 1977, but the details of what this change meant for the UVF in practice are not as well known as for the PIRA. See Garland, *Gusty Spence*, 218–219; Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 193–194.

[142]See for example the planning to target civil servants implementing the 1985 Anglo-Irish accords. See ibid., 238.

[143]English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 260.

[144]For an overview of Loyalist fund-raising practices with a focus on the use of crime, particularly by the UDA, see Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail"; and Silke, "Drink, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part Two."

from the UDA membership and the Protestant community over UDA gangsterism.[145] By the mid-1980s the UDA military capability essentially existed to serve the rackets by making it easy to threaten businessmen.[146] As the PIRA began conducting bigger operations through the 1980s, the lower ranks of the UDA became increasingly frustrated with their own organization's failure to respond in kind.[147] Of course, some of the dissatisfaction may have been because little profit was passed down to the lower ranks.[148]

7.5.3 Revitalization of UDA and the Descent into Internal Feuding: 1988–2003

By 1988, internal resentment against the UDA leadership boiled over and Tyrie was deposed.[149] The internal politics of the leadership change are quite revealing. There are essentially two versions of what happened. The first is that Tyrie was held accountable for the organization's problems because he committed two sins: appointing unpopular "brigadiers" in violation of the UDA tradition of having local volunteers elect their leader; and failing to investigate his appointees when suspicions of corruption arose.[150] The second version is that during the 1980s, Tyrie had managed to anger two major factions within the group, creating a large coalition favoring his removal.[151] His efforts to centralize the organization angered the traditionalists who favored a good deal of independence for the brigades, while his efforts to reduce the sectarian killing angered the more

[145]The gangsterism is exemplified by the UDA building rackets described in Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 169–171.

[146]Cusack and Taylor, "Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation—Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study," 8–9.

[147]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 110–111, interview with "Terry," Ibid., 118, interview with "Jackie." Cusack and Taylor, "Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation—Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study," 4.

[148]For an excellent overview of Loyalist fund-raising, see Silke, "In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail," 334–335. Interestingly, the dissatisfaction in the UDA over the distribution of profits stands in distinct contrast to the attitude of South Armagh PIRA Volunteers who apparently felt little resentment over the economic privileges enjoyed by their senior leaders. Perhaps the rank and file's tolerance for the South Armagh leaders' lifestyles had to do with their obvious success in prosecuting the conflict with the British.

[149]Bruce, *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*, 249–257, 260.

[150]Cusack and Taylor, "Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation—Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study," 18.

[151]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 136–137.

hardline members. Whichever explanation is accurate, both point to the centrality of internal politics in larger terrorist organizations and illustrate the limits imposed on their leaders by the need to maintain the allegiance of the membership.

This example raises a more general point, which deserves to be highlighted again; terrorist leaders are often constrained by their operatives' preferences in subtle ways. In the models in chapter 5, this happened because leaders' threats were outweighed by the value to operatives of doing what they wanted. In Tyrie's case, it happened because his move to centralized authority threatened valued autonomy. Tyrie's expulsion was followed by a purge of his allies.[152] This coincided with a series of arrests that would change the character of the organization's leadership. In September 1989, the Stevens Enquiry into collusion between the UDA and the Northern Ireland security services began. The Enquiry led to the arrest of many of the corrupt older leadership, especially those who were working with security services.[153] These arrests had the twin effect of easing security pressures and clearing the way for a younger, more aggressive leadership.[154] Just as the UVF's reputation had helped it recruit in the 1970s, word of the new UDA leadership's commitment to violence helped UDA recruiting in the late 1980s as well.[155]

In late 1991 the UDA began conducting more attacks. This led to a virtuous cycle: more operations led to more prestige, which meant better recruits and more disciplined violence, which further increased the group's status.[156] While the new UDA leadership was indeed more aggressive, this increase in violence was not driven from the top. UDA violence increased despite an agreement between the UDA and UVF to limit "offensive activity."[157]

As the PIRA internal politics ground slowly on between 1992 and 1994, UVF and UDA violence continued apace. Major operations like the October 1993 Greysteel attack were centrally planned and coordinated.[158]

[152]Cusack and Taylor, "Resurgence of a Terrorist Organisation—Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study," 5, 7.
[153]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 26, 26–29.
[154]Bruce, "Loyalists in Northern Ireland: Further Thoughts on 'Pro-State Terror,'" 17.
[155]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 157–159, interview with "Tommy." Ibid., 174–175, interview with "Gordon."
[156]Ibid., 120–121, interview with "Jackie."
[157]Bruce, "Loyalists in Northern Ireland: Further Thoughts on 'Pro-State Terror,'" 264–265; McDonald and Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror*, 201–209, 228–229.
[158]Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 193–195, 198–199, 206–207, interviews with anonymous combatants.

But, central planning was the exception. Most Loyalist violence during this period, especially UDA violence, was generated at the local level, only sometimes in response to specific PIRA activities.[159] By the summer of 1994, the Loyalists' paramilitaries had tamped down their internal feuding and were putting effective pressure on the PIRA.[160]

In October 1994, one month after the PIRA announced their next-to-last ceasefire, the UVF responded in kind. The UDA joined in one month later. It was easier for the UVF, with its centralized structure and restricted membership, to make the decision about whether or not to follow the PIRA initiative.[161] The UDA leadership had to convince a much larger population of militants who were not used to having policy decided at the top.[162] Following the truce, both the UDA and UVF had problems finding peaceful roles that would satisfy their members.[163] And, by some accounts, the senior UVF political leaders had an easier time controlling their organization because their political representatives in the PUP, men like David Ervine, were seen as credible hardliners.[164]

Following the end of the PIRA ceasefire in February 1996 there was a great deal of dissension among both Loyalist groups about how to respond, providing a useful illustration of how leaders' ability to exercise control is constrained by their operatives' preferences. The disagreements degenerated into violent feuding within the UDA.[165] While there was no internal violence within the UVF, unsanctioned attacks against Catholics by the Portadown UVF in July 1996 led to a split in the organization.[166] The UVF tried to force their leader in Portadown, Billy Wright, into exile. Wright refused, as his local power base was sufficiently strong that the UVF leadership could not effectively threaten him.[167] Instead, Wright took his local supporters and formed the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) which quickly began to engage in more sectarian killings and was to be the most active Loyalist group against Catholics for the remainder of the

[159]For example, a long series of tit-for-tat attacks followed the PIRA attempt to kill Johnny Adair, a UDA company commander who would later cause major rifts in the organization. See Taylor, *The Loyalists*, 223–225.
[160]Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, 310–311.
[161]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 191.
[162]McDonald and Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror*, 272–274. Crawford, *Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence*, 42.
[163]Steve Bruce, "Turf War and Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries Since 1994," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (2004) 505.
[164]Bruce, "Terrorists and Politics: The Case of Northern Ireland's Loyalist Paramilitaries," 45.
[165]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 201–214.
[166]Cusack and McDonald, *The UVF*, 346–347.
[167]Ibid., 347–348.

conflict.[168] Neither the UVF nor the UDA officially ended the ceasefires they had started in the fall of 1994, but Loyalist violence began to rise, mostly conducted by the LVF.

As 1997 progressed with few Republican attacks in the North, the Loyalist paramilitaries increasingly focused their energies on each other. Throughout 1997, conflicts between the UVF and UDA continued, driven by a wide variety of local grievances.[169] In mid-January 1998, the UDA briefly broke its sectarian ceasefire and its political party, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), was expelled from the multi party talks.[170] At this point the conflict was obviously going to be resolved politically and the costs of not being at the table were clear. By late January UDA leaders convinced their militants to reinstate the ceasefire so the UDP could rejoin the multiparty talks.[171]

After January 1998, Loyalist violence was almost entirely confined to internecine feuding, much of it revolving around control of drug territory and related revenues.[172] As in previous periods, UDA Brigade commanders had good control over their local areas, but the political leaders held little sway.[173] In fact, UDA-UVF violence reached its worst in the latter half of 2000 because of this independence. One UDA company commander in the Shankill area, Johnny Adair, decided to try to clear the UVF from his area, against the wishes of both his superiors and his fellow company commanders in the West Belfast Brigade.[174] UVF leaders did not have such problems, in part because the core UVF leadership were able to violently punish their own. For example, the 2000 Shankill feud ended in part because the UVF shot one of their own operatives as punishment for his role in attacking Adair.[175] By 2002, Loyalist feuding was almost entirely confined to fights within the UDA. The last of these was settled in February 2003 with an oddly formal surrender of the main renegade UDA unit.[176]

[168]Steve Bruce, "Turf War and Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries Since 1994," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (2004), 511.
[169]McDonald and Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror*, 290–291.
[170]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 218–219.
[171]See ibid., 220–1. See also the CAIN chronology at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron.htm.
[172]Neil Jarman, "From War to Peace? Changing Patterns of Violence in Northern Ireland, 1990–2003," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (2004), 427.
[173]Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA*, 266–267.
[174]McDonald and Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror*, 329–332.
[175]Ibid., 370–371.
[176]Bruce, "Turf War and Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries Since 1994," 516–517.
McDonald and Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror*, 385.

7.6 CONCLUSION

This brief study of the major terrorist organizations that fought in Northern Ireland provides strong support for three of the four hypotheses set forth in the beginning of this chapter. Table 7.2 summarizes the case study findings for each of the six areas in which we can find evidence of central control. Where there was no solid evidence, the table reports an area as not being under central control.

Table 7.2. Control in Northern Ireland: 1969–2001

	PIRA	UVF	UDA
Target choices	No[1]	No[2]	No
Operational procedures	Yes	Yes	No
Personnel assignments	Yes	No	No
Resources	Yes	No	No
Fund-raising	Yes	No	No
Recruiting	No	Yes	No

[1] The level of control exercised by PIRA leaders increased dramatically over time. By the late 1980s, the leadership effectively modulated violence to support negotiations.
[2] The level of control exercised by UVF leaders increased over time. Target choices for major operations were centrally controlled by the late 1980s.

Turning to our hypotheses, we see that hypothesis 1 is clearly supported. Throughout the conflict, the PIRA leadership exercised a greater degree of control over their organization than did the leaders of either Loyalist paramilitary. Operational procedures and personnel assignments were controlled by the PIRA Army Council for most of the conflict. On occasion, local units flouted orders about operational procedures. For example, in May 1971 a very effective four-man ASU in Newry disbanded rather than follow orders to operate with men from Belfast who were known to the security services.[177] Such isolated incidents pale in comparison to the wholesale restructuring of the organization in the late 1970s and the control over promotions during the personnel changes of the 1980s.

[177]Collins, *Killing Rage*, 81–82; Kevin Fulton, *Unsung Hero* (London: John Blake Publishing, 2006), 32.

Hypothesis 2 is similarly supported. While the PIRA Army Council never had perfect control over target choices, they were able to direct surges and lulls in attacks to support negotiations in the mid-1970s and in the 1990s. Control over smaller-scale activities also increased over time, not the least due to the development of an internal disciplinary arm in the late 1970s. Importantly, control over tactical choices in the PIRA was increasing over time for exactly the reason embedded in hypothesis 2: the political damage from indiscriminate attacks began to matter more to the group's leadership.[178] It was not just control over attacks that changed over time. Part of the late 1970s reorganization involved bringing such resources as guns and explosives under the control of local quartermasters who reported directly to either Northern or Southern Command.[179]

The histories of all three groups provide support for hypothesis 4. Leaders in the PIRA, UVF, and UDA were restricted in what they could ask of their organizations. Moreover, we saw direct evidence of the causal process embedded in hypothesis 4. Again and again leaders refrained from making certain demands exactly because they knew they could not enforce certain orders.[180] Indeed, one explanation for the prominence of internal politics in the secondary literature on the Northern Ireland groups may be that historians' main primary sources—former militant leaders like Adams, McGuinness, Spence, and Ervine—spent a great deal of their time working to change their operatives' preferences to more closely mirror their own.

The evidence in support of hypothesis 3 is somewhat more ambiguous, owing to the paucity of detailed information on the internal organization of the two Loyalist paramilitaries.[181] The broad patterns of the conflict certainly support the notion that the UVF leadership exercised greater control. While UVF militants were carefully targeting PIRA activists in the second half of the 1980s, the UDA was still busy with sectarian attacks and internal feuding. Moreover, the UVF leadership clearly controlled

[178]In terms of the model presented in chapter 5, b, was increasing over time as the PIRA leadership became more invested in the political process and as the Catholic population became less willing to tolerate sectarian killings.

[179]At least they were supposed to. That they did even some of the time meant there was an increase in central control over resources compared to earlier periods.

[180]This is analogous to the situation in the models in chapter 5 in which the leader refrains from communicating because he knows it won't do any good and the agent will just do what he wants as the motivational constraint is not met. Recall that this occurs when the additional utility the agent gets from taking preferred action instead of doing what the leader wants is greater than the costs the leader can impose.

[181]Indeed, the fact that even those who have done extensive interviews with UDA militants lack a clear picture of the organization is in itself evidence in support of hypothesis 1, in so far as a coherent organization is a necessary condition for leaders to control agents with heterogeneous preferences.

recruiting early on and successfully reorganized along more cellular lines shortly after the PIRA did. Later in the conflict, UVF leaders discussed the links among political goals, discrimination, and the need to control violence in exactly the terms we would expect given all we have seen so far. They understood the political costs of indiscriminate violence and sought to control it.[182] Control was exercised mainly through persuasion, but the UVF leaders did use sanctioning when they had the power to do so. While the UDA leadership recognized the same constraints, they made fewer efforts to exert control because discrimination was simply less important to them.[183]

Overall, the history of how terrorist groups in Northern Ireland were managed is broadly consistent with the argument that terrorists face a consistent set of organizational dilemmas, regardless of what they are fighting over. Importantly, the Northern Ireland case highlights that both pro- and anti-government terrorist groups face similar challenges. While pro-government groups face less security pressure, their leaders' ability to manage violence is constrained when operatives wield a credible threat against them, just as that of leaders in anti-government groups. Still, one may reasonably object that the first two case study chapters have focused on European groups, and that the managerial dilemmas faced by groups in other settings (e.g., the Middle East), or by groups that have an explicitly religious motivation, may be fundamentally different. To address that concern we turn next to a comparative analysis of secular and religious groups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As we will see, both organizations face similar dilemmas, or at least dilemmas that differ as we should expect them to given differences in preference divergence between the groups.

[182]UVF leader Gusty Spence even reached out to the PIRA leadership in prison in 1976 with the suggestion that both groups' political goals would be better served if they could tamp down the sectarian killings. See Garland, *Gusty Spence*, 200–202.
[183]Recall that discrimination was less important to the UDA both because the group lacked a successful political affiliate and because for much of the conflict the UDA leaders were more interested in racketeering than politics.

CHAPTER 8

Preference Divergence and Control in Palestine

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine drew unprecedented attention to Palestinian territorial claims by hijacking an El Al flight out of Rome on July 22, 1968, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been defined primarily by Palestinian terrorism and the Israeli response to it. Studying this conflict provides insight into two aspects of terrorism. First, and foremost, the contrast between how Hamas and Fatah addressed their organizational dilemmas gives us strong evidence on the role of preference divergence. Both groups faced the same enemy (Israel), both had military commanders outside the Occupied Territories managing fighters on the inside, and both faced roughly similar incentives for the use of violence insofar as both were trying to compel Israeli concessions on territory and Palestinian rights (or the right of return). Where the groups clearly differed was in their level of preference divergence. Fatah was notoriously corrupt and fissiparous for most of its existence, yet stories about graft and infighting in Hamas are vanishingly rare.

The contrast between Fatah and Hamas also provides insight into the second question of whether there is something unique about how religiously motivated groups are organized. Since the most prominent practitioners of terrorism today are Islamic fundamentalist groups, any broad analysis of how terrorists organize naturally raises that question.'[1] The documentary evidence from al-Qa'ida and AQI used in earlier chapters certainly suggests that agency problems and the resulting

[1]For an excellent collection of papers on the links between religious fundamentalism and political extremism, see Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London: Frank Cass, 2004). For evidence that Islamic fundamentalist groups tend to be more indiscriminate in their use of violence and kill more people per attack, see Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, "The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth Wave of International Terror," in *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, ed. Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 71–90.

organizational dilemmas are present in even the most extreme religiously motivated groups, but leave open the possibility that less religious groups operating in the same environment would have had an even harder management challenge. Comparing how the secular-nationalist Fatah handled its managerial dilemmas with how the religious-nationalist Hamas organization solves this indeterminacy by allowing us to hold constant most aspects of the operational environment. Doing so shows that religion has organizational consequences insofar as it afforded religious groups greater opportunities to screen their operatives, thereby reducing preference divergence and increasing control.[2]

For those familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it may seem trivial to say that Fatah faced higher levels of preference divergence, but measuring preference divergence is more complicated than simply looking at observed levels of conflict. To see why, consider how one would assess whether there is preference divergence over spending in Hamas. Strikingly, no real evidence of graft in Hamas has emerged despite all the information Israel has released on the group, and despite the fact that releasing such evidence would obviously fit Israeli interests. As we saw in chapter 5, such low levels of observed conflict could stem from two different dynamics. Either everyone in Hamas is honest and spends money purely for the organization's benefit; or there is real preference divergence, but it is kept in check by monitoring and the threat of punishment. The existence of detailed financial reporting by Hamas operatives certainly suggests the latter explanation is correct but such reporting could serve other purposes.[3] The approach used in the previous two chapters doesn't help here either. There we were able to infer differences on the independent variables, uncertainty and discrimination, by comparing groups' political

[2]A related take on the organizational impact of religion is that radical religious groups tend to be active social service providers. The more extensive their social service provision network, the greater their advantage in aligning the incentives of members to effectively perform violent action without defection. For a thorough treatment of these dynamics in the context of terrorism, see Eli Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground," 10004 Working Paper, NBER (2003); and Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, "Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (2008) 1942–1967. The latter argues that religious groups' effectiveness at avoiding defection opens up a new set of tactical choices, including the use of suicide attacks against high-value targets. These arguments are developed at greater length in Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*.

[3]Detailed accounting can serve purposes beyond just monitoring agents' spending—leaders wishing to decide how to allocate resources across subcommands might want to know how efficiently they are operating even if they have no questions about their agents' probity—and there is no good basis for comparing the precision of accounting practices across these groups, so we do not want to make too much of this.

goals. But there is no similarly unambiguous public information from which we can infer preference divergence across groups.

The best approach, then, to measure preference divergence in this case is to combine a rough assessment of the prevalence of disagreements—not conflicts—with an examination of the pattern of who joins different groups and why. From those we can infer which group faces higher levels of preference divergence.

Fortunately, Fatah and Hamas provide a fairly stark contrast on both scores, particularly in terms of who joins their militias and why. Fatah did not even begin to establish a paramilitary presence in the Occupied Territories until the early months of the First Intifada, or uprising. This meant that from the outset, Fatah's militant operations in the Occupied Territories were managed by commanders based outside the Territories. The "outside" commanders' ideas about how to effectively oppose Israeli rule were dramatically different than those of their "inside" operatives. In particular, the outsiders had a strong interest in preventing the emergence of strong inside leaders, a preference that conflicted with the personal goals of the most competent inside militants. When Fatah returned to Israel as the dominant party in the PLO in 1994 under the Oslo agreement, the organization faced the further challenge of combining two groups of operatives with very distinct preferences: activists who grew up under Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories and militants who served in the Fatah guerrilla forces abroad. Hamas did not face such issues, as it grew out of the well-established Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization, recruited almost entirely within the territories, and thus drew on a much more homogenous population.

Given these differences we should expect much greater levels of preference divergence within Fatah, and indeed experts on the groups report many more disagreements over strategy and tactics in Fatah than in Hamas.[4] Even the most sympathetic observers of Palestinian politics report intense disagreements within Fatah over a variety of issues including whether to get involved in guerrilla warfare, how to deal with breakaway factions, and how to respond to various Israeli actions during the Second Intifada.[5] Now part of the difference between Fatah and Hamas may lie in the fact that Fatah was a much larger organization throughout most of the period under study. Even if it drew its operatives from a pool of recruits

[4]The contrast is starkly apparent in roughly comparable Israeli analyses of these two groups: Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* and Anat N. Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005).

[5]See for example Ramzy Baroud, *The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 67, 94–95, 107.

with exactly the same distribution of preferences as Hamas' recruits, we would expect Fatah to have more members whose preferences differed significantly from their leaders. Still, the greater frequency with which preference divergence in Fatah is discussed in the secondary literature suggests the following comparative hypothesis:[6]

H_1: Hamas leaders exercised greater control than Fatah leaders during both the First and Second Intifadas.

We can also use the Palestinian case to obtain evidence on the impact of government counterterrorism on control. During the First and Second Intifadas, from December 1987–1991 and September 2000–2005 respectively, Fatah's militants came under a great deal of security pressure from Israeli sources. If anything, the pressure was higher during the Second Intifada as Fatah's leaders were then based in the Occupied Territories. Between the two Intifadas, however, Fatah faced no meaningful security pressure as it was the leading party in the Palestinian Authority (PA) government and its militants formed the core of the PA's security services. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_2: Fatah leaders exercised greater control over their operatives during the period between the two Intifadas.

That a group operating under almost no security constraint should have few problems controlling its operatives is not surprising. But, the fact that Fatah was not able to do so during either Intifada means the secular change in control in Fatah offers us a clear example of the security-control tradeoff in action.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 provide brief histories of Fatah and Hamas, respectively. The analysis in

[6]Unfortunately, there is insufficient information available about other militant groups in this conflict to test similar comparative hypotheses and the secondary literature is simply too sparse. The most prominent of these are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). I am unaware of any detailed history of the PFLP. The most detailed book-length account of PIJ is Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv University: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern / African Studies, 2001). Even the information about the internal processes of Hamas and Fatah is relatively sparse compared to that for the Russia and Northern Ireland studies. The only major English-language study that deals explicitly with command-and-control in Palestinian military organizations is Joe Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002). The report combines press reporting and original interviews to assess whether the political leaders of the major Palestinian factions exercise sufficient control over their militias to bear responsibility for attacks on civilians under the doctrine of command responsibility in the Law of Armed Conflict.

this chapter will focus on the period after Hamas' formation in 1987. Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence before then on how Palestinian militant factions differed in terms of the variables we are concerned with.[7] Section 8.4 explicitly compares Fatah and Hamas, and section 8.5 presents chapter conclusions.

8.2 FATAH: THE CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION

Fatah's history can be divided into four distinct periods: the years leading up to the First Intifada in December 1987; the First Intifada to the September 1993 Oslo agreement; the Oslo years from September 1993 to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000; and the Second Intifada to Hamas' victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. Though our analysis will focus on the latter three periods when comparisons to Hamas become possible, examining Fatah's earlier history reveals two interesting patterns. First, in this conflict it appears that greater central control actually served to increase the security of the rank and file during the time when the Palestinian organizations had a safe haven where they could operate openly, without fear of Israeli counterterrorism. Second, pressure from more extreme elements in Fatah led to organizational splits and pushed the group into forms of violence senior leaders wanted to avoid. We will therefore begin with a brief review of Fatah's origins as a guerrilla force.

8.2.1 Fatah as a Guerrilla Army: 1965–1987

Fatah has been the dominant secular party in Palestinian politics since at least February 1969, when Fatah founder Yasser Arafat was elected chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive

[7]The best overall history of the Palestinian nationalist movement through the First Intifada is Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). While Sayigh's account shows that the internal problems identified in previous chapters plagued Palestinian militants from 1949 on, few other accounts provide similar evidence on differences within and between Palestinian factions before the First Intifada. For a useful summary of financial issues, though, see James Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It.*

Committee. For much of this history, Fatah operated as a guerrilla group and had no significant military presence in the occupied territories. From 1965 to 1970, Fatah conducted cross-border raids into Israel from Jordan. By 1970 there were approximately 25,000 fighters in the various Palestinian factions, of which Fatah was the largest, and another 15,000 fighters served in the PLO's conventional army, the Palestine Liberation Army.[8] After being kicked out of Jordan in September 1970 (commonly referred to by Palestinians as "Black September"), the organization regrouped, establishing a state-within-a-state in Southern Lebanon. Until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the only real military pressure on Fatah and the other Palestinian militant organizations operating in Lebanon came from indigenous Lebanese groups such as the Shiite Amal and Christian Phalange militias. In Lebanon, Fatah and other groups established traditional military structures and continued to focus on cross-border raids into Israel.[9]

Because the security challenge for Fatah, the PFLP, and other exile factions was to identify and avoid penetration by Israeli agents rather than to evade detection by state police forces, all the factions organized along fairly hierarchical lines. This allowed the groups to employ security bureaucracies for internal policing and to use trusted central leaders to coordinate operations.[10] This did not mean that the Palestinian militants were without problems when it came to controlling their operatives. In fact, the PLO, led by Fatah, had frequent problems controlling smaller militant factions, and graft was endemic among senior Fatah leaders who used their position atop the PLO to enrich themselves.[11] Within the different factions, however, strong central control was clearly the norm.

[8]For a description of Palestinian militants' command and control arrangements in the 1970s, see Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), ch. 6. For a full breakdown of the 1970 fedayeen order of battle, see ibid., 253.

[9]The PFLP, with its focus on high-profile international terrorism, was the exception to this pattern. In the fall of 1971 Fatah established a small force called "Black September" to conduct transnational terrorism, but dropped the group after it became clear its actions were hurting the PLO's standing with Arab governments. See Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 379–383; and O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis*, 151.

[10]For a detailed description of how hierarchy supported security in the Abu Nidal Organization—a dissident Palestinian faction that broke from the PLO in 1974—see Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire* (New York: Random House, 1992), 11, 18–24, 27–29, 186. As the case of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) shows, excessive centralization for the sake of security can become quite inefficient. See ibid. 145–146.

[11]Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It*, 103–104.

Fatah's sojourn in Lebanon came to an end in Spring 1982 following a series of attacks on high-profile Israeli targets in Europe. On April 3, 1982, an Israeli diplomat was assassinated in Paris by a small Lebanese organization, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. Although Fatah's leaders denied responsibility for the attack, Israel responded with a series of air strikes against PLO positions in Southern Lebanon. Fatah refrained from responding to the Israeli air strikes until May, when internal pressure forced the group's leaders to order artillery attacks on Northern Israel.[12] In June 1982 the Abu Nidal Organization (a small Palestinian faction that conducted a number of high-profile attacks between 1973 and 1997) tried to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Britain, triggering the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The invasion pitted the large Israeli army against the much smaller Palestinian forces in what was essentially a conventional war.[13] Israeli forces quickly besieged Beirut and forced the PLO to evacuate Lebanon under international protection in August.[14] Israeli forces withdrew from Beirut soon after the PLO evacuation but retained a security zone in Southern Lebanon, effectively ending Fatah's ability to conduct cross-border attacks.

Following the eviction from Beirut, there was a great deal of conflict within the PLO and Fatah as to how to proceed.[15] Much of this disagreement focused on how to respond to American diplomatic initiatives designed to give Jordan a central role in representing the Palestinians. In February 1983, the 16th Palestine National Council voted to reject the Reagan Plan for Palestinian self-government under Jordanian sovereignty but did not offer a clear positive alternative. The key source of tension was that, while military options were foreclosed by the loss of any operational sanctuary on Israel's borders, the available diplomatic options were quite poor. From the standpoint of a movement that had so recently been promising its supporters a military victory, accepting anything less than

[12]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 102.

[13]Palestinian command and control arrangements followed conventional military lines, with most factions within the PLO taking responsibility for distinct geographical areas of responsibility. See Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[14]The decision to withdraw rather than force the Israelis to take the last PLO strongholds in Beirut by force was a matter of great debate within the PLO. There is an excellent overview of these debates in ibid., ch. 4.

[15]The eviction of the PLO from Beirut changed the dynamic of the Palestinian nationalist project, with those in the Territories becoming much more politically active, as evidenced by the huge increase in "disturbances" reported by the Israeli security services. Helena Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 2 (1990): 229. For a collection of statistics on the West Bank before the First Intifada, see Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project. 1987 Report* (Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Base Project, 1987).

a full seat at the table was a political impossibility.[16] Although the 16th Council did not offer a clear political plan, it marked the beginning of a shift within the Fatah leadership toward a non-guerrilla strategy.[17]

This shift was not well received by the more militant members of Fatah, a group of whom broke off to form the Fatah-Provisional Command. The rebels' core disagreement with the mainline leadership was over whether to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Any such strategy necessarily entailed a recognition of Israeli statehood and so was unacceptable to the rebels.[18] On May 9, 1983, the Fatah rebels occupied the group's offices in Damascus, starting what amounted to a Palestinian civil war.[19] Arafat quickly returned to Lebanon to direct the defense against the breakaway faction.[20] Over the next seven months, the Fatah rebels took over all of the Palestinian positions in Lebanon, used artillery against Fatah positions in refugee camps near Tripoli, and forced Arafat to evacuate Lebanon for a second time in December. The Fatah rebels' victory would prove to be pyrrhic as their willingness to use force against their fellow Palestinians cost them the support of the diaspora community and discredited calls for reform in Fatah and the PLO.[21] Ultimately, the net effect of this internal split in Fatah was to enhance Arafat's control over the organization.[22]

With the loss of their last territorial base adjacent to the occupied territories, and with Jordan's increased efforts to win political support in the West Bank, Fatah shifted its focus to building up a political infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. Fatah established a party newspaper for the Territories, subsidized trade unions, and established a semi-overt youth organization (*harakat ash-shabibah*), commonly known as Shabiba.[23] Although Shabiba avoided military action against Israelis

[16]Naseer Aruri, "The PLO and the Jordan Option," *MERIP Reports* (1985): 4–6.
[17]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 105–106.
[18]Yezid Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," *International Affairs* 65, no. 2 (1989): 249.
[19]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 108. Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 251.
[20]Jaber Suleiman, "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 1 (1999): 68.
[21]Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 249–250. Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 63.
[22]Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 255–256.
[23]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 110–111. Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 229.

in the run-up to the First Intifada, it played a key role in facilitating more militant activities by helping to identify and punish Israeli spies.[24] Overall, Fatah's move into mass political organization played a key role in mobilizing Palestinians in the Territories towards participation in the nationalist project, but Fatah remained focused on non-violent activities through at least the first months of 1985.[25] That focus began to change in the spring of 1985 as diplomatic progress stalled and opposition groups like ANO and the PFLP kept up a steady of high-profile attacks.[26] In April 1985 Fatah attempted to land a commando party in Israel and by September 1985 internal pressure on the Fatah leadership to resume attacks overcame their concerns that violence would be counterproductive.[27] Between April 1985 and the outbreak of the First Intifada, Fatah-linked militants would conduct 10 more attacks, killing 111 people and injuring 26 more.[28]

While Fatah and other militant groups continued sporadic attacks on Israel and Israeli interests abroad throughout 1986, civil unrest began to reach serious levels in the West Bank and Gaza. From April 1986 through May 1987 there were 3,150 violent demonstrations in the Occupied Territories.[29] In light of this increasing domestic unrest and the diplomatic isolation of the PLO, Fatah moved in a more militant direction. At the April 1987 Palestine National Council meeting, Arafat made a point of demonstrating his solidarity with the more extreme PFLP and reappointed the leader of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, PLF leader Abu Abbas, to the PLO Executive Committee.[30] After a short period in the mid-1980s when it appeared that the loss of its Lebanese sanctuary would push Fatah in a more diplomatic election, the group had moved back toward aggressive militancy on the eve of the First Intifada.

[24]Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 257-258.
[25]Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," 218.
[26]In particular, the joint PLO-Jordan initiative agreed to in February 1985 fell apart. See Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*, 70.
[27]Ely Karmon, *Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: International Terrorism Strategies (1968–1990)*, Report, (International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT, 2000).
[28]Global Terrorism Database, search for attacks by "al-Fatah," "Fatah," and "Palestine Liberation Organization" between April 1, 1985, and December 9, 1987.
[29]Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 54–55.
[30]Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*, 81.

8.2.2 From Civil Unrest to Diplomatic Resurgence: 1987–1993

On December 9, 1987, a riot in the Jabilla refugee camp triggered a cascading series of demonstrations across the occupied territories, marking the start of the First Intifada. Much of Fatah's activity during this period was not terrorist in nature, and Fatah's efforts to establish an underground military presence in the West Bank in early 1988 using its elite paramilitary unit, Force-17, failed.[31] Still, three relevant themes emerge in reviewing Fatah's history during this period. First, while preference divergence between outside leaders and operatives in the Territories made it hard for Fatah's leaders to control the details of specific actions by inside militants, those leaders did dictate the larger strategy. Second, Fatah had no problems controlling its militants outside the Territories. This is not surprising in that its leaders presumably had more in common with the outside militants and a greater ability to punish them for bad actions, a fact reflected in the dearth of documented disagreements between Fatah leaders and the outside fighters during this period. Third, Fatah leaders used their control over financial resources to exert control over operatives in the Territories.

From 1985 through November 1987, there were a number of dramatic spikes in civil unrest in Gaza and the West Bank. What made the December riots different was the response by a wide variety of groups who joined together to institutionalize the unrest.[32] Eight days after the first riot, on December 17, the first in a series of leaflets was released by an organization calling itself the United National Leadership of the Intifada (UNL) (*al-Qaida al-Watania al-Muwahada lil-Intifada*). The UNL—sometimes referred to as the Unified National Command (UNC)—was the idea of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and was made up of the local leaders of several organizations, including militant and nonviolent civic groups.[33] Although a full roster of UNL leaders is not available, Fatah appears to have dominated the organization. Of the first sixty UNL activists deported by Israel in

[31]Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*, 89–90. Force-17 would become Arafat's presidential guard when he took control of the Palestine National Authority.
[32]Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," 208.
[33]The UNL was similar to the Russian Soviets in that it combined militant parties with a wide variety of other civic institutions. Although some sources report the UNL was the brainchild of the PFLP, most report it as a DFLP initiative.

December 1987, thirty-eight were affiliated with Fatah, eight with the DFLP, four with the PFLP, and two with Hamas.[34]

Fatah moved quickly to assert control over the UNL, against the desires of the UNL leadership, and by February UNL leaflets were citing its subservience to the PLO. Fatah was able to take over the UNL for both political and practical reasons. On the political side, the UNL needed PLO endorsement for its credibility within the territories.[35] On the practical side, Israel's ability to arrest UNL leaders in the Territories created a demand for leaders operating from the outside, and Fatah's relatively deep coffers meant that it could use "its control over financial resources and ability to determine the scope of activity of local forces by differential provision of money. Funds transferred to institutions in the territories secured their subordination to the leadership in exile."[36]

Local leaders in the territories chose the tactics during the first two years of the Intifada, but the PLO, which Fatah essentially controlled, set the strategy.[37] Fatah activities in Palestine fell under the group's "Western Sector" (*al-Qita' al-Gharbi*) headed by Khalil al-Wazir, who also supervised Shabiba until his assassination by Israel in April 1988.[38] Despite his strategic control, Wazir's ability to coordinate specific actions in the territories appears to have been quite low. As one analyst puts it, "the highest manifestation of *tanzim* cohesion would be to publish a leaflet in the name of Fatah and to distribute it across the West Bank and Gaza with a consistent text."[39]

One reason Fatah had so much trouble controlling the details of the First Intifada was that the preferences of the leaders in the territories were different than those of the outside leaders. There were several reasons for this.[40] First, Fatah's inside leaders had much more in common with their local compatriots from the other PLO factions—PFLP, DFLP, and

[34] Amal Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention*, 1967–2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 92–93.
[35] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 191–192.
[36] Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 118.
[37] For a contrasting view of why Fatah was able to take control of the Intifada, see Hillel Frisch, "The Palestinian Movement in the Territories: The Middle Command," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 2 (1993): 254–264. Frisch argues that the sociology of the Palestinian leaders who came of age during the Israeli occupation created a cadre of mid-level leaders who were willing to accept a subordinate position and focus on managing Fatah's activities according to the preferences of the diaspora leaders.
[38] Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*, 95–96.
[39] Nigel Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 137.
[40] The following is based on Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 88–99.

the Communist Party—than they did with their exile leaders. Because of these shared interests, the insiders made a number of agreements with the other factions that violated official Fatah policies.[41] Second, Fatah's inside leaders took more radical positions on the use of violence than their bosses in exile, whose rhetoric was restrained by the need to please sanctuary states such as Jordan and Syria. Third, Fatah's inside leaders wanted to build their reputations and amass power, while the exile leaders wanted to forestall the emergence of powerful internal leaders to ensure the exiles' eventual dominance of a Palestinian state.[42]

By mid-1988 the Intifada had irrevocably changed the politics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and on July 31 Jordan cut its administrative, financial, and legal links to the West Bank.[43] This move created a gap in social service provision in the territories, creating an opening for the PLO's competitors and forcing it to become more serious about governance. At the 19th Palestine National Council (PNC) in November, Fatah pushed through two major changes to the PLO position that reflected the new political calculations of senior Fatah leaders. First, the PNC accepted the principle of a two-state solution. Second, the PNC agreed to take United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel.[44] These moves marked a major departure from the long-standing PLO rejection of any action that would grant implicit recognition to the state of Israel. More important, Fatah's decision to push these changes through broke with the PLO tradition of consensus politics, a tradition that had given small guerrilla parties an effective veto over negotiations with Israel.[45]

Arafat followed up on these moves in December 1988 by pledging to abstain from terrorism in an address to the UN General Assembly in Geneva. Arafat's declaration created a dilemma for Fatah and for other non-rejectionist factions in the PLO. Supporting the Intifada and continuing to conduct attacks against Israeli targets were necessary for Fatah's legitimacy among Palestinians, but were incompatible with Israeli and American preconditions for negotiation. Fatah's leaders tried to create

[41]The best summary of disagreements during the First Intifada is provided in Schiff and Ya'ari, *Intifada*.
[42]Wazir was particularly aggressive in reminding the internal leadership of their ultimate subordination to the exiles. See Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 98–99.
[43]Ibid., 115.
[44]The changes in the Palestinian political position embodied in the documents produced by the 19th PNC are detailed in Rashid Khalidi, "The Resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 2 (1990): 29–42.
[45]Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 254–255.

space for some continued violence by arguing that cross-border incursions were legitimate in the context of the Palestinian struggle for national self-determination.[46]

The extent to which this strategy was mirrored in practice is informative about Fatah's ability to exert control during this period. Fatah greatly reduced the rate of attacks in 1989, conducting half as many cross-border attacks as in 1988.[47] Despite this change, locally generated violence in the territories skyrocketed as the Intifada took on an increasingly military tone.[48] Fatah's avowed strategy, in other words, was successfully enforced on militants outside the Occupied Territories but not on those within the territories, where the group faced greater preference divergence and had less ability to enforce discipline.

While the late 1988 changes to the Palestinian position did little to alter the dynamics of the conflict, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1989 did. The PLO supported Iraq. In response, most of the Persian Gulf states kicked out their Palestinian guest workers, driving the Palestinian economy, which depended on labor remittances from these workers, into a tailspin. The guest workers' evictions also cut the PLO off from the taxes it was charging Palestinians living the in the Gulf states.[49] Compounding these problems, many Arab states dramatically reduced their financial support for the PLO.[50] This loss of support reduced the flow of resources into Fatah's coffers, making it more difficult to regulate the Intifada by selectively funding different factions.[51] It also greatly reduced Fatah's ability to buy the allegiance of various smaller militant formations in the PLO exile community, further degrading the group's control over violent actions.[52] Together, these changes pushed Fatah and the PLO toward a negotiated solution, as failing to do so meant potentially losing control over the Palestinian movement. As Fatah was being pushed toward renewed negotiations, the United States and USSR drew on the diplomatic momentum generated by the war against Iraq to sponsor international peace talks between themselves, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in Madrid at the end of October 1991. The Palestinians were represented by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The talks continued in Washington throughout 1992 with little progress. In January 1993, back-channel talks

[46]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 124.
[47]The Global Terrorism Database reports four attacks by Fatah in 1988 and two in 1989.
[48]The GTD lists 10 attacks by "Palestinians" in 1988 and 110 in 1989.
[49]Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 43.
[50]Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 157.
[51]This is one reason 1990-91 saw large increases in the rate of both anti-Israeli and intra-community violence. See Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 127–129.
[52]Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 128–129.

between senior Fatah leaders representing the PLO and Israel began in Oslo.[53]

Throughout the runup to Oslo there was a great deal of tension between Fatah leaders and operatives in the territories due to specific disputes over negotiating strategies and to the years-long effort of the exiled leaders to simultaneously facilitate the Intifada and restrain independent activism in the Territories. New tensions were also created by the dire financial straits of Fatah's traditional military units, which had been marginalized as the group's geographic focus shifted to the Territories and its strategic focus shifted to the political process.[54]

In September 1993, the back-channel negotiations finally reached a breakthrough, as the PLO and Israel signed the Declaration of Principles, commonly known as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords laid out a multistage process for reaching a final peace agreement. The Occupied Territories were to be divided into three areas until a final settlement was reached: area A under Palestinian rule; area B under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control; and area C, covering Israeli settlements and security zones, under full Israeli control. The first stage was set to begin in 1994 with the establishment of Palestinian self-government over the Gaza Strip and Jericho.

8.2.3 Fatah Atop the Palestine National Authority: 1994–2000

As the Oslo Accords were implemented, Fatah's dominance over the PLO naturally transitioned into dominance over the Palestine National Authority (PA). Senior Fatah leaders took the majority of the senior posts in the PA and Fatah's military commanders took the leading role in establishing the nascent state's security services.[55] In a very real sense, Fatah's militants became the PA security services with all the freedom from Israeli pressure that implies.

[53]A concise history of the talks can be found in Dean G. Pruitt, Jacob Bercovitch and I. William Zartman, "A Brief History of the Oslo Talks," *International Negotiations* 2 (1997): 177–182. For a longer autobiographical account see Ahmed Qurie, *From Oslo to Jerusalem: The Palestinian Story of the Secret Negotiations* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

[54]The sources of internal tensions in Fatah during this period are well detailed in Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 131–132.

[55]A full summary of the factional affiliations of senior PA leaders can be found in Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, appendix 4.

Examining the period between the Intifadas reveals two important patterns for our study. First, Fatah had a great deal of difficulty integrating disparate groups of activists as its leaders moved into the Territories in late 1993 and early 1994. Second, Fatah controlled its militants quite well during this period, avoiding violence against Israelis and modulating its suppression of Hamas in response to political pressures. This should not be surprising, as Fatah dominated the PA and therefore operated under no real security constraint from 1994 to 2000.

The Oslo process began on a sour note. Negotiations over the details of the first self-rule agreement were surprisingly acrimonious and an agreement on the Israeli pullout from Gaza and Jericho was not reached until May 1994.[56] On May 25, Israeli forces began their withdrawal. The first PA government, chosen by the Fatah-dominated PLO Executive Committee, took office shortly thereafter. Fatah's militias formed the core of the PA security apparatus and were not involved in significant military activity, except against Hamas, for the next six years. Because the history of this period is very well detailed in other work, this section focuses on the challenges Fatah faced in integrating two very disparate groups into the new PA government: the exiles who returned to the Territories in June 1994 and the locals who led the First Intifada.[57]

Those challenges of integrating operatives with diverse interests and preferences were reflected in the spate of violence inside Fatah that began a mere eight days after the Oslo Accords were signed. This provides the clearest evidence of these difficulties.[58] Throughout the fall of 1993 and into the winter of 1994 there was a steady drumbeat of assassinations and vigilante killings as Fatah leaders such as Sari Nusseibeh struggled to control the Fatah Hawks militia in Gaza.[59] Observers identified a number of reasons for this internal violence, including: a struggle between Fatah militia leaders who had grown powerful during the Intifada and the more politically minded leaders who stood to gain as Fatah transitioned from

[56] Qurie, *From Oslo to Jerusalem: The Palestinian Story of the Secret Negotiations*, 288–289.

[57] The best big-picture analysis of the politics of this period is Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, ch. 5–6. I will follow Rubin in using the terms "outsider" and "insider" to describe the background of various Fatah officials.

[58] Joel Greenberg, "P.L.O. Buries a Slain Leader in a Divided Gaza," *New York Times*, September 23, 1993.

[59] Patrick Martin, "Vigilante Militia Failing to Protect Palestinians," *The Globe and Mail*, October 28, 1993. "Gaza Fatah Hawks Renounce Truce," *Jerusalem Post*, November 30, 1993. Pinhas Inbari, "Hawk's death in Gaza: Clues to the Mystery," *Jerusalem Post*, February 9, 1994.

a guerrilla organization to the dominant party in a new government;[60] the efforts of outside leaders from Fatah's military wing to impose their authority over the organization in the territories;[61] and the cultural gap between the insiders and outsiders recruited into the new security services.[62] Given the vastly different life experiences, political goals, and career incentives faced by the two groups of Fatah activists, the preference divergence revealed in Fatah's transition from guerrilla force to ruling party is no surprise.

Further evidence of the preference divergence between local Fatah activists and the national leadership emerged in the runup to the January 1996 PLC elections. In October 1995, Fatah's eighteen-member Central Committee tried to ease the impression that it was an outsider-dominated organization by adding two additional members from the Territories. The move was largely symbolic as the Central Committee remained dominated by former exiles, but it reflected a desire to placate the insiders.[63] The extent of the conflict became even more clear in November when the Central Committee rejected the slate of candidates nominated by Fatah's West Bank membership, replacing them with a group chosen by Arafat and threatening to expel any members who ran independently.[64] Fatah remained a riven organization for the next several years.[65]

Despite the clear preference divergence within the group, Fatah effectively controlled its fighters during the Oslo years.[66] Even after Baruch Goldstein killed twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers in Hebron in February 1994, radicalizing elements of the Fatah rank and file, the group was able to restrain its operatives from conducting reprisals.[67] None of

[60]Peter Ford, "Palestinian Deaths in Gaza Rend Fabric of PLO's Fatah," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 2, 1993.
[61]Pinhas Inbari, "PLO Power Struggle Leads to anti-Arafat Coalition," *Jerusalem Post*, January 5, 1994. Pinhas Inbari, "Arafat's Next Step: Autonomy or Fatahland?" *Jerusalem Post*, February 16, 1994. Steve Rodan, "Public Police or Arafat's Private Army," *Jerusalem Post*, April 8, 1994.
[62]Clyde Haberman, "Palestinians Learn to Police Their People and the People Learn to Accept It," *New York Times*, June 16, 1994.
[63]The most prominent Fatah leader from the territories, its West Bank leader Marwhan Bhargouti, was not brought on. Barry Rubin, *The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 22–23.
[64]Ibid., 98.
[65]For specific examples see Ibid., 99, 102–103, 106.
[66]Ibid., 104.
[67]On Fatah members' reactions to the Hebron massacre, see: Sarah Helm, "Fatah Faithful Turn Against Their Leader," *The Independent*, March 2, 1994; and Lamia Lahoud, "Massacre Has Made Fatah Forces More Extreme," *Jerusalem Post*, March 8, 1994.

the Fatah militias engaged in serious violence against Israel between 1994 and mid-2000.[68] This pattern of effective control in the face of preference divergence would soon change as Fatah's militias came under renewed security pressure during the Second Intifada.

8.2.4 Fighting for Legitimacy: 2000–2005

Fatah faced a delicate problem during the Second Intifada. It had to use violence against Israel or it would lose all public support. However, too much violence would bring a decisive Israeli reaction and Fatah, like any governing party, had a great deal invested in institutions and infrastructure that were easy for Israel to target.[69] This problem called for a level of control Fatah was unable to achieve. By the end of the Intifada, Fatah's inability to control its militants had triggered a devastating Israeli reaction against the group. For example, the massive increase in suicide bombings in 2002 that pushed Israel to reinvade areas transferred to PA control under Oslo, Area A, was led by Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB).

The roots of the Second Intifada lay in the failure of the Camp David talks in July 2000, which led to a crisis of legitimacy for the PA.[70] The rioting that began in September 2000 was as much a rejection of the corrupt PA government that had failed to deliver significant improvements in Palestinian's daily lives as it was a reaction to the failure of the Camp David accords.[71] Recognizing this fact, Fatah moved aggressively into violence to preserve its leadership role in Palestinian politics.[72]

A few weeks into the genuinely spontaneous rioting, Fatah's local militia units, Tanzim, began a campaign of attacks against Israel with the goal of regaining Fatah's position as the preeminent representative of the

[68] There were four attacks by the Fatah Hawks in 1994–95, but other elements in Fatah acted quite aggressively against these low-level dissidents. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) records no attacks by Tanzim or al-Fatah and only one suspected attack attributed to the PLO between May 1994 and July 2000.

[69] As we will see, Hamas faced an analogous dilemma from 1994 to 2000 when it had to use violence to maintain its political standing, but feared a decisive crackdown by the PA.

[70] The clearest description of the path of the Second Intifada from summer 2000 through mid-2004 comes from Luca Ricolfi's careful analysis of patterns of suicide attacks by various Palestinian factions. My account essentially parallels his. Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981–2003," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 96–97.

[71] Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 6.

[72] Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 138–139.

Palestinian cause. This was not the top-down strategic decision it appears to be with the benefit of hindsight. That there was little preparation for this move strongly suggests it was not a strategy considered by Fatah's leaders. Rather, the group lost control of violence as units in different areas began conducting operations without the coordination of Fatah's central leadership.[73] When a few local Fatah activists took the initiative to fire on Israeli troops, Arafat gave his tacit consent by refraining from issuing an order to cease fire and by leaving the country to attend a rally in Tunisia and a conference in Spain.[74] By the third week of the Intifada, Fatah's Tanzim militia began launching strikes against Israeli settlements with mortars and machine guns.[75] Israel re-invaded several Palestinian towns in response and assassinated two senior Fatah leaders in November. The assassinations pushed Fatah into more military operations against Israel and also demonstrated that Fatah militants no longer enjoyed immunity due to their affiliation with the PA security services. Fatah began to face a security constraint.

As the Intifada continued into 2001, Fatah's lack of control over the violence was compounded by the reactions of other actors. Israeli operations against the Fatah infrastructure accelerated the decline of the PA's preventive security apparatus. This decline reduced the ability of Fatah's leaders in the PA to use government forces to punish wayward units.[76] Even when Fatah could effectively sanction its operatives, the political cost of doing so grew as aggressive Israeli counterterrorism—closures, assassinations causing collateral damage, and the like—enhanced the militants' popularity.[77] Over time, Fatah's ability to use money to condition its agents also fell as Tanzim units—and later AMB units—found willing funders in the Palestinian refugee camps abroad.[78] Competition between Fatah cadres for leadership of the larger movement inhibited coordination between units engaged in military operations and made leaders' management problems worse by creating escalatory incentives at the local level (being an active commander could be a route to

[73] Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 160.
[74] Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," *Survival* 43, no. 3 (2001): 49.
[75] Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 265–266. The expressed goal of these attacks was to convince the Israeli settlers to leave by subjecting them to a steady stream of harassing fire.
[76] Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 139. In terms of the models presented in chapter 2, sanctioning became more costly.
[77] On the impact of Israeli actions, see for example Lee Hockstader, "Arafat's Dilemma: What Pleases U.S. Offends at Home," *Washington Post*, November 19, 2001.
[78] See for example Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 85.

prominence for mid-level leaders) that were absent higher up.[79] Moreover, as Hamas and the PIJ ramped up their use of suicide bombings in 2001, and as the Intifada took on an increasingly religious character, local Fatah operatives felt a keener need to up the ante than did their leaders.[80] Finally, the longer the Intifada went on, the more reluctant Fatah's fighters became to stop the violence without concessions from Israel.[81]

Two weeks after the assassination of a prominent Fatah leader in Tulkarm on January 14, 2002, the AMB conducted the first Fatah suicide bombing on January 27, dramatically ending the ceasefire that had been called by Arafat on December 16 of the previous year.[82] The Brigades emerged out of Fatah's Tanzim militia as a tactical response to help Fatah keep pace with the Islamist factions' high-impact attacks.[83] AMB militants made decisions about attacks under loose, personality-driven local command structures, with a higher degree of autonomy and improvisation than other Palestinian militant organizations.[84] AMB's actions were, however, a net negative for Fatah in the long run as attacks against civilians by the ruling party in the PA gave Israel a ready reason to refrain from further negotiations.

Recognizing that attacks were creating a problem, Fatah began trying to get AMB to stop targeting Israeli civilians in February and even tried to disband the group.[85] But the attacks continued, and by late March it was clear that Israel was preparing to re-invade the West Bank and Gaza. Mere hours after Arafat declared a unilateral ceasefire on March 28 in a last-ditch attempt to head off the re-invasion, an AMB leader in

[79] Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 161.
[80] While Fatah's leaders were pushed by the same dynamic, most accounts suggest they did not feel the pressure to compete as intensely as their operatives did. On the incentives of local leaders, see: Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 75; Keith B. Richburg, "Armed Factions Undermine Arafat; Palestinian Uprising Nurtures Grass-Roots Rivals to His Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 7, 2001; and Sandro Contenta, "Arafat's Unhappy Fighters Get New Orders," *Toronto Star*, June 5, 2001.
[81] Marwan Barghouti, for example, argued that Arafat "can't just say to people, after 14 months of Intifada, of sacrifices ... 'here's a ceasefire.' He has to offer something to the Palestinian people." Quoted in Cameron W. Barr, "Arafat's Historic Support Wanes," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 19, 2001.
[82] Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 268. Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 140.
[83] AMB also gave Fatah a more "Islamic" gloss, which was increasingly necessary as the Palestinian society became more religious. Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 266.
[84] Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 63, 81–82.
[85] Ibid., 78, 84–85.

the Northern West Bank released a leaflet vowing that AMB would fight on.[86]

Israel invaded the West Bank in "Operation Defensive Shield" on March 29, 2002, and re-took most of Area A within days. By August it had become clear that Fatah simply could not get AMB to stop targeting Israeli civilians. In that month, Husan al-Shaykh, Marwan Barghouti's successor as Secretary General of Fatah's Higher Committee in the West Bank which ran day-to-day Fatah affairs in that area, made an announcement which implied that suicide attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel were not part of Fatah's strategy. AMB leaders immediately rejected this statement. Instead, they argued that suicide attacks should continue unless Israel withdrew behind the Green Line, released all Palestinian prisoners, and stopped assassinations of militant leaders.[87]

The control problem for Fatah was that its militants had very different preferences over violence than their leaders, but the leaders could not effectively punish their agents. All they could do was make demands.[88] A whole series of Fatah statements in August and September 2002 were rejected by leaders of AMB. One Fatah leader from the Dheisheh refugee camp near Bethlehem "... gave the view of many local Fatah leaders who have criticized suicide bombings against civilians when he told Human Rights Watch that implementing any initiative such as that considered in May by the Fatah Revolutionary Council would not be possible without some form of Israeli reciprocity. "Fatah may say stop," he said, "but no one will listen."[89]

In February 2003, PA Interior Minister Hani al-Hasan, a prominent member of the Fatah central committee, issued a statement saying that two AMB members who carried out a January suicide bombing in Tel Aviv were not members of Fatah.[90] This implicit criticism of AMB did not go over well with the group's leaders in Nablus, who threatened to kill Hani if he entered their city. Since Hani's position as Interior Minister meant

[86]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 85.
[87]Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 269.
[88]The evidence suggests that credible communication was not the problem. Most of the public statements from Tanzim and AMB operatives about specific ceasefire calls explicitly reject the leadership's goals. There is no suggestion that the members think the leadership is dissembling, or saying "stop" just to please the Israelis. See for example John Kifner, "Militants Reject Policy on Attacks in Israel," *New York Times*, August 13, 2002; and Abraham Rabinovich, "Fatah Split on Fine Print of Ceasefire," *The Australian*, September 12, 2002.
[89]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 86–87.
[90]"Al-Aqsa Brigades Warn Palestinian Interior Minister Against Entering Nablus for Denying Two 'Martyrs' of Tel Aviv Dual Operation," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, London, February 7, 2003, 2. Translation by BBC Monitoring Service.

he would be responsible for enforcing the unilateral Palestinian ceasefire that was being discussed by the main Palestinian factions, this threat is a particularly dramatic example of Fatah's weakness.[91]

Ironically, AMB's unsanctioned actions played a key role in the revival of Fatah's political status in the Territories.[92] The accompanying surge in PA power contributed to the June 2003 truce, which is generally considered to mark the end of the Second Intifada.[93]

At the end of June 2003, the major Palestinian factions declared separate ceasefires following weeks of intense talks under international pressure.[94] While Hamas and PIJ followed the truce until late August, when a local Hamas operative conducted a suicide bombing in Jerusalem without the leadership's approval, AMB did not.[95] To the contrary, AMB accelerated its rate of attacks in July and did not stop conducting attacks until mid-August.[96] Throughout the remainder of 2003, the PA leadership tried repeatedly to renew the truce, but was ultimately unable to do so. In addition to the traditional disputes between Fatah and the more extreme Palestinian organizations, independent local units were a real problem, especially in the West Bank where gangs affiliated with AMB controlled entire neighborhoods.[97]

For much of 2004, Fatah units continued sporadic attacks against Israeli targets at similar levels to 2003.[98] Fatah's failure to get AMB to constrain operations to the West Bank and Gaza, despite the Fatah

[91]The fact that Hani immediately traveled to Nablus following the threat shows that Fatah's inability to sanction AMB did not mean AMB could effectively sanction Fatah. Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 171.

[92]The revival cited in many histories is loosely reflected in the survey data used by David A. Jaeger et al., *Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada*, Working paper 16475 (NBER, 2011). They show that support for Fatah increases from 22.91 percent in 2001 to 27.15 percent in 2003 and 32.07 percent by 2004.

[93]Importantly, this interpretation reconciles area experts' accounts of the Second Intifada with the findings of scholars who have focused more tightly on terrorist tactics. The best works on the latter score are Reuter, *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*; and Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*.

[94]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 144.

[95]The attack was intended as revenge for the Israeli killing of the operative's friend, a leader in PIJ. As such, it is sometimes referred to as a joint operation. See Jeroen Gunning, "Hamas: Socialization and the Logic of Compromise," in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 131.

[96]Global Terrorism Database.

[97]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 147.

[98]Fatah militias conducted twenty attacks in 2004, compared to nineteen in 2003. RAND/MIPT data.

Central Committee's expressed preferences that it do so, was symptomatic of its poor control over its operatives.[99]

Despite Fatah's problems of control, violence by the group dropped off significantly following the PA-Israel truce agreed to at the February 2005 Sharm el-Sheik conference between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and newly elected PA president Mahmud Abbas. There were only five attacks by Fatah militias from February through June 2005, followed by a brief spate of rocket and shooting attacks in July and August as Israel pulled out of Gaza. None of these attacks took place inside the Green Line. It is unclear whether this pattern emerged because AMB could no longer carry out attacks inside Israel in the face of the newly constructed security barrier, or because Fatah was effectively restraining its operatives. One factor suggesting the latter is that while Fatah operatives had strong incentives to try to enhance local leaders' electoral prospects by attacking Israelis in the West Bank, there were few Fatah attacks outside the barrier.

Either way, our study of Fatah ends with Hamas' surprising victory in the January 2006 PLC elections which upended Palestinian politics. Importantly, a major contributing factor to Fatah's loss was that many of its local notables who failed to secure a place on the official Fatah list ran as independents.[100] In doing so, they split the secular vote in many districts between the official Fatah candidates and the Fatah-affiliated candidates. This split allowed Hamas to win a disproportionate number of the sixty-six seats allocated to multi-member districts.[101] Fatah, in other words, failed even to coordinate its politicians.

8.3 HAMAS

Hamas' history as a distinct organization is much shorter than Fatah's. The group emerged in 1987 as the coordinating body for a number of smaller organizations set up by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza. A few months into the First Intifada, Hamas broke with the Brothers' quietist traditions and began organizing attacks

[99]Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 286–287.
[100]Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 7.
[101]For succinct analyses of the Palestinian electoral system and its impact on the 2006 PLC election, see Jarrett Blanc, *Palestinian Election Analysis: How Hamas Won the Majority*, Report (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2006) *http://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=How%20Hamas%20Won%20the%20Majority; and http://www.fairvote.org/media/pep/Palestine.pdf.

against Israeli settlers and military forces. Two facts about Hamas' history during the First Intifada stand out for our purposes. First, hierarchy was at times used as a solution to the group's security problems. When Hamas' precursor organizations had problems with informers, they created an internal security apparatus. Second, the group reoriented its structure in response to security challenges. When the group came under strong Israeli pressure in late 1992, it severed horizontal links between operatives in the territories, replacing them with vertical links to commanders on the outside. This was not a costless move, as the preference divergence between Hamas' inside and outside leaders began with this change as security concerns forced the insiders to become increasingly divorced from the military side of the struggle. What the move demonstrates though is an organization dealing rationally with the security-control tradeoff.

With the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, Hamas entered a long period during which it had to carefully calibrate its use of violence, conducting just enough attacks to disrupt the peace process without bringing the full weight of the PA security services down upon itself. Hamas spent much of its energy during the Oslo years building up the social services infrastructure that would pay great electoral dividends later on. With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Hamas was freed from the need to avoid provoking a crushing response from the PA, but found itself facing renewed competition for its role as the leading rejectionist organization. Hamas' history from 1993 on highlights two facts. First, the group continually modulated its use of violence in response to changing political conditions. Second, Hamas' leaders in exile almost always sought higher levels of violence than its leaders in the Territories. So, while the inside political leaders often had problems controlling the violence, it was not because their agents would not follow direction. Instead, their agents were reporting to a different set of principals, the outside leaders, to whom the agents listened quite well.

8.3.1 The Brothers Turn to Violence: 1987–1993

Hamas' origins can be traced back to Sheik Ahmed Yassin's Islamic Center (*al-Mujamma' al-islami*), which became the leading mainstream Muslim Brother (MB) organization in Gaza shortly after it was founded in 1973.[102] During the first half of the 1980s, Yassin's organization became

[102]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 20–21. The Muslim Brothers are a transnational Sunni Islamist movement with branches in most Arab states.

increasingly involved in political competition with the mainstream nationalist movement.[103] Though their Islamist rivals in PIJ began pushing for immediate violent jihad against Israeli as early as 1980, Yassin's group continued to focus on the traditional MB goal of establishing a more Islamic society through social work and ideological outreach throughout the mid-1980s.[104] Elements of the group affiliated with Yassin did form small militant cells and began collecting weapons, but this was not a coordinated activity at first and the group's violence remained focused on Palestinian collaborators.[105] The effort to procure weapons was quickly compromised by Israeli agents. After Yassin was released from a short prison term, he sought to prevent such problems in the future by establishing a security apparatus to collect information on Palestinians collaborating with Israeli intelligence.[106]

For a few months after the start of the Intifada, the *Mujamma'* leaders tried to remain focused on their "... campaign for proper Muslim social behavior."[107] Despite this quietist impulse, Yassin and his fellow leaders soon felt they had to give up their nonviolent posture in the face of pressure from young militants to get involved.[108] The alternative was to lose political ground to the PLO and PIJ. Adopting a "jihad now" policy was seen as a matter of organizational survival, even though the group's leaders felt that getting involved in violence was a risky

[103]In 1983, for example, the Brothers took over both the management of the Islamic University in Gaza and control over the student union. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 23–24.

[104]Ahmad Rashad, *Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue*, 2, Occasional Paper Series (United Association for Studies and Research 1993), 4–5. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 32–34.

[105]Reuven Paz, "The Development of Palestinian Islamic Groups," in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), 27. Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 31. Chehab is a Palestinian refugee who has personal relationships with many senior members of Fatah and Hamas. His reporting on Hamas is much more detailed than most, and while he puts a positive spin on Hamas's actions whenever possible, that spin is no more egregious than the negative spin one finds in Levitt's account. Mishal and Sela provide the least biased discussion of Hamas.

[106]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 34. Others place the formation of Hamas' security wing later, in 1987. See Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 11.

[107]Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," 215.

[108]More recent accounts typically report that Hamas moved quite readily into violent confrontation during the First Intifada. This is likely due to hindsight bias on the part of Hamas leaders who are now quite committed to violence. When interviewed and asked to look back on the group's early period, they naturally tend to exaggerate how quickly their organization adopted militancy.

proposition given their lack of experience at underground militancy.[109] By February 1988, the *Mujamma'* had transitioned into Hamas, a highly centralized organization where Yassin directly managed propaganda and the distribution of funds, but gave his aides considerable freedom in the operational and organizational management of the group's geographically defined sectors in Gaza and the West Bank.[110]

There are two important patterns to Hamas' activity during the early months of the Intifada. First, the group strategically moderated its rhetoric in response to the political environment. As a much smaller organization, Hamas usually avoided openly challenging the PLO-dominated UNL, even on small issues such as what day of the month to hold strikes.[111] Hamas's rhetoric also responded to changes in popular preferences, focusing increasingly on violent confrontation and civil disobedience as these tactics become more popular. Discussions of economic disengagement with Israel disappeared from Hamas' leaflets as it became clear that disengagement was unpopular with the average Palestinian and would severely damage the Palestinian economy.[112]

Second, Hamas adjusted its organization in response to Israeli pressure. Israel began paying more attention to Hamas after the group published its charter in August 1988, and the rate at which Hamas activists were being arrested began to increase in September 1988. In May 1989, Yassin and a number of other key leaders were arrested. Hamas responded by tightening horizontal compartmentation in the Territories and turning to vertical hierarchy between local activists and headquarters abroad.[113] Musa Mohammed Abu Marzuq took over as Hamas' leader and directed a top-to-bottom reorganization, dividing the West Bank and Gaza into smaller geographical regions—seven and five respectively—each of which had four functional divisions whose leaders together formed the subdistrict command.[114] The West Bank and Gaza were linked by a coordinating committee, which had three subcommittees: political, military, and da'wa

[109]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 35. Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 32.
[110]Anat Kurz and Nahman Tal, *Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle* (Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1997), 16–17. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 55. One earlier account places the formation of Hamas in August 1988. See Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," 215.
[111]Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005* 114–115.
[112]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 61–63.
[113]Ibid., 56–57.
[114]Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*, 122.

(outreach/social services).[115] According to Israeli interrogation reports, the new subdistricts recruited through existing social ties by directing new members to bring in their trusted acquaintances.[116] These changes started the transfer of authority over military matters to leaders outside of the territories by giving them more control over the organization's operational ranks and also marked the beginning of the tension between the Hamas' political authorities in the territories and the group's military leaders in exile.[117] When another wave of Israeli arrests in early 1991 devastated the organization that had been rebuilt after the 1989 arrests, Hamas completed the process of moving the administration of military matters abroad, where the Israeli authorities had a much harder time monitoring and attacking operatives.[118]

Hamas' ability to influence events waned as the Intifada wore on and the economic recession caused by the PLO's support for Iraq deepened. The group's call for a general strike on December 18, 1990, was followed in the West Bank but not in Gaza, where the group had historically been more influential.[119] As informal negotiations over the U.S.–USSR peace initiative began to make headlines, Hamas intensified its military activity against Israel in the Occupied Territories in an attempt both to rejuvenate its support and to scuttle the incipient peace talks.[120] Hamas' efforts failed on both accounts, and as the Madrid peace talks moved forward and then transferred to Washington, Hamas continued to step up its military activity.[121] Much of the increased violence during this period that is often credited to Hamas was not in fact directed by the group. Rather, from 1991 on, it was activists operating outside the Hamas hierarchy claiming the mantle of Hamas' military wing, the "battalions of 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam," more commonly known as the Qassam Brigades.[122] Given their evident popularity, Hamas readily claimed many of these actions.

By the spring of 1993, Hamas' organization had stabilized and analysts began to identify four characteristics that would remain unchanged as the Oslo process developed. First, Hamas was divided at the leadership

[115]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 58–59.
[116]Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 75–76.
[117]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 153–154, 161.
[118]Aviad Guy, *Leksikon Hamas* (Tel Aviv: Tsahal, Hotsaat "Ma'arakhot": Misrad ha-bitahon, 2008), 22–23.
[119]Kurz and Tal, *Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle*, 18–19.
[120]Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 118.
[121]Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), 244. Ricolfi "Palestinians, 1981–2003," 91.
[122]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 64–65.

level. Most of the group's leaders in exile fell into the absolutist camp whose members genuinely believed the entire historical land of Palestine had to be liberated through violence. The more pragmatic inside leaders saw the acceptance of a political settlement in the short run, which they argued could be generations long, as being complementary to Hamas' long-term goals.[123] That the outside leaders ran military operations helps explain why Hamas' pacific overtures were so often accompanied by violent attacks. Second, Hamas was more disciplined than its secular rivals, or at least Palestinians saw Hamas' cells as being more professional than the Fatah militias.[124] Third, Hamas effectively controlled its members without much direct communication. The Hamas leadership provided very clearly articulated directives for all its functional divisions. As a result, the Qassam Brigades could adhere effectively to the leadership's policies even though they operated with a great deal of tactical independence.[125] Fourth, Hamas understood the counterproductive potential of terrorism. At a 1993 Hamas meeting in Philadelphia, the FBI taped senior operatives arguing that, since they had so much support activity—fund-raising and the like—going on in the United States, it was best not to "... cause troubles in the American theater."[126] This last characteristic, a keen sense for when to strike and when to lay low, would prove crucial to Hamas' survival during the Oslo years.

8.3.2 Controlled Aggression: 1994–2000

The September 1993 Oslo Accords and subsequent Declaration of Principles presented Hamas with an existential problem. The group had to find a way to keep up the violent struggle that defined it without either losing popular support if its actions were seen as slowing Israeli withdrawal or getting into an open confrontation with the vastly larger PA security services.[127] During the seven years between Oslo and the

[123]Mishal, "How Hamas Thinks," 92, 97. On Sheik Yassin's pragmatism see Wendy Kristiansen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 3 (1999): 22, and Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 111–112.

[124]Rashad, *Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue*, 18.

[125]Units typically informed the Hamas leadership of their plans only immediately before or after an operation. Ibid., i, 9–10.

[126]Cited by Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 214.

[127]Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 149. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 67–69.

Second Intifada, Hamas' activities were marked by two familiar patterns. First, the group effectively modulated its use of violence to serve political goals.[128] Second, the inside-outside divide among Hamas' leaders created continued problems controlling violence from the perspective of the inside leaders.

Hamas conducted no major attacks during the first few months after Oslo when support for the peace process was at its highest among Palestinians.[129] Although the group had some problems restraining young activists who had been reared on the notion of armed struggle, Hamas appeared to be moving back toward a focus on social change and the Islamization of society as a necessary precursor to violent struggle. The February 1994 attack on Palestinian worshippers in Hebron fatally undermined this emerging moderation.[130] After careful deliberation, the group's leaders decided to conduct several suicide attacks to avenge Hebron. Responsibility for conducting the attacks was given to a cell run by Yehiya Ayyash, commonly known as "The Engineer." Ayyash manufactured the explosive belts for the operation and used the non-military parts of Hamas to identify potential bombers, who were then vetted by the group's internal security branch.[131] On April 6 and April 13, a little more than a month after the Hebron attack, Hamas conducted its first suicide attacks in Afula and Hadera, Israel, killing thirteen and injuring eighty-five more.

In the wake of the intense reaction to these bombings, the head of Hamas' Political Bureau, Musa Abu Marzuq, identified three major problems Oslo created for Hamas: (1) the threat to Hamas' presence in Jordan from joint Israeli and American pressure; (2) the growing negative perceptions of Hamas internationally as a terrorist movement targeting civilians; and (3) the criticism from Palestinians that it offered no positive alternative to the peace process.[132] While Hamas' leaders clearly recognized that preventing these problems from becoming fatal to the group required modulating their use of violence, and while they agreed

[128]One common reading of this period is that Hamas successfully derailed the Oslo Accords by giving hawkish Israeli politicians an excuse not to follow through on their commitments, thereby setting the stage for the next Intifada. There is surprisingly little evidence that Hamas' leaders actually defined their goals as derailing the peace process. Instead, they seem to have been more focused on maximizing their position within Palestinian politics while staying reasonably faithful to their founding ideology.
[129]RAND/MIPT data. The GTD does not cover 1993.
[130]Kristiansen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo," 22–23.
[131]The process is described in some detail in Samuel M. Katz, *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber* (New York: Fromm International, 1999), 101–103.
[132]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 96.

on a set of core principles for how to use violence, they did not agree on how much violence was appropriate.[133] Hamas' Gaza-based leaders were more conservative about attacking Israel than outside leaders like Marzuq—then based in Jordan—because they had to live with the consequences of PA repression.[134] One sign of the different environments the two leadership camps faced is that Hamas' inside leaders were much more circumspect in their criticism of the PA during the 1990s.[135] The outsiders prevailed in the mid-1994 debates about the level of attacks, and attacks continued at a steady clip for the next year.

In mid-1995, several factors came together to push Hamas into a more quiescent stage. First, Jordan cracked down on the group's activities as part of its May 1995 peace agreement with Israel, expelling Abu Marzuq and other leaders who had been operating from Amman.[136] These expulsions reinforced the fact that Hamas depended on the tolerance of Israel's neighbors for its outside leaders to operate.[137] Second, Hamas suicide attacks inside Israel in July and August generated a great deal of resentment and disapproval among the majority of Palestinians, who saw the attacks as an attempt to derail ongoing negotiations over further Israeli withdrawals.[138] This reaction made it clear to the leadership that additional suicide attacks would not be supported by Palestinians and would hurt the group's standing in the Territories.[139] Third, the signing of the Taba Accords in September 1995 prompted Hamas' leaders inside the territories to halt all attacks to avoid interrupting the Israeli withdrawal

[133]These five core principles were: (1) not to attack Israeli targets abroad, only within the pre-1948 boundaries of Palestine; (2) to attack only "legitimate military targets," the definition of which lost all substantive meaning as the conflict went on; (3) to tie attacks to specific Israeli actions whenever possible; (4) to modulate violence depending on the political situation; and (5) to continually assert its right to armed resistance. See summary from a researcher sympathetic to Hamas in Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, 245–250.

[134]Kristiansen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo," 26.

[135]Once when Yassin was challenged about why he did not more aggressively condemn Arafat for agreeing to the Oslo Accords, he reportedly responded that "If you say such a thing in Gaza a war would start tomorrow. Followers of Arafat and Fatah would fight followers of Hamas ...". Cited by Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 109.

[136]Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*, 123.

[137]In theoretical terms, the Jordanian reaction revealed political changes that effectively increased the value of discrimination in the use of violence.

[138]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 33–34.

[139]Ariel Merari, "Social, Organizational, and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005) 80.

from more Palestinian cities.[140] From August through December, Hamas conducted no major operations.

Hamas' internal debate over the reaction to the Taba Accords was short-circuited by events in January 1996, when Israel assassinated Yehiya Ayyash, Hamas' most prominent militant and an immensely popular symbol of resistance to Israel.[141] The political pressure to respond was clear, but there was significant debate within Hamas over how best to do so. Hamas' West Bank and Gaza leaders wanted to stick to the undeclared truce with Israel and follow a wait-and-see policy. They feared that a bombing campaign would invoke a disproportionate Israeli response for which Hamas would be blamed, destroying their political prospects. The outside leaders opposed restraint because they thought it would embolden Israel and signal weakness, thereby compromising Hamas in the eyes of its supporters.[142] Notice that both sides in this debate were deeply concerned with achieving the right level of violence to serve political goals, but differed on how to define those goals. The inside leaders were focused primarily on the group's standing among Palestinians. The outside leaders cared about this, but were also concerned with using violence to maintain the group's reputation with Israeli officials.

In the end, the outside leaders again decided how violence would be used and ordered Muhammad Daif, the Qassam commander in Gaza, to conduct the attacks. Daif assigned Hasan Salama, a senior West Bank Qassam operative, to train and recruit the bombers while he coordinated the necessary logistical support.[143] Salama's operatives conducted four major attacks, including two attacks on one bus route in Jerusalem on February 25 and March 3 which together killed forty-five civilians and injured fifty-five more. The attacks precipitated a major Israeli crackdown and, as the inside leaders predicted, greatly damaged Hamas' standing among Palestinians.[144] Afterward, the disagreements over the response to Ayyash's assassination became public when a March statement issued in the name of "Izzedin al-Qassam" ordered Qassam units in Gaza and the West Bank to "immediately and absolutely obey central decision

[140]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 73.
[141]Chehab suggests that Ayyash's successor, Mohammed Deif (sometimes Dayef), was chosen by the group's leaders for his competence as a manager, but gives no real details. See Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 62.
[142]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 36–38.
[143]Katz, *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*, 200. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 75–76.
[144]Support for the group in public opinion polls would not return to their January levels until December. See Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005*, 147.

taken by the Qassam leadership to halt martyrdom attacks against the Jews." It turns out that elements of the Gaza Qassam leadership had reached an agreement with the PA to halt attacks, but the Gaza political leadership wasn't in on the discussion and outside leaders opposed it, as did elements in the Qassam brigades.[145] This is one of the very few instances in which there is good evidence of disagreements within the Hamas military apparatus.

The wave of bombings to avenge Ayyash led directly to the election of hardline Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May. Hamas remained relatively inactive after Netanyahu's election, calculating that military escalation would give Netanyahu an excuse to demand further concessions from Arafat and future attacks would force Arafat to be more aggressive against the group as he faced a more demanding negotiating partner.[146]

In the spring of 1997, the inside and outside wings of the Hamas leadership reached something of a rapprochement, agreeing on two key points: first, there would be no conflict with the PA; and second, armed action should be retaliatory and directed at soldiers and settlers only.[147] Despite this agreement, Hamas conducted three suicide attacks in the spring and summer of 1997. Hamas officials tried to avoid blame after each attack, but it quickly became obvious that all three were conducted by a Qassam cell in PA-controlled Nablus.[148] Given the group's well-thought-out position that violence would be counterproductive in 1997, it's not clear whether these attacks reflected poor control over operational elements, a deliberate strategy to try to induce an excessive reaction by the hawkish Netanyahu government, or a decision by outside leaders to violate the terms of their agreement with the inside leaders.

From September 1997 on, Hamas shifted toward small arms and limited its attacks to the Territories. The shift to small arms reflected the increasing challenge of procuring explosives as PA-Israel cooperation improved.[149] The shift to attacks in the Territories reflected a reevaluation of the group's tactics as internal leaders' influence increased following the October 1997 release of Sheikh Yassin from Israeli prison.[150] The internal

[145]See Kristiansen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo," 29.
[146]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 40. With the benefit of hindsight, many analysts have regarded Netanyahu's election as a desirable outcome for Hamas in that it helped derail the Oslo process, but there is little evidence Hamas' leaders saw it that way at the time.
[147]Kristiansen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo," 30.
[148]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 78.
[149]Reuven Paz, *Hamas Analyzes Its Terrorist Activity*, Technical Report (International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT), 1999).
[150]Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*, 122.

leaders' influence was further enhanced by the election of Ehud Barak's centrist Israeli government in the summer of 1999. With Barak in place, the peace process began to regain momentum. As support for the process increased in the PA and as Jordan cracked down on Hamas, the main focus of Hamas' leaders shifted to figuring out how to maintain their political and financial position in the anticipated post-Oslo world.[151] When Jordan issued a decree in November 1999 banning all Hamas activities, Hamas' leaders in the Territories did little to protest the move. This reflected the fact that the new Jordanian policy gave Yassin and the other inside leaders more freedom from the external leadership.[152] Moving into 2000, the internal leadership was ascendant and Hamas appeared to be shifting back toward a focus on social service and political competition within the PA.

8.3.3 An Islamist Alternative: 2000–2005

The Second Intifada caught Hamas by surprise and it took the group some time to respond. Once again, we can discern several clear patterns in Hamas' behavior. First, the group continued to be quite sensitive to the message sent by its violent activities. Second, one particularly prominent failure to control its agents proved devastating to Hamas, at least in the short term.

Hamas did not conduct its first significant attack against Israeli civilians during the Second Intifada until mid-February, four months after Fatah militants began directly attacking Israelis.[153] As Hamas' suicide bombing campaign ramped up in the spring and summer of 2001, Israel began again targeting Hamas' leaders in the territories, prompting a self-reinforcing cycle as Hamas sought to avenge its losses.[154] Hamas' dramatic tactics helped it quickly overtake Fatah in the Palestinian imagination. By July 2001 the net impact of the Intifada was a decline in support for Fatah, an increase in support for Hamas, and a large increase in the proportion

[151]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 41.
[152]Paz, *Hamas Analyzes Its Terrorist Activity.*
[153]GTD data. NSSC data.
[154]Israeli assassinations tend to yield a net increase in terrorism in the short term, while arrests yield a net decrease. This is likely because assassinations create a rally-around-the-flag effect. See Edward H. Kaplan, et al., "What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28 (2005): 225–235.

of the Palestinian population supporting violence.[155] During this period, Palestinian journalists reported that Hamas leaders exercised control over target choices as local decisions were referred to higher levels for approval before being implemented.[156]

While the group's heavy use of suicide bombings was clearly helping Hamas win the political battle with Fatah, the September 11 attacks in the United States temporarily changed the political dynamics of such terrorism. To avoid being tarred as an al-Qa'ida-esque organization, Hamas abruptly stopped the wave of suicide attacks and Sheik Yassin told reporters that "We are not ready to move our struggle outside the occupied Palestinian land. We are not prepared to open international fronts, however much we criticize the unfair American position."[157] Despite continued Israeli assassinations, which had always motivated a prompt retaliatory bombing during the previous nine months, Hamas did not resume the campaign until December 2001.[158] This temporary pause reflected both a clear sensitivity to the political impact of different modes of attacks and the ability to exercise sufficient control over operatives that the group could respond to changing political incentives.[159]

Hamas' resumed suicide bombing campaign was soon overtaken by the massive wave of AMB attacks. From January through September 2002, AMB and Tanzim together conducted fifty-six attacks while Hamas carried out only twenty-seven.[160] The disparity on suicide attacks was even more stark, with AMB attempting twenty-eight suicide attacks in nine months to Hamas' eleven.[161] Hamas did not respond with an escalation of its own. Instead, the group kept up essentially the same rate of attacks

[155]The period also saw a huge decrease in Palestinians' perception of PA performance. The percentage seeing the PA as corrupt rose from 49 percent to 83 percent from July 2000 to July 2001. During the same period, the percentage of Palestinians thinking violence could achieve concessions that negotiations could not went from less than 33 percent in July 2000, to 59 percent in July 2001, to 71 percent in September 2001. See Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2002): 92–93.

[156]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 70, 75.

[157]Beth Gardiner, *Associated Press*, September 11, 2001.

[158]The NSSC data report two failed Hamas attempts in November. This discrepancy highlights the inferential pitfalls of analyzing the politics behind patterns of attacks using data that only include successful attacks.

[159]Gunning, "Hamas: Socialization and the Logic of Compromise," 147. Interestingly, PIJ, which had expressed little interest in political participation, and therefore was less sensitive to being labeled as irretrievably extremist, did not slow down its suicide bombing campaign in the weeks and months after September 11. NSSC data.

[160]RAND/MIPT data.

[161]NSSC data.

until the June 2003 ceasefire. Whether this was an intentional choice or the net result of a failed attempt to escalate is unclear.[162]

What is clear is that the August 19, 2003, suicide bombing attack of a bus in Jerusalem, which killed eighteen people and broke the ceasefire, was not approved by Hamas' leaders.[163] The attack was a short-term disaster for Hamas. Israel immediately announced a plan to target all of Hamas' leaders, including political figures who had previously been considered off-limits. The PA cracked down and seized Hamas' bank accounts in the territories.[164] Breaking the ceasefire also triggered the international condemnation Hamas had feared since September 11. The European Union added Hamas to its list of terrorist organizations in September and stopped making a distinction between the group's political and military wings.[165] That distinction had been vital to Hamas' efforts to raise funds through Europe-based charities, a critical source of income for the group.

Under increased pressure on all sides in 2004, Hamas slowed but did not stop its bombing campaign. Throughout 2004, the group focused on broad-based consultation over most major decisions to build internal unity. The leadership also put off any decisions, such as reconsidering the group's strategic posture, that could lead to deep internal disagreements.[166] In October 2004, senior Hamas leaders in Gaza reportedly circulated a memo suggesting that the group should give up its secret underground apparatus. The plan was rejected by other leaders in Gaza and by the political leadership outside the territories. Still, by 2005 there were strong trends in Hamas arguing for ceasefire.[167] After a brief surge in Hamas attacks in December 2004 and January 2005, the group remained relatively quiet for much of 2005. Hamas, like Fatah, briefly ramped up attacks in July as Israel prepared to pull out of Gaza, before essentially stopping attacks as it focused on preparations for the January 2006 PLC elections.[168] As

[162]It is possible, for example, that following Hamas's March 2002 attack on a Passover Seder, the single largest terrorist attack of the Second Intifada, the group came under greater security pressure and so the opportunities for attacks by the two groups were a bit different.

[163]Gunning, "Hamas: Socialization and the Logic of Compromise," 131.

[164]Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, 145.

[165]Gunning, "Hamas: Socialization and the Logic of Compromise," 146. The United States and Israel had been pushing the EU to do so for many years.

[166]Shaul Mishal, "Hamas: The Agony of Victory," *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 1 (2006): 9.

[167]Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 242.

[168]GTD data. Some analysts suggest the lull in Hamas and Fatah violence after Arafat's death was due more to aggressive Israeli counterterrorism than to Palestinian choices. Hillel Frisch, "Motivation or capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 5 (2006): 843–869.

we saw in our discussion of Fatah, Hamas won a plurality in the 2006 PLC elections largely because it exercised better party discipline, running multiple candidates only in the larger multi-member districts.

8.4 CONTROL IN FATAH AND HAMAS

Throughout their histories, both Fatah and Hamas clearly struggled with the challenge of exercising control over their operatives, and both suffered from significant preference divergence in terms of how to use violence. For Fatah, this divergence was between senior leaders and local operatives. For Hamas, it was between different camps in the leadership. To formally assess the organizational consequences of those differences it is useful to proceed in two steps. First, we will evaluate how comparable the groups were on factors other than preference divergence. Any differences we see in control provide reliable evidence about the impact of preference divergence on terrorist organizations only to the extent that their political programs led to the same amount of uncertainty and values of discrimination, and insofar as they faced similar levels of government pressure. Second, we will look at the differences between the groups more formally by examining leadership control over the same six areas that we used in the Northern Ireland study: target choices; operational procedures; personnel assignments; resources; fund-raising, and recruiting.

8.4.1 How Comparable Are They?

The first thing to note in comparing Fatah to Hamas is that their political programs had similar implications regarding uncertainty and discrimination. Both groups' programs were quite pragmatic throughout the period under study. Although it led to the loss of some more extreme members, Fatah shifted to an acceptance of negotiations once the Israeli invasion of Lebanon made it clear that a military solution was untenable. While many analysts make much of Hamas' irredeemable militancy, the organization's rhetoric proved just as flexible as that of Fatah. Throughout its history Hamas has demonstrated a distinct pragmatism in defining its stated policy goals and officially accepted modes of action.[169] Several

[169]Hamas was also quite flexible in the language it used. For example, the group's discussion of Judaism became much more moderate over time, shifting from its early

clear examples of this pragmatism include: Yassin's April 1989 statement expressing a willingness to enter negotiations with Israel under certain conditions; Hamas' decision in 1993 to encourage its members to join the PA on a personal basis; Yassin's offer of a conditional truce after his release from Israeli detention in September 1997; and the group's explicit argument that the duty of jihad is limited to the territory of occupied Palestine. This last restriction allows attacks in Israel proper, but precludes attacks on Israelis and their allies overseas.[170]

Hamas' rhetoric about peace with Israel has also been fairly close to Fatah's over time. Hamas maintained a clear distinction between the "Historic Solution"—which involved a single state over all of Israel and the Territories—and the "Interim Solution" which could involve a generations-long truce with Israel.[171] This distinction is quite similar to the one Arafat and other Fatah leaders made between the short-term and long-term consequences of participating in Oslo.[172] Indeed, Arafat's frequently noted tendency to discuss Oslo as a temporary stopping point when speaking to Arab audiences, and Fatah's continued preparation for violence during the Oslo years, are often taken as evidence that Oslo was little more than a tactical truce for Fatah.[173] In this reading, the key difference between Fatah and Hamas was not the content of their political programs but the honesty with which Hamas discussed its long-term aims.

With respect to uncertainty and discrimination, both political programs contained strong incentives to control violence within certain bounds during the 1990s, and it is not clear that they implied different levels of uncertainty or different levels of discrimination during the two Intifadas. Indeed, in some ways the four main Palestinian militant groups—Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, PIJ—were all motivated more by the competition for political support among Palestinians from 2000–2005 than by the groups' very different views of how to resolve the conflict with Israel. As a result, these groups almost certainly varied less on the dimensions of discrimination and uncertainty during the Second Intifada than one would think given a superficial reading of their vastly different political programs.

Despite the commonalities during the Intifadas, there were some key differences in the reasons why the groups needed to be discriminate during

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discussion of Jews as the religiously defined enemy to a focus on Zionism and the Israeli state as the problem. Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, 49–51.

[170]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 14–15. Mishal, "How Hamas Thinks," 98.

[171]Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, 69–84.

[172]Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*, 192–199.

[173]See for example Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Secular Terrorism* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003), 4.

the period between the Intifadas. The prospect that Hamas operatives might follow their rejectionist ideology to its logical conclusion—that the PA was illegitimate and should be fought—presented an existential threat to the group during the Oslo period. Direct confrontation with the PLO would have been disastrous for Hamas' social and communitarian institutions, hence Hamas repeatedly warned its activists against intra-Palestinian violence and shifted its rhetoric so that avoiding conflict among Palestinians became more central to the group's ideology.[174] Likewise, the prospect of its operatives serving in the PA security apparatus conducting attacks on Israel presented a potentially massive threat to Fatah.

Between the two Intifadas, Fatah faced less security pressure than Hamas. It is much harder to say whether the groups faced different levels of counterterrorism during the Intifadas. From 1987 through 1992, both groups' militants were arrested in large numbers. If anything, Hamas faced less security pressure because the group was less well known and its outside leaders did not face the same threat of Israeli assassination at that time.[175] During the Second Intifada, the groups again encountered similar levels of security pressure. Leaders of both groups were largely free from PA pressure. Senior leaders in Fatah lived in the Territories and therefore faced a higher level of Israeli pressure than Hamas' outside leaders. Mid-level leaders in both groups suffered Israeli arrests and assassinations. Hamas' mid-level leaders and operatives faced occasional pressure from the PA, but more often needed only fear Israeli forces. Overall, the groups appear to have faced similar levels of pressure during both periods.

While Fatah and Hamas are roughly comparable on three of the four independent variables, Fatah faced much greater levels of preference divergence for two reasons. First, Fatah had to integrate two very disparate groups of fighters: those who grew up under the Israeli occupation and those who returned with Arafat in 1994 to lead the PA security apparatus. Second, Fatah recruited from a much more diverse pool during the 1990s. Early in its history, Hamas grew by recruiting for the Qassam Brigades from within the Muslim Brotherhood, later shifting to recruiting from among those taking advantage of the group's youth centers and other social services.[176] This means that most of Hamas' pool of potential

[174]Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 150.
[175]See, for example, Israel's assassination of Fatah's West Bank leader Khalil al-Wazir in Tunis in April 1988. Hamas leaders did face some risk of retaliation—Sheikh Yassin was released in 1997 because of a failed Israeli attempt to kill Khaled Meshal in Amman—but the level of threat was surely lower than for Fatah leaders in the West Bank.
[176]Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 52.

recruits had already made a conscious choice to accept the group's ideology and had done so for little in the way of pecuniary compensation. By comparison, being a Fatah fighter was a well-paid position for Palestinians in exile. When the group returned as the head of the PA, positions in the security services became a major form of patronage. Thus, entering the pool of potential recruits for Fatah required no ideological commitment; it required only that one wanted a job. As a result, Fatah's recruiting pool was never very homogenous.

8.4.2 Relative Levels of Control

With these patterns in mind it should be no surprise that Fatah had few problems controlling its operatives during the period between the Intifadas. This is entirely consistent with what we have learned so far. Control is easy for groups that face no real security constraint. Communicating with agents is costless, and their ability to threaten the leadership is drastically curtailed. To the extent there was unauthorized violence during that period, it was all intra-Palestinian feuding, the vast majority of which was internal feuding in Fatah.

Turning to the prediction that Hamas would exercise more control than Fatah, H_1, we can measure control in each group as we did in the Northern Ireland case by looking at the same six areas of organizational activity: (1) target choices; (2) operational procedures; (3) personnel assignments; (4) resource allocation; (5) fund-raising methods; and (6) recruiting practices. The number of areas controlled by the political and ideological leadership provides an ordinal scale of control, such that a group in which five of these six areas are centrally controlled can be said to exhibit a higher level of control than a group in which only three of the six are controlled. Disciplining the analysis this way is useful, as it clarifies just how control in Hamas is different from that in Fatah.

When we look at control in this way, only three of six areas were centrally controlled for Fatah: fund-raising, personnel, and resource allocation. The evidence for central control over fund-raising is particularly clear. During the First Intifada, Fatah's leaders controlled both PLO taxes on diaspora communities and the flow of funds from other Arab states. During the Oslo period, Fatah's leaders likewise controlled the PA budget. While many Fatah leaders were able to generate a great deal of income by taking advantage of their positions in the PA, there is little evidence that these resources went to militant activities. Fatah's leaders lost control over fund-raising only during the Second Intifada when Tanzim and AMB units

began funding themselves through a combination of criminal activity and by seeking out wealthy rejectionists outside the Territories.[177]

Fatah's leaders appeared to control personnel movements as well, at least at the senior levels. Almost all accounts agree that Arafat directly selected the group's top leaders.[178] Certainly Barghouti's decision to step aside in favor of Mahmud Abbas during the election to replace Arafat suggests that he remained loyal to Fatah despite his reluctance to rein in Tanzim in 2001 and 2002. While there is little evidence that the main leaders controlled personnel movements in the lower ranks, that is hardly surprising in a group as large as Fatah.

When analyzing the level of central control over resources in Fatah, it is important not to conflate corruption with a lack of control. By almost all accounts Fatah was notoriously corrupt long before it took over the PA.[179] Throughout the 1990s, Fatah remained corrupt from the perspective of the people the PA claimed to serve.[180] Stories of aid money being diverted to senior Fatah officials are legion.[181] However, from the organization's point of view, much of this corruption appears to have functioned as an implicit salary. Moreover, documents captured when the Israelis took over part of his Ramallah compound in March 2002 suggest that Arafat exercised a good deal of control over resources, especially when it came to operational expenses such as buying weapons or making payments to fighters' families. According to a dossier of captured documents assembled by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, he micro-managed transactions worth mere hundreds of dollars.[182]

The evidence is also quite clear that control over tactics, operational procedures, and recruiting was poor in Fatah. The history given above shows unambiguously that Fatah leaders exercised little control over target choices when the group was under security pressure, especially during the

[177]On criminal activity see for example: Sayed Anwar, "Exiled Palestinian Militants Ran Two-Year Reign of Terror," *Washington Times*, May 13, 2002; and "A Bloody Vacuum—Palestine," *The Economist*, October 2, 2004.

[178]See for example Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*, 235.

[179]Adams, *The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It*, 103–104.

[180]J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 223.

[181]See: A. Chaplin, *Terror: The New Theater of War* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 92; and Steven Erlanger, "A Life of Unrest," *New York Times Magazine* (2007): 45.

[182]Dani Naveh, *The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel, Corruption and Crime*, Report (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).

Second Intifada.[183] For the remaining two areas—operational procedures and recruiting—there is simply no evidence of central control. Fatah's militias—the Fatah Hawks during the First Intifada and Tanzim and AMB during the Second—seemed quite free to organize themselves as needed and to recruit as they saw fit.

This poor control of operations in Fatah contrasts sharply with Hamas, in which there was a clear fight between factions of the leadership, but operatives clearly responded to directives from one faction at all times. As a general pattern, Hamas' inside leaders tended to have more control over the group's political and social activities, while the outside leadership generally determined how the military wing behaved. Each of Hamas' three wings has a different decision-making structure.[184] The charities are highly autonomous and answer to their Trustees, who elect an executive board every four years. The political body has regional councils, a national council, and a political bureau, all elected biennially and generally dominated by the inside leadership. Individual cells in the Qassam Brigades often have links to exile leaders which bypass both internal political leaders and Brigades' own hierarchy.[185] Taken together, this means that if the Hamas leadership agreed on a strategy for the use of violence, they would likely be able to implement it. Control over attacks, however, rests with a specific subgroup among Hamas's leaders and that group's preferences often differ from those of the group's other senior politicians. As a general rule, the outside leadership tended to favor higher levels of violence, not least because they did not have to suffer the immediate consequences.[186]

Despite these complications, we can make some clear comparisons to Fatah on control over target choices. Hamas steadfastly avoided engaging in violence on Jordanian territory, and until the late 1990s the group successfully avoided provoking a crackdown by the Jordanian state.[187] When Jordan evicted Abu Marzuq and other Hamas leaders in May 1995, many lower-profile Hamas operatives were allowed to remain. These operatives remained loyal to the group's leaders and continued to follow the prohibition against using Jordan as a staging ground. When Jordan finally kicked Hamas out in November 1999, the group quietly accepted

[183]For a thorough discussion of the early Fatah strategy and related command and control problems during the Second Intifada, see Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt."
[184]Gunning, "Hamas: Socialization and the Logic of Compromise," 133–134.
[185]One reason Israel's targeted killings have done so little to deter Hamas is that those who control the money for the Qassam Brigades, and influence their operations, reside outside of Israel, where they are hard to assassinate. Ibid., 142–143.
[186]Kurz and Tal, *Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle*, 41–42, 52.
[187]Muslih, *The Foreign Policy of Hamas*, 25.

the decision and moved to Syria. This quiescence contrasts sharply with Fatah's behavior in sanctuary states such as Lebanon. Fatah had constant trouble controlling operatives on the outside and faced a full-fledged rebellion in Lebanon after the senior leadership was forced to relocate.

Moreover, Hamas controlled the timing of attacks much more tightly than Fatah. The group's political leadership, or more accurately those who managed the Qassam Brigades, clearly had the authority to initiate or halt attacks as a matter of policy, even if they did not play a role in selecting specific targets.[188] The late founder of the Qassam Brigades, Salah Shehadah, reported in an online chat on the Qassam Brigades website that Hamas' military wing decides how to execute operations, but that "the vision of the political wing is what we follow at the military section, and the political decisions have authority over the military wing ..."[189] Shehadah also stated that the military wing recommends martyrs to the political leaders who make final decisions about who conducts suicide operations. Shehadah's statements mirror those of Israeli intelligence agents who suggest that "... there are no rogue operations, but cells do push the boundaries" in terms of how they carry out approved operations.[190]

Finally, internal policing in Hamas appears to have fallen under central control. According to evidence introduced during extradition hearings for Abu Marzuq, operatives in Gaza checked with the outside leadership before executing suspected collaborators.[191] Taken together, the evidence on attacks suggests that Hamas' leaders exercise control over target choices. Hamas' leaders also exercised control over operational procedures, though the control did not always extend as far down as they might have liked. During the First Intifada, leaders such as Sheikh Yassin and Abu Marzuq were clearly able to determine the general parameters of the organization. The clearest evidence of this is Marzuq's reorganization of Hamas following Yassin's 1989 arrest. Prior to this reorganization, militants received informal advice from senior political leaders on matters such as where to establish safe houses and when to relocate abroad, but did not always follow the advice.[192] After the reorganization, the lines

[188]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 63. The Human Rights Watch report is by far the best analysis of the command and control abilities of different Palestinian factions, but focuses less on divisions within Hamas's leadership than many other accounts.
[189]Cited by Ibid., 70.
[190]Cited by Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 216–217.
[191]Yehudit Barsky, "Focus on Hamas: Terror by Remote," *Middle East Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (1996).
[192]Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 47–49.

of authority became much clearer.[193] One area in which control over procedures reached down to the smallest detail was the handling of suicide bombers' families. Hamas had well-defined procedures for making sure that bombers' families were supportive of Hamas when they appeared in public.[194]

The evidence is also quite strong that Hamas' leaders controlled both fund-raising and resources through most of the period under study. During the 1990s, contributions were first transferred to the central leadership and then were sent back out to Hamas regional commanders, who distributed the money to operatives, prisoners, and the families of those killed by Israeli forces.[195] In contrast to Fatah, Hamas enjoys a reputation for financial probity. Allegations of corruption in Hamas are almost nonexistent. Moreover, there is no solid, publicly released evidence that Hamas has diverted money donated to social welfare organizations for military purposes.[196] That such diversions are so rare despite the obvious temptation to use charitable institutions as a cover for raising funds for militancy suggests Hamas' leaders have been able to effectively enforce a strategic decision to strictly separate social service provision from military activity. The lack of diversions is especially striking since the leaders of Hamas' charitable institutions clearly play a role in arranging the transfer of funds to militant units.[197]

On the recruiting front, Hamas' leaders dictated recruiting policies. Early on, they chose to recruit through existing social ties. Over time, the focus of Hamas recruiting shifted to finding recruits from the population taking advantage of Hamas' various community organizations. As the group moved into suicide bombings, senior leaders vetted potential bombers and chose from among the willing volunteers.

The evidence of control over personnel movements in Hamas is more ambiguous than for other areas of control. A number of examples point directly to central control over personnel assignments in Hamas. Adnan al Ghoul was reportedly promoted to be the head of weaponry for the Qassam Brigades following Ayyash's assassination because of his skill in

[193]Although Israeli informers in the mid-1990s reported that Hamas members were quite indiscreet about operational matters, there is no evidence this was a result of poor control. There appears to have been no guidance from above on such issues. See Ibid., 74.
[194]Ibid., 96–97.
[195]Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 75–76, 159.
[196]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 102–103.
[197]The links are explored in great detail in Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*.

coordinating attacks.[198] In the mid-1990s, Jamal Tawil, Hamas military commander for Ramallah, was instructed by the Hamas propaganda bureau head in Syria, Abu Ahmad, to become the Hamas spokesman in Ramallah.[199] In some cases Hamas militants were reassigned to fund-raising duties by the central leadership.[200] However, unlike the Northern Ireland case, we do not have clear examples of political leaders deciding the path of succession after prominent leaders were removed by Israeli or PA action.

Table 8.1 summarizes the evidence on control in Fatah and Hamas. As in the Northern Ireland cases, areas where the evidence is ambiguous are coded as not being under central control. H_1 is clearly supported. There is strong evidence that Hamas exercised control over five of six areas, while Fatah leaders appear to have controlled only three of six areas.

Table 8.1. Control in Palestine: 1987–2005

	Fatah	Hamas
Target choices	No[1]	Yes[2]
Operational procedures	No	Yes
Personnel assignments	Yes	Maybe
Resources	Yes	Yes
Fund-raising	Yes[3]	Yes
Recruiting	No	Yes

[1] Fatah leaders did control strategy during the First Intifada.

[2] From the outside leaders' perspective.

[3] Fatah's leaders did not control fund-raising during the Second Intifada.

8.5 CONCLUSION

Comparing Hamas and Fatah is instructive on many levels in relation to two questions: what is the impact of preference divergence, and do religiously motivated groups have a particular organizational advantage? Looking at these two groups illustrates that the religious-nationalist

[198] Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, 64. Chehab uses the language of hierarchical promotion but gives few specifics.
[199] Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, 47.
[200] Ibid., 87–88.

organization, Hamas, had much lower levels of preference divergence which enabled it to better control operatives and more efficiently manage funds. Fatah, the larger, secular-nationalist organization, did exercise better control over operatives between the First and Second Intifada, but this fact is entirely consistent with an agency theory approach; during that period Fatah faced no meaningful security constraint.

Overall, the Palestine case provides strong support for the hypotheses about preference divergence and control. Examining specific cases of poor control in both Hamas and Fatah, such as the Hamas suicide bombing which ended the 2003 ceasefire, shows they were almost all caused by agents who sought different goals from their leaders. In that case, the bomber was seeking revenge for an Israeli attack that killed the operative's friend, a leader in PIJ, while his leaders were more interested in achieving overall political impact.

The Palestine case also provides evidence on the role of religion. Hamas largely grew out of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, a well-established, hierarchical group that provided a rich array of community services. That religious network enabled the organization to screen its potential operatives, thereby reducing preference difference and making it possible to maintain more control over its members. It was not the particular Islamic commitment of its members that made Hamas more efficient. That commitment did not stop them from carrying out unsanctioned attacks at times; rather, Hamas was more efficient because it faced an easier managerial challenge.

Ultimately, one of the most striking lessons from the Palestine case is how the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations can limit options for reaching a negotiated settlement. Whatever deals might have been made between the internal leadership of Hamas and the Israeli government (and there is a great deal of disagreement on whether any such deals were possible), the internal leadership could not have followed through on them because they did not control military operations. Similarly, by March 2002, Fatah's leaders recognized that the terrorist attacks by AMB militants had become so intense that Israel was likely to abandon the Oslo process and re-invade the West Bank. Those leaders were, by some accounts, trying to stop the terrorist campaign to avoid that Israeli response, but proved unable to do so as they had no viable threat over their operatives. In this case a terrorist organizations' apparent unwillingness to compromise stemmed from their internal agency problems, and not from a well-thought-out decision to continue attacks. That internal agency problems limit terrorist group behavior in such critical ways has a number of implications for government counterterrorism policies. The next chapter lays those out in more detail.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion and Recommendations

9.1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Throughout this book we have seen a wide variety of evidence that terrorist groups from the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries look strikingly familiar from an organizational perspective, whether they operate in Europe, the Middle East, or elsewhere. Most struggle to manage their people, and many employ the same set of standard managerial tools as any other organization, including expense reports, personnel tracking spreadsheets, and other paperwork that seems quite risky for ostensibly covert groups to hang onto. The very normality of the bureaucratic minutiae terrorists produce taps into a deeper reality: terrorist groups have the same strengths as other human organizations and suffer the same problems.[1] Once we take into account that they produce violent attacks against noncombatants instead of the widgets firms produce, and once we consider that their regulators (i.e., counterterrorist units) typically show up in the middle of the night with guns as opposed to politely requesting quarterly financial statements, the agency theory perspective presented in this book provides rich insights into why terrorist groups are organized the way they are and into how to effectively deal with them.

Chapter 1 argued that the key to understanding these groups is recognizing the terrorist's fundamental organizational dilemma; the things they must do to efficiently manage the use of organizational resources and precisely control the application of violence—establishing reporting standards, auditing expenses, setting up security bureaus, and the like—are all costly and create risks. The extent of those risks and the value of control vary across groups and over time, but the dilemma is persistent for all terrorist organizations, and throughout history.

[1] And sometimes they focus on mundane details that we wouldn't typically associate with terrorist groups. Take, for example, the regulations for an al-Qa'ida guest house in Afghanistan in the late 1990s stating that, "The guest can't exceed his visit for more than a day and a half unless a special permission from the dispatcher was submitted." Harmony, AFGP-2002-600148.

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the terrorist's dilemma is nearly inescapable. For a variety of reasons, political and ideological leaders, or the principals, must delegate certain duties—such as planning attacks, soliciting funds, and recruiting—to middlemen or low-level operatives, or their agents. This delegation poses no problem if all agents are perfectly committed to the cause at hand, agree with leaders on how best to serve the cause, and are privy to the same information as leaders about how different actions will advance the cause. Under such conditions, the preferences and beliefs of the principals and their agents will be perfectly aligned, and the agents will act just as the principals would like. This "perfect storm," however, rarely happens. Operatives' views of how to use violence almost always deviate somewhat from those of their leaders. When the preferences of leaders and agents are not completely aligned, the covert nature of terrorist groups necessarily implies that agents can take advantage of the situation to act as they prefer, rather than as their principals would like.

This basic agency problem leads to the two tradeoffs that have bedeviled terrorist organizations from *Narodnya Volya* in 1879 through al-Qa'ida today. The *security-control tradeoff* creates a dilemma when: preferences over tactics are not perfectly aligned, so that some agents want to attack different targets or want to conduct more or fewer attacks than their leaders;[2] principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents' tactical planning nor wield a threat of violence over them; and political goals are being placed at risk by the types of tactics operatives would employ if left to make their own decisions. All three conditions are necessary. If a group's political goals are not being put at risk, for example, then leaders have no reason to pay the security costs of exercising control.

The *security-efficiency tradeoff* creates a dilemma under similar conditions, when: agents aren't perfectly committed or want to spend money differently than leaders would like;[3] principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents' uses of money nor credibly punish them for observed infractions; and resources are constrained so that leaders will not just accept the financial inefficiencies created by agency problems. Once again, all three conditions are necessary for the joint condition. If a group's

[2]This can occur because operatives have different preferences over violence than leaders or because leaders and their operatives receive different information about the appropriate targets.

[3]Agents can have the exact same preferences as the leaders, but the leaders have a problem unless everyone below them is perfectly committed. No matter what their preferences are between spending on attacks and allocating resources to salaries or other private goods, leaders want every cent they pass down to be spent on achieving political impact. I thank Jim Fearon for pointing this out.

resources are unconstrained, for example, then it need not care about financial efficiency.

Chapter 2 also outlined why these agency problems are so pervasive in terrorist groups and offered an initial way of thinking about the impact of four variables: (1) the level of government security pressure; (2) the discrimination in the use of force demanded by a group's political goals; (3) the uncertainty operatives face about what attacks will serve the political goal; and (4) the amount of preference divergence within the group.

Chapter 3 assessed how the challenges of hierarchy and control have played out across a broad range of groups by presenting evidence drawn from 108 terrorist autobiographies. Collectively, these memoirs served several purposes. First, they offered rich details about what goes on inside terrorist groups and highlighted how even the most fanatical groups can appear quite normal in several ways. Because most terrorist groups do not leave a large documentary record of their politics, bureaucracy, and operations, individual accounts provide the only effective publicly available window into how these organizations operate day to day. Second, the memoirs offered a way to assess how widespread agency problems are among terrorist groups. Since the memoirs provide information on forty-five different terrorist groups operating from 1880 through to the first decade of the current century, the frequency with which specific indicators of agency problems show up in these accounts (e.g., how often the memoirs report substantial disagreements over tactics) provides a sense for these indicators' prevalence among terrorist groups. Agency problems appear in most of the memoirs, and security-reducing paperwork and hierarchy, that which we might term bureaucracy, was present in roughly one third of them. Because most former terrorists sitting down to write their history are naturally inclined to shy away from mentioning the bureaucratic challenges of being a terrorist, these accounts amount to strong evidence that the terrorist's dilemma constrains all but a few organizations.

Chapter 4 examined 109 internal documents regarding the financial and operational management of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to deepen our understanding of how bureaucratic tools are used. These documents provide rich insights into how one of the most prominent terrorist organizations of the last twenty years sought to solve its dilemmas. They showed us a group that clearly organized in ways that were, at least in part, intended to strike a balance between maintaining appropriate levels of control and avoiding excessive security breakdowns. Overall, what was most striking about the Sinjar documents was how ordinary they are. The organization charts, accounting spreadsheets, personnel forms, and internal correspondence justifying specific decisions constitute a familiar set of organizational tools. While they reveal certain tensions and tradeoffs specific to managing a terrorist organization, their form is completely mundane.

Chapter 5 built on the insights from the autobiographies and AQI documents by digging deeper into the strategic mechanisms behind the managerial dilemmas terrorists face. Managing terrorist groups involves handling two different kinds of agency problems. The first half of the chapter studied the familiar moral hazard problem that creates the tradeoff between security and financial efficiency. In the terrorist context, middlemen are often called on to manage funds for an attack or other organizational activities. But, as we have seen, these middlemen are not uniformly driven by accomplishing a mission. Many are driven, at least in part, by monetary rewards. Because the success or failure of any terrorist activity has a substantial random component, the scope for graft can be substantial. Bureaucratic tools can help limit that scope.

The second half of chapter 5 analyzed the security-control tradeoff that has troubled terrorist leaders from Lenin to Zarqawi. This tradeoff is a natural consequence of the three core problems of managing violent, covert groups. The first problem is that operational terrorists often have different preferences over targets than their leaders, perhaps because they define political impact differently or because operators are not maximizing political impact as the leadership understands it. By exercising greater control, leaders can mitigate the impact of this preference divergence, but doing so has a security cost. The second problem is that terrorist leaders often have different information about the relative political value of targets than the operatives themselves, either because they understand the group's motivating doctrine better or because they have more contact with people who are outside of the group. Of course, both types of problems can be present at the same time. When this occurs, leaders face a third problem, as conflicting interests over targets makes it harder to communicate about which targets should be hit and get operatives to obey.

By focusing on the conditions for a "normal" organizational outcome to occur in equilibrium—one in which leaders communicate about their preferred target and operatives hit it because the threat of being punished keeps them from doing otherwise—the discussion led to a set of expectations about about how control will vary across groups: (1) the greater the discrimination required by a group's political goals, the more control leaders will exert; (2) the more uncertainty there is about how specific targets or methods of attack will support political goals, the more control leaders will exert; and (3) greater preference divergence leads to less control. The model also provides intuition for why higher government security pressure reduces the incentives for leaders to exercise control over operations.

With those intuitions in hand, chapters 6 through 8 provided further evidence of how the terrorist's dilemma plays using a series of comparative case studies—one on leftist groups in pre-Revolutionary Russia, one on nationalist groups in Northern Ireland, and one comparing secular

and Islamist groups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The simple fact that so many of the patterns of terrorist organization described in the preceding chapters figured prominently in groups operating over such a broad period, and across such different conflicts, reinforces the notion that certain dilemmas are an inevitable part of managing terrorism. That fact also debunks the notion that today's terrorist threats are fundamentally different than those of the past. Managing terrorism requires certain basic functions which give rise to the same set of dilemmas, whether in nineteenth-century Russia, or in twenty-first century Iraq.

Chapter 6 focused on left-wing groups in pre-Revolutionary Russia. From a comparative perspective, there were clear differences between the main Russian terrorist organizations in the level of uncertainty over targets implied by their political doctrines, allowing us to examine uncertainty's impact in a relatively clean manner. Given their ideology, Anarchist operatives had a much easier time identifying good targets than did activists in the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries. Once the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party decided to engage in terrorism, they did so with a set of beliefs that made identifying targets easier than for the Socialist Revolutionary combatants, but not quite so easy as for the Anarchists. As an agency theory perspective predicts, Anarchist leaders exercised less control than Social Democratic leaders, who exercised less control than the Socialist Revolutionary leaders. Additionally, because the history of these groups is extremely well developed, several other important patterns emerged in the Russian case. Groups continually struggled to find the right balance between security and control and had constant problems with more militant members defecting to other organizations. Operatives in "combat detachments" often lost sight of their group's political goals and engaged in ill-directed attacks which damaged their organizations. Embezzlement was endemic among militant organizations, yet émigré leaders proved unable to contain the problem because they could not credibly punish their operatives in Russia. Finally, leaders in both *Narodnya Volya* (NV) and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Lenin's group) recognized the security-control tradeoff. Indeed, their inability to find a satisfactory solution to the tradeoff was a major argument marshaled against terrorism by those who opposed it in NV, by the Menshevik leaders, and even by the Bolshevik leaders prior to their decisions to adopt terrorism before late 1905.

Chapter 7 turned our attention to the conflict in Northern Ireland, almost certainly the best studied terrorist conflict of the twentieth century. This case also facilitated a neat comparison in terms of the discrimination demanded by different groups' political goals. In Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) political goals demanded much more discrimination than those of the Loyalist paramilitaries. Within the

Loyalist side, the Ulster Volunteer Force's (UVF) goals required it to be more cautious about using violence than the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). As expected, the PIRA exercised greater control than the UVF, which in turn exercised greater control than the UDA. The level of control within the PIRA also changed in the expected direction over time. As the demand for discrimination by the PIRA increased in the 1970s, so too did the level of control exercised by the group's leaders. A further key finding from the Northern Ireland case is that preference divergence restricted control by Nationalist and Loyalist leaders in two specific ways outlined in chapters 2 and 5. First, leaders refrained from issuing orders that were too far from their operatives' preferences because they knew such orders would not be obeyed. Second, control on the Loyalist side was constrained by leaders' inability to wield a sufficient threat over their operatives.

Chapter 8 studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in large part because any analysis of terrorist organizations in the twenty-first century must address whether there is something unique about how religiously motivated groups are organized. While documentary evidence from al-Qa'ida and AQI clearly suggests there is not, this third case study goes a step further by directly comparing a secular-nationalist organization, Fatah, with a religious-nationalist one, Hamas. In the Palestinian-Israel conflict, religious ideology had organizational consequences insofar as it afforded Hamas greater opportunities to screen its operatives, thereby reducing preference divergence. Given that, it is not surprising that its leaders exercised much tighter control than Fatah's leaders. From its founding in 1987 onward, Hamas' leaders effectively modulated the timing and intensity of attacks to respond to changing political conditions. During the First Intifada, Fatah had some success controlling its operatives' strategic choices by selectively funding different factions, but exercised little control at the tactical level. During the Second Intifada, Fatah proved unable to control its militias, or even its politicians for that matter. Those failures had devastating consequences for the group and ultimately led to Hamas' electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Importantly, Hamas was not more united because it was based on a religious ideology. To the contrary, the organization's leadership was frequently riven by deep divides over the utility of violent action.

9.2 EXPLOITING ORGANIZATIONAL VULNERABILITIES

While one of the principal goals of this book is to demystify terrorism by showing just how mundane it can be, this analysis also provides a

set of clear practical implications for how to take advantage of terrorists' organizational vulnerabilities. By their very nature, terrorist organizations face difficulties in almost any operational environment.[4] Maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specific political ends, and preventing local authorities from degrading the group's capabilities are all challenging tasks. As we have seen, accomplishing them is harder for terrorist groups than is commonly assumed because terrorists also face the problems of trust and control common to more mundane organizations such as business firms, political parties, and traditional insurgencies.

The starting point for thinking through how to take advantage of the terrorist's dilemma has to be that terrorist groups all seek to achieve political impact. Al-Qa'ida's goal from 1998 to 2001 was to compel the United States to remove its forces from Saudi Arabia and to stop supporting apostate Arab regimes such as the Saudi royal family.[5] The Red Brigades, Weathermen, and other leftist groups in the 1970s sought to provoke a political revolution that would reshape their societies in a more egalitarian mode. The Mau Mau sought to compel Britain to give Kenya its independence. With the possible exception of Aum Shinrikyo, it is hard to think of a truly nihilistic terrorist group. Even Bakunin's anarchists had a well-specified political program.

Achieving political goals requires terrorist groups to control violence, manage money, and avoid having all their members captured or killed. Yet all the tools that help to control violence and manage money increase the risks to their members. Terrorists thus face an inescapable dilemma. Government efforts to degrade groups' operational capacities should take advantage of that by using the following principles to guide counterterrorism efforts:

1. Take advantage of agency problems.
2. Drive terrorists into trading security for other values.
3. Use the terrorist's dilemma to guide policy tradeoffs.

While these principles may seem obvious by now, thinking them through reveals some specific approaches to fighting terrorism. Take the last point. Because terrorist groups can adapt their organizational methods in response to changes in the operational environment, the appropriate policy today depends on the end game policy makers have in mind. Increasing security pressure, for example, can lead groups to reduce control which may make ending the conflict harder. Even if the

[4]Elements of this section were written collaboratively in 2006 with Joe Felter for *Harmony and Disharmony*.
[5]Ayman al Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophets Banner*, 2001.

increased pressure makes terrorist leaders want to switch to a purely political strategy, they may not be able to force their operatives to go along with such a change if they are under too much pressure.

The remainder of this chapter makes those abstract principles concrete. Many of the policies discussed below contain inherent tradeoffs against other valued policy goals. Efforts to make terrorist communications more costly by intercepting electronic communications, for example, may not be compatible with long valued civil liberties in Western democracies. Dealing with those kinds of tradeoffs would require a separate book. For now, we should keep in mind that sometimes the counterterrorism policy maker too faces a dilemma, one that may have no easy answer, no matter how well we understand terrorist groups.

9.2.1 Take Advantage of Agency Problems

Government interventions that reduce operational control or efficiency within the terrorist organizations generate a corresponding reduction in the political impact they can achieve. The value of control is highlighted by captured al-Qa'ida documents, which show how concerned leaders were with documenting their members' commitments. An al-Qa'ida employment contract, for example, includes the obligation for new members to swear loyalty solely to al-Qa'ida with the requirement that members "have no dealings with any other Islamic group."[6] This requirement is repeated almost verbatim in a series of AQI documents captured five years later, in which operatives in Iraq pledge to "1- Refrain from disclosing any accurate information to anyone, under any circumstances," which makes perfect sense for a covert group; and also "2- Not to join any organization affiliated with al-Qaidah any where in the world," which seems a bit odd and perhaps reflects the fact that controlling operatives is harder if they feel like they can leave for another organization.[7]

The similarity between these documents is particularly telling given the different political goals of the groups. What is also telling is that AQI documents recording these kinds of pledges always include operatives' names and signatures, and often include fingerprints and pictures. The value of memorializing operatives' commitments to things like "1- Listen and obey all orders of the Emir during this trip for treatment" and "2- Adhere to all security regulations during this trip" was apparently

[6]Harmony, AFGP-2002-600045.
[7]Harmony, NMEC-2007-658071, NMEC-2007-658058, and others.

sufficiently high that AQI felt it worth the security risk of having the names, signatures, fingerprints, and pictures of the agents written down where Coalition forces could, and did, find them.[8]

9.2.1.1 Interpret Behavior in Light of Intra-organizational Dynamics

One of the many challenges facing governments dealing with terrorist organizations is how to interpret their actions. After watching a particularly horrific attack, analysts may be tempted to infer that the terrorist leaders are such unrequited savages that they cannot be negotiated with and therefore must be killed. That may or may not be the right inference to draw.

Take for example Israel's policy toward Hamas in the 1990s. The Israeli government did put the group under great pressure, especially after it started conducting suicide bombings in 1994 because it mistakenly interpreted those attacks as the choice of a unified leadership. Ultimately, though, by cracking down on Hamas in the Occupied Territories, the Israelis paradoxically made it harder for the leaders who were inclined to negotiate to control their operatives. Going after the group empowered a more militant faction which was relatively immune from Israeli pressure because its managers were operating from Jordan and Syria.

In the case of the PIRA, key leaders such as Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams were struggling throughout the 1990s to rein in their organization. To do so they had to be able to restrain operatives who consistently demanded more action against the British. Had the British arrested them and their closest deputies, it certainly would have been harder for the PIRA to operate, but those arrests also would have removed the only people who could get the PIRA to deliver on the promises of restraint that the group was making at the negotiating table. In both of these cases, an agency theory perspective highlights costs to security crackdowns that are not apparent if we treat terrorist groups as unitary actors.

9.2.1.2 Refrain from Actions that Encourage Preference Alignment

Members who appear less committed should not be removed from the network even if they present easy targets, provided they can be reliably observed. By leaving them in place, the probability that the group will identify agency problems and hence adopt security-reducing measures

[8]Harmony, NMEC-2007-658048, NMEC-2007-658024, NMEC-2007-658005, and others.

increases. Here we can think of the auditing revealed in a February 11, 1999 e-mail from Ayman al-Zawahiri to a Yemeni cell leader, castigating him for providing an inadequately precise expense report.[9] Individuals like the one on the receiving end of Zawahiri's ire worsen the terrorist's dilemma. Their presence may arguably contribute more to degrading a group's capabilities if they are allowed to remain in the organization than if they are selected out.

Importantly, in the case of the Yemeni cell, it was the perception of financial inefficiency that mattered, not the inefficiency itself. Such perceptions can be created by pursuing measures that incriminate financial agents and add to suspicions of graft and corruption in the eyes of their leaders.[10]

9.2.1.3 Make Credible Punishment of Operatives Harder

This is most easily done by providing an exit option for members other than indefinite detention or death. This approach yields benefits by making it harder for groups to enforce discipline—hence exert control—through the use of force against their own members. A good example of this tactic working is the defection of Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi from Saudi Arabia in June 2003. Al-Ghamdi was involved in the May 12, 2003 bombings of Riyadh and was known to have close ties with Al-Qa'ida. There are varied accounts of al-Ghamdi's reasons for giving himself up, but his own father told reporters that "... security agencies have promised that if he gives in and is convicted of the alleged crimes, his punishment would be reduced to half."[11]

Making it less costly to defect will reduce the level of political impact groups can achieve. In the context of the model of sanctioning, presented in chapter 5, these strategies would entail either reducing the cost of being sanctioned to the terrorist operative or increasing the amount leaders must pay to sanction. Both make it less likely leaders will be able to control their organization. A corollary not inherent in the model, but implied by rational decision-making, is that making it harder for organizations to punish agents who talk can make these agents more likely to share information with the government when captured. The British "supergrass"

[9]Cullison, "Inside Al-Qa'ida's Hard Drive." The response to Zawahiri's e-mail explains a number of these financial anomalies in a defensive, seemingly irate manner and ends with a threat to leave al-Qa'ida.

[10]For an example of an agent trying to explain away lost funds, see Harmony, AFGP-2005-0001472.

[11]Abdul Mohsen Al-Murshid, "Ali Al-Ghamdi's Father Urges Son to Surrender," *Asharq Al-Awsat*, June 17, 2003.

system of rewarding and resettling cooperative witnesses, for example, was extremely effective at producing intelligence and thereby hindering PIRA operations, even if it did fail to produce convictions that would stand up on appeal.

As a general rule, lowering the perceived costs of exit—by offering well-publicized amnesty or reduced sentences for voluntary defectors—effectively reduces the demands the organization can make on its members. In the financial sphere, for example, enhancing agents' outside options makes it harder for the group to prevent agents from skimming resources by threatening them with expulsion. In response, groups must either accept greater agency costs or become more careful about screening applicants. Greater screening reduces the pool of potential members or increases the use of problematic screening mechanisms. Both changes make counterterrorism easier.

9.2.1.4 Provide Information that Makes the Political Impact of Actions Unclear

Dissension within groups often stems from debates over how the struggle is going politically. We see this in a 2002 letter from 'Abd al-Halim Adl to "Mukhtar," believed to be senior al-Qa'ida military director Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. This letter expresses concern that al-Qa'ida is "experiencing one setback after another and has gone from misfortune to disaster," blaming this series of failures on faulty leadership. Adl argues that those in charge rush "to move without vision." Focusing on the negative impact that Osama bin Laden has had on the organization in particular, the letter pleads with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to reject bin Laden's orders and instead concentrate efforts on reorganizing and reinvigorating both the organizational infrastructure and the relationship between the commanders and the foot-soldiers.[12] The core complaint expressed in this letter is that the principal, bin Laden, doesn't understand the political impact of the group's actions. Adl, the agent, has different preferences than the leadership because he is getting different information about the state of the world.

Information that brings into question the political impact of specific actions, or the justifications for them, may help increase uncertainty and in turn will either reduce the amount of control senior leaders can exercise or force them to adopt security-reducing solutions.

[12]For a more detailed discussion of this letter and the operational history of the writer, see Brown, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989–2006*.

9.2.1.5 Call the Probity of Financial Managers into Question

There are two ways to accomplish this goal. The first is to publicize just how uncommitted some operatives are. The Indian government recently followed this tack in publicizing how foot-soldiers in the Islamist group the Indian Mujahideen (IM) have stolen from their superiors, and how higher level managers have ripped off their foreign sponsors. As the story in a major Indian English-language daily newspaper put it, "Money meant to fund terror activities or recruit new operatives was on many occasions siphoned off and used for 'personal benefit'."[13] In the article, an Indian counterterror official described how IM operative Mirza Himayat Baig used roughly 20 percent of the funds sent to him for a terror mission to pay off his debts, saying, "Most IM operatives use this modus operandi since there is no accountability where money is concerned in the outfit. The top functionaries are bothered only about operations. The money does not come out of their pockets and hence they do not care to keep tabs on it." In terms of security-efficiency tradeoff, he is essentially saying that IM faces no meaningful budget constraint, and so it does not seek to control its operatives' finances. Whether the sources in the story, all of whom are government officials, are telling the truth or simply spreading misinformation, if they succeed in shifting IM leaders' expectations about how committed their agents really are, they may induce them to adopt security-reducing measures.

The second way to call financial managers into question is to refrain from publicizing the freezing of funds or seizure of assets. When government freezes funds in a non-public way, the individual responsible for those funds has to explain what happened. Either he must make up for the missing funds from his pocket, or come under suspicion within the group, creating the perception of diverging preferences that presents leaders with incentives to take security-reducing actions. Keeping asset seizures secret also increases the perceived uncertainty of the operational environment, making it more difficult to maintain effective oversight in many interactions. In an uncertain environment, it is harder to know if an operation failed because your agent did not faithfully execute his orders, or because you got unlucky.[14] This in turn leads to a worsening of many agency problems.

[13]Mateen Hafeez, "Jihadis Cheat Bosses, Pocket Terror Funds," *The Times of India*, July 16, 2012.

[14]More formally, the lower the signal-to-noise ratio in each signal, the less effectively conditioning on any one signal will be in motivating optimal actions.

9.2.1.6 Crack Down on Fund-raising Through Legitimate Businesses and Charities

Forcing groups to resort to criminal fund-raising will greatly reduce the efficiency of their financial transactions. Illicit fund-raising has historically created dissent over both resource allocation and tactics. With respect to resource allocation, money from illicit purposes must be laundered if leaders want to prevent investigators from using the money-generating offense to gain information on the group.

The process of laundering criminal proceeds starkly highlights the security-efficiency tradeoff in that it enhances security, but almost always burns up some portion of the laundered funds. Because the laundering process requires secrecy, it makes monitoring how funds are used more difficult, rendering the group more prone to corruption.[15] Moreover, terrorist cells trained in illicit fund-raising are extremely likely to begin seeking opportunities for personal profit, even at the expense of political goals. We saw this pattern in chapter 6 with the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries and in chapter 7 with the PIRA. In the tactical arena, reliance on criminal fund-raising also creates additional opportunities to generate negative reactions in the community.[16]

Links between terrorists and criminal organizations have been cited periodically as a threatening trend. To the contrary, they are a sign of weakness on the terrorist's part and create substantial operational vulnerabilities.

9.2.1.7 Make Sole Source Funding Unavailable

One further implication of the agency theory framework is that central management of funding provides at least a minimum level of organizational control for leaders, who can withhold funds if agents do not behave as desired. PIJ leaders in Lebanon reportedly use this method to condition the behavior of logisticians arranging suicide bombings.[17]

[15]Many PIRA efforts at money laundering led directly to problems of graft and corruption, and hence internal conflict. See John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing the Green Card: Financing the Provisional IRA—Part 2," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 2 (2003): 1–60.

[16]AQI, the FARC, JI, the PIRA, the UDA, and the UVF all suffered politically for their moves into criminal fund-raising.

[17]Incentive-based pay can also help to control agents. Iran reportedly used performance-based incentives in funding Palestinian Islamic Jihad from September 2000 on. Douglas Frantz and James Risen, "A Secret Iran-Arafat Connection Is Seen Fueling the Mideast Fire," *New York Times*, March 24, 2002.

Chapter 8 discussed how Fatah's exile leaders used their authority over the group's funds to control their agents inside the Occupied Territories during the First Intifada. During the Second Intifada, these leaders' ability to exercise control declined as operational units found other sources of money.

Central management of funding is easiest when groups rely on a few deep-pocket donors who prefer to deal with one leader rather than several factions, or when they raise funds from sources requiring centralized infrastructure.[18] This centralized process guarantees leaders *de facto* control over resources. To the extent that government actions can deter donations from deep-pocket donors, the frequency of agency problems should increase.

9.2.2 Drive Terrorists to Trade Off Security for Other Values

Government interventions that raise the value of communications and control can reduce how efficient terrorist groups can be by inducing a demand for security-reducing structures to control operatives. There are several subtle ways to worsen the terrorist's dilemma.

9.2.2.1 Create Uncertainty about Operationally Relevant Technical Information

One key vulnerability of all terrorist organizations is communications. A greater volume of communications between operational cells and others presents a proportionally greater number of opportunities for compromise. If terrorist operatives can readily find reliable technical information on bomb-making and the like, they can conduct attacks with a great deal of independence. If, however, public technical data sources are rife with misinformation, then cells will need to communicate more to make sure they are using appropriate materials/techniques.[19] This is not to say that governments should place unreliable information in public libraries and the like. Rather, they may wish to consider circulating inaccurate information in the underground market for terrorist field manuals.[20]

[18]For example, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) fund-raising in the Sinhalese Diaspora in Canada is facilitated by the coordinated use of social pressure. LTTE leaders control organized groups that blacklist businesses and individuals who do not contribute. See John La, "Forced Remittances in Canada's Tamil Enclaves," *Peace Review* 16, no. 3 (2004): 379–385.

[19]I thank Kurt Gaubatz for pointing out this strategy.

[20]See for example the old al-Qa'ida training manual introduced into evidence in the Africa Embassy Bombings trial.

9.2.2.2 Create Uncertainty about Operationally Relevant Political Information

One fundamental challenge of underground organizations is staying sufficiently in touch with the community to understand the political impact of operations. We saw in chapter 6 that Russian Marixst groups were constantly concerned with maintaining connections between leadership and the people, and similar concerns have been central to *jihadi* policy planning. Osama bin Laden's mentor Abdallah Azzam emphasized these links in the 1980s and Abu Musab al-Suri's influential recent work argues that the loss of a connection between *jihadi* leadership and the people has been a key factor in the failure of historical jihadi movements, particularly in Syria.[21] Of course, if cells are allowed to choose their own targets to enhance security, the leadership does not necessarily face an unpalatable tradeoff. Problems arise only when cells attack targets that arouse public ire. Thus there is a greater premium on control when operational units are uncertain about the political environment.

Fortunately, one of the clear weaknesses of decentralized terrorist organizations is that those who form cells inspired by an ideology such as al-Qa'ida's are often quite ignorant about how their actions will be perceived. The plot to attack New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport that was disrupted in June 2007 provides a striking example on this score. The plot's alleged leader, Russell Defreitas, explained his choice of targets by arguing that "[Americans] love John F. Kennedy. If you hit that, the whole country will be in mourning. It's like you can kill the man twice."[22] The ludicrous nature of Defreitas' political analysis is matched only by the alleged plotter's technical incompetence. He and his compatriots erroneously believed that by setting the airport fuel farm on fire they could trigger a series of explosions in an underground pipeline that led to the airport. The plotters were apparently unaware that combustion requires both fuel *and* oxygen.

There are three direct policy implications here. First, information operations that damage terrorists' consensus about politics in target states, or about how their actions are perceived in their supporting populations, will worsen agency problems. Such operations can include

[21] For a fascinating guide to Jihadi intellectuals, see William McCants and Jarret Brachman, *Militant Ideology Atlas* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). The *Atlas* contains the first thorough citation mapping of the strategic literature of the modern Jihadi movement. Suri's work is thought to have been influential at the tactical and operational levels, but does not appear to have had a large impact on the Jihadi academic literature.

[22] Cara Buckley and William K. Rashbaum, "4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines," *New York Times*, June 3, 2007.

engaging in discussions on jihadi websites in ways that provoke uncertainty about politics in targeted nations. Second, officials in the United States can take advantage of disrupted plots to sow further uncertainty. Hyping every terrorist arrest as a major victory increases a terrorist's beliefs about the political impact of successful attacks which makes such attacks more likely. Instead, officials should sometimes hype arrests and sometimes announce them in a deliberately laconic fashion, perhaps with a discrete web-only press release. Doing so can increase political uncertainty, pushing terrorist leaders to exert greater levels of control.[23] Third, creating a sufficient level of uncertainty can prevent groups from engaging in terrorism. Greater uncertainty reduces the utility of terrorism. When the utility of terrorism becomes too low relative to the value of other activities, groups may choose to use other methods to achieve their political goals. In 1995, for example, a leading Hamas figure in Gaza, Mahmud al-Zahar, argued that his group "... must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill a goal without violence, we will do so."[24]

9.2.2.3 Make Screening Strategies Appear Risky

Terrorist groups have historically tried to reduce preference divergence, and hence increase their ability to achieve political impact, by screening their members at the time of entry. A common strategy to do so is to recruit within familial networks. By openly monitoring the family relations of known terrorist operatives, governments can create the perception that using family ties to screen potential members is a security risk. This takes away a useful screening strategy, reducing the maximum feasible level of security. Making family ties risky also increases the probability that members of these groups will enter into close relationships outside the network. Such relationships can dilute commitment, as competing social concerns become important. This dynamic was observed in the Syrian case, as the foreign jihadis who married locals tended to lose their motivation and left the struggle.[25] Note that this is an additional benefit not available when monitoring of family ties is strictly covert.

[23]Of course, such a strategy would be hard to enforce among local leaders and would deny federal officials certain political benefits.
[24]Mahmud is cited by Mishal, "How Hamas Thinks," 93.
[25]Harmony, AFGP-2002-600080.

9.2.3 Use the Terrorist's Dilemma to Guide Policy Tradeoffs

Terrorist groups' critical organizational vulnerabilities stem from the inherent security costs of dealing with agency problems. That basic fact should guide policy.

9.2.3.1 Expect Discontinuous Responses

Actions that reduce the maximum level of security can engender larger strategic shifts if those actions mean groups can no longer achieve their minimum acceptable levels of both security and control. We saw this in the Northern Ireland case in which changes to British law in 1974 made it harder for the PIRA to conduct attacks in Britain. This in turn empowered leaders calling for restraint and enabled them to enforce a ceasefire agreement. Similar dynamics should be expected in the financial arena. Making leaders sufficiently unsure about the probity of their middlemen may lead them to shift out of spending money on attacks and into other political activities.

9.2.3.2 Create an Environment in Which Terrorists Place a Premium on Discrimination

The value of control for terrorist leaders is, in large part, determined by their need for discrimination in using violence to achieve political objectives. Nationalist groups like the PIRA are typically attempting to achieve objectives that require significant popular support. They must be very careful about who they attack in order to avoid losing the people. Such concerns are present in the *jihadi* literature as well. Captured al-Qa'ida documents, for example, show Somalia was seen as not being "ready for classic jihad" because the Somali Islamist movement had already come close to alienating itself from the masses.[26] In contrast, groups like AQI started with very loosely defined political goals which appeared to extend little beyond driving the United States out and preventing a political settlement. Given that their objectives initially did

[26] Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. For a thorough discussion of the problems al-Qa'ida had operating in Somalia, see Shapiro and Watts, *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, and Ken Menkhaus and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Non-state actors and failed states: Lessons from al-Qa'ida's Experiences in the Horn of Africa." In *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty.* Anne L. Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, eds. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

not hinge on winning broad-based popular support, Zarqawi's group may not have needed to be as careful about whom they kill.[27] Over time though, as the group came to have political ambitions and as Coalition forces figured out how to win some local cooperation, excessive violence at the operational level became a problem for senior leaders in AQI.[28]

Governments can ramp up the value of discrimination by highlighting the human costs of terrorism among groups' supporting populations.

9.2.3.3 Prioritize Efforts Based on Sub-group Political Goals

When developing strategies to limit the political impact of violent spoilers like AQI in mid-2005, for example, making control harder does not matter much because the group values it little. Policies that offer unhappy operatives a way out, and thereby make punishment harder, would be unlikely to have much effect on such groups. With groups like Hamas (or AQI in 2007 when it apparently started to care more about discrimination), actions that make it harder to control operatives—increasing surveillance of institutions the group uses to screen fighters, for example—may have outsized effects because groups care deeply about control and so will sacrifice a great deal of operational security to maintain it.

9.2.3.4 Deny Terrorist Groups the Benefits of Security Vacuums

As we saw in detail in the study of terrorism in Northern Ireland, the existence of a safe haven greatly eases terrorists' organizational challenges. The same was true of Hamas: Jordan's May 1995 decision to expel senior Hamas leaders, and hence the group's loss of a valuable safe haven for certain activities, played a key role in pushing the group into a more peaceful stage.

That terrorist safe havens make organizing easier is a rather obvious point, but policy makers have often been misguided about what makes a piece of territory a safe haven. Essentially, policy makers are wrong to be concerned about the existence of ungoverned spaces; their concern should be about improperly governed spaces.[29] Such areas provide a much more effective safe haven.[30] Captured documents and public web postings

[27]Zarqawi's "indifference curve" would thus look much flatter than that of leaders who demand greater control and discrimination.
[28]See Harmony IZ-060316-02.
[29]Shapiro and Watts, *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa.*
[30]This argument is developed in detail by the very influential jihadi intellectual Abu Bakr Naji in *The Management of Savagery.*

demonstrate that al-Qa'ida, for example, has been thinking about the necessity to exploit such spaces since its founding. In the context of the theoretical framework presented in this book, the existence of usable security vacuums greatly eases a group's organizational tradeoffs. If there is a safe rear area for the hierarchy, then exercising a given level of control has much smaller security implications. As we saw in chapter 7, the South Armagh PIRA exercised tighter control than other PIRA units largely because it had a ready safe haven across the border in the Republic of Ireland.[31] One ETA militant, who left the group in 1983, described his decision as being driven by the fact that greater cooperation between Spanish and French authorities would mean the loss of the group's safe haven in France. As he put it: "Any time they had a mind to do so, the French state could dismantle 50 or 60 or 70 percent of the organization overnight. In that case you find yourself without an organization."[32]

Areas without functioning state institutions, however, do not provide the kind of safe haven in which one can put the terrorist equivalent of a back office. The security vacuum creates problems for the terrorists too. In a series of reports from Somalia in the 1990s, Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs), details the challenges of operating in a failed state. Prominent among these are problems with local bandits, the costs of corruption in neighboring states, and the ability of Western forces to act in ungoverned spaces.[33]

Here two documents are particularly instructive. The first, from Somalia, identifies a five-point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front.[34] The author argues for: (1) expulsion of the foreign international presence; (2) rebuilding of state institutions; (3) establishment of domestic security; (4) comprehensive national reconciliation; and (5) economic reform and combating famine. This approach parallels that of the June 2005 Zawahiri letter addressed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.[35] In that letter, Zawahiri argues that jihad in Iraq should proceed incrementally, according to the following phases: (1) expel the Americans from Iraq; (2) establish an Islamic authority or emirate,

[31] In 1997, for example, members of the South Armagh PIRA who rejected the Mitchell Principles did not join the RIRA as did similarly dissatisfied members from other areas.
[32] Reinares, "Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study of Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA," 787.
[33] See Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, AFGP-2002-600110, and AFGP-2002-800597.
[34] Harmony AFGP-2002-600053, 6.
[35] Available online at: http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html. The provenance of this letter has been questioned on linguistic grounds. See Juan Cole, "Zawahiri Letter to Zarqaawi: A Shiite Forgery?" at the website of Informed Comment, http://www.juancole.com/2005/10/zawahiri-letter-to-zarqawi-shiite.html. Last accessed April 27, 2006.

then develop it and support it; and (3) extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

Notice that what is important to these authors is not the existence of a security vacuum, but what comes next, establishing functioning state institutions under jihadi control.[36] What made Afghanistan so useful to al-Qa'ida from 1995 onward was not an absence of state institutions; it was that al-Qa'ida could operate under the protection of a sovereign state, relying on that state's sovereignty to shield its infrastructure from potential attack by Western forces. Operating in a security vacuum, in which training camps and the like can be more readily attacked directly by the United States and indirectly by local allies, is much less attractive. In fact, existing security vacuums have not proven to be a viable base for exporting attacks abroad. Only one major international attack has been supported out of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia since those states have become true security vacuums.[37]

Thus, while a concern with security vacuums is warranted, the implication is not that governments must consistently prevent security vacuums. That takes immense resources. A more cost-effective strategy is to maintain the capability to act decisively when necessary in security vacuums, without embarking on an unsustainable mission to end security vacuums worldwide. Such a strategy prevents security vacuums from easing terrorists' fundamental organizational challenges without setting an unrealistic state-building agenda.

9.2.3.5 Take the End Game into Account

All of the interventions above serve to decrease the political impact terrorists can achieve. In doing so, they are also likely to induce changes in terrorists' organizations. Most important from a policy perspective, they will induce changes in how much control terrorist leaders can exercise over their operatives. Whether a government should engage in interventions that reduce control depends critically on a number of factors.

The first such factor is the type of violence the government is willing to accept. If a government cracks down hard on a group whose leaders

[36]A similar argument is made in Naji, *The Management of Savagery*. Naji's core argument there is that the Jihadi movement should win public support by showing it can manage state institutions and provide public goods such as order and contract enforcement more effectively than secular governments.

[37]The one prominent attack supported out of Iraq was the November 2005 suicide bombing of a wedding in Amman, Jordan. The attack greatly reduced Jordanian support for Islamist militancy in Iraq.

valued discrimination and were playing a restraining role, for example, the expected result would be a short-term spike in violence. Such spikes may prove politically damaging to the terrorists, as they often have for the groups we have studied, but some political leaders may not want to accept greater levels of indiscriminate violence in exchange for less political impact. Moreover, a strategy that puts so much pressure on a group that leaders lose the ability to control their operatives leaves the government with no way to end the conflict except to kill or imprison everyone in the group.

This leads us to the second factor leaders should consider: the end game. If a government decides that it cannot win militarily and needs a negotiating partner, as the British government did in Northern Ireland, then it may want to take actions that allow leaders to increase control over their operatives.[38] There is a hard balancing act here, as reducing security pressure also reduces the incentives for a group to negotiate. The key thing for decision makers to keep in mind is that short-term policies to reduce terrorists' political impact can foreclose long-term options for ending the conflict.

9.2.3.6 Keep Organizational Changes in Perspective, They Are a Metric

The United States and its allies found great success fighting al-Qa'ida as an organization between 2001 and 2012. They significantly degraded its formal command structure, debilitated its capabilities to move money, and closed most of its training facilities. Despite these successes against al-Qa'ida, terrorism continued in the group's name in London, Madrid, and elsewhere. While not closely coordinated by the al-Qa'ida organization, these attacks were informed by the ideology that al-Qa'ida popularized. Many analysts cited the spread of such "al-Qa'ida-inspired" attacks as signs of a more dangerous threat. But should al-Qa'ida's transformation from 2001 to 2012 have been taken as evidence that counterterrorism policies were ineffective?

From an organizationally informed perspective, the answer is clearly "no." These organizational changes did not make al-Qa'ida more dangerous. The group did not choose such a decentralized organizational form. It traded operational control and financial efficiencies for security

[38] One contributing factor to the failure of the Oslo peace process was that Hamas' political leaders were never able to enforce their preferences over the use of violence. Another factor was the failure of successive Israeli prime ministers to follow through on commitments regarding halting settlement activity because doing so would have meant alienating key members of their ruling coalitions. It is not just the Palestinian's agency problems that doomed Oslo.

and organizational survival. That al-Qa'ida decentralized did not mean that was a preferred or more dangerous organizational form; rather, it meant that al-Qa'ida opted for security when faced with a hard choice between security and other values. Organizational changes toward less formal, more networked structures in al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups suggests strongly that governments' efforts are succeeding. Leaders, policy analysts, and military strategists would do well to keep that in mind.

9.3 CONCLUSION

At the end of the day the most important reason to understand the terrorist's dilemma is that doing so helps us to put the threat of terrorism in perspective. Terrorist groups look like other human organizations in so many ways because they face many of the same managerial challenges. Their members can be every bit as corrupt and self-seeking as workers in any business or government bureaucracy and, just like those entities, terrorist groups need to establish systems to cope with the resulting agency problems. What sets terrorists apart is that all of the systems human beings have worked out for coping with those problems create security vulnerabilities. For leaders of covert violent organizations, every memo, every extra call to make sure a subordinate understands what is to be done, and each additional check and balance, can be a ticket to a violent death or life behind bars.

Terrorist groups therefore face two fundamental tradeoffs. The *security-control tradeoff* means that whenever a group's political goals would be put at risk by operatives choosing targets with no oversight, leaders will undertake some security-reducing actions to exercise control. The *security-efficiency tradeoff* means that whenever groups have a limited budget and operatives tasked with managing money want to spend it differently than leaders would like, leaders will adopt managerial systems that create security vulnerabilities.

All organizations wrestle with dissension and members who don't see eye to eye with their leaders. When it comes to terrorist organizations, these differences create exploitable security vulnerabilities. The larger the terrorist group, moreover, the more such vulnerabilities we can expect it to have. And while large groups may occasionally get lucky and pull off spectacular attacks, they can never pose an existential threat to a competent, well-governed state. The inherent managerial dilemmas of terrorism mean the odds are stacked too firmly against them for that.

Keeping that in mind will help us approach this threat with all of the seriousness it deserves, but no more than that. The more we can see terrorist groups for what they are—ordinary organizations operating at a tremendous disadvantage—the easier it is to consign them to their proper place in the range of threats to society.

APPENDIX A

Annotated Bibliography of Terrorist Autobiographies

A.1 INTRODUCTION

This section summarizes 108 terrorist memoirs. As discussed in chapter 3, these are memoirs written by participants in terrorist groups that include some detail on their activities, so it excludes pure ideological tracts. Terrorist groups are defined as those whose use of violence regularly violated the principles of distinction and proportionality under the law of armed conflict for at least one year of their existence.[1]

Before beginning the bibliography, a few general points about these books should be noted. First, as figure A.1 shows, the set of groups we learn about in these biographies is skewed toward groups that "won," in the sense that their members took prominent roles in the post-conflict government, groups such as the African National Congress, Mau Mau, Provisional IRA, and Russian Marxist groups. Second, the level of operational detail in the memoirs varies a tremendous amount, due to both individuals' level of recollection but also because of their political position. Third, some memoirs spend the majority of their time on individuals' personal histories and touch briefly on the details of their involvement in terrorism. The memoirs are, in other words, as diverse as their authors.

The following books are organized alphabetically, according to which terrorist group the author writes about.

[1]This is an intentionally inclusive definition which picks up some groups normally thought of as insurgents, such as the Greek Cypriot insurgent organization EOKA. Since there is no bright line between insurgency and terrorism, this inclusiveness seemed appropriate for assessing organizational issues. Skeptical readers should discount stories from members of groups they do not consider to be terrorists.


Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 12
African National Congress (ANC) 12
Mau Mau 10
Irish Republican Army (pre–1968) 7
Weatherman 6
M–19 5
People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 4
National Liberation Front (FLN) 4
Loner 3
Irgun Zwai Leumi 3
Ulster Defense Association (UDA) 2
Stern Gang 2
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) 2
Red Brigades 2
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) 2
Movement 2 June 2
Japanese Red Army 2
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 1
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 1
Sandinista National Liberation Front 1
Revolutionary Cell 1
Red Army Faction (Baader–Meinhoff Gang) 1
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 1
Polish Underground 1
Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) 1
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 1
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 1
Narodnaya Volya 1
Machteret 1
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 1
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 1
KPD 1
Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK) 1
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 1
Hukbalahap 1
Hezbollah 1
Hamas 1
Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) 1
German Neo–Nazi 1
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 1
Fatah 1
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 1
Armed Islamic Group 1
Al–Qa'ida 1
African Resistance Movement (ARM) 1
0
4
8
12
Number of Memoirs by Organization

Figure A.1. Distribution of terrorist memoirs by group.

A.2 TERRORIST AUTOBIOGRAPHIES

A.2.1 African National Congress (ANC)

Bernstein, Rusty. *Memory Against Forgetting.* London: New York: Viking, 1999.

Lionel "Rusty" Bernstein, a white Jewish ANC activist who was tried in South Africa's 1956–59 treason trial and was the only one of the ANC leaders acquitted at the Rivonia trial in 1963–64, offers detailed memoirs of his time in

the Communist and anti-apartheid movements. Although banned from political activity, Bernstein went on to play a leading role in drafting the ANC's key Freedom Charter in 1956 and was repeatedly arrested, eventually being placed under house arrest after the 1960 State of Emergency. His memoir provides a particularly useful depiction of the ANC's turn to militancy between 1959 and the Rivonia trial, as he recounts how MK merged armed efforts from the ANC and the Communist Party.

Dingake, Michael. *My Fight Against Apartheid.* Kliptown Books, 1987.
Dingake was a Botswanian who worked for the ANC, joined during the Defiance campaign in 1952, and eventually took over the job of infiltrating MK fighters from Botswana. He fled South Africa in February 1965 to Botswana and organized infiltration routes for MK fighters from Zambia through Botswana. In December 1965, he was arrested while traveling through Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and sent to South Africa, where he was tortured and ultimately sent to Robben Island for a fifteen-year term. He discusses few details regarding his operational role and does not expound on any real disagreements within the group.

Duka, Norman. *From Shantytown to Forest.* Richmond, B.C. Canada: LSM Press, 1974.
Norman Duka recounts his experiences first in the political scene and then in Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). From an early age, Duka would attend ANC meetings with his father, and once the movement was banned he engaged in illegal leafleting. Duka recounts spending the majority of his years in MK fighting the Rhodesian army and also recalls his time working for the ANC in Tanzania and Zambia following his release from a Botswana prison.

Kasrils, Ronnie. *Armed and Dangerous: My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid.* Oxford: Heinemann, 1993.
Kasrils, an unrepentant, white former leader in the ANC's military wing Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) who eventually became the group's head of intelligence, recounts his time at the center of the underground fight against apartheid. He became a member of the SACP's (South African Communist Party) Central Committee, a bodyguard of sorts for then-ANC leader Rowley, and an MK leader from its beginnings after the arrests of Mandela and other ANC leaders. He provides extensive detail on clandestine operations both abroad and underground in South Africa, and discusses strategy, decision making, and discipline in the organization. Kasrils provides excellent detail on the group's struggles with informers and waning discipline, and depicts a top-down organization.

Kathrada, Ahmed. *Memoirs.* Gaborone, Botswana: Pula Press, 2004.
Kathrada, one of the ANC leaders convicted for sabotage and treason in the 1964 Rivonia Trial, recounts fighting against apartheid as an Indian Muslim in South Africa. As part of MK's regional command, he describes leading sabotage efforts before being removed from his command due to disagreements over his concerns about civilian casualties. While in prison he spent many years with Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders, and he offers intimate portraits of these prominent political figures.

Keitseng, Fish. *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground.* Gaborone, Botswana: Pula Press, 1999.
Keitseng, an unrepentant Botswana-born African National Congress (ANC) activist who was sentenced in the major Treason Trial, recounts his entry into the group in 1948, the ANC's early years, and the formation of its military wing, MK, in 1961. He recalls operations including smuggling ANC operatives out of South Africa through Botswana in the 1960s, the Treason Trial. He is candid in his recollections.

Mandela, Nelson. *Long Walk to Freedom.* New York: Little Brown, 1994.
Mandela, leader of ANC and first post-Apartheid president of South Africa, is extremely detailed in his memoir in terms of political activities that are discussed. There aren't very many operational details included about MK, aside from the initial description of its structure as Mandela established it in 1962. The lack of specificity on MK operations likely comes from the fact that Mandela was in prison for most of the time the group was active. The book does include excellent detail on negotiations with the South African government and the politics within the ANC between Mandela, with whom the South African government chose to negotiate, and the ANC leadership in exile.

Mhlaba, Raymond. *Raymond Mhlaba's Personal Memoirs. Narrated to Thembeka Mufamadi.* Johannesburg: Thorold's Africana Book, 2001.
Mhlaba, a leading member of the ANC and one of those convicted in the Rivonia treason trials, recounts the group's shift from activism to civil disobedience to militancy by the beginning of the 1960s, covering disagreements about the use of violence, how to work with others, and Mandela's decision to begin negotiating with the government. After being convicted at the Rivonia trial, Mhlaba gives a lengthy account of his time in prison, and his story also includes the ANC's transition to governance after he was released from prison.

O'Malley, Padraig. ***Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa.*** **New York: Penguin Books, 2007.**
University of Massachusetts–Boston Professor Paidrag O'Malley draws on interviews with ANC leader Mac Maharaj, the senior Indian in the ANC, to produce this collaborative biography, which describes MK's operations and the ANC's organizational evolution. There is also significant detail on Maharaj's arrest, detention, and interrogation, as well as on management challenges within MK toward the end of the apartheid era.

Slovo, Joe. ***Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography of ANC Leader Joe Slovo.*** **Melbourne; New York: Ocean Press, 1997.**
Slovo, who became the first white leading member of the African National Congress (ANC), recounts his life and struggle against apartheid. Slovo details major events of the ANC struggle in the 1950s, including the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign, the banning of the SACP, the drafting of the ANC Freedom Charter and the Treason Trial (where he was both a defendant and a member of the defense team). As one of the founders of MK and its chief of staff, Slovo provides particularly valuable detail on the formation and evolution of the ANC's military wing. His anecdotes about other leaders are also excellent, and Slovo's memoir is notable for its candor.

Turok, Ben. ***Nothing But the Truth: Behind the ANC's Struggle Politics.*** **Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979.**
Turok recounts his time as a Jewish immigrant and ANC leader in South Africa. He recalls going underground when the ANC was banned, as well as his own participation in bombing attempts (targeting property, not civilians). He became Johannesburg's first white political prisoner and Turok details his harsh prison conditions and treatment. His memoir is notable for its descriptions of conflict inside the ANC, as he recounts debates about the use of violence and strained relations with other Communist activists. His letters to ANC leaders and their responses, both reprinted verbatim, give the impression of an organization that had significant discipline problems (at least in Tanzania).

Wilderson, Frank. ***Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile & Apartheid.*** **Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2008.**
As one of only two American members of the ANC, Wilderson recounts his time in South Africa as well as in the United States. He focuses heavily on South African and American politics. He is quite critical of Nelson Mandela and provides valuable detail on the conflicts between MK operatives and the ANC leadership during the last days of the apartheid regime.

A.2.2 African Resistance Movement (ARM)

Lewin, Hugh. ***Stones Against the Mirror: Friendship in the Times of the South African Struggle.*** **Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004.**
Lewin was a member of the African Resistance Movement (ARM), a small, mostly white "protest sabotage" group that used acts of sabotage against government infrastructure to protest apartheid. Lewin recounts his years as a student activist and his decision to join the group, as well as his arrest in July 1964. Lewin does not regret the acts of sabotage, which he says were explicitly planned to avoid hurting individuals. Lewin's book is mostly a meditation on his personal relationships, with relatively little operational detail.

A.2.3 Al-Qa'ida

Nasiri, Omar. ***Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda.*** **New York: Basic Books, 2006.**
Nasiri recounts operating with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an Algerian terrorist group operating in Europe, before working for European intelligence agencies as an informant and getting loosely involved in al-Qa'ida. Sent to Afghanistan after 1995, he details his time at al-Qa'ida training camps at Khaldun and Darunta, where he had contact with senior leaders and received training in weapons, explosives, resisting interrogation, and ideology.

A.2.4 Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Gacemi, Baya. ***I, Nadya, Wife of a Terrorist.*** **Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.**
This is the memoir of a young Algerian woman, Nadya, who spent four years in the mid-1990s as the wife of an active member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Her husband, first a petty criminal, joined the GIA and rose to become their town's emir. Nadya recounts how the group intimidated locals and collected money through racketeering and "revolutionary taxes" while also providing material assistance to the poor. As the government waged war against the GIA, she describes how the group's excessive violence turned people against them, and also discusses internal disputes, violence, and problems with informants.

A.2.5 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)

Mauricio Aranguren Molina, interviewing Carlos Castano. *Mi confesión. Carlos Castaño revela sus secretos.* Bogota, Colombia: Editorial Oveja Negra, 2001.
Castaño, chief of the right-wing Colombian AUC paramilitary group, relates his life and militant actions; he claims to have planned and committed cold-blooded murders (e.g., that of presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro) and reveals information about the AUC's activities that had been kept secret for a long time. Organizational discussions tend to be focused on the high politics of the AUC and other right-wing paramilitaries.

A.2.6 Fatah

Iyad, Abu, and Eric Rouleau. *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle.* New York: Times Books, 1981.
Abu, Iyad (aka Salah Khalaf) tells his story as the former head of Special Services for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and a senior official of Fatah, where he played a major role in driving Palestinian nationalist discourse. Iyad denies being the head of the Fatah-affiliated Black September terrorist group, as he is often thought to be, though the memoir provides a lot of detail on some operations. Though he details instances of intra-group conflicts and outside efforts to weaken the PLO, Iyad paints a rather one-sided picture of the group's troubled relations with the Arab world.

A.2.7 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

Arenas, Jacobo. *Cese el Fuego: Una Historia Poltica de las FARC.* Bogota, Colombia: Editorial Oveja Negra, 1985.
This memoir of FARC leader Jacobo Arenas outlines the changing political role of violence for the FARC and the events leading up to the proposed ceasefire. Arenas claims that the Colombian Armed Forces have not maintained the ceasefire that the FARC signed with the Betancourt government in 1984. The Seventh FARC Conference, held in 1982 under the direction of Arenas, formulated several new strategic approaches and reaffirmed the combination of all forms of struggle, both political and armed.

A.2.8 German Neo-Nazi

Hasselbach, Ingo, and Tom Reiss. *Fhrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi.* New York: Random House, 1996.
The repentant 28-year-old Ingo Hasselbach recounts his time as a leader of Germany's neo-Nazi movement in the early 1990s. In and out of prison, he met old Nazi war criminals, and was led toward militant fascism, Holocaust denial, and the idea that Nazi Germany represented a greater Germany of the past. Hasselbach formed East Germany's first neo-Nazi party in 1988. He details huge street fights with left-wing extremists and attacks on immigrant refugees, strong support from American neo-Nazi groups, and sending recruits to fight in Croatia.

A.2.9 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)

Sifaoui, Mohamed. *Inside Al Qaeda.* New York: Thunder's Mouth, 2004.
Sifaoui, an Algerian Muslim journalist, describes several months of working with the Al Qaeda–affiliated Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). After a member of an active GSPC cell made contact with Sifaoui while he was observing the 2002 trial of Algerian GIA terrorists in Paris, he infiltrated the organization from October 2002 to January 2003 by posing as a fundamentalist. Sifaoui provides useful details on the surprisingly haphazard nature of the GSPC's vetting process.

A.2.10 Hamas

Yousef, Mosab Hassan. *Son of Hamas.* Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2010.
Yousef recounts his experience serving as Israel's primary informant within Hamas during the Second Intifada. He goes into great detail about his activities as an informer and how the information he obtained for the Shin Bet was used to arrest and assassinate top Hamas leaders and suicide bombers.

A.2.11 Hezbollah

Qassem, Naim. *Hezbollah: The Story from Within.* London: Saqi, 2010.
Qassem, Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, gives an account of the group's evolution from a resistance movement into its current role in the Lebanese

political mainstream. Qassem details the organization's militant activity, its transition into politics, and recounts debates about Hezbollah's structure, whether and how it should participate in Lebanese Parliamentary politics, and what concessions to make to attract those who do not adhere to a strict Islamist ideology. Less a memoir, this book is part history of Hezbollah and part description of its goals and political philosophy.

A.2.12 Hukbalahap

Taruc, Luis. ***He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader.*** **New York: Praeger, 1967.**
Taruc recounts his time commanding the Huk rebel group against Japanese occupiers in the Philippines during World War II and leading the group's communist insurgency after the war. Taruc describes conflict over ideology and organizational strategy. He also details violent and criminal acts committed by the group, including violence against other members to deter surrenders.

A.2.13 Irgun Zvai Leumi

Begin, Menachem. ***The Revolt.*** **New York: Nash Publishing, 1977.**
Begin offers an account of his leadership of the Irgun, a Jewish guerrilla group fighting British occupation of Palestine. His memoir begins with his incarceration in a Soviet gulag in 1941 and ends with the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. He recounts his 1943 transition to the Irgun leadership and declaration of revolt against the British occupation in 1944. Begin describes the Irgun's methods, including "confiscations" of British arms and bombing attacks on military and police, but does not include many operational details. He generally does not recount intra-group conflict, aside from some disagreements over strategy and relations with other Jewish resistance groups.

Heller, Tzila Amidor. ***Behind Prison Walls: A Jewish Woman Freedom Fighter for Israel's Independence.*** **Hoboken, NJ: Jabotinsky Press, 1999.**
Tzila, a female member of the Zionist underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, recounts her time in prison under British Occupation authorities in Palestine. While she touches on her actions with the Irgun before going to prison, her memoir focuses almost entirely on the period after her first arrest and the harsh conditions of the British women's prison at Bethlehem. She

provides some details on how the female Zionist militants organized in prison, but there is little operational detail.

Meridor, Ya'acov. *Long Is the Road to Freedom.* Hewlett, NY: Judaea Publishing, 1985.
Meridor, an unrepentant leader of the Irgun fighting against British occupation of pre-Israel Palestine, recounts his time in Africa as one of the 251 fighters exiled there on October 19, 1944. Meridor went to Baghdad to sabotage oil fields with the Irgun leader David Raziel. When Raziel died, Meridor briefly led the group before going on to serve as Menachem Begin's deputy. Meridor was captured by the British and taken to Cairo. (Ultimately, he escaped and returned to Israel in 1948.) His account primarily concerns his time in the British detention camps and the many escape attempts and arrests for which he was famous.

A.2.14 Irish Republican Army (pre-1968)

Barry, Tom. *Guerrilla Days in Ireland: A Personal Account of the Anglo-Irish War.* Dublin: Anvil Books, 1981.
Barry, who led one of the IRA's "Flying Columns" of guerrilla volunteers, recounts his involvement in the 1919–21 Anglo-Irish War and in the 1922–23 Irish civil war on the anti-Treaty side. He writes about serving with the British Army during World War I before turning to the Republican cause and joining the IRA after the failed 1916 Easter Uprising. He first became an intelligence officer in County Cork before joining the IRA's military arm and setting up the West Cork Flying Column, and he details training and planning for operations while commanding the brigade. He vividly recounts the guerrilla operations and assassinations that were conducted against the much larger British Army. He also writes about shooting informers, divisions between prominent leaders, and occasional disagreements with central headquarters.

Behan, Brendan. *Confessions of an Irish Rebel.* London: Hutchinson of London, 1965.
The majority of this memoir focuses on Brendan Behan's life following his brief involvement as an active member of the IRA. There is little discussion of the IRA's organization and operations. Behan describes his participation in a firefight with British police officers who were monitoring the IRA's Easter Rising Commutation Parade and his subsequent flight from the police that culminated in his arrest and six-year detainment in the Borstal youth prison.

Clarke, Kathleen. *Revolutionary Woman.* Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1991.
Clarke and her husband were part of the IRA during the early 1900s, and this book recounts their leadership roles, her husband's participation

in the Easter Rising, and her nonviolent contributions such as establishing the Irish Republican Prisoner Dependants Fund. Clarke recounts her later participation in Sinn Féin as well as her position as the Lord Mayor of Dublin.

Devlin, Paddy. *Straight Left: An Autobiography.* Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1993.
Devlin, a one-time IRA member and founding member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), joined the IRA at age fifteen and saw little action, but was interned until the end of World War II with several hundred other IRA members for his involvement in the group. After prison, he went into politics and was involved with negotiations between the IRA and Unionist leaders that led to the first ceasefire in 1972.

Donnelly, Donal. *Prisoner 1082: Escape from Crumlin Road, Europe's Alcatraz.* Cork: Collins Press, 2010.
Sentenced to ten years in prison because of his membership in the IRA, this book tells of Donnelly's dramatic escape and life on the run. He details the penal system, provides incredibly insight into his escape and information on those who supported him. Less is discussed about his time in the IRA during the "Border Campaign" from 1956 to 1962, although he does provide some insights about their operations.

O'Brien, Nora Connolly. *We Shall Rise Again.* London: Mosquito Press, 1981.
At the age of eighty-eight, O'Brien, who was acting Paymaster General of the IRA in 1923, recounts the events surrounding the preparation for the 1916 Easter uprising. O'Brien carried messages between the revolutionary leadership in Dublin and Volunteers in the North during the uprising, but she provides few details on war. Instead, she mostly reminiscences about her father James and other men and their role in the uprising and there is little operational detail.

O'Malley, Ernie. *On Another Man's Wound.* London: Rich & Cowan; Dublin: The Sign of the Three Candles, 1936.
O'Malley, an Irish Volunteer who recruited and organized fighters against the British during the Irish Revolution, offers an account of the uprising from 1916 to 1921. O'Malley's account offers significant details on daily life in Ireland at the time, including views of the rebellion and the British. He also provides a firsthand account of some of the important rebellion leaders. He provides no evidence of significant disagreement over strategy or tactics.

A.2.15 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Breininger, Eric [aka Abdul Gaffar Almani]. *Mein Weg nach Jannah [My path to Jannah].* Internet publication, 2010.
Breininger writes the book while in Waziristan and Afghanistan and is killed by the Pakistani army shortly after completing it. As a young adult in his native Germany, Breininger is converted to Islam from Christianity by a co-worker, who is a radical Islamist. Breininger is advised to leave Germany shortly before members of his group are arrested, travels to Egypt to learn Arabic, and then joins one of his Islamist friends from Germany on a trip to Waziristan (Pakistan) via Iran, where they join the IJU. He undergoes training at an IJU camp and participates in attacks on ISAF and U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

A.2.16 Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK)

Mulla Krekar, *Med egne Ord (In My Own Words).* Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003.
Krekar (born Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad) was born in 1956 in Sulaymaniyia in the Kurdish part of Iraq. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1970 and attended training camps and fought for the Kurdish nationalists 1974–75. After the March 1988 gas attack on the Kurdish town Halabja, Krekar joined the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK) in 1989, and was elected a member of the Shura council the same year. In 1992, he also became second in command of IMK's military department. When IMK split in 2002 he formed Ansar al-Islam, but was arrested in the Netherlands in September 2002 and deported to Norway, where he was eventually imprisoned.

A.2.17 Japanese Red Army (JRA)

Shigenobu, Fusako. *A Personal History of the Japanese Red Army: Together with Palestine.* Tokyo: Kawade, 2009.
Shigenobu was the leader of the JRA and wrote this book in 2009, after she was arrested in Japan. The book mostly describes political doctrines they declared and the historical development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After going to fight for the PFLP, she mostly stayed in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. She does not provide detailed information about the JRA and its activity. Shigenobu notes that getting involved in terrorism hurt her group and ideology politically, particularly with ordinary people.

Haruo Wako. *Nihon Sekigun Toha Nandatta Noka: Sono Sousouki Wo Megutte (What Was the Japanese Red Army? On Its Infancy)*. Tokyo: Sai-ryu-sha, 2010.
Wako wrote this book in 2010, after he was sentenced to life imprisonment and describes the JRA in more detail than Shigenobu does. He describes being recruited in 1973, how the JRA was founded as an organization in 1974–5, and how they conducted attacks. He describes why he left the JRA in 1982 to fight for the PFLP. He is critical of the JRA and Shigenobu.

A.2.18 Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

Tarrants, Thomas A. *The Conversion of a Klansman: The Story of a Former Ku Klux Klan Terrorist.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979.
Tarrants details his long and tumultuous journey from a Ku Klux Klan terrorist to a repentant "born again" Christian. Tarrants first gained recognition in the Klan through his attacks on synagogues and drive-by shootings aimed at black civil rights leaders. He later led the attempted bombing of the house of Meyer Davidson, a prominent Jewish critic of the Klan, and in the process shot Mike Hatcher, a policeman who pursued Tarrants following the attempted bombing.

A.2.19 KPD (Communist Party of Germany)

Hoelz, Max. *Vom 'Weissen Kreuz' zur Roten Fahne: Jugend-, Kampf- und Zuchthauserlebnisse* (From 'White Cross' to Red Flag: Experiences during youth, in combat, and in prison). Leipzig: Roderberg, 1984.
In the aftermath of World War I, Hoelz forms a militia, which is loyal to the German Communist Party, in his native Vogtland in Saxony. The militia takes military control of the area, extorts protection money from factory owners, distributes food, and liberates political prisoners. When the militia is defeated by the German armed forces, Hoelz flees to Czechoslovakia and soon returns to instigate bomb attacks in several German cities. In March 1921, Hoelz is a leader in the "March Action," an uprising of Communist workers in Central Germany. The revolution fails and its leaders are put on trial. After several years in prison, Hoelz is amnestied. He emigrates to the Soviet Union, where he writes his autobiography.

A.2.20 Lone Actors

Berkman, Alexander. *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist.* New York: Shocken Books, 1970.
Anarchist Alexander Berkman recounts his imprisonment after attempting to assassinate the industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 1892 in order to incite a revolution. While the Russian-born Berkman expounds on revolutionary theory and his own motivations, his operational period is only covered in the first, short section of the book. Berkman's memoir is almost entirely devoted to his time in prison, as he focuses on the harsh conditions and his evolving philosophy.

Collins, Aukai. *My Jihad.* Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2002.
Collins describes his years-long involvement with Islamist militants in the 1990s when he was training at a Pakistani camp near Kashmir, and then in Afghanistan with Hurakat-ul-Jihad in 1993 before he conflicted with camp leaders who wouldn't send him to fight. He then returned to the United States before leaving once more to fight against the Russian army in Chechnya. He subsequently becomes disillusioned by the group's infighting, backstabbing, and targeting of civilians, and became an agent for the FBI and CIA.

Hill, Paul. *I Shot an Abortionist.* Current Controversies Series, The Abortion Controversy. Greenhaven Press, 2001.
Hill, a lone gunman who assassinated a doctor and his bodyguard outside of a Pensacola abortion clinic, recounts his crimes and justification for the murders. The majority of the book is dedicated to Hill's moral and religious rationalizations. He briefly recounts planning for and carrying out the attack, and also describes his trial and his belief that being executed would make him a martyr for the pro-life cause.

A.2.21 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Akallo, Grace, and McDonnell, Faith J. H. *Girl Soldier.* Grand Rapids, MI: Chosen Books, 2007.
Akallo recounts her time as a child soldier in the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, with painstaking details about the abuse and suffering she endured. She writes about escaping her captives, the ways she survived, and the harrowing details of death around her. McDonnell mirrors her story with a detailed history of Uganda, the civil wars, and the current situation, complete with information on foreign aid and assistance currently available. Detailed and explicit, the book is also heavily based in the authors' Christian faith.

A.2.22 M-19

Bateman, Jaime, and Dario Villamizar. *Jaime Bateman: Profeta de la Paz.* Santafe de Botoga, D.C., Colombia: Compania Nacional para la Paz, 1995.
Dario Villamizar transcribes many interviews given by Jamie Bateman, commander of M-19, before his death in a plane crash in 1983. Bateman provides a long history of the Colombian guerrilla organization from its origins in 1970 to the proposed amnesty in the early 1980s. The book addresses the group's relations with the government as well as the broader struggle between the "pueblo" and an imperialist oligarchy. He also describes M-19's organization and membership, and touches on the group's training, recruiting, and decision making. As the leader and chief representative of M-19, Bateman only rarely acknowledges the existence of dissent in the organization.

Fayad, Alvaro. *Siembra Vientos y Recogeras Tempestades.* Bogota, Colombia: Planeta, 1982.
Fayad was a founding member of M-19. He describes the group's initial plot to steal Bolivar's sword and reports on the aftermath when many group members, including Fayad, were detained and tortured. He describes how M-19 takes over the Dominican embassy and attempts to sabotage the 1982 election. After Lleras negotiates a peace for amnesty deal with the M-19 leadership, Fayad is freed and goes back into hiding. Distinctly a vanity memoir, not a lot of detail.

Pábon, Rosemberg Pábon. *Así nos tomamos la embajada.* Bogota, Colombia: Planeta, 1984.
This memoir of "Commandante Uno" describes the takeover of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota which began on February 27, 1980. Pabón describes the two-month hostage crisis that followed and the demands of M-19.

Vasquez Perdomo, Maria Eugenia. *My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005.
Perdomo offers her memoir as a female revolutionary and leading fighter in Colombia's Marxist 19th of April Movement (M-19). She recounts receiving military training in Cuba and Libya and participating in operations in the 1970s and '80s that included kidnappings, robberies, and several major hostage events. She also describes living and operating with other militants, and details her decision to give up two sons to relatives so that she could be free to climb the ranks of M-19. While Vasquez details the intersection of the group's militancy and politics, her memoirs focus more on her personal life than strategic and organizational detail.

Wolff, Antonio Navarro. *Mi guerra es la Paz.* Bogota, Colombia: Planeta, 2004.
Wolff, who was second-in-command of M-19, writes of his time in the Colombian guerrilla organization. He describes the group's organization and operations, including details on collaboration between M-19 and Cuba, as well as with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). He also includes many disagreements over the group's use of violence.

A.2.23 Machteret

Rapaport, Era. *Letters from Tel Mond Prison.* New York: Free Press, 1996.
Rapaport, an unrepentant leader of Israel's right-wing Machteret ("Underground") terrorist group, compiles a series of his letters from 1975 to 1996, written while imprisoned for his involvement in 1980 bombings targeting allegedly PLO-associated Palestinian mayors in the West Bank. He defends his actions, justifying them as retaliation against PLO violence and appealing to a biblical justification for the violent reclamation of Israel. Rapaport does not discuss decision making or disagreement within the group. Rather, his letters are primarily a political manifesto.

A.2.24 Mau Mau

Barnett, Donald L., and Karari Njama. *Mau Mau from Within: An Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt.* London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1966.
University of Iowa anthropologist Barnett records Njama's story as a guerrilla leader fighting in Kenya's Mau Mau uprising from 1953 to 1956. Njama relates many discipline problems, and his account provides excellent detail on the group's constant efforts to protect against defection and punish wayward members. Njama describes the group's evolution from the more traditional Kikuyu egalitarian structure of the uprising's political side toward a hierarchical military-style leadership. Barnett provides introductory notes and analysis and contributes additional information based on his own eighteen months with the Kikuyu.

Itote, Waruhiu. *Mau Mau General.* Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967.
Waruhiu Itote, one of the prominent leaders of the Mau Mau known as "General China," provides an important perspective on the group's activities. Upon returning from East Asia where he fought for the British during World War II, Itote joined the Kenya African Union (KAU), but soon became more militant

and joined the Mau Mau. He played a key role in training Mau Mau fighters and eventually sat on Committee No. 4, the central Mau Mau committee that coordinated the group's activities and established its Rules of Conduct. Itote offers details of operations carried out to obtain weapons, the elaborate guard system within Mau Mau forest camps, and the ways in which camp hygiene was maintained.

Kabiro, Ngugi. *Man in the Middle.* Richmond, B.C. Canada: LSM Press, 1973.
Kabiro describes his experience assisting the Mau Mau in Nairobi during the 1950s. Kabiro's involvement in the Mau Mau was limited to smuggling arms from Nairobi to Mau Mau fighters in the forest. His account, therefore, does not offer details of Mau Mau operations or the ways in which the forest fighters organized themselves. He does, however, provide a good account of the coercive tactics used by the Mau Mau to gain the loyalty of the masses and describes the strong influence of the group's underground court system that would try to punish suspected traitors.

Kaggia, Bildad. *Roots of Freedom 1921–1963. The Autobiography of Bildad Kaggia.* Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975.
Kaggia, a leader of the Kenyan Mau Mau independence movement, describes the early days of the movement. He covers his involvement in trade unionism and militancy, including his time on the Kenyan African Union's Central Committee. He describes how the Mau Mau uprising was formed from a secret, central committee and details activities that include murdering police for weapons and killing an alleged traitor in the back of a taxi. A significant portion of the book focuses on his trial and near-decade in prison. Kaggia recounts few real principal-agent problems except for dealing with police who managed to penetrate the group.

Kahinga Wachanga, Henry. *The Swords of the Kirinyaga.* Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1975.
From his vantage point as the Mau Mau's General Secretary, Wachanga describes his experiences with the Mau Mau forest fighters in the 1950s and his subsequent detainment by the British authorities. Wachanga recounts how he also represented the Mau Mau in its negotiations with the British colonial government. Wachanga also describes disagreements over tactics, such as whether the Mau Mau should engage in riskier missions against white settlers, and he does not gloss over failed missions.

Mathu, Mohamed. *The Urban Guerrilla: The Story of Mohamed Mathu.* Richmond, B.C., Canada: LSM Press, 1974.
Mathu recounts his activities in the Mau Mau serving first as an urban guerrilla in Nairobi and later as a Mau Mau forest fighter. He documents the operations

he participated in. Mathu's account is rich with examples illustrating how the Mau Mau exerted control over its members and details its extensive list of rules. While Mathu emphasizes that he is proud of the Mau Mau's accomplishments, he nonetheless discusses the movement's faults and his disagreements with fellow Mau Mau fighters.

Muchai, Karigo. *The Hardcore: The Story of Karigo Muchai.* Richmond, B.C., Canada: LSM Press, 1973.
Muchai describes the time he spent fighting for the Mau Mau and his subsequent detainment. He emphasizes how the British deceived him by promising a better life in Kenya in exchange for his service fighting for them in Burma during World War II. Muchai's account offers much insight into the Mau Mau's organizational structure and the ways in which its leadership exercised control over its members. The second half of Muchai's memoir focuses on his time as a "hardcore" prisoner, a title designated to those prisoners who refused to confess their Mau Mau involvement.

Muriithi, Kiboi. *War in the Forest.* Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971.
Muriithi recounts the time he spent fighting in the Kenyan forests for the Mau Mau. He describes both offensive ambushes and defensive operations that he participated in against Home Guard and British forces as well as his experiences as the personal secretary for Mau Mau General Muriuki Kamotho. The sole survivor of a major battle at a spot later christened the "Glade of Death," a good part of his account focuses on the time he spent alone and dejected, surviving on his own in the Kenyan forest. Muriithi's account is extremely detailed with the sights, sounds, and feelings that characterized his time in the Mau Mau, though there is little detail on the group's organizational structure.

Mwangi Kariuki, Josiah. *Mau Mau's Detainee.* London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Kariuki, a member of the Mau Mau, recounts his years as a detainee in fourteen British detention camps during the 1950s. The majority of his memoir centers around his eight years as a detainee and provides detailed insights on various aspects of the British detention system in Kenya, from the ways in which the detainees organized themselves to the procedure established by the British to rehabilitate detainees.

Wamweya, Joram. *Freedom Fighter.* Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971.
Wamweya recounts his experience fighting for the Mau Mau during the 1950s. He first served as an oath administrator and soon after joined the Mau Mau forest

fighters, by which time the group's strength had been weakened severely by the British. His account primarily documents supply raids carried out to ensure the group's survival, rather than offensive attacks. Wamweya's account provides insight into the increasingly strained relationship between the Mau Mau and the local population. This memoir also sheds light on the ways in-group conflicts were resolved.

A.2.25 Movement of 2 June

Baumann, Michael. *Terror or Love?* New York: Grove, 1979.
The unrepentant German left-wing terrorist Michael "Bommi" Baumann recounts his story as a leading member of West Berlin's militant June 2nd Movement. His story is a case study in the violent intersection between Germany's counterculture and left-wing politics. An excellent chronology of terrorist organizations in Germany is provided at the beginning of the book, and includes Baumann's role in Berlin's developing militant counterculture, first through the Roaming Hash Rebels and later through the formation of Tupamoros West Berlin. Baumann eventually tires of living in hiding and retires from terrorism to go into exile.

Meyer, Till. *Staatsfeind: Erinnerungen (Enemy of the State: Memories)*. Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1996.
As a teen in West Berlin, Till Meyer is politicized by leftist students, participates in violent protests, and joins the Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (APO) [Extraparliamentary Opposition]. He joins the nascent terrorist group Movement of 2 June in 1972 and participates in a number of attacks before being arrested and sentenced in 1974. He is paroled in 1986 and becomes an editor of the TAZ newspaper in Berlin. Meyer details a wide range of disputes within the group and also describes his collaboration with the East German secret service.

A.2.26 Narodnaya Volya

Figner, Vera. *Memoirs of a Revolutionist.* DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991.
Vera Figner recounts her time as a founding member of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) terrorist organization, where she fought to oppose the tsar's reign in the late 1800s. Figner worked as a paramedic and joined other activists to propagandize against the tsarist government as part of the Land and Freedom organization. The first half of the book recounts the group's attempts on Tsar Alexander II's life from 1879 until their eventual success in 1881, and the second half details her time in prison for her involvement in the assassination.

A.2.27 National Liberation Front (FLN)

Boudaoud, Omar. ***Du PPA au FLN: Memoires d'un Combattant.*** **Casbah, 2007.**
Omar Boudaoud, a member of the FLN Committee during Algeria's war of independence and head of the FLN division in France, focuses his memoir tightly on his experiences during the war against France. Boudaoud describes both his actions in France, where the group fought other Algerian factions, and the internal evolution of the FLN structure, particularly between 1956 and 1962.

El-Ghoul, Slimane. ***Slimane El-Ghoul: Memoires, Temoignages, Situations.*** **Editions dar el gharb, 2005.**
This is the memoir of a former captain of the FLN in the mountainous Ouarsenis region during the Algerian war of independence. El-Ghoul mostly recounts operations against the French forces on the mountains of Ouarsenis, but provides little organizational detail.

Louanchi, Anne-Marie. ***Salah Louanchi: Parcours d'un militant algerien.*** **Editions Dahlab, 1999.**
The wife of Salah Louanchi who was in charge of the Algerian scouts and later head of the FLN division in France, describes the politics of the Algerian independence movement. There is a broad coverage of the internal divisions within the PPA and the FLN, but little in terms of the details of armed operations. The memoir does provide very useful details on leadership fights on the militant side.

Zamoum, Ali. ***Le Pays des Hommes Libres: Memoires d'un Combattant Algerien (1940–1962).*** **Pensee sauvage, 1998.**
Ali Zamoum, a member of the PPA/MTLD, recounts his participation in clandestine activities in Kabylie and how he is captured by the French. The majority of the book consists of the descriptions of his life in various Algerian and French prisons, although in the first part there are descriptions of clandestine operations.

A.2.28 National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)

Grivas, Giorgios. ***Memoirs of General Grivas.*** **London: Longmans, 1964.**
General Grivas, leader of the EOKA Cypriot nationalist militant group, details organizing the group's sabotage and execution teams, and provides significant

detail on sabotage operations and assassinations against British forces and civilians, as well as Cypriots suspected of being informants. He also discusses significant disagreement between military and civilian leaders of the Cypriot liberation movement, especially when he wanted to reject any alliance with Britain and the United States in the runup to the December 1959 ceasefire.

A.2.29 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Al-Hout, Shafiq. *My Life in the PLO.* London, New York: Pluto Press, 2011.
Al-Hout, leader of the left-wing Palestine Liberation Front, provides an insider's take on the PLO, in which he was a leading figure. He details decision-making processes and criticizes many decisions made within the organization. A bit self-congratulatory at times, the book offers a good deal of information about inter-factional competition within the PLO.

A.2.30 Party of Socialist Revolutionaries

Savinkov, Boris. *Memoirs of a Terrorist.* New York: A. & C. Boni, 1931.
Savinkov offers his memoir of his time in the left-wing Party of Social Revolutionaries (PSR) in Russia from 1902 to 1909, where he was the second-in-command of the party's Terrorist Brigade, a committee that worked on assassinating government officials. He recounts planning and carrying out operations to assassinate officials and details many instances of conflict between cells and disagreement on tactics, such as who should be targeted and whether or not to go forward with operations when planning went awry.

A.2.31 People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

Kua, Kufa. *The Revolution in Angola.* Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.
This is an account of Kufa's experience serving as a guerrilla fighter with the MPLA fighting against the Portuguese in Angola. Kufa participated in many ambushes against the Portuguese and is thus able to provide much insight on the guerrilla tactics employed by MPLA fighters. Kufa was eventually promoted

to *chefe do grupo* (leader of a small unit) and was charged with carrying out ambushes on Portuguese patrols. Kufa only documents successful ambushes, although he does highlight how on one occasion most of his men retreated after the Portuguese fired bazookas at their position.

Malasa Luis, Lucas. *The Revolution in Angola.* Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.
Luis describes life growing up under Portuguese rule in Angola and his role in the MPLA, the guerrilla group that fought against the Portuguese in the Angolan War of Independence. He briefly recounts his role in the MPLA as a village chairman tasked with organizing villagers to supply food for MPLA guerrillas and later helped reconstruct the base camp that had been destroyed by the Portuguese. Luis offers insight into the ways in which the MPLA organized itself politically and elicited support from the local population, though there is no discussion of specific attacks carried out by the group.

Paulo, Candonga. *The Revolution in Angola.* Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.
Candonga recounts his experience as a guerrilla fighter in the MPLA. He first served as a translator explaining MPLA motives to villagers in order to elicit their support. In the book he describes a number of ambushes he was a part of and discusses the tactics employed. Candonga's account not only provides details of specific attacks but also stresses the premium that the group placed on the "soft" methods used to generate support for the MPLA among the local population, such as political argumentation and obtaining a village's consent before executing villagers convicted as traitors.

Pinto, Rui de. *The Making of a Middle Cadre: The Story of Rui de Pinto.* Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1934.
This memoir describes Pinto's journey from his petit-bourgeoisie lifestyle to his time serving as a leader in the MPLA fighting for Angolan independence. Fed up with Portuguese society, Pinto decides to escape to Morocco. While escaping by rowboat, Pinto was caught and accused of being a communist. During his time in prison, Pinto began to view the Portuguese state as his enemy and upon his release escaped to France, where he made contact with the MPLA, ultimately serving as his unit's Political Comisar. Pinto recounts the operations he took part in as a guerrilla fighter as well as his later role in the Department of Information and Propaganda (DIP) creating propaganda materials and communicating the MPLA cause to foreign governments. He stresses the strong sense of discipline and commitment displayed by MPLA members.

A.2.32 Polish Underground

Korbonski, Stefan. *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State.* Funk & Wagnalls, 1968.
This is the memoir of Stefan Korbonski, who served as a leader in the Polish underground during World War II. He was appointed the movement's Chief of Civil Resistance and would later become its Government Plenipotentiary during the underground's final days. Korbonski did not participate in military operations but rather spent much of his time establishing communications with the Polish Government-in-Exile while updating them on the movement's activities. From his vantage point at the movement's highest level of leadership, Korbonski offers much insight into how the movement organized itself and about the underground court system, which sentenced traitors and drafted rules for all Poles to observe during the German occupation, such as boycotts of German goods. Korbonski is sincere in his attempt to also highlight the darker sides of the movement and documents the rivalries that existed between the civilian and military leaders as well as instances of betrayals.

A.2.33 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Khaled, Leila, and George Hajjar. *My People Shall Live: Autobiography of a Revolutionary.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973.
Khaled offers her memoir as one of the most well-known revolutionaries of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). She participated in the 1969 TWA hijacking and a failed El Al hijacking during Black September in 1970, and was elected to the PFLP's central committee. Much of the book is devoted to Khaled's leftist and nationalist beliefs as she criticizes Israel, the West, and non-revolutionary Arabs.

A.2.34 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

Adams, Gerry. *Before the Dawn.* Dublin: Brandon Books, 2001.
Adams, the unrepentant former PIRA leader, recounts his time in the group prior to becoming president of its political wing Sinn Fein. Adams recalls how the 1969 riots in Northern Ireland turned him on to IRA activism at age twenty, and describes his life on the run and in prison. Throughout, Adams is careful to downplay his personal role in PIRA operations, focusing instead on the group's history and his own activities for Sinn Fein. The result is a book that serves mostly as a political document, with few operational details.

Bradley, Gerry, and Feener, Brian. *The Insider: Gerry Bradley's Life in the IRA.* Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2009.
Gerry Bradley, an unrepentant PIRA operative from 1970 to 1994, co-wrote this very detailed account of his time in the PIRA, with a prominent reporter. There are many interesting details on internal conflicts and leadership struggles as well as a nice depiction of how Bradley carried out his day-to-day responsibilities.

Breen, Dan. *My Fight for Irish Freedom.* Dublin: Anvil Books, 1989.
Breen, a leader of the Anglo-Irish War who organized volunteers after the failed 1916 Irish revolt, recounts his time as a guerrilla fighting to drive the British out of Ireland between 1916 and 1922. Breen details his involvement in the ambush and shooting of Royal Irish Constabulary officers in 1919, which sparked the Anglo-Irish War. Breen recounts life underground after the ambush and his memoir includes accounts of other leaders from that time. He does not describe much in the way of efforts to control operatives. Breen nicely describes the ground up decision making that led to the formation of the IRA's "Flying Columns."

Collins, Eamon. *Killing Rage.* London: Granta Books, 1997.
With the British journalist Mick McGovern, Eamon Collins recounts his actions and motivations in the Provisional IRA. Collins details planning and helping to execute killings as well as his own growing doubts about the group's violence, politics, and other members. He recounts his arrest and his entry into the supergrass program as an informant to avoid prosecution.

Gilmour, Raymond. *Dead Ground.* London: Little Brown, 1988.
Gilmour recounts his time as a paid informant working for British security forces while volunteering with the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and the Provisional IRA. He was then recruited by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as an informant before joining the INLA and participating in operations for two years. He later switched to the PIRA, where he joined one of the Derry "active service units" and was sent to a secret training camp. Mostly as a getaway driver in stolen cars, he was involved in carrying out (and foiling) IRA shooting attacks on police officers.

MacStiofain, Sean. *Memoirs of a Revolutionary.* London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975.
MacStiofain recounts his role in founding the Provisional IRA and leading the group from 1969 to 1972, when he was arrested in the wake of Bloody Friday. He details the growth of the PIRA and conflict among its leaders, as well as disagreements between individual cells and the leadership in Dublin. MacStiofain provides very good detail on the PIRA's split from the Official IRA. He also details administrative difficulties such as the extensive record-keeping

burden on leaders as well as the first secret negotiations between the PIRA and the British government during the 1972 ceasefire.

McGartland, Martin. *Fifty Dead Men Walking.* London: Blake, 1997.
McGartland offers his memoir as a highly successful informant for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) within the PIRA. McGartland emphasizes how he would tip off the British government to sabotage operations. He also recounts discipline and conflict within the PIRA, as well as disagreements over the use of the punishment squads. McGartland's account is vividly written, and is notable for portraying positive and negative sides of both the British and the PIRA.

McGuire, Eamon. *Enemy of the Empire: Life as an International Undercover IRA Activist.* Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2006.
McGuire recounts his role as technical expert for the IRA during the 1970s and '80s. When America sought to extradite him for his illegal arms smuggling, McGuire fled to Mozambique but was eventually apprehended by American agents, spent a number of years in American prisons, and was eventually released to return home to Ireland. Most of McGuire's account is a travelog detailing the various places where he lived, and there is no discussion of specific operations carried out by the IRA or its organizational structure.

McGuire, Maria. *To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA.* London: Macmillan, 1973.
McGuire gives an account of her time working for the Provisional IRA in 1971–72, before leaving after Bloody Sunday. McGuire provides excellent detail on many high-level disputes and maneuvering between leaders for control, but provides little insight into principal-agent issues.

Noonan, John. *What Do I Do Now?* Self-published by John Noonan, 2005.
Noonan, a PIRA volunteer from the South, self-published this memoir on his time in the IRA and Sinn Fein. He recounts planning attacks on the police and includes some personal rants against individuals. Much of Noonan's account is dedicated to his interrogation and time in prison, including divisions among the IRA prisoners and conflicts with the guards. The book also covers Noonan's time as a community organizer after his release, his subsequent entry into politics, and his local activism for the Concerned Parents Against Drugs.

O'Callaghan, Sean. *The Informer.* London: Bantam Press, 1998.
O'Callaghan describes his time as a Provisional IRA operative and informant for the Irish police. He describes his shooting of an RUC man and his role in the killings of an off-duty policewoman, which led to remorse that combined with

dislike and distrust of the IRA and Sinn Fein leadership. He describes conflicts between PIRA leaders while sabotaging IRA operations and contributing to dozens of arrests.

A.2.35 Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ)

De Vault, Carole. *Confessions of an Ex-Terrorist.* Toronto: Fleet Publishers, 1982.
De Vault focuses on her time as an informer for the Montreal Police, providing them with information on the FLQ, a violent far-left Quebecois nationalist organization. She supported the FLQ's denunciation of capitalism and its solidarity with the working class, though she opposed the group's violent tactics. De Vault describes the methods the FLQ used to distribute communiques and details the levels of leadership in the Front National (FN), a successor organization to the FLQ that de Vault was able to penetrate.

Vallieres, Pierre. *White Niggers of America.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
Vallieres, the leader of the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ), writes an autobiography that functions mainly as an FLQ manifesto, but he does not detail his actions once in the group. Instead, he develops the parallel between Quebec's working-class French Canadians and black Americans under slavery, arguing that they are exploited as second-class citizens. There is little detail on the FLQ as a terrorist organization.

A.2.36 Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhoff Gang)

Schiller, Margrit. *Remembering the Armed Struggle: Life in Baader-Meinhof.* London: Zidane, 2008.
Schiller describes her short involvement in the Red Army Faction. She joined and was arrested in 1971, after the first main operations in 1970 and before the next wave of the May Offensive in 1972. With Baader and Meinhof in jail after the 1970 operations, she was involved in trying to reorganize the group, and her description of that period highlights the group's fecklessness as they debate what to do but lack the skills and resources to actually conduct operations. The last half of the book addresses her time in prison and provides a history of Germany's crackdown on left-wing militants.

A.2.37 Red Brigades

Giorgio. *Memoirs of an Italian Terrorist.* New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003.
An unrepentant Giorgo describes his time as a member of a left-wing terrorist cell during 1970s Italy's "Years of Lead." He recounts his path from thefts, demonstrations, and violent clashes with the police to terrorism. Giorgio recalls choosing assassination targets and the day-to-day grind involved in the guerrilla campaigns. The author, however, does not detail the specifics of the operations carried out or his own ideology; rather, his story is overwhelmingly centered on the loneliness and difficulty of living underground.

Peci, Patrizio. *Io L'infame (Trans: I, The Contemptible One).* Milano: Knopf, 1983.
Peci, a former Red Brigades (RB) member in Italy and a leader of the group's Turin column, recounts his time in the group and as the first of the *pentiti* (repentant RB members who provided information on their former compatriots), where his collaboration with the authorities led to the arrests of many other RB members. He recalls his own entry into the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary terrorist group in 1977 in Turin after spending years reading left-wing newspapers and eventually founding PAIL (Proletari Armati in Lotta).

A.2.38 Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP)

Bobrovskaya, Cecilia. *Twenty Years in Underground Russia. Memoirs of a Rank-and-File Bolshevik.* Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1934.
Cecilia Bobrovskaya recounts her experience in the Bolshevik movement serving as a revolutionary leader in Warsaw, Baku, Moscow, and a number of other cities. Over time, Bobrovskaya rose in the ranks of the movement, organized workers in various cities, and spearheaded efforts to print and distribute illegal pamphlets espousing anti-autocratic sentiments. Although Bobrovskaya herself did not participate in violent operations, she does provide insight into the organizational challenges that the Bolshevik movement faced.

Broido, Eva. *Memoirs of a Revolutionary.* London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Eva Broido recounts her time serving in the underground revolutionary movement in Russia during the early 1900s. She is arrested for operating a secret printing press for socialist groups in St. Petersburg. Broido was heavily involved

with propaganda work for the Mensheviks in Baku and later served as the secretary-general of the Menshevik Central Committee. With the exception of a brief standoff with Russian soldiers in Siberia, Broido does not document taking part in any violent actions.

A.2.39 Sandinista National Liberation Front

Cabezas, Omar. ***Fire from the Mountain: The Making of a Sandinista.*** **New York: Crown, 1985.**
Cabezas, a major figure in the Sandinista campaign against Nicaragua's Somoza dynasty during the 1970s, offers a personal account of the guerrilla war. He provides significant details on formative events in his personal life and political evolution, as well as some important actions by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). He provides detailed accounts of training, being sent to the mountains to be tested, and the clear military hierarchy that emerged as the organization grew. The focus on Cabezas's personal life and idealism of the revolutionary movement leaves the book relatively incomplete as a history of the movement and Somoza regime, which was successfully overthrown in 1979.

A.2.40 Stern Gang (Lehi)

Avner. ***Memoirs of an Assassin.*** **London: A. Blond, 1959.**
A member of the militant Zionist Stern Gang, Avner describes life in the group, carrying out attacks to spur the British to leave Palestine. Avner details specific attacks by the Stern Gang, as well as their motivations and daily interactions. The translator's preface notes similarities and differences between Avner's account and those of contemporaneous press accounts, ultimately judging Avner to be a generally reliable source, despite some possible exaggerations. The last part of the book addresses the author's return to an ordinary life following his involvement in terrorism.

Cohen, Guelah. ***Woman of Violence: Memoirs of a Young Terrorist, 1943–1948.*** **New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.**
Geulah Cohen, the underground radio voice of the Stern Gang, describes her decision to join the group at the age of seventeen, after it split from the Irgun (Etzel) over the Lehi's desire to continue fighting against the British in Palestine despite the war against the Nazis. Cohen details her life in the Lehi and on the run, living underground in safe houses as they carried out operations. Cohen's account provides detailed anecdotes of operations, other members, and their life underground.

A.2.41 Ulster Defense Association (UDA)

Adair, Johnny. *Mad Dog.* London: John Blake Publishing, 2009.
Adair, an Ulster paramilitary leader, recounts his life and involvement in crime, street gangs, and "C Company" of the UDA. Accused of dozens of murders, Adair offers candid details about his involvement in attacks, deaths, and interrogations. He is honest about his involvement, while occasionally remorseful, and provides valuable perspective on leadership conflicts in the UDA after the Good Friday Accords.

Stone, Michael. *None Shall Divide Us.* Wales: John Blake Publishing, 2003.
Stone was a long-time member of the loyalist Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and conducted the 1988 Milltown attack on a high-profile IRA funeral. He provides significant detail on the dynamics of the Loyalist movement, including feuds and killings within the group and their relations with the RUC, British Army, and the PIRA. He also details killings and failed operations, although he fails to mention several important events. Sent to prison after the Milltown attack, Stone also recounts his time there. Throughout, Stone portrays himself and his actions in a positive light, but also tries to leave the reader with the idea that he is a remorseful, changed man.

A.2.42 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

Hamilton, David. *A Cause Worth Living For: My Journey Out of Terrorism.* Godalming: Highland Books, 1997.
Repentant former Loyalist fighter David Hamilton wrote this short book after his release from prison in 1983. Hamilton reports an attempt on his life when he first tried to join a Loyalist paramilitary unit because he was suspected of being a government agent. He eventually manages to join the UVF and provides a fairly detailed description of his involvement in robberies to raise money for the group. Most of the focus, though, is on his time in prison and his conversion to evangelical Christianity.

A.2.43 The Weather Underground Organization

Alpert, Jane. *Growing Up Underground.* New York: Morrow, 1981.
Alpert recounts carrying out bombing attacks in New York City as part of the Weather Underground before going into hiding. She adopted the radical views

of Sam Melville and joined him in a spree of bombing attacks in 1969. After forfeiting bail following her arrest and going underground, she published this memoir to clarify her motives and look back on what drove her to radicalization and violence.

Ayers, Bill. *Fugitive Days. New York*: Penguin, 2003.
Ayers offers a rather selective memoir as a founding member of the left-wing militant Weather Underground in the 1960s and '70s. He recounts stealing explosives, living underground in leftist safe houses, and some of the group's bombing activities (including the accidental explosion that killed his girlfriend and four other Weathermen members in 1970). When Ayers does recount riots and bombings, he eschews responsibility, notes that their bombs never hurt others, and is evasive on potentially incriminating information related to the group's choice of targets. Ayers also discusses splits within the group over the use of violence and defends his own motives and actions.

Grathwohl, Larry. *Bringing Down America.* New York: Arlington House, 1976.
Grathwohl, the only FBI informant to infiltrate the Weather Underground Organization in the late 1960s, recounts his time with this left-wing American revolutionary group. In his role carrying orders from the Central Committee to operating units, Grathwohl was able to provide details of the group's plans for bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings, and sabotaged several operations. He also describes how the group centralized decision making, debated strategy, and punished members.

Rudd, Mark. *Underground: My Life with SDS and the Weathermen.* New York: HarperCollins, 2009.
Rudd describes his activities in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and as a leader of the Weather Underground, including his role in organizing the Days of Rage in Chicago, a series of riots instigated by the Weathermen that led to hundreds of injuries and arrests. Rudd documents how he helped move his faction of the SDS underground, transforming it into the Weather Underground Organization (WUO), his reaction to a bomb-making accident in which three of its members were killed, and his eventual decision to leave the organization. Rudd's account provides an insider's perspective on the group's culture. He does not apologize for his radical leftist views but emphasizes that his story is antiheroic and strewn with disastrous mistakes.

Stern, Susan. *With the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman.* New York: Doubleday, 1975.
Stern writes her memoir of life in the anti-Vietnam Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and then in Weathermen in Seattle after it split from the SDS

in 1969. She candidly describes life in the left-wing counterculture of late-1960s America, the attraction to joining such groups, and her own self-destructive tendencies. Stern also recounts the divisive social dynamics in the group and details the group's efforts to recruit and plan for riots and tactical disagreements.

Wilkerson, Cathy. *Flying Close to the Sun.* New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007.
Wilkerson recounts her role as a leader in the radical leftist Weathermen organization during the 1960s and '70s. She documents the beginning of her journey from a peaceful activist to one who joined the Weathermen leadership collective in New York and allowed it to use her family's townhouse to prepare a bomb that ultimately killed three. Wilkerson also describes fire-bomb attacks, the cult-like behavior practiced by Weathermen collectives, and the FBI's active efforts to infiltrate the group. Wilkerson contends that the organization did play a positive role in serving as a powerful voice of outrage that spoke for thousands of angry young people.

A.2.44 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

Moyo, Temba. *The Organizer: The Story of Temba Moyo.* Richmond, B.C., Canada: LSM Press, 1974.
Moyo recounts his experience fighting in the Zimbabwe African's People's Union (ZAPU), a group dedicated to achieving independence from white settler rule in Zimbabwe. After training in the USSR, he participated in numerous sabotage and guerrilla operations against the settler regime. Moyo provides an honest portrayal of ZAPU and does not just highlight the group's successes, but also emphasizes how political differences within the ZAPU leadership spread to rank-and-file members and eventually led to a complete paralysis of the organization.

APPENDIX B

Methodological Appendix

This appendix contains a brief note on case selection and sources for the academic reader.

B.1 CASE SELECTION

The broad empirical strategy of this book entailed two stages. I first developed a theory of terrorist organizations using two sources of data to motivate the analysis: a broad examination of the historical evidence on terrorism and an in-depth study of a non-random sample of captured documents from al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups. I then used a series of detailed historical case studies to provide evidence that the processes I discuss in the theoretical sections are indeed explaining outcomes. There are three very general concerns with such an approach.

First, can the case studies actually provide evidence to falsify the theory? As a general rule, the answer to this question is "yes" so long as either: (a) the cases used in validating the theory were not considered when constructing the theory; or (b) the cases use new, independent evidence from that examined at the inductive stage. As my initial research entailed looking at the widest possible sample of terrorist groups, I necessarily follow the latter approach. Each case study uses a wide set of sources not consulted while developing the core theory. So, while this is not the kind of out-of-sample test one might ideally conduct, the concordance between theory and what we see in the world is strikingly strong.

Second, do the cases hold constant consequential independent variables? Suppose, for example, that background cultural factors not explicitly considered in the theory are an important determinant of organizational form. If that were the case, then choosing cases which controlled for the variables important to the theory but did not account for cultural factors, would lead to biased findings, i.e., the findings might be due to those cultural factors and not due to the variables posited in the theory.[1] By focusing on conflicts where there is

[1] In statistical work this problem is typically referred to as omitted variable bias.

variation between combatant organizations in one settings, we can minimize the potential for such omitted variables. In each case I therefore use the variation between groups fighting in the same time period and cultural setting to explicitly test comparative hypotheses. This approach minimizes the problem of omitted variable bias as the combatant organizations being compared draw recruits from the same larger culture and face the same state enemy. Such analysis cannot, however, completely eliminate the problem of omitted variable bias as the groups being compared in all three cases recruit from different sub-populations and face somewhat different patterns of government counterterrorism.

Third, do the cases suffer from potential selection bias because I chose cases that support favored hypotheses? To minimize such concerns I used two criteria in choosing the set of potential cases for this study. First, I looked for cases in which there was a consensus in the expert literature that groups within the conflict varied on one of the key independent variables in the theory. For example, in the Palestine case there is a consensus that Hamas suffers less preference divergence than Fatah, but there is no strong consensus on whether Hamas seeks to be more or less discriminate in its use of violence than Fatah. Second, I looked for cases in which there was sufficient data that I could both identify core organizational processes and find a large number of sources not consulted in my initial inductive work. This second requirement substantially narrows the set of cases as few scholars write about groups that fail quickly or that do not attack Western targets.[2]

From this larger set of potential cases, I then chose three specific cases to provide variance along two potentially important dimensions, group size and ideological motivation. Size might matter in that all kinds of organizational problems are harder to solve in larger groups. We should thus be attuned to the possibility that there is a discontinuous relationship between group size and the strength of the relationship between my independent variables and organizational outcomes. To enable me to identify if the relationships I describe hold across group sizes, I chose cases involving groups which range from tiny elitist factions such as *Narodnya Volya*, whose core combatant organization never had more than thirty operatives at any one time,[3] to small armed bands such

[2]This pattern of scholarship introduces an inescapable selection bias in the study of terrorism. Theories of terrorism are, to a large extent, really theories about long-lived groups which attack Western targets. A useful avenue for future research is to ameliorate this bias by collecting brief organizational histories on a wide variety of obscure, short-lived groups. A substantial advances on this score is Martin C. Libicki and Seth G. Jones, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida* (RAND Corporation, 2008). The data developed for that study have formed the basis for some nice quantitative empirical work; see David C. Carter, "A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups," *International Organization* 66 (2012): 129–151.
[3]Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populsim: the Narodnaya Volya, 1879–83," 48–49.

as the Provisional IRA which had a small cadre of full-time activists and 500 to 1,500 part-time members depending on the period,[4] to mid-size militias such as Hamas which had 200–250 operatives in its military wings operating in the Occupied Territories in mid-2001 and perhaps a thousand more personnel in its social and political wings,[5] to large political parties, such as the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party which had approximately 40,000 operatives in 1905.[6] As we will see, the predicted patterns hold across each of these groups, suggesting there is no discontinuity.

Ideology clearly matters for how groups organize, though perhaps not for the reasons traditionally identified. The core concerns from a case selection perspective are that certain ideologies may create pressures to organize in particular ways or may confer advantages which mean the dynamics driving my theory do not explain organizational outcomes in some groups. To address these concerns, I chose cases with groups that span the ideological spectrum. The three comparative case studies include social revolutionary organizations such as the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, secular separatists such as the Provisional IRA and Fatah, secular reactionaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Association, and religious separatists such as Hamas. The case study of al-Qa'ida in Iraq deals with a religiously motivated revolutionary organization, while the analysis of terrorist autobiographies spans all types of groups. Across these different groups we will find support for my approach, implying we can be relatively confident that organizational choices are driven by those elements of ideology I argue should matter: the level of care required in target choices and the level of uncertainty about which targets should be attacked.

B.2 SOURCES

Finally, a short note on sources. Throughout this book I refer to documents captured from al-Qa'ida and other groups. These documents were originally contained in the United States Department of Defense's Harmony Database. The database contains more than 1 million documents captured during operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Roughly a quarter of these documents have been fully translated. The documents run the gamut from strategic policy studies, to accounting reports, to membership lists, to technical training

[4]CAIN Organizational Profiles, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ.
[5]Stork, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians*, 65. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49.
[6]Perrie, "The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Before 1917," 224–225.

manuals, to draft ideological screeds, to letters between family members. From 2005 to 2008, and again in 2012, I collaborated with a team at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy to identify, analyze, and release documents from the database which shed light on al-Qa'ida's organization and operations. We produced a series of reports, and my contributions and our discussions in preparing them formed, in many ways, the germ of this book.[7]

As with any archival research, the team tried to ensure that the documents we used were representative of the broader data. The key difference in this case is that the broader archive, so to speak, is not available to the public. Fortunately, the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University has begun to make more of these records public and can assist researchers in using these data.[8] Originals and translations of the documents I refer to, as well as many others, are available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp. Documents from the Harmony database are referenced by their document number.

[7]Felter and al., *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*. Shapiro and Watts, *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*. Felter et al., *Bombers, Bankers, and Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq*.
[8]http://www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm?type=section&secid=101&pageid=4.

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